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Engels @ 200: An Introduction
Frank Jacob
I would always say »Engels and Marx.« The big rabbit was … Engels.1
Paul Frölich (1884 – 1953),2 a founding member of the German Com-
munist Party, recognized the importance of Friedrich Engels in this 
quote, which he sent as a remark related to a manuscript3 by the 
Ukrainian Marxist Roman Rosdolsky (1898 – 1967).4 In contrast to 
Frölich’s view, however, Engels continued to be seen as the second 
fiddle5 and is often neglected with regard to his role and influence 
on the course of the history in general and Marxism in particular. 
Engels, as German historian Jürgen Herres put it, was a »republi-
1 Letter by Paul Frölich to Roman Rosdolsky, Kew Gardens, New York, October 
26, 1948, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, Rosdolsky Papers 
6, Correspondence with Paul and Rosi Frölich 1948 to 1950, 3. I would like to 
thank Riccardo Altieri for pointing me towards this source.
2 Riccardo Altieri, »Paul Frölich, American Exile, and Communist Discourse 
about the Russian Revolution,« American Communist History 17, no. 2 (2018): 
S. 220 – 231.
3 The manuscript was eventually not published before both, Frölich and Rosdolsky, 
were already dead. Roman Rosdolsky, Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Marxschen 
Kapital (Frankfurt am Main / Vienna, 1968). 
4 Janusz Radziejowski, »Roman Rosdolsky: Man, Activist and Scholar,« Science & 
Society 42, no. 2 (1978): 198 – 210.
5 Georges Labica, »Friedrich Engels — Wissenschaftler und Revolutionär,« in 
Zwischen Utopie und Kritik: Friedrich Engels — ein »Klassiker« nach 100 Jahren, 
eds. Theodor Bergmann, Mario Keßler, Joost Kircz and Gert Schäfer (Hamburg: 
VSA, 1996), 18. Engels called himself a »second violine« in a letter to Johann 
Philipp Becker, October 15, 1884, in: Marx-Engels-Werke (Berlin: Dietz, 1956-, 
henceforth MEW), 36: 218.
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can communist and a European social critic.«6 Thomas Kuczynski 
in addition called him a »young genius of social science.«7 A quarter 
century after his death, an article in Der Wahre Jacob claimed Engels 
to be the »creator of eternal intellectual works« and, at the same 
time, a »pioneer of German and international socialism.«8 Engels 
indeed was an intellectual giant, whose personality was so colorful 
and multifaceted that it is not easy to describe it accurately.9 Regard-
less of this fact, the number of biographies and works about Engels 
never became legion, as it did in the case of his friend Karl Marx 
(1818 – 1883).10 At the same time, however, Engels’s work was much 
more diverse than the writings of Marx.11 He was, to name just one 
example here, not only a philosopher and a social scientist, but also 
a military historian, one who realized the importance of the techno-
6 Jürgen Herres, »Friedrich Engels: Republikanischer Kommunist und eu-
ropäischer Gesellschaftskritiker,« in Friedrich Engels: Ein Gespenst geht um in 
Europa — Begleitband zur Engelsausstellung 2020, ed. Lars Bluma (Wuppertal: 
Historisches Zentrum Wuppertal, 2020), 16 – 29.
7 Thomas Kuczynski, »Die zweite Violine,« in »Die Natur ist die Probe auf die 
Dialektik«: Friedrich Engels kennenlernen, eds. Elmar Altvater et al. (Hamburg: 
VSA Verlag, 2020), 27.
8 A. Conrady, »Friedrich Engels,« Beilage zum Wahren Jacob, No. 887, July 30, 
1920: 10027.
9 Theodor Bergmann, Mario Keßler, Joost Kircz and Gert Schäfer, »Einleitung,« 
in Zwischen Utopie und Kritik: Friedrich Engels — ein »Klassiker« nach 100 Jahren, 
eds. Theodor Bergmann, Mario Keßler, Joost Kircz and Gert Schäfer (Hamburg: 
VSA, 1996), 9; Michael Krätke, »Friedrich Engels, der erste Marxist,« in Friedrich 
Engels oder: Wie ein »Cotton-Lord« den Marxismus erfand, ed. Michael Krätke 
(Berlin: Dietz, 2020), 58.
10 Some important biographies are Gustav Mayer, Friedrich Engels: Eine Biographie, 
2 vols. (Berlin: Springer, 1920 – 1933); Hans Peter Bleuel, Friedrich Engels: Bürger 
und Revolutionär (Bern / Munich: Scherz, 1981); Tristram Hunt, Friedrich Engels: 
Der Mann, der den Marxismus erfand, transl. by Klaus-Dieter Schmidt, third 
edition (Berlin: List, 2020). 
11 Bergmann, et al. »Einleitung,« 11; Conrady, »Friedrich Engels,« 10027 – 10028; 
Marcel van der Linden, »Friedrich Engels’s Herkunft und Lebensleistung: Eine 
biografische Skizze,« in »Die Natur ist die Probe auf die Dialektik«: Friedrich 
Engels kennenlernen, eds. Elmar Altvater et al. (Hamburg: VSA Verlag, 2020), 19.
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logical development and identified the industrial-military context.12 
Engels was consequently called a »pioneer of the revolutionary-so-
cialist military theory«13 as well, and one of his writings, »Po and 
Rhine« (1859),14 was initially considered to have been written by a 
member of the Prussian General Staff.15 What already becomes clear 
from this short introduction here is that there is more to Engels than 
just his friendship with Marx that makes him an important intellec-
tual of the 19th century. Since he intellectually represented »a ma-
terialism of conditions and complex mediation, which determined 
the problems of scientific research for him,«16 is it not surprising that 
Engels got interested in other scientific fields during his life as well? 
While diving into all kinds of knowledge, he developed what Epifa-
nio San Juan, Jr. called a »genius that was organized strategically.« 
Engels’s intelligence »aimed for practice« and therefore influenced 
all his research.17 It was, at the same time, very much influenced by 
his personal life, which is essential to understanding how the young 
Engels turned into a radical communist.
The German historian Gustav Mayer (1871 – 1948), in his »ground-
breaking work«18 on Engels’s life, emphasized that no biography of 
any other important leaders of the political workers‹ movement ini-
tially pointed so little to such a historical course.19 Born on 28 No-
vember 1820 in Barmen, nowadays part of Wuppertal, Engels was 
the eldest son of a cotton manufacturer by the same name and grew 
up in »a family of culture« in which »nothing pointed to his later 
12 Bergmann, et al. »Einleitung,« 11.
13 van der Linden, »Friedrich Engels’s Herkunft,« 17.
14 MEW 13 : 225 – 268. Online at http://www.mlwerke.de/me/me13/me13_225.htm. 
Accessed August 20, 2020.
15 Kuczynski, »Die zweite Violine,« 30.
16 Epifanio San Juan, Jr., »Was wir aus Engels’s revolutionärer Ästhetik lernen kön-
nen,« in Zwischen Utopie und Kritik: Friedrich Engels — ein »Klassiker« nach 100 
Jahren, eds. Theodor Bergmann, Mario Keßler, Joost Kircz and Gert Schäfer 
(Hamburg: VSA, 1996), 69.
17 Ibid., 70.
18 Hunt, Friedrich Engels, 13.
19 Mayer, Friedrich Engels, 4.
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revolutionary interest.«20 His early years were determined by »indus-
try, trade, bourgeois duties, and loyalty to the family,«21 and while 
Engels did not face any sorrows and was surrounded by »loving par-
ents [and] indulgent grandparents,«22 the boy would eventually suffer 
from »the pressure of religious, political, and social conventions.«23 In 
1837, Engels had to leave school, as his father wanted him to become 
part of the family business, especially since the latter had decided 
to expand and invest in a joint venture with the Ermen brothers‹ 
factory in Manchester.24 Following this decision, the young Engels’s 
life changed, and from then onwards, he had to subordinate his own 
interests to the family business.25 
After a year in the Barmen factory and a first trip to England with 
his father in the summer of 1838, Engels was sent to Bremen, where he 
was supposed to continue his business education in a company where 
he oversaw exports and was responsible for international correspon-
dence. Regardless of the fact that he had to work in a field he very 
much disliked, Engels, in contrast to Marx, was never melancholic or 
discouraged.26 He was rather »a radical romantic damned to a life in a 
trading post.«27 After his time in Bremen, Engels served as a volunteer 
in the Prussian Guard Artillery Brigade in Berlin.28 While officially 
serving in the military, the young intellectual used his time in the 
metropolis to intensify his studies and visited lectures at the univer-
20 Hunt, Friedrich Engels, 19.
21 Ibid., 22.
22 Ibid., 19.
23 Narihiko Ito, »Realismus und Utopismus,« in Zwischen Utopie und Kritik: Fried-
rich Engels — ein »Klassiker« nach 100 Jahren, eds. Theodor Bergmann, Mario 
Keßler, Joost Kircz and Gert Schäfer (Hamburg: VSA, 1996), 23. On Engels’s 
early years in Wuppertal see Reiner Rhefus, Friedrich Engels im Wuppertal: Auf 
den Spuren des Denkers, Machers und Revolutionärs im »deutschen Manchester« 
(Hamburg: VSA, 2020).
24 Hunt, Friedrich Engels, 38; van der Linden, »Friedrich Engels’s Herkunft,« 8.
25 Krätke, »Friedrich Engels,« 15.
26 Ibid., 19.
27 Hunt, Friedrich Engels, 47.
28 Ibid., 64; van der Linden, »Friedrich Engels’s Herkunft,« 10. 
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sity, where he got particularly interested in philosophy, especially the 
works of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 – 1831).29 The latter, 
although he had already been dead for a decade, would always remain 
an »authority of the history of science«30 for Engels, who considered 
philosophy to be the root of German communism.
The young intellectual was consequently further radicalized in 
Berlin. In 1842, when he visited the editorial staff of the Rheinische 
Zeitung in Cologne, he met Marx for the first time. However, the 
beginning of their more intense cooperation had not yet developed.31 
Instead, Engels spent time in England again — between Novem-
ber 1842 and August 1844 — where, working as an assistant for the 
management at Ermen & Engels, he began to understand the rules 
of modern capitalism. In his writings, which resemble those of an »el-
egant novelist,«32 especially since Engels wrote much more lightly and 
clearly than Marx,33 he criticized capitalism and its consequences for 
the working class early on. Already in 1839, Engels had anonymously 
published some »Letters from Wuppertal«34 in which he had criticized 
pietism, Calvinism, and authentically described the bad condition 
of the workers in his home region.35 His time in England and his 
relationship with Mary Burns (1821 – 1863), a factory worker, however, 
further radicalized Engels, and when he returned, he was dedicated 
to changing the fate of the working class.36 In 1845 he published his 
first major work, The Condition of the Working Class in England,37 in 
29 Hunt, Friedrich Engels, 66; Ito, »Realismus und Utopismus,« 23.
30 Krätke, »Friedrich Engels,« 38.
31 van der Linden, »Friedrich Engels’s Herkunft,« 11.
32 Hunt, Friedrich Engels, 50.
33 Kuczynski, »Die zweite Violine,« 32.
34 Telegraph für Deutschland, nos. 49, 50, 51, 52, 57 and 59 in March and April 1839. 
Online at https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1839/03/telegraph.htm. 
Accessed Augsut 20, 2020.
35 Hunt, Friedrich Engels, 54; van der Linden, »Friedrich Engels’s Herkunft,« 9.
36 Bergmann, et al. »Einleitung,« 10; van der Linden, »Friedrich Engels’s Herkunft,« 
12.
37 For a more detailed discussion of the work see Regina Roth, »›Die Lage der ar-
beitenden Klasse in England‹ von Engels im Spiegel ihrer Zeit (1845 – 1892),« in 
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which he not only prophetically announced a near revolution38 but 
also provided an early study of empirical social research. The study is 
still considered today to be a »pioneer work«39 in this field and »classic 
of urban sociology.«40
In August 1844, after his time in England, he met Marx again 
for ten days in Paris, where both intensively discussed their views 
and laid the foundation for their following and intensive coopera-
tion.41 In Marx, Engels had finally found somebody who understood 
him and did not have a problem with him being a »private scholar,« 
having previously been criticized by academics and confronted with 
their classist views.42 Both intellectuals would be further influenced 
by historical events. While Engels had predicted a revolution in the 
early 1840s that would happen in accordance with a theoretical mod-
el in relation to the French Revolution of 1789,43 the reality would be 
a disappointment and demand some reflections about revolutionary 
processes as such.44 Engels had been actively involved in the revo-
lution, first as a journalist and then as a barricade fighter, but he 
Friedrich Engels: Ein Gespenst geht um in Europa — Begleitband zur Engelsausstel-
lung 2020, ed. Lars Bluma (Wuppertal: Historisches Zentrum Wuppertal, 2020), 
84 – 99. 
38 Krätke, »Friedrich Engels,« 30.
39 van der Linden, »Friedrich Engels’s Herkunft,« 16.
40 Krätke, »Friedrich Engels,« 32.
41 van der Linden, »Friedrich Engels’s Herkunft,« 13.
42 Krätke, »Friedrich Engels,« 19 and 23. That classism is still a problem in academia 
is discussed in some recent publications: Riccardo Altieri and Bernd Hüttner, 
eds. Klassismus und Wissenschaft. Erfahrungsberichte und Bewältigungsstrategien 
(Marburg: BdWi-Verlag, 2020) and Julia Reuter, Markus Gamper, Christina 
Möller and Frerk Blome, eds. Vom Arbeiterkind zur Professur: Sozialer Aufstieg 
in der Wissenschaft. Autobiographische Notizen und soziobiographische Analysen 
(Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2020).
43 Ito, »Realismus und Utopismus,« 25.
44 For Engels’s evaluation of the Revolution of 1848, see Friedrich Engels, »Das Jahr 
1848 war das Jahr der Enttäuschung, 17.III.[1849],« IISH, Karl Marx / Friedrich 
Engels Papers, ARCH00860, H_8.
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could not change its historical course and had to witness its failure.45 
The experience would, however, influence the further work of Marx 
and Engels, who tried to scientifically prepare another revolution in 
the future while their politics were determined by a »revolutionary 
reservation« (Revolutionsvorbehalt).46 Both consequently conceptual-
ized the process of a revolution of the 19th century in their work, 
and they made it clear that it would be important to have access to 
the full power of a purposeful party and an enlightened mass of the 
people to really secure the success of a future revolution.47 Engels, 
who considered history to be a process without any final or absolute 
truth, emphasized the role of crises in awakening the revolutionary 
potential of a particular time.48 Engels’s and Marx’s reflections about 
revolutions, nevertheless, were consequently products of their own 
experiences of the 1840s and must be considered as such when taken 
into consideration today.49 
What is important to understand is that Engels already realized in 
the 1840s that a revolution was like an inevitable natural event, forced 
into being by pressure from suppressed people who demanded change. 
It could therefore not be made or planned by a small minority — as 
such revolutions would fail like the revolutions of 1848 / 49 — but was 
the expression of a popular demand by the masses.50 The failure of the 
revolution also meant an end for Engels’s dream to leave the business 
world and to help with creating a new, better world.51 Due to his 
45 Kuczynski, »Die zweite Violine,« 28; van der Linden, »Friedrich Engels’s Her-
kunft,« 16.
46 Georg Fülberth, Friedrich Engels (Cologne: PapyRossa, 2018), 68.
47 Ibid., 69.
48 Hunt, Friedrich Engels, 73; Krätke, »Friedrich Engels,« 28.
49 Marjan Britovšek, »Die slawischen Nationalbewegungen und die Perspektiven 
der Revolution,« in Zwischen Utopie und Kritik: Friedrich Engels — ein »Klassiker« 
nach 100 Jahren, eds. Theodor Bergmann, Mario Keßler, Joost Kircz and Gert 
Schäfer (Hamburg: VSA, 1996), 140.
50 Conrady, »Friedrich Engels,« 10028.
51 Kuczynski, »Die zweite Violine,« 28; Detlef Vonde, Auf den Barrikaden: Friedrich 
Engels und die »gescheiterte Revolution« von 1848 / 49 (Wuppertal: Köndgen, 2019), 
7 – 8.
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active role, he was forced into exile, »expatriated by the bourgeois 
revolution.«52 In the following years, Engels tried to better understand 
what had happened in 1848 and therefore studied historical cases as 
well. His work on The Peasant War in Germany (1850)53 was »a small 
but nice attempt to interpret the central European peasant rebellions 
of the 16th century in a materialist way.«54 Regardless of these ap-
proaches and the wish to understand revolutions much better, Engels, 
like Marx as well, was not in favor of so-called revolutionaries by pro-
fession.55 In their works, the two men rather addressed questions of 
their times, which is why German political scientist Georg Fülberth 
correctly called them »operative intellectuals.«56 Regardless of his 
many works, while in exile, Engels also had to work for the company 
of his father, which he could not leave before 1869 due to financial 
necessities; consequently, until then, he had to live a double life as a 
businessman and an intellectual.57 However, between 1870 and 1895, 
he could focus on the latter.58 Regardless of his personal condition, 
Engels worked relentlessly to develop a socialist science, although he 
remained a passionate utopian at the same time.59 He remained a be-
liever in revolution as the only way to achieve the final liberation of 
mankind, and in 1892 assumed that the socialist party would be in 
52 Ibid., 8.
53 Friedrich Engels, »The Peasant War in Germany« (1850). Accessed August 20, 
2020. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1850/peasant-war-germany/
index.htm.
54 van der Linden, »Friedrich Engels’s Herkunft,« 18.
55 Krätke, »Friedrich Engels,« 59.
56 Fülberth, Friedrich Engels, 12.
57 Paul Lafargue, »Persönliche Erinnerungen,« in Friedrich Engels oder: Wie ein 
»Cotton-Lord« den Marxismus erfand, ed. Michael Krätke (Berlin: Dietz, 2020), 
185; van der Linden, »Friedrich Engels’s Herkunft,« 18. Engels had saved suffi-
cient money for his later life, and when he died his fortune still counted for more 
than 30,000 Pounds (approximately more than 4 million Euro today). 
58 Georg Fülberth, »Endlich angekommen: Friedrich Engels’s Londoner Jahre 
1870 – 1895,« in Friedrich Engels: Ein Gespenst geht um in Europa — Begleitband 
zur Engelsausstellung 2020, ed. Lars Bluma (Wuppertal: Historisches Zentrum 
Wuppertal, 2020), 182 – 195.
59 Ito, »Realismus und Utopismus,« 32.
Engels @ 200: An Introduction 15
power in the next decade.60 At the same time, however, he declared a 
year later that this was not the final goal for German socialism, as one 
would rather have to consider the socialists to be revolutionaries who 
were not intending to dictate the future of human society but wanted 
to achieve freedom for the masses so that they could decide this for 
themselves.61
The impact of the political ideas of Friedrich Engels is, at the same 
time, important to understand the development of his friend Karl 
Marx,62 as it was their friendship63 and intellectual cooperation that 
would be responsible for a new interpretation of human history and 
progress alike. The lives and works of the two friends eventually be-
came so interwoven that it is quite challenging to separate them.64 
However, Engels not only supported Marx intellectually, he also sup-
ported the latter and his family financially, and in 1851 even accepted 
fatherhood for the child Marx had had with Helene Demuth, the 
family’s maid, and thereby saved Marx’s marriage.65 With regard to 
their intellectual cooperation,66 Engels played an equally important 
role, as both only seemed to accept each other as critics of their own 
60 Friedrich Engels, »Interview mit dem Korrespondenten der Zeitung L’Éclair am 
1. April 1892,« in Friedrich Engels oder: Wie ein »Cotton-Lord« den Marxismus 
erfand, ed. Michael Krätke (Berlin: Dietz, 2020), 158.
61 Friedrich Engels, »Interview mit dem Korrespondenten der Zeitung Le Figaro 
am 8. Mai 1893,« in Friedrich Engels oder: Wie ein »Cotton-Lord« den Marxismus 
erfand, ed. Michael Krätke (Berlin: Dietz, 2020), 164.
62 Eike Kopf, »Marx ohne Engels — das wäre kaum eine halbe Sache geworden,« 
in »Die Natur ist die Probe auf die Dialektik«: Friedrich Engels kennenlernen, eds. 
Elmar Altvater et al. (Hamburg: VSA Verlag, 2020), 69 – 89.
63 On the friendship of the two men see Jürgen Herres, Marx und Engels: Porträt 
einer intellektuellen Freundschaft (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2018).
64 Lafargue, »Persönliche Erinnerungen,« 187.
65 Kuczynski, »Die zweite Violine,« 29; van der Linden, »Friedrich Engels’s Her-
kunft,« 17.
66 Georg Fülberth, »Wie zwei ein Compagniegeschäft betrieben: Friedrich Engels’s 
Beitrag zum Werk von Karl Marx,« in »Die Natur ist die Probe auf die Dialektik«: 
Friedrich Engels kennenlernen, eds. Elmar Altvater et al. (Hamburg: VSA Verlag, 
2020), 54 – 68.
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works,67 and as German political scientist Michael Krätke empha-
sized, »Both were arrogant, each in his own way, but together they 
could be obnoxious.«68 Regardless of Engels’s intellectual capacity and 
expertise in many different fields,69 which often even surpassed Marx, 
the former would never achieve similar authority.70 In the early 1850s, 
Engels wrote all of their works on military issues and foreign affairs, 
including the English articles Marx would publish under his own 
name in the New York Daily Tribune.71
It is safe to say, to quote Michael Krätke once more, »that there 
would not have been Marxism without Engels,«72 as the latter was the 
first who sought, especially after his friend’s death, to make Marx’s writ-
ings known to a wider public. It was probably the humbleness of En-
gels — who always would refer to himself as the second fiddle, a talent, 
and to Marx as a genius — that made the rise of Marx and his legacy 
possible. The two men might have appeared like an »inseparable duo,«73 
yet Engels, often intentionally, tended to stand in the shadow of his 
friend.74 Regardless of his humbleness, Engels was important for Marx 
in many ways. He, according to Krätke, was a »guide, stimulator, a 
source of ideas, a thought leader and a critic«75 alike and pretty heavily 
influenced the latter’s economic works.76 It was also Engels who actually 
repeatedly insisted that Marx publish his works while providing his 
friend with the necessary time and financial security to do so.77 Engels 
would help Marx, according to the latter’s own statement, at any time 
67 Lafargue, »Persönliche Erinnerungen,« 189.
68 Krätke, »Friedrich Engels,« 13.
69 Lafargue, »Persönliche Erinnerungen,« 191.
70 Ibid., 187 – 188.





76 Conrady, »Friedrich Engels,« 10027; Herres, Marx und Engels, 46; Krätke, 
»Friedrich Engels,« 29.
77 Conrady, »Friedrich Engels,« 10027; Fülberth, Friedrich Engels, 69.
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and in any condition.78 This support was essential for Marx’s works and, 
therefore, one cannot omit the Engelsian influence when talking about 
these important writings of the 19th century. In addition, in the years 
after Marx’s death, Engels worked relentlessly for the Marxian legacy 
and, after 1883, he became the spiritual head of international socialism.79 
He edited volumes 2 and 3 of Capital, an undertaking for which he was 
criticized because some people argued that he had not only changed 
but falsified parts of the work.80 Engels had attempted to make the 
work more appealing to the masses, although he could not complete it 
either, and Capital remained »an incomplete masterpiece.«81 He might 
have therefore been the »first Marxist,« although he did not consider 
it to be an orthodoxy but rather a work in progress that needed to be 
reframed according to the historical and existent circumstances.82
Marxism was not a doctrine for Marx and Engels, but rather
1. a historical-materialist analysis of economy and class relations,
2. a political theory based on this analysis, and
3. a political practice that demands the end of a capitalist society.83
It is hard to understand this by a divided analysis of the works of Marx 
and Engels, which must rather be seen as a compendium in which the 
single works relate to each other. This, however, should also not deny 
some kind of intellectual individualism, especially since too often the 
two men were pressed into an almost religious duality.84 There were 
also attempts to divide them, even to antagonize them. Marx was 
considered the universal thinker, and Engels the one responsible for 
78 MEW 28 : 596.
79 Labica, »Friedrich Engels,« 17 – 19.
80 Krätke, »Friedrich Engels,« 39 – 41; van der Linden, »Friedrich Engels’s Her-
kunft,« 23 – 24. 
81 Krätke, »Friedrich Engels,« 43.
82 Bergmann, et al. »Einleitung,« 12; Fülberth, Friedrich Engels, 8; Krätke, »Fried-
rich Engels,« 54 – 56.
83 Fülberth, Friedrich Engels, 9.
84 Bergmann, et al. »Einleitung,« 9; Krätke, »Friedrich Engels,« 13.
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the flattening of his friend’s ideas that could then be corrupted by 
totalitarian systems, e. g. Stalinism.85 
In contrast to such arguments, it is important to understand En-
gels as an intellectual who tried to practically apply his thoughts to 
change society.86 His experiences in English factories, his participation 
in the Revolution of 1848, and his almost endless hunger for know-
ledge helped to forge his and Marx’s intellectual work. He must there-
fore be considered an equal to Marx, and nothing less. The negative 
or anti-Engelsian attitude does not take into account that Engels, de-
spite being in steady contact with the SPD leadership since the 1880s, 
i. e. August Bebel (1840 – 1913) or Eduard Bernstein (1850 – 1932), never 
gave up his belief in a better future, which could only be achieved by a 
revolution of the masses.87 It is this belief, next to his many works that 
seem to have never lost their actuality, that makes Engels important 
for the 21st century as well.
While Marx is — also academically — en vogue again since crit-
icisms of global hyper-capitalism have gained ground,88 especially 
during the COVID-19 crisis, which due to its impact threatens the 
further existence of capitalism as such, Engels has still not received 
the necessary attention. Those in circles on the left, especially those 
who call themselves Marxists today, still tend to make him responsi-
ble for the failures of regimes that used supposedly Marxist doctrines 
to legitimize their rule89 and use Engelsism as a derogative term.90 
Nevertheless, the 200th birthday of Engels stimulated some interest, 
85 Bergmann, et al. »Einleitung,« 10.
86 Hunt, Friedrich Engels, 16.
87 Fülberth, Friedrich Engels, 72. For Engels's relation with and impact on German 
Social Democracy also see Detlef Lehnert and Christina Morina, eds. Friedrich 
Engels und die Sozialdemokratie: Werke und Wirkungen eines Europäers (Berlin: 
Metropol, 2020).
88 Especially the 200th birthday of Marx in 2018 stimulated some public and ac-
ademic interest again. For one of the recent surveys on problems and thoughts 
related to his legacy see Martin Endreß and Christian Jansen, eds. Karl Marx im 
21. Jahrhundert: Bilanz und Perspektiven (Frakfurt am Main: Campus, 2020). 
89 Hunt, Friedrich Engels, 8; Labica, »Friedrich Engels,« 20.
90 Krätke, »Friedrich Engels,« 58.
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especially in Wuppertal, where many events commemorated his lega-
cy.91 Regardless of such events, it is more than timely to bring Engels 
back into the spotlight and to re-read his writings, especially since 
they offer so many insights into a variety of problems our society 
still struggles with and will have to deal with in the 21st century. It 
is time to draw him out of Marx’s shadow92 and to emphasize his 
actuality, e. g. with regard to questions of housing,93 family theory,94 
or gender-related discussions.95 As was already argued 25 years after 
his death, Engels »must not be a simple name for the current genera-
tion,« but must become a »role model and teacher«96 instead. Engels 
never feared to learn something new or to be critical with regard to 
his own views either.97 We should be as critical and try to learn from 
Engels’s experiences in the 19th century for our own benefit in the 21st 
century. There is much to learn, and, if applied, the knowledge Engels 
provides us with might be decisive for formulating our own revolu-
tionary dream that can become a reality if the global masses share it.
91 Rainer Lucas, Reinhard Pfriem and Hans-Dieter Westhoff, »Einleitung der Her-
ausgeber,« in Arbeiten am Widerspruch: Friedrich Engels zum 200. Geburtstag, eds. 
Rainer Lucas, Reinhard Pfriem and Hans-Dieter Westhoff (Marburg: Metropo-
lis-Verlag, 2020), 13.
92 Ibid., 14.
93 Burghard Flieger, »Engels’s Stellungnahme zur Wohnungsfrage: Anstöße für 
zukunftsfähige wohnungsbaugenossenschaftliche Konzepte?« in Arbeiten am 
Widerspruch: Friedrich Engels zum 200. Geburtstag, eds. Rainer Lucas, Reinhard 
Pfriem and Hans-Dieter Westhoff (Marburg: Metropolis-Verlag, 2020), 335. 
An essential text by Engels related to this question is Friedrich Engels, »Zur 
Wohnungsfrage,« in MEW 18, 5: 209 – 287.
94 Gisela Notz, »Auseinandersetzung mit Friedrich Engels’s ›Ursprung der Fami-
lie …‹: … und was er uns heute noch zu sagen hat,« in Arbeiten am Widerspruch: 
Friedrich Engels zum 200. Geburtstag, eds. Rainer Lucas, Reinhard Pfriem and 
Hans-Dieter Westhoff (Marburg: Metropolis-Verlag, 2020), 398 – 404.
95 Adelheid Biesecker, Frigga Haug und Uta von Winterfeld, »Nachdenken mit 
Friedrich Engels: Über Geschlechterverhältnisse und gesellschaftliche Naturver-
hältnisse,« in Arbeiten am Widerspruch: Friedrich Engels zum 200. Geburtstag, eds. 
Rainer Lucas, Reinhard Pfriem and Hans-Dieter Westhoff (Marburg: Metropo-
lis-Verlag, 2020), 417 – 438.
96 Conrady, »Friedrich Engels,« 10027.
97 Labica, »Friedrich Engels,« 21.
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The present volume must consequently be understood as an attempt 
to give a survey of questions and topics to which Engels’s thoughts and 
writings can be applied, or at least taken into consideration. It offers 
an insight into Engels’s broad variety of ideas and experiences, and it 
hopes to stimulate further research on the man who was so important 
for the intellectual lives of so many who tried to follow in his footsteps. 
The first three chapters — by Vitor Bartoletti Sartori, Frank Jacob and 
Jia Feng — will describe Engels’s view of dialectics and history. They will 
not only analyze the role of dialectics in his historical worldview, but 
will also show how Engels understood revolutions as historical process-
es that are linked to a specific space-time continuum and what we can 
make of Engels’s theoretical concepts when they are applied to a con-
crete analysis of a historical case study. In the following contributions, 
Renildo Souza, David Pavón-Cuéllar, Maria Rosario and Gottfried 
Schweiger will shed light on some fields Engels was also interested in 
when they discuss his works in the field of political economy, his psy-
chology and his reflections on empirism and ideology, and his thoughts 
about both evolutionist ethnology as well as the philosophy of nature.
That Engels intellectually offers much more than reflections about 
historical materialism is also shown by Henrique Wellen’s analysis of 
Engels’s understanding of the relationship between art and politics 
and Vincent Streichhahn’s chapter on the ›woman question‹ and so-
cial reproduction theory from an Engelsian perspective. The existence 
of Engels’s minor role, at least with regard to his perception in the 
digital age, is analyzed by Riccardo Altieri, before Nuruddin Al Akbar 
discusses a critical reading of Engels’s perspective in a time that is cur-
rently so heavily determined by the COVID-19 pandemic. Last but 
not least, Alexander Maxwell provides a practical insight and shows 
why Engels provides a course reading for history classes in the 21st 
century that will not only engage students much better than Marx’s 
Capital but also open the eyes of those who might be in steady contact 
with global capitalism yet do not understand its functionality. 
All in all, the editor and the authors hope that Engels will receive 
more attention from activists and scholars alike because his works 
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and legacy remain timely and relevant in a century that faces many 
crises. If a revolution of the masses can eventually change the world 
and, through the abolishment of capitalism, turn it into a better place, 
this might rely on a revival of Friedrich Engels, whose works provide 
at least a theoretical map to solve the problems of humanity during 
our century.
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Notes on Dialectics and History  
in Friedrich Engels1
Vitor Bartoletti Sartori
Engels was certainly the closest collaborator of Marx. And that — for 
those who, with the help of Marxist thought, aim to understand and 
effectively criticize bourgeois society — is not a minor thing. It is 
worth stressing the issue in a double sense in relation to the two au-
thors in order to formulate an effective critique of capital: first, Engels 
was the author of The Condition of the Working Class in England, and 
was the person who brought many of the works of Marx (books II 
and III of Das Kapital were organized by Engels!) to the wider public; 
secondly, it is important to state that special attention must be given 
to the »second fiddle« insofar as Engels contributed significantly in 
his dialogues with Marx, which is evident in their letters, in the books 
they wrote together, and in the close friendship that the two socialists 
developed. It is important to note then that when we read Marx, to a 
certain extent, we also read Engels. Conversely, when we read Engels, 
we also read his friend Marx. For Marxists, there is no possibility of 
treating Engels as a secondary figure. At the same time, it is import-
ant to point out that in spite of the similitude between both authors‹ 
ideas and positions (Standpunkt), there are significant differences that 
in some crucial topics (such as the question of the organization of the 
State and the right to suppress (Aushebung) bourgeois society) can be 
decisive for those who embrace Marxism as their frame of reference.
Here we try to delineate an Engelsian treatment of dialectics and 
history, mainly taking into consideration his work after The Paris 
1 This chapter is a translation of »Apontamentos sobre dialética e história em Frie-
drich Engels,« Verinotio revista online 20 (2014) ISSN 1981 – 061X. We thank the 
author and the journal for the permission to publish this translation.
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Commune, an event impeccably treated by Marx in his The Civil War 
in France. This approach is justified in that it is a collaboration be-
tween the author of Anti-Dühring and those who later became prom-
inent leaders of the commune and gained prominence in the socialist 
camp in Germany, Kautsky and Bernstein. We cannot deal in detail 
here with how Engels was appropriated (many times erroneously) by 
these authors, who became responsible for the vulgarization of Marx-
ism. Nor can we deal with all the differences between Marx and En-
gels. We will only approach the topic to the extent that it deals with 
the methodological foundation of a critique of capitalist society. We 
will demonstrate the way in which Engels’s position fits in this field 
without neglecting Marx. In this way, we will show the existence of 
certain points of tension in Engels’s work.
The author of Anti-Dühring was explicit in what he wrote about 
the necessary critique of common sense: »common sense, a very 
respectable character, behind closed doors, between the four walls 
of a house, lives truly marvelous adventures, when it dares to enter 
the wide field of research.«2 This means that it is necessary to apply 
special care when dealing with complex issues such as the State or 
history. Without this care, our reasoning could be tainted with a 
metaphysical appeal rather than a dialectic one. There would be 
a tendency to hypothesize social relations on a daily basis, giving 
them a ghostly appearance and reifying them in such a way that it 
would be »a unilateral method, limited, abstract« that »gets lost in 
unresolvable contradictions since, absorbed by concrete objects, it 
cannot see its relationships.«3 The »reflexive determinations« (Re-
flexionsgestimmungen) of the effective reality (Wirklichkeit) will be 
eclipsed by common sense, which makes it necessary to break away 
from a linear thought that is too attached to a shallow conception of 
the causality of social reality, a conception in which »cause and effect 
take the shape of a rigid anti-thesis.«4 In this way, Engels attacked 
2 Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1990), 20.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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two twin aspects of a »metaphysical« vision. On the one hand, he 
criticized the reification of social relationships marked, among other 
things, by the loss of a rational and effectively concrete dimension 
of the effective reality. On the other hand, he points out that the 
highlighted relationship is not simply antithetical or marked by un-
solvable antinomies. It is necessary to overcome these antinomies 
with a type of thought that »reflects its genesis and its lapse«5 in such 
a manner that it is understood as something inseparable from forms 
of being (Daseinformen), determinations of existence (Existenzbes-
timmungen) that are constituted by effectiveness itself. Contrary to 
this position, there is »the metaphysical individual« who »thinks in 
a whole series of disconnected anti-theses: for him there is only a 
simple yes or no, and when he gets out of these molds, he finds only 
disorder and confusion.«6 
Therefore, we must recognize that there is a critique of the way 
in which the quotidian takes form. To the extent that the »specula-
tive method seems to us extremely plausible, because of the so-called 
common sense,«7 it is clear that what is opposed to common sense 
is not »speculation,« which is nothing more than the other face of 
knowledge tied to immediacy. Thus, it would be necessary to ques-
tion common sense as well as the »speculative method« in a decisive 
manner. And this, Engels intended, would be accomplished with the 
dialectical method, which had been inherited from Hegel but had 
been superseded (aufgehoben) by Marx when he took into account the 
contradictions present in the Hegelian system.
This occurred in the exact measure in which the »method« was 
centralized, opposing, in Hegel, the »system.«8 The author of Phe-
nomenology of Spirit, then, at the same time that he brought up 




8 See Engels, Anti-Dühring.
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ing homage to it, even when he tried to supersede it.9 In the words 
of Marx, there was a situation in which, »in its mystified form, the 
dialectic was a German fashion because it seemed to turn the exis-
tent into the sublime,«10 which is linked to the way in which Hegel 
equated reconciliation (Vörsonung) and the rationality of the real.11 If 
we follow Engels’s reasoning, then in Hegel there was the inability to 
follow the very »method« in which, according to the author of Anti- 
Dühring, just as would happen with Marx, »movement is a mode of 
material existence.«12 That is to say, dialectics would oppose a view 
in which concepts »are isolated objects of research, fixed objects, im-
mutable, one observed after the other, each one per se, like something 
determined and perennial.«13 Indeed, Hegel himself, according to En-
gels, would not have been consistent with this:
Indeed, his philosophy still suffered from a great incurable contra-
diction since, on the one hand, he considered it essential to the his-
torical conception, according to which human history is a process 
of development that cannot, by its very nature, find an intellectual 
solution to the discovery of what are called absolute truths. On the 
other hand, it presents itself as a summary or compendium of those 
9 According to Salgado, a Hegelian, there is a new form of metaphysics in Hegel: 
»There remains the possibility of a metaphysics of reason to replace the meta-
physics of understanding« (Joaquim Carlos Salgado, A ideia de justiça em Hegel 
(Petrópolis: Loyola, 1996), 56).
10 Karl Marx, O capital bk. 1, vol. I, transl. by Régis Barbosa and Flávio R. Kothe 
(São Paulo: Nova Cultural, 1988), 27.
11 To a certain extent, according to Engels’s comments, Lukács states: »This rec-
onciliation is, on the one hand, an idealist mystification of unresolvable contra-
dictions, but on the other hand, it expresses at the same time the realist sense 
of Hegel, its proximity to the concrete social reality of his time, his profound 
knowledge of the real life of human society, his efforts to discover the contra-
dictions of progress in its true battlefield, which is in the economic life of man.« 
György Lukács, El joven Hegel y los problemas de la sociedad capitalista, transl. by 
Manuel Sacristán (México: Grijalbo, 1963), 413. 
12 Engels, Anti-Dühring, 51.
13 Ibid., 20.
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absolute truths. A universal and compact system, definitively shaped, 
which is intended to frame both natural science and history, is in-
compatible with the laws of dialectics.14
The »laws of dialectics« would be incompatible with the Hegelian pro-
cess, marked, at the same time, by an emphasis on becoming — which 
comes from the dialectic between being (Sein) and nothing (Nichts), 
according to the author of The Science of Logic — , on movement, and 
on a systematic philosophy (»a universal and compact system«) that 
conforms to a »summary and compendium« of »absolute truths.« 
In other words, the problem of Hegelian dialectics is twofold: 
while it would have been a »lesser« dialectic in seeking a systematic 
philosophy in which effective reality would be viewed as a certain 
closure, it would at the same time have been — in the wake of Shell-
ing — a »greater« dialectic in seeking to frame »natural science and 
history« in a universal system with the necessary mediations. On the 
one hand, then, the author of Phenomenology of Spirit would have 
been inconsistent with his own assumptions; on the other hand, how-
ever, with these very assumptions, he would have been taken to a 
systematic and universal »application« of the dialectic, which would 
require greater care — if we were to follow Engels’s observations.15 And 
with that, Hegel was criticized while his merits were recognized, in-
cluding, by the way, by Marx. 
Nevertheless, at this point, some caution is necessary. It must be 
noted how the author of Anti-Dühring put himself above the dialectic. 
There were »fundamental laws of dialectical thought,« which »do not 
exclude but rather imply that the systematic knowledge of the exter-
nal world in its totality could progress with giant steps generation 
after generation.«16 At this point, Engels seems to oppose the system-
14 Ibid., 22 – 23.
15 See Friedrich Engels, Dialética da natureza (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1979).
16 Friedrich Engels, Do socialismo utópico ao socialismo científico & Ludwig Feuer-
bach e o fim da filosofia clássica alemã, transl. by José Severo de C. Pereira (São 
Paulo: Fulgor, 1962), 60.
Vitor Bartoletti Sartori30
atic character of Hegelian thought with another form of »systematic 
knowledge,« a form that would be more open. It is clear that with 
this the author wanted to say that we are talking about knowledge of 
»the exterior world in its totality« and, in this sense (the separation 
between subject and object is already being assumed in the notion of 
the »outside world,« essential for any materialist position), he demon-
strates a decisive distancing from Hegel, who considers the identical 
subject-object of speculative idealism as something essential.17 How-
ever, we must recognize that it is still uncomfortable for those who 
know the work of Marx, which is marked by the immanence of the 
objectivity and historicity of being18 — a diction that intimately links 
a »system« (evidently distinct from that of Hegel) to the »fundamen-
tal laws of dialectical thought.«
With this intonation, one could, at times, fall into the temptation 
of believing that it would be a matter of »correctly applying« a »meth-
od« in order to reach a way of apprehending effectiveness that would 
be real and effectively dialectical.19 In this sense, contrary to what we 
see in Marx20, the »method,« in Engels, could provide an opportu-
nity (if one were not to deal carefully with effectiveness [Wirklicht-
keit]) with an epistemological apparatus and not with the real fabric 
of reality. Thus, we cannot dismiss a reading according to which there 
would be a certain impetus that is simultaneously gnoseological and 
logical in its way of apprehending Engels; this is precisely the thesis of 
17 It is important to note that certain Marxists tend to disagree with Engels with 
regard to the closed character of the Hegelian system. See Paulo Arantes, Hegel e 
a ordem do tempo (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1982).
18 See Vitor Bartoletti Sartori, »De Hegel a Marx: da inflexão ontológica à antítese 
direta,« Kriterion 55, no. 130 (2014): 691 – 713.
19 Marx was clear when he said »the materialist method becomes its own anti-thesis 
when it is utilized not as a thread conducting historical research but rather as a 
finished model to which one must adapt historical facts« (Karl Marx and Fried-
rich Engels, Cultura, arte e literatura: textos escolhidos, transl. by José Paulo Netto 
(São Paulo: Expressão Popular, 2010), 119.
20 See José Chasin, Marx: estatuto ontológico e resolução metodológica (São Paulo: 
Boitempo, 2009).
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an important theoretician like György Lukàcs,21 reinforced by the fact 
that Marx’s main collaborator, at the end of his life, tried to develop a 
»dialectic of nature,« a theme that, unfortunately, we cannot deal with 
in this article but is highly polemical in the Marxist literature.
We should note that it is not that nature ought to be considered 
in a static way, or that there is a tight opposition between the spirit 
sciences and the natural sciences, as Löwy22 seems to point out in the 
footsteps of Dilthey. It happens, however, that its movement could 
not, as Engels sometimes implied,23 be quasi-deduced from the »laws 
of dialectics.« Engels had a very peculiar way of dealing with dialec-
tics, searching for the »laws of dialectics« (»interdependency of oppo-
sites,« »quantitative leap,« and »negation of negation«) at the same 
time as he criticized a way of thinking marked by »the intellectual 
solution in the discovery« of »what are called absolute truths,« which 
shelter a »compact universal system.« In other words, as much as the 
»spirit« of the author’s text could diametrically oppose a Hegelian »in-
tellectual solution,« it merges with a certain way of thinking in which 
the »method,« at times, seems to be taken as dissociated and dissocia-
ble from the object (Gegenstand) and from objectivity itself. In Marx, 
there is no being (Wessen) lacking determinations and marked, logi-
cally, by the becoming of movement, but there is an understanding 
of categories as ways of being driven by historicity that break with a 
state of being »concentrated in its static condition«24 only insofar as 
it deals with the complex mediations between man and nature, and 
among humans themselves (to the extent that human praxis, realized 
under conditions linked by the past,25 is focused more on its own im-
manence of »sensitive human activity« [sinnlich menchliche Tätigkeit]).
21 See György Lukács, Prolegômenos para uma ontologia do ser social, transl. by Lya 
Luft and Rodnei Nascimento (São Paulo: Boitempo, 2010).
22 See Michel Löwy, As aventuras de Karl Marx contra o Barão de Münchhausen (São 
Paulo: Cortez, 1994).
23 Engels, Dialética.
24 Engels, Anti-Dühring, 20.
25 As Marx says, »men make their own history, but they do not make it according 
to their free will; they do not make it under circumstances that they choose 
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In this specific sense, as Lukács has already suggested in The His-
tory of Class Consciousness26 — although with a different prism in his 
critique of Engels — , it may be possible to say that the author of 
Anti-Dühring stopped focusing on decisive aspects of the praxis in-
asmuch as he brought to light the »laws of dialectics.« In a way, the 
position according to which it would not be a question of opposing 
the preceding idealism would be eclipsed by a contemplative mate-
rialistic position in which »the object [objekts], reality [Wirklichtkeit], 
the sensitive [Sinnlichtkeit] is apprehended in the form of the object 
or contemplation [Anschauung] but not as sensitive human activity, 
as a practice [praxis], not subjectively.«27 Engels, in this sense, would 
bring with him a limited conception of dialectics. 
At the same time that he approached Hegel, Engels criticized 
him based on the opposition of »system« and »method«; he came to 
stress the autarchy of effective reality, breaking with the conception of 
Hegelian science (related to the systematic treatment of all knowledge 
and reality). We also should take into consideration this aspect of the 
tensions within the thought of the author of Anti-Dühring:
From the moment that each science has to account for its position in 
the Universal framework of things and the knowledge of those things, 
there is no longer room for a science especially dedicated to the study 
of universal concatenations. From the previous philosophy, with its 
own existence, there only remains afoot the theory of thinking and its 
laws: formal logic and dialectics. The rest is dissolved in the positive 
science of nature and history.28
but under those that they face directly, linked and transmitted by the past. The 
tradition of all dead generations oppresses, like a nightmare, the brains of those 
who are alive.« Karl Marx, O 18 Brumário de Luís Bonaparte, transl. by Leandro 
Konder and Renato Guimarães (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1997), 21.
26 György Lukács, História e consciência de classe, transl. by Rodnei Nascimento 
(São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2003).
27 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, A ideologia alemã, transl. by Rubens Enderle 
(São Paulo: Boitempo, 2007), 533.
28 Engels, Socialismo utópico, 60 – 61.
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Engels was clear about what came to be known as »the end of classical 
German philosophy,«29 concatenated to the extent that the task of 
philosophy would no longer refer to a posture that would not be, in 
itself, a taken position and would refer to praxis, »sensitive human 
activity« being something that would not accept the rigid dichotomy 
between reason and sensitivity, nor the dissolution of the sensitive 
into a form of Aufhebung in reason. Thus, according to the appreci-
ation of the immanence of effective reality, Engels was consistent in 
valuing science. He also emphasized the impossibility of any form 
of hypostasis of universality30 (which, at times, seemed to happen in 
Hegel’s own Science and Logic, and in Plato before him), with rea-
son. However, maybe Engels was in a rush to deal with philosophy 
as something that remains only a »theory of thinking and its law,« 
something that refers to a conception as a bias that can, in some cir-
cumstances, acquire a memorable gnoseological tonality in which it is 
a matter of »applying« a »method« marked by the valorization of the 
»dialectical laws« — which did not arrive, in the author, at a »compen-
dium« of »absolute truths,« given that there was a clear valorization 
of the correct apprehension of effective reality when it recognized the 
importance of the »positive science of history.« Nevertheless, the issue 
can become complex if we consider that there seems to be a certain 
separation between »formal logic and dialectics« on the one hand and 
»the positive science of nature and of history« on the other. That is 
to say, there seems to be the possibility of thinking in terms of cate-
gories without considering »forms of being, determinations of exis-
tence«; thus, there is a certain counter-position to Marxist thought on 
this specific point. The »science of history« mentioned earlier brings 
with it the immanence of dialectics, considered the very movement 
29 Ibid.
30 This a risk that could not be taken: as Marx had already stated in 1842, the best 
hypothesis runs the risk of falling into the trap of Hegelian dialectic, which, 
»as a universal in itself, I turned into something independent; it is immediately 
mistaken with empirical existence and then the finite is tuned in an uncritical 
manner into the expression of an idea.« Marx and Engels, A ideologia alemã, 77.
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of the real, and now the question emerges in a somewhat different 
way, breaking apart — at least when it comes to exposition (Darstel-
lung) — the unity between »method« and effective reality.
It is clear that Engels did not create a simple apology for the partial 
sciences, being consistent with a position that he, along with Marx, 
defended in German Ideology.31 He placed them in a position to be 
criticized in that he highlighted only the »positive science of nature 
and history.« However, it is impossible not to notice a certain oppo-
sition between »the laws of dialectics,« present in what was left of 
the philosophy of yore, and the apprehension of historical objectivity 
itself, since Marx explicitly said that the »materialist method« pres-
ents itself »as a conducting thread of historical investigation« and is 
inseparable from it, from the apprehension of its own effective reality. 
Marx emphasized in Capital that »it is, without doubt, necessary 
to distinguish the method of presentation [Darstellungsweise], formal-
ly, from the method of research [Forsuchungweise].«32 In this sense, we 
can understand Engels’s note as him being careful not to juxtapose 
both moments of the apprehension of the real. However, it is import-
ant to note that Engels seems to open the door to misunderstandings, 
since his diction is more accessible to those who have not been initiat-
ed into the thought that Marx and the author criticized (»speculative 
method«) — or who are unconcerned with the themes that permeated 
the »previous philosophy« — and more obscure for those who seek 
to see the way in which the conception developed by the author of 
German Ideology differentiates itself from the conception of Hegel. In 
other words, Engels is didactic when he seeks to offer a systematic 
treatment of the themes of both dialectics and history (and at this 
point he has perhaps come too close to the language of »common 
sense«), and it seems confusing since he ends by leaving the possi-
bility for the belief that it would be possible to depart from certain 
31 In that work, the authors said: »There is no history of politics, of right, of science, 
of art, of religion, etc.« Marx and Engels, A ideologia alemã, 77.
32 Marx, O capital I, 26.
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epistemic dissociations between the »laws of dialectics,« »method,« 
and effective reality.
When we say »leaving the possibility,« an important caveat is nec-
essary: it seems to us that the intention of Engels was not to draw a 
wall between the above-mentioned aspects, quite the contrary. How-
ever, maybe it is possible to find in this field of Engelsian theory the 
germs of the notorious distinction — divulged by the Stalinist vul-
gate — between »materialist dialectics« and »historical materialism,« 
which, verbally, sought to overcome the opposition between the 
present position in the partial sciences and the »speculation« marked 
by a certain hypostasis of the »laws of dialectics.« That is to say, the 
Engelsian critique of common sense and the speculative method was 
powerful, so powerful that it went so far as to be able to oppose even 
those who would follow its author. 
Sometimes, therefore, the »mode of exposition« used by Engels 
was not the best, oscillating between the systematically exposed »laws 
of dialectics« and the apprehension of effective reality itself, created 
as a beacon of the »laws of dialectics« and carried out as a »positive 
science of history.« It is necessary to realize, however, that in no way 
did the author seek, ontologically, to distinguish that which — in ex-
position — he separated dialectically. 
Reason itself could not be considered except in connection with 
effectiveness in the following sense:
The French philosophers of the eighteenth century that paved the way 
for the Revolution appealed to reason as the only judge of everything 
that exists. They intended to establish a rational state, and anything 
that contradicted eternal reason was to be buried without pity. (…) 
Indeed, that eternal reason was nothing but the idealized intelligence 
of the middle-class men of that period, the class from which the 
bourgeoisie would emerge.33
33 Engels, Anti-Dühring, 223.
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When trying to understand history, reason was seen by Engels, as by 
Marx, as a unitary process in which we cannot separate the »totality 
of relationships of production,« »the economic structure of society,« 
the »political and judicial superstructure,« and »determined forms of 
consciousness,« in short, every »process of intellectual, political and 
social life.«34 For Engels, the notion of reason was, therefore, some-
thing inseparable from the contradictory development of the social 
process as a whole, being effective not to the extent that »the rational 
is real and the real is rational«35 but rather insofar as it is a matter 
of seeing history as something made by man himself in the midst 
of objective social conflicts and with the mediation of »ideological 
forms, under which men acquire consciousness of those conflicts and 
confront them [ideologischen Formen, worin sich die Menchen dieses 
Konflikts bewusst werden und inh ausfechten].«36 The notion of reason, 
then, although it may contain within itself certain gnoseological de-
tours, is essentially considered when, in the same way that it tried 
to mark itself as an »eternal reason,« it is defined by the finitude of 
the bourgeois society emerging at the time. The notion is inseparable 
from its ontological basis.
If Engels said that the French philosophers played an essential role 
in preparing the ground for the French Revolution, then it is obvious 
that he did not consider history as something produced by philoso-
phers; however, at the same time, he could not fail to emphasize that 
the influence of »ideological forms« could be left aside when dealing 
with the »consciousness« of social conflicts, a consciousness that, in 
the midst of determined material conditions, could be decisive. 
34 Karl Marx, Contribuição à crítica da economia política, transl. by Florestan Fer-
nandes (São Paulo: Expressão Popular, 2009), 47.
35 Georg Hegel, Princípios da filosofia do direito, transl. by Orlando Vittorino (São 
Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2003), xxxvi.
36 Marx, Contribuição, 46. For a detailed treatment of this ideology, see Ester Vais-
man, »A ideologia e sua determinação ontological,« Verinotio — Revista on-line de 
Filosofia e Ciências Humanas 12 (2010): 40 – 64.
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Consciousness or unconsciousness of the way in which effective 
reality is actually and effectively conformed is not a »scholastic mat-
ter«; at the same time, however, it is not the criterion for dealing with 
»ideological forms,« not least because, as Marx pointed out, men of-
ten operate through determinations of existence of which they are not 
fully aware — »they do not know it, but they do it [Sie wissen das nicht, 
aber sie tun es].«37 Thus, in the case brought up by Engels, even if the 
French philosophers had used a concept of reason that would be, in 
the midst of the social process of the development of capitalist society, 
ineluctably reconciled with the vicissitudes of the emerging bourgeois 
society, it would not be, on the part of these philosophers, an act of 
simple bad faith, of mere deception. Before, there was a prevalence of 
objective determinations that made »eternal reason,« in fact, operate 
amid the irrationality of capitalist effectiveness. Bearing this in mind, 
post festum, it was possible for Engels to say that »eternal reason was 
nothing but the idealized intelligence of middle-class man of those 
times, from which the bourgeoisie would emerge.«
To the same extent that reason was placed as timeless and eternal, 
therefore, temporality and finitude left their indelible marks, and thus 
there did not exist a watertight separation between the immanence of 
objective determinations of the real and a method conceived, to a cer-
tain extent, in a gnoseological manner in the treatment of the author 
of Anti-Dühring. For him, the »Rational State« was not, then, simply 
gnoseologically mistaken (to the extent that it would not be possi-
ble for it to become effective); the effective reality that came from 
the process that culminated in the French Revolution carried with 
it the role that this ideal — this »ideological form« — played in men’s 
acquisition of consciousness of their own time in such a way that, 
even though this consciousness might have been mistaken from the 
gnoseological point of view, it fulfilled its function. In other words, 
we can see a certain tension in the Engelsian text here too.
37 Karl Marx, O capital bk. 1, vol. II, transl. by Régis Barbosa and Flávio R. Kothe 
(São Paulo: Nova Cultural, 1996), 200.
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Thus, at this moment, we can see that, at times, Engels’s manner of 
exposition seems to go against the very thing that the author wants to 
say. This happens, however, to the extent that the mode of exposition 
and the mode of research need to gain greater relevance; we will focus 
on this aspect in the next part of this text, in which the question of 
history appears with special emphasis.
From what we have discussed, Engels’s exposition was not always 
favorable for a better understanding of his work and the work of 
Marx. This happened because, in Engels, the concept of dialectics 
developed in a systematic manner in opposition to Marx’s procedure, 
in which the immanent approach is more prominent. Evidently, there 
are statements of a general character in the Marxist work, but they 
were always related to a careful analysis of effective reality, with the 
categories always being presented as »forms of being, determinations 
of existence.« In Engels, the issue is more nuanced.
Maybe the problem is expressed more penetratingly when we take 
into account the conception that that spoke of »laws of dialectics« 
and, at the same time, when it is pointed out categorically that, »ac-
cording to the materialist conception, the decisive factor in history 
is, ultimately, the production and reproduction of immediate life.«38 
Sometimes, when dealing with history, the author of Anti-Dühring 
presented generalizations that were interpreted in an erroneous 
manner by the self-styled Marxist vulgate (i. e., by Stalinism). The 
reference to the »last resort« — placed alongside the »laws of dialec-
tics« — resulted in its long and infamous career, leading to the most 
diverse scholarly and economic resources, even in some authors held 
in high regard, such as Bukharin, criticized by Lukács39 and Gramsci.40 
It should be noted that it is not that the Engelsian passage is abso-
38 Friedrich Engels, Origem da família, da propriedade privada e do estado, transl. by 
Ruth M. Klaus (São Paulo: Centauro, 2002), 10.
39 Lukács, História e consciência.
40 Antonio Gramsci, Maquiavel: notas sobre o estado e a política. Cadernos do 
cárcere, vol. 3, transl. by Carlos Nelson Coutinho (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização 
Brasileira, 2002).
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lutely incompatible with the Marxist conception. However, there is 
a considerable difference between the emphasis on the »real basis«41 
and speaking of a »decisive factor in history.« The passage by Engels 
made it seem as if the »ideological forms under which men acquire 
consciousness« are, »in the last resort,« no more than epiphenomena. 
From what has been stated above, even in Engels, this is not true. 
If »the French philosophers of the eighteenth century … paved the 
way to the Revolution,« this happened to the extent that the »decisive 
factor« derived from human activity itself, an activity mediated by the 
relationships of production, by the »judicial and political superstruc-
ture,« and certainly by ideology. This activity is »sensitive human ac-
tivity,« praxis, which implies the highly important role of conscious-
ness. It is true that »it is not consciousness that determines life, but 
life that determines consciousness«42; however, it is equally the case 
that it is through ideology that, oftentimes, men acquire conscious-
ness of social conflicts and seek to act upon them. Let us synthesize: 
in Engel’s exposition, the way in which the different spheres of the 
social being take shape as reflective determinations was sometimes 
obscured, giving the impression of it being a social process that pos-
sesses a kind of hidden engine that exercises unilateral determination. 
This, in turn, occurred while the »last resort« was a much less precise 
image than the one used by Marx, that of the »preponderant mo-
ment« (übergreifendes Moment) placed in social production, which is 
»the effective starting point … the point at which the whole process 
takes place again.«43 Thus, once again, the exposition hinders the un-
derstanding of the Engelsian text.
It happens, however, that the objective concatenations of history 
are effectively seen in a somewhat automatic manner in Engels: when 
dealing with the first Bonaparte and the historical situation of France, 
for example, Engels — faced with historical necessity and the »laws 
of dialectics« — tended to eclipse the role of consciousness, and even 
41 Marx and Engels, A ideologia alemã; Marx, Contribuição.
42 Marx and Engels, A ideologia alemã, 94.
43 Karl Marx, Grundrisse, transl. by Mário Duayer (São Paulo: Boitempo, 2011), 49.
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that of individual differences, stating that if it had not been Napoleon, 
another individual would have taken his place. In a century like the 
nineteenth century, strongly influenced by the specter of the Little 
Corporal, the position of the author of Anti-Dühring undoubtedly 
deserves criticism. First, Engels dealt with Napoleon’s shadow, a phe-
nomenon that certainly had deep social roots (from which he could 
not be dissociated), but he also depended on the personality of the 
Emperor. Amidst the »laws of dialectics,« we can see the failure of the 
republican model of the French Revolution44 as well as the contradic-
tory way in which this failure took place in 18 Brumaire as something 
necessary and in such a way that there seems to be a certain logical 
necessity directing history in the way conceived by Engels.45 
That is to say that even though Hegel is strongly criticized, his 
influence can be sensed in Engels. While Marx had already remarked 
that »the philosophical moment is not the logic of the thing, but 
the thing of logic,«46 the main collaborator of Marx seems, at times, 
to go against Marx in some specific points. There is an important 
point to be considered here: the mode of research. Engels made a very 
correct point about the development of bourgeois society when he 
said that »by turning things into commodities, capitalist production 
destroyed all the old traditional relationships and replaced inherited 
customs and historical rights with buying and selling, with the ›free 
contract‹«47. This passage can be supported by many references in 
44 Felipe Ramos Musseti, »Marx e a constituição da república francesa de 1848,« 
Verinotio — Revista on-line de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas 19 (2015).
45 Engels stated that »it was a coincidence that Napoleon Bonaparte, precisely a 
Corsican, became a Military Dictator that the French Republic needed, exhaust-
ed by war. It can be demonstrated that without Napoleon, another man would 
have fulfilled that function given the fact that the person in question was always 
found as soon as it became necessary. Behold also the cases of Caesar, Augustus, 
Cromwell, etc.« Friedrich Engels, »Brief an Walther Borgius in Breslau (Heinz 
Starkenburg) (Carta a W. Borgius em Bratislava — Heinz Starkenburg de 25 de 
Janeiro de 1894),« in MEW 39: 206.
46 Karl Marx, »Introdução,« in Crítica à filosofia do direito de Hegel, transl. by 
Rubens Enderle and Leonardo de Deus (São Paulo, Boitempo, 2005), 39.
47 Engels, Origem da família, 93.
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Marx. However, when it comes to understanding the different ways 
in which »traditional relationships« are destroyed, we must highlight 
certain points.
The first point concerns the fact that the »traditional relations« 
Engels mentions still existed in various countries when he wrote the 
sentence cited above, and Engels was, obviously, aware of this. The 
second point is related to the specificity of the way in which the said 
process could take place under different social and historical condi-
tions. With this point in mind, Engels said the following about the 
social commune and the possibility of the social development of so-
cialism in Russia: »From India to Russia, the form of society in which 
this isolation predominated always found in it its complement. The 
Russian state, not only in general terms but in its specific form, the 
Czarist despotism, instead of hanging in the air, is a necessary and 
logical consequence of the social conditions of Russia.«48
The first issue that stands out is the consideration of Russia and In-
dia together. When dealing with the particularity of capitalist devel-
opment, Engels did not fail to consider the concrete manner in which 
bourgeois society developed under different conditions and historical 
contradictions. When dealing with the peculiarities of the countries, 
therefore, Engels believed that he could place India and Russia in the 
same field. In this way, just as the complement of the rural commune 
(with its relative isolation) was a manifestation in India of »oriental 
despotism,« the same situation would take place in the Russian con-
text. This would happen to the extent that there would be a certain 
confluence between »oriental despotism« and »czarist despotism.« In 
other words, there seems to be a solid analysis of the immanence of 
the effective reality behind Engels’s position, which would be focused 
on the fact that there would be »a necessary and logical consequence 
to the Russian social conditions.« And here the problems reemerge.
48 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Lutas de classes na Rússia (São Paulo: Boitempo 
Editorial, 2013), 51.
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A certain theological and logicizing tone of a Hegelian nature 
seems to be present in Engels’s position, as he saw the Russian process 
as having a »necessary and logical« direction, that is, with an objective 
form of conformation that would not bring in any other possibilities 
than the development of a modern capitalist society. Later, the author 
would say that »the way things were, there was no alternative.«49 In 
other words, in view of the »laws of dialectics,« Engels may not have 
gone deep enough in terms of his research, and it is important to say 
that, against the challenges from Russian militants about the possi-
bility to achieve socialism, Marx began to study this issue. It is also 
important to understand how this happened.
For us to be fair to Engels, it is necessary to say that Marx also 
spoke of something similar to the »laws of dialectics.« Marx made ref-
erence, in perhaps one of his most problematic texts on the situation 
of India in the face of British colonization, to an »immutable law of 
history.« In other words, we cannot blame Engels for a certain slip 
in his exposition. When dealing with India, a country that has been 
invaded several times by different peoples, Marx pointed out that 
»according to the immutable law of history, barbaric conquerors are 
conquered by the superior civilization of the peoples conquered by 
them.«50 The Indian situation, until the British invasion, would not 
have changed substantially since the Indian civilization was superior 
to that of those who had invaded the country previously. British dom-
ination, thus, despite being atrocious, would bring with it progress by 
making possible a rupture with a form of domination based precisely 
on what Engels called a combination of isolation and despotism, pro-
viding, in the late development, the foundations for the demise of 
British — and capitalist — domination in the Indian territory. Marx, 
therefore, does not seem to simply »apply« the »laws of dialectics.« 
Even if his diction is problematic, we can see that immanence already 
appears insofar as »history« and »dialectics« are not separated, tak-
49 Ibid., 139.
50 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Acerca del colonialismo (Buenos Aires: Editorial 
Utopia Libertaria, 2009), 48.
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ing into account the specificity of the Indian case, as opposed to the 
advance of capitalism in a typical form, as happened in England. In 
other words, historical development is uneven, and we always have 
to take into account the objectivity and historicity of the social being 
himself, with praxis being the criterion for obtaining them, so much 
so that Marx clearly highlighted the following with regard to primi-
tive accumulation:51
The chapter on primitive accumulation aims exclusively at delineat-
ing a route through which, in Western Europe, the capitalistic order 
emerged from the bowels of the feudal economic order. Therefore, 
it accompanies the movement that divorced the producer from his 
means of production, transforming the former into a wage earner 
(a proletarian in the modern sense of the word) and the latter into 
capital.52
At the same time that Marx mentioned the »immutable law of histo-
ry,« he stressed that the way in which bourgeois society placed itself 
in Capital only took Western Europe into account and, therefore, not 
India or Russia. In this sense, in order to deal with these two coun-
tries, careful research was necessary before a judgment could be made 
about the peculiarity of the historical development of each one.53 
Thus, there is an intimate relationship between that which is placed 
in a quite large degree of generality and the particular cases; however, 
we can never ignore any of these aspects. According to the German 
author, in some cases they could be
51 Primitive accumulation got underway in India through colonialism, and it was 
a possibility in Russia in the face of the disintegrating tendencies that tried to 
impose themselves upon the Russian commune.
52 Marx and Engels, Lutas de classes, 66
53 On this point, the use of quotation marks is essential: »The ›historical fatalism‹ 
of this movement is restricted to the countries of Western Europe.« Ibid., 89.
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[e]vents of a striking analogy but which take place in different his-
torical environments leading to totally different results. When you 
study each one of these developments separately, we can easily figure 
out the key to this phenomenon. However, we will never arrive at 
this with a historical-philosophical master key whose supreme virtue 
consists of being supra-historical.54
Sometimes there would be »different historical environments lead-
ing to totally different results,« and in these cases, it must be said, 
Marx disagreed with Engels on this point about Russia: while Engels 
took India and Russia together, that is not what Marx did in Capital, 
which was emphatic about the prospect of a distinct development of 
Russia, which had the possibility of a direct transition to socialism 
from the rural commune.55
The Russian situation would be different in that the peasantry itself 
would not be marked by private ownership of the means of produc-
tion. In England, »in the final analysis, there is a transformation of one 
form of private property into another form of private property. The 
land in the hands of Russian peasants has never been their property.«56 
There would also be the permanence of the rural commune in the mid-
dle of the capitalist development that would be inseparable from Rus-
sia, and thus, for reasons that we cannot go into here, Marx said that 
»it can, therefore, become the direct starting point of the economic 
system towards which modern society drifts and sheds its skin without 
having to commit suicide.«57 In other words, in view of the uneven de-
velopment of the history of capitalist society, not only would it be im-
possible to homogenize solutions to the problems of bourgeois society, 
54 Ibid., 69.
55 After much study, Marx pointed out that »the conclusion at which I arrived is 
the following: If Russia continues to pursue the path she has followed since 1861, 
she will lose the finest chance ever offered by history to a nation, in order to 
undergo all the fatal vicissitudes of the capitalist regime.« Ibid., 66.
56 Ibid., 89.
57 Ibid., 100.
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it would also be a matter of apprehending the real and effective fabric 
and particularity of each social formation, thus making it necessary to 
be very careful in one’s research, which would imply the impossibility 
of predictions of or narrative concatenations that did not have solid 
support in the historicity and the objectivity of the social being. With 
this, Marx again distinguished himself from Engels by bringing greater 
care to these issues: in the face of this uneven development, he tried 
to delineate the difference between India and Russia in a rigorous and 
cautious way. First, he highlighted the »contemporaneity of the cap-
italist production: it is precisely thanks to the contemporary nature 
of capitalist production that it can appropriate all positive achieve-
ments, and this without going through its unpleasant vicissitudes.« 
Subsequently, he emphasized how this had implications, pointing out 
that »Russia does not live isolated from the modern world, nor was it 
the victim of a foreign conqueror, as were the East Indies.«58 In this 
sense, there is very special care with regard to research, something that, 
of course, Engels always had in mind but could not always put into 
practice with the necessary diligence (it is perhaps possible to point out 
some slightly hurried generalizations even in the classic The Origin of 
the Family, Private Property and the State).
In this short contribution, we have made some notes about the the-
orizing of Engels on »methodological« aspects. These aspects, appar-
ently irrelevant when dealing with analyses of conjecture or political 
positions, proved decisive in the end. Even when it comes to one of the 
greatest confluences in the history of social thought (the one between 
Marx and Engels), the question arose in a strident manner. To the ex-
tent that the authors shared substantive positions, it was possible to see 
how a conception of dialectics and history that barely differs in some 
points can effectively bring forth different concrete positions to the 
surface. In view of these positions, we notice that, in Marx, research 
was essential, and the exposition was realized with difficulty, seeking 
to express in the best possible way that which was obtained through 
58 Ibid., 90.
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careful research. In Engels, of course, there was never any deliberate 
neglect with regard to research or seeking objective concatenations 
present in the effective reality itself; nevertheless, using a certain tone, 
sometimes logical, and supported by the »laws of dialectics,« the Ger-
man philosopher may have stumbled at times. This happened with 
regard to the mode of exposition, which tends to be too systematic in 
some of its essential points (and this may have given rise to no less than 
a century of vulgar »Marxism«), as well as with regard to the method 
of research that, in the face of certain previous systematic treatments, 
may have been neglected at times. Such tension, from what we have 
seen, is the concrete expression of a certain Engelsian treatment that 
brings with it a conflicting relationship between an exposition that, at 
certain moments, borders on the gnoseological understanding of the 
method and a concrete position that seeks, with care, to deal with the 
real fabric of the effective reality. Thus, if Engels pointed out in Hegel a 
»contradiction between system and method,« certain »contradictions« 
can perhaps be pointed out in the author of Anti-Dühring. This does 
not diminish his merits in the least; it only gives a necessary warning to 
all those who look at Marx’s and Engels’s texts as sources of assistance 
in the determined critique of capitalist society. Even if Engels was 
rushed at times, for us, self-criticism is, and always will be, essential.
Translated by Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo
Works Cited
Arantes, Paulo. Hegel e a ordem do tempo. São Paulo: Hucitec, 1982. 
Chasin, José. Marx: estatuto ontológico e resolução metodológica. São Paulo: 
Boitempo, 2009. 
Engels, Friedrich. Do socialismo utópico ao socialismo científico & Ludwig 
Feuerbach e o fim da filosofia clássica alemã. Translated by José Severo de 
C. Pereira. São Paulo: Fulgor, 1962. 
Notes on Dialectics and History in Friedrich Engels 47
—. »Brief an Walther Borgius in Breslau (Heinz Starkenburg) (Carta a W. 
Borgius em Bratislava — Heinz Starkenburg de 25 de Janeiro de 1894).« In 
Marx / Engels Werke Vol. 39. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1968. 
—. Dialética da natureza. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1979. 
—. Anti-Dühring. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1990. 
—. Origem da família, da propriedade privada e do estado. Translated by Ruth 
M. Klaus. São Paulo: Centauro, 2002. 
Engels, Friedrich and Karl Kautsky. O socialismo jurídico. Translated by Már-
cio Naves and Lívia Cotrim. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2012. 
Gramsci, Antonio. Maquiavel: notas sobre o estado e a política. Cadernos do 
cárcere vol. III. Translated by Carlos Nelson Coutinho. Rio de Janeiro: 
Civilização Brasileira, 2002. 
Hegel, Georg. Princípios da filosofia do direito. Translated by Orlando Vittori-
no. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2003. 
Löwy, Michel. As aventuras de Karl Marx contra o Barão de Münchhausen. São 
Paulo: Cortez, 1994. 
Lukács, György. El joven Hegel y los problemas de la sociedad capitalista. Trans-
lated by Manuel Sacristán. México: Grijalbo, 1963. 
—. História e consciência de classe. Translated by Rodnei Nascimento. São 
Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2003. 
—. Prolegômenos para uma ontologia do ser social. Translated by Lya Luft and 
Rodnei Nascimento. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2010. 
Marx, Karl. Grundrisse der Kritik der politichen ökonomie. Berlin: Dietz Ver-
lag, 1953.
—. »Kritik des Goethaer Programms.« In Marx / Engels Werke Vol. 19. Berlin: 
Dietz Verlag, 1962. 
—. O capital bk. 1, vol. I. Translated by Régis Barbosa and Flávio R. Kothe. 
São Paulo: Nova Cultural, 1988. 
—. Grundrisse. Translated by Martin Nicolaus. London: Penguin Books, 1993. 
—. O capital bk. 1, vol. II. Translated by Régis Barbosa and Flávio R. Kothe. 
São Paulo: Nova Cultural, 1996. 
—. O 18 Brumário de Luís Bonaparte. Translated by Leandro Konder and 
Renato Guimarães. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1997. 
—. »Introdução.« In Crítica à filosofia do direito de Hegel. Translated by 
Rubens Enderle and Leonardo de Deus. São Paulo, Boitempo, 2005. 
Vitor Bartoletti Sartori48
—. Contribuição à crítica da economia política. Translated by Florestan Fer-
nandes. São Paulo: Expressão Popular, 2009. 
—. Grundrisse. Translated by Mário Duayer. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2011. 
—. O capital. Translated by Rubens Enderle. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2013. 
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. »Die deutsche Ideologie.« In Marx / Engels 
Werke Vol. 3. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1968. 
—. A ideologia alemã. Translated by Luís Cláudio de Castro e Costa. São 
Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2001. 
—. A ideologia alemã. Translated by Rubens Enderle. São Paulo: Boitempo, 
2007. 
—. Acerca del colonialismo. Buenos Aires: Editorial Utopia Libertaria, 2009. 
—. Cultura, arte e literatura: textos escolhidos. Translated by José Paulo Netto. 
São Paulo: Expressão Popular, 2010. 
—. Lutas de classes na Rússia. São Paulo: Boitempo Editorial, 2013. 
Musseti, Felipe Ramos. »Marx e a constituição da república francesa de 1848.« 
Verinotio — Revista on-line de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas 19 (2015): 
144 – 159. 
Salgado, Joaquim Carlos. A ideia de justiça em Hegel. Petrópolis: Loyola, 1996. 
Sartori, Vitor Bartoletti. »De Hegel a Marx: da inflexão ontológica à antítese 
direta.« Kriterion 55, no. 130 (2014): 691 – 713. 
Vaisman, Ester. »A ideologia e sua determinação ontológica.« Verinotio — Re-
vista on-line de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas 12 (2010): 40 – 64.
Friedrich Engels  
and Revolution Theory
The Legacy of a Revolutionary Life
Frank Jacob
Introduction
Friedrich Engels was a revolutionary by heart, who never, although 
having witnessed failed revolutions in 1848 and 1871, gave up believing 
in its final success. He might have considered himself as second fiddle 
to Karl Marx,1 but when it comes to the study and the attempt to theo-
retically explain revolutions as a phenomenon of modernity and the fi-
nal aim of the communist movement, he was as important as his friend, 
and together, these »revolutionary twins«2 were actively involved in 
finding an explanation for the course of revolutionary processes. Their 
contemporaries considered Engels to be Marx’s alter ego,3 and it is true 
that both of them shared many thoughts, although the latter would re-
main the more important, at least with regard to the consciousness of 
the masses. Nevertheless, Engels not only played an important role in 
the intellectual development of Marx, he can and also should be taken 
seriously as an intellectual of great ability.4 The rise of Marx as one of 
1 Sigmund Neumann and Mark von Hagen, »Engels and Marx on Revolution, 
War, and the Army in Society,« in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to 
the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 
264.
2 Oscar J. Hammen, »Alienation, Communism, and Revolution in the Marx-Engels 
Briefwechsel,« Journal of the History of Ideas 33, no. 1 (1972): 80.
3 J. D. Hunley, Life and Thought of Friedrich Engels: A Reinterpretation of His Life 
and Thought (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 47.
4 Samuel Hollander, Friedrich Engels and Marxian Political Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 279 – 313.
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the most well-known intellectuals of the 19th century was without any 
doubt only possible due to the support of Engels, who, as the econo-
mist Samuel Hollander emphasizes, was »more royalist than the king«5 
and promoted and even finished important parts of Marx’s own work. 
Many of the latter’s texts would not have existed without Engel’s influ-
ence, and the textual production of Marx and Engels was a cooperative 
venture most of the time. When Marx was invited to write articles for 
the New York Daily Tribune, Putnam’s Monthly, and The New American 
Cyclopaedia, Engels translated some of his friend’s texts and also gave 
him material that was eventually published under the former’s name.6 
And Capital, especially volumes 2 and 3, would never have seen the 
light of day without the hard work of Engels.7
Whenever Marx needed advice, he would consult Engels, who 
also supported his friend financially for many years.8 The former was 
thankful for this support, as he highlighted in a letter to Engels on 7 
May 1867: »Without you, l would never have been able to bring the 
work to completion, and I assure you, it has always weighed on my 
conscience like an Alp that you have dissipated your splendid energy 
and let it rust on commercial matters, principally on my account, and 
into the bargain, still had to participate vicariously in all my minor 
troubles.«9 It is ironic that Engels was accused by many scholars, and 
Marxists in particular, for having revised Marx’s intentional ideas and 
therefore paved the way for all the misery that has been caused by 
dogmatic Marxism in the years ever since.10 Hence, and regardless of 
such criticism, Engels, especially 200 years after his birth, needs to be 
reconsidered and deserves to be treated as equally important as Marx. 
Considering the number of works this »open-minded, experimental, 
5 Ibid., 279.
6 Hunley, Life and Thought, 127.
7 Ibid., 137.
8 Ibid., 134.
9 Cited in ibid., 138.
10 Ibid., 96.
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heretical thinker«11 has left, it is very much worthwhile to have a closer 
look at his thoughts, especially since the historical interpretations of 
»Marxian theory« are related to his ideas and attempts to better un-
derstand the world and the forces that created it.12 
It should be taken into account that Gustav Mayer’s biography 
is still one of the best about Friedrich Engels;13 however, his life and 
work have unfortunately not attracted as much attention as those 
of Marx. Of course, most of these writings »were carried out as part 
of a mutual collaboration with Marx,«14 but there are »increasing 
attempts to view and treat Engels as separate and apart from Marx.« 
Although Indian politician and intellectual Rustam Singh argued 
that »[t]here may be some merit in these attempts, but, in our view, 
the separation creates more problems than it solves,«15 it seems to be 
valuable to take a closer look at Engels, especially when one dives 
into revolution theory in relation to Marxism. Naturally, and due 
to the mentioned working process the two intellectuals applied, »to 
study Engels separately … represents a very difficult task.«16 Mar-
tin Berger also remarked with regard to the overlap of ideas in the 
collected works of Marx and Engels that »[i]n the background of 
most studies of Marx and Marxism lurks the pale figure of Fried-
11 Gert Schäfer, »Friedrich Engels: Builder of Closed Systems?« Science & Society 62, 
no. 1 (1998), Friedrich Engels: A Critical Centenary Appreciation: 35.
12 Eric R. Wolf, »The Peasant War in Germany: Friedrich Engels as Social Histori-
an,« Science & Society 51, no. 1 (1987): 82.
13 Gustav Mayer, Friedrich Engels: Eine Biographie, 2 vols. (Berlin: Springer, 
1920 – 1933). For an early review of vol. 1 see Hermann Oncken, »Friedrich Engels 
und die Anfänge des deutschen Kommunismus,« Historische Zeitschrift 123, no. 2 
(1921): 241 – 242.
14 Elvira Concheiro, »A Century after His Death: Friedrich Engels and the Con-
cept of Political Parties,« Science & Society 62, no. 1 (1998), Friedrich Engels: A 
Critical Centenary Appreciation: 164.
15 Rustam Singh, »Status of Violence in Marx’s Theory of Revolution,« Economic 
and Political Weekly 24, no. 4 (1989): 9. A similar view is expressed in Edmund 
Silberner, The Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1946), 251.
16 Concheiro, »A Century after His Death,« 164.
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rich Engels. When a suitable Marx quotation fails to come to hand 
to illustrate a point, Engels can always fill in; thus most works on 
Marx and his Ism are really studies of Marxandengels. So close was 
the partnership of the two that it is virtually impossible to do Marx 
without including Engels.«17
However, considering that both men remained individuals and 
worked in their own fields of interest as well, one cannot simply de-
clare all of Engels’s work to be based on Marx’s ideas and vice versa.18 
Engels also remained the first and probably most important critic of 
his friend, and as Oscar J. Hammen put it, »Engels frequently enough 
was critical of Marx’s findings, but there is no evidence of a disturbing 
conflict of views. Marx, in turn, never hesitated to alter or reject the 
draft of an article by Engels — on one occasion even because the item 
was not written in the customary ›easygoing‹ (sic) style, when a ques-
tion of popularization was in the picture.«19 All in all, the two men 
lived and worked as equal partners, who still had their own ideas and 
projects, which they, however, would share and discuss with each oth-
er. They also profited from each other, not only financially, but first 
and foremost intellectually, a fact that made their »company-busi-
ness« so successful and productive for so many years.20 In contrast to 
Marx, whose economic work is that of a genius, Engels did not limit 
himself to one field of study, and, just as his intellectual sources may 
17 Martin Berger, »Disentangling Engels from Marxandengels,« International La-
bor and Working-Class History 12 (1977): 41.
18 Hans Peter Bleuel, Friedrich Engels: Bürger und Revolutionär (Bern / Munich: 
Scherz, 1981), William O. Henderson, The Life of Friedrich Engels, 2 vols. (Lon-
don: Frank Cass, 1976), Tristram Hunt, Friedrich Engels: Der Mann, der den 
Marxismus erfand, transl. by Klaus-Dieter Schmidt, third edition (Berlin: List, 
2020), and Norman Levine, The Tragic Deception: Marx contra Engels (Santa 
Barbara / Oxford, Clio Books, 1975) tried to provide a more separated view of 
Engels’s life.
19 Hammen, »Alienation, Communism, and Revolution,« 79. Also see Erhard 
Lucas, »Marx‹ und Engels’s Auseinandersetzung mit Darwin: Zur Differenz zwi-
schen Marx und Engels,« International Review of Social History 9, no. 3 (1964): 
433 – 434.
20 Hammen, »Alienation, Communism, and Revolution,« 79 and 82.
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have been diverse,21 so too were his writings with regard to the topics 
he covered.22 The two men were, however, not static in their thinking, 
but, as American historian Leonard Krieger (1918 – 1990) remarked, 
»it has been recognized that the passion for the comprehension of 
facts which drove Marx and Engels from the Hegelian dialectic to 
dialectical materialism drove them at the same time to a search for 
a command over historical and social knowledge.«23 Their result was 
a new way to explain and understand historical processes, a method 
that went away from the great men who determined human history 
and important events that changed the course of the world. They ex-
plained history as being related to class and class conflict, and there-
fore to the masses of the people.24 
When we talk about a Marxist-Engelsian approach towards histo-
ry, we talk about revolutionary history, something especially Engels 
outlined in his many works.25 Because communism, as Marx and En-
gels understood it, »sought to stand up for and with all the world’s 
oppressed peoples, especially its workers, who were being crushed 
under the wheels of industrialization, privatized greed, and a ruling 
elite’s attempt to monopolize wealth,«26 it is not surprising that they 
looked at the history of the people’s struggle against exploitation as 
well. According to their interpretation, i. e. historical materialism, »[t]
hese two men believed that all human history was leading inevitably 
to a class-based warfare that would result in the violent overthrow of 
the upper classes by the working class.«27 Engels, due to the existent 
21 Karl A. Wittfogel, »The Marxist View of Russian Society and Revolution,« World 
Politics 12, no. 4 (1960): 487.
22 Martin Berger, »Engel’s Theory of the Vanishing Army: A Key to the Develop-
ment of Marxist Revolutionary Tactics,« The Historian 37, no. 3 (1975): 422.
23 Leonard Krieger, »Marx and Engels as Historians,« Journal of the History of Ideas 
14, no. 3 (1953): 382.
24 Jonathan Joseph, Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent (Edinburgh: 
Edin burgh University Press, 2003), 6 and 9 – 15.
25 Krieger, »Marx and Engels as Historians,« 383.




situation in the late 1840s, also focused on social groups rather than 
political organizations when he considered the form and course of 
the revolutionary process that would supposedly follow in the near 
future.28 However, Engels was also aware that the existent conditions 
would play an important role in any revolution and therefore, not sur-
prisingly, changed his ideas about the revolution to come, although 
not his belief that it would eventually change the world. He consid-
ered revolutionary processes to act according to natural law, and in a 
letter to Marx in February 1851, Engels wrote: »A revolution is a pure 
phenomenon of nature, which is led more according to physical laws 
than according to the rules which in ordinary times determine the 
development of society. Or rather, these rules take on a much more 
physical character in revolution; material power emerges much more 
violently.«29
Since Marx and Engels, as historians, included their own experi-
ences in relation to the revolutionary events of the 19th century when 
they discussed the revolution of the future, they also pointed out the 
social and political shortcomings of a century in which the masses 
began to demand more power from those who had determined the 
latter’s fate for so long.30 The evaluation of bourgeois and proletarian 
revolution, as well as the interrelationship between the two, was a 
process for Marx and Engels, in which they changed their opinion 
multiple times, as they could observe failed revolutionary attempts 
over a long period of time. The two revolutionaries could look back 
on the events of 1848 / 49, and they also knew about the Great French 
Revolution. Therefore, they could base their theoretical assumptions 
on actual historical knowledge, although the failures of the past did 
not limit their revolutionary enthusiasm for the future.31 Like Marx 
28 Krieger, »Marx and Engels as Historians,« 388.
29 Cited in ibid., 392.
30 David Leopold, »The Structure of Marx and Engels’s Considered Account of 
Utopian Socialism,« History of Political Thought 26, no. 3 (2005): 466.
31 Martin Hundt, »Zur Entwicklung der marxistischen Revolutionstheorie nach 
der Revolution von 1848 / 49,« Marx-Engels-Jahrbuch 10 (1986): 31.
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and Engels, we have to be careful when we discuss revolutions in 
retrospect and consequently have to analyze them in their historical 
context.32 In the case of the two famous revolutionaries, this means 
that their ideas were the scientific condensation of actual experiences 
related to the revolutionary process of 1848 / 49. The witnessing of the 
failed revolution would determine the scientific condensation of their 
thoughts about future revolutions,33 a process not only Marx and En-
gels went through. While theoretical works about the formation of 
Marxist revolution theory were legion in an East German context,34 a 
detailed analysis of Engels’s works and his thoughts on revolution as 
a phenomenon of modernity has not really been of interest since the 
end of the Cold War, although some reflections were provided by his-
torian Martin Hundt in 1986. Hundt also argues that Engels’s revo-
lution theory could not ignore his actual experience of the revolution 
in 1848 / 49 and, like other revolution theories, was the consequence 
of historical developments witnessed by the author of such theoretical 
reflections.35 The Communist Manifesto (1848) was consequently the 
attempt to provide a solid revolution theory for the first time; howev-
er, it would have to be proven by historical developments,36 and due 
to the many failed revolutions that would follow in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, it was redefined and reconfigured by other revolutionaries 
32 Manfred Kossok, »Revolution und Weltgeschichte im Werk von Walter Mar-
kov,« in Walter Markov, Weltgeschichte im Revolutionsquadrat, ed. and introduced 
by Manfred Kossok (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1982), ix. 
33 Hundt, »Zur Entwicklung,« 31.
34 Wolfgang Eichhorn, »Gesetzmäßigkeit von Revolutionen,« Sitzungsberichte der 
Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR. Gesellschaftswissenschaften 11 (1984); Ernst 
Engelberg and Wolfgang Küttler, eds. Formationstheorie und Geschichte: Studien 
zur historischen Untersuchung von Gesellschaftsformationen Werk von Marx, En-
gels und Lenin (Berlin: Akademie-Verlagm 1978); Manfred Kossok, ed. Studien 
über die Revolution (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1969); Manfred Kossok and Walter 
Markov, eds. Studien zur vergleichenden Revolutionsgeschichte 1500 – 1917 (Berlin: 
Akademie-Verlag, 1974).
35 Hundt, »Zur Entwicklung,« 33 – 34. 
36 Ibid., 34.
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who turned Marxism into a new form of historical interpretation, e. g. 
Leninism or Maoism. 
Regardless of such later changes, the present chapter intends to 
take a closer look at Friedrich Engels’s writings and ideas about rev-
olution. First, however, a look at his life as a revolutionary shall be 
taken in order to explain where his ideas originated from. In the 
second part, the chapter will then pay close attention to some texts 
by Engels in which he develops his ideas in relation to a revolution 
he believed would soon change the world. It is important to under-
stand that Engels did not create a static revolution theory, but rather 
tried to adjust his thoughts over a long period of time to match the 
existent preconditions. He nevertheless was a true believer in revo-
lution and never gave up on preparing himself and society for a tre-
mendous transformation that would soon take place. Unfortunately, 
Engels and his ideas were often used as a scapegoat to explain the 
failures of revolutionary processes in the 20th century when Marxist 
ideas about revolution and decontextualized quotes from Marx and 
Engels were used to make arguments on behalf of corrupted revo-
lutionary governments, whose leaders claimed to rule only in the 
sense of Marx and Engels and at the same time promised a new and 
better world.37 This was probably also possible due to the fact that 
Engels in particular had written about the revolution in different 
tones at different times. His revolution theory was a work in process 
and therefore must be understood as something that might have 
fitted into the 19th century but could not be applied to the events 
of the 20th century without further processing. Regardless of this 
fact, however, Engels’s writings about revolution are important to 
understand this global phenomenon of modernity a bit better, and 
those interested in revolution theory and its application in the 21st 
century should be encouraged to pay close attention to these writ-
ings to better understand revolutionary processes, and especially the 
dangers related to them.
37 Frank Jacob, 1917: Die korrumpierte Revolution (Marburg: Büchner, 2020). 
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The Revolutionary Life of Friedrich Engels
Engels was interested in philosophy from early on,38 which probably 
revolutionized his mind and made him aware of the problems of his 
time.39 When he first arrived in England in 1842 to work in the cotton 
business of his father, Engels already, to quote British historian Greg-
ory Claeys, »considered himself as something of a revolutionary,« and 
when considering his early writings, including The Condition of the 
Working Class in England (1845), it seems clear »that he expected and 
desired a revolution to take place there.«40 When he met Marx for the 
first time at the Rheinische Zeitung in 1842, Engels had probably been 
more revolutionary than his future friend and companion, and it is 
not surprising that his revolutionary ambitions were even intensified 
by his experiences in Manchester between 1842 and 1844.41 It was the 
British industrial center that offered Engels a deeper insight into the 
functioning of industrial capitalism, and the exploitation and poverty 
of the working class he observed there would turn the young capitalist 
into a socialist revolutionary. In August 1844 he met Marx again, this 
time in Paris, where the latter worked on the Deutsch-Französische 
Jahrbücher, and the two men eventually forged their friendship while 
discussing their theoretical ideas for ten days.42 Engels would become 
one of the few people Marx accepted as intellectually equal, and the 
38 Georges Labica, »Engels and Marxist Philosophy,« Science & Society 62, no. 1 
(1998), Friedrich Engels: A Critical Centenary Appreciation: 13 – 34.
39 Narihiko Ito, »Realismus und Utopismus,« in Zwischen Utopie und Kritik: Fried-
rich Engels — ein »Klassiker« nach 100 Jahren, eds. Theodor Bergmann, Mario 
Keßler, Joost Kircz and Gert Schäfer (Hamburg: VSA, 1996), 23 – 33.
40 Gregory Claeys, »The Political Ideas of the Young Engels, 1842 – 1845: Owenism, 
Chartism, and the Question of Violent Revolution in the Transition from ›Uto-
pian‹ to ›Scientific‹ Socialism,« History of Political Thought 6, no. 3 (1985): 457.
41 Philip Erbentraut and Torben Lütjen, »Eine Welt zu gewinnen: Entstehungskon-
text, Wirkungsweise undNarrationsstruktur des ›Kommunistischen Manifests‹,« 
in Manifeste: Geschichte und Gegenwart des politischen Appells, eds. Johanna Klatt 
and Robert Lorenz (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2010), 77.
42 Friedich Engels, »Zur Geschichte des Bundes der Kommunisten,« in Marx-Engels- 
Werke (Berlin: Dietz, 1956-, henceforth MEW), 21: 212.
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following years would show that the two were quite good at working 
as a productive joint venture. On the other hand, Engels worshipped 
Marx and often agreed to work for his friend instead of following his 
own interests to a larger extent.43 
In his spare time, however, Engels worked extensively on many 
other things than just economic questions. One field he was partic-
ularly interested in was military matters,44 and he not only studied 
military history but also strategy and tactics, although Engels would 
also set his knowledge about military affairs in the context of his rev-
olutionary ambitions and reflections about the revolution he hoped 
to witness soon, despite the failure of that of 1848 / 49.45 In military 
science, it was therefore Engels who »was the dominant member of 
the Marx-Engels partnership,« and it was not only there but in many 
other relevant fields of his expertise that »he was the originator, not 
merely a popularizer or vulgarizer of Marx’s ideas.«46 The famous Ger-
man revolutionary also steadily combined his knowledge in military 
affairs with his revolution theory, e. g. his Theory of the Vanishing 
Army, and was therefore able to understand revolutionary processes in 
their full complexity. His studies in relation to different military mat-
ters consequently »shaped the classical Marxist approach to the tim-
ing and tactics of revolution.«47 This also becomes obvious due to the 
fact that Engels had had some experiences during the Revolution of 
1848 when he was actively involved in the fight against the European 
reaction, which he would later reflect upon in his writings about revo-
lution: »Revolutions, Engels said, produced confusion, and confusion 
43 Erbentraut and Lütjen, »Eine Welt zu gewinnen,« 78.
44 For a detailed discussion see Jehuda L. Wallach, Die Kriegslehre von Friedrich En-
gels (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1968); Gerhard Zirke, Der 
General: Friedrich Engels, der erste Militârtheoretiker der Arbeiterklasse (Leipzig: 
Urania-Verlag, 1967).
45 Berger, »Engel’s Theory of the Vanishing Army,« 421 – 422; Martin Kitchen, »Frie-
drich Engels’s Theory of War,« Military Affairs 41, no. 3 (1977): 119; Wittfogel, 
»The Marxist View,« 489.
46 Berger, »Engel’s Theory of the Vanishing Army,« 422.
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did not promote military efficiency. Unorganized enthusiasm would 
not win battles.«48 With regard to the growing militarism in Europe, 
Engels also predicted that this would lead to revolution,49 although, in 
contrast to his assumptions, such revolutions, e. g. in Russia in 1917 
or Germany in 1918, would not change the world and end capitalism.
Due to his experience of the failed Revolution of 1848, it seemed 
clear that the revolution of the future needed to be better prepared, 
and tactical considerations, including those about the military and 
its role during such a revolutionary process, were quite prominent 
in Marx’s and Engels’s writings of later years.50 Engels, in particular, 
»expressed increasing revulsion at the prospect of a future world war, 
which threatened to destroy all the advances made not only by the 
working class and by socialist movements, but by Western civilization 
itself.«51 He also emphasized the role of a crisis in stimulating the 
increase in revolutionary potential in the late 1850s. In 1857 he wrote 
to Marx that »[a] continuing economic depression could be used by 
astute revolutionary strategy as a useful weapon for a chronic pres-
sure … in order to warm up the people … just as a cavalry attack has 
greater elan if the horses trot five hundred paces before coming within 
charging distance of the enemy.«52 Engels consequently included his 
own observations in his reflections about the future revolution. This 
also highlights that Engels’s revolution theory was a process based 
on his everyday life experience since the 1840s. The theory, therefore, 
cannot be considered as absolute, but rather a work in progress. In 
the 21st century, this means that Engels’s assumptions can be accepted 
as a theoretical base or framework, which, nevertheless, needs to be 
adjusted to the present-day context.
48 Ibid., 425.
49 See for example Engels’s preface to The Capital (1886) or Friedrich Engels, Herr 
Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science (Anti-Dühring) (New York: International 
Publishers, 1939), 189 – 190.
50 Neumann and von Hagen, »Engels and Marx on Revolution,« 262.
51 Ibid.
52 Cited in ibid., 263.
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Marx and Engels understood that their theoretical approach to 
understand the world and to prepare the revolution of the future 
needed to include multiple aspects, e. g. economic development, for-
eign policy, military affairs, etc. In addition, they realized, to quote 
Sigmund Neumann and Mark von Hagen once more, »that the fu-
ture of the European revolution would not be determined by the ef-
forts of one country alone. This realization directed their attention to 
a serious consideration of the relationships between socialism, mil-
itary policy, and foreign affairs, because without an understanding 
of these relationships a realistic revolutionary strategy could not be 
possible.«53 At the same time, both tried to criticize the existent order 
for its shortcomings and the existent stumbling blocks that prevented 
people from realizing the necessity of revolution.54 Regardless of such 
criticism, Marx and Engels were in favor of nationalism as well, as 
long as it was directed towards their favored goals, e. g. the unification 
of Germany and Italy or Polish independence from Russia.55
Regardless of such aspects related to the revolutionary thoughts of 
the two men, it was the experience of 1848 / 49 that first and foremost 
defined the theoretical reflections of Marx and Engels, who, due to 
the outcomes of the European revolution in these years, accepted the 
lessons and necessities for a new and inevitable revolutionary attempt 
in the near future: »Equally inevitable [as another revolution] was the 
violent nature of this revolution. This inevitability of the revolution 
and its violent nature was determined by the very structures of the 
bourgeois system. Marx and Engels concluded this on the basis of 
their analysis of the historical forces and the then existing social rela-
tions, and of the nature of private property.«56 For Marx and Engels, 
53 Ibid., 264.
54 For Engels’s views on religion see Michael Löwy, »Friedrich Engels on Religion 
and Class Struggle,« Science & Society 62, no. 1 (1998), Friedrich Engels: A Critical 
Centenary Appreciation: 81.
55 Horace B. Davis, »Nations, Colonies and Social Classes: The Position of Marx 
and Engels,« Science & Society 29, no. 1 (1965): 27; Iring Fetscher, »Friedrich En-
gels, Polen und der Russische Imperialismus,« Osteuropa 7, no. 6 (1957): 431.
56 Singh, »Status of Violence,« 9.
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it was clear that »[t]he revolution is necessary … not only because the 
ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but also because 
the class overthrowing it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding 
itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society an-
ew.«57 Further studies and experiences, however, made the two men 
rethink their attitude towards violence. In some political systems, a 
peaceful change, i. e. the working masses gaining the popular vote in 
the elections and the popular vote, seemed at least possible, although 
the ›revolutionary twins‹ emphasized »that the working class should 
not forego its right to use violent methods even at such places because 
the ruling classes could not be expected to give up their power, even 
here, without an armed resistance.«58
In February 1848, Engels was more than enthusiastic about the 
revolution and was sure that it would bring the anticipated changes 
with it in no time.59 Well aware of the history of the French Revolu-
tion, however, Marx and Engels had to witness how the Revolution 
of 1848 was corrupted similarly to the French Revolution of 1789 and 
ended with a Bonaparte ruling France again. Marx, in The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852), commented on this fact as follows: 
»Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and per-
sonages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as 
tragedy, the second time as farce.«60 The revolutionary process seemed 
to have repeated the doomed course of that of 1789.61 As participants, 
nevertheless, Marx and Engels had tried to influence the course of the 
57 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (Moscow: Progress Pub-
lishers, 1976), 60, cited in ibid.
58 Ibid., 18.
59 Christopher Andrew, Secret World: A History of Intelligence (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2018), 386.
60 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852). Accessed August 
20, 2020. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/. 
61 Bernard H. Moss, »Marx and Engels on French Social Democracy: Historians or 
Revolutionaries?« Journal of the History of Ideas 46, no. 4 (1985): 541. For a discus-
sion of generic revolutionary processes and the danger of them being corrupted 
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revolution and lead it to a positive outcome. Marx left Paris for Co-
logne, where he worked as the editor of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung 
that was launched on 1 June 1848. Engels later emphasized that the 
journal was led by his friend like a dictator, but he was able to achieve 
a circulation of 5,000 issues of the paper, which was quite impressive 
for the time.62 Despite their involvement, their attempt to radicalize 
the revolutionary process, and their hopes for a real change as a con-
sequence, the revolution lost its dynamic, and it seemed impossible 
to achieve the changes that had been demanded by the representatives 
of the international proletariat.63 The revolution remained unfulfilled, 
a half one, and the revolutionaries failed to overthrow the bourgeois 
elites who continued to determine the fate of the single nation states. 
For the moment, it seemed clear that the hopes and aims of Marx 
and Engels would remain long-term goals, while the former coined 
the idea of a revolution in permanence (Revolution in Permanenz) in 
March 1850.64 This concept would be essential for the further study 
of and discussions about revolutions, and it was particularly necessary 
because the revolution of 1848 had unexpectedly strengthened the 
counter-revolutionary forces across Europe. Very soon after its ap-
pearance, »[t]he revolutionary momentum faded away without visi-
ble result,«65 although the many military struggles had turned Europe 
into the battlefield of a civil war-like conflict about the future and a 
vision for modernity. It was the eventual failure of this revolution-
ary attempt that demanded an explanation and therefore stimulated 
the further development of a scientific form of socialism. Marx and 
Engels would work on this specific issue in their post-revolutionary 
exile. One of their assumptions in relation to their studies was the fact 
62 Andrew, Secret World, 387.
63 Peter Stadler, »Wirtschaftskrise und Revolution bei Marx und Engels: Zur Ent-
wicklung ihres Denkens inden 1850er Jahren,« Historische Zeitschrift 199, no. 1 
(1964): 113.
64 Ibid., 114; Erik van Ree, »Marxism as Permanent Revolution,« History of Political 
Thought 34, no. 3 (2013): 540.
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that a crisis was considered to be a necessary trigger66 for every future 
revolution to begin, and when the European economies seemed to be 
under pressure in 1857, they had hopes that »the European reaction 
would give way to a new revolutionary situation. Engels was delight-
ed by the thought that he might soon be able to leave business for 
the battlefield and his office stool for a horse.«67 In addition to their 
scientific approach to the study of revolutions, Marx and Engels, as a 
consequence of their experiences of 1848, interpreted history as such 
as a permanent class struggle.68 Alongside this conclusion, Engels 
also realized the important interrelation between war and revolution. 
While the latter could be triggered by the former, revolutions could 
also cause wars, especially civil wars in the course of the events relat-
ed to a revolutionary process. Due to this insight, Engels remained 
interested in the military developments and the wars of his time, be 
it the Crimean War, the US Civil War, or the Franco-Prussian War.69 
Maybe he was observing these historical events so closely because he 
hoped that they would unleash another, this time maybe successful, 
revolutionary process. He would also do so as Engels, like Marx, con-
tinued to believe that only a revolution would be able to create a new 
social order and therefore must have been considered the conditio sine 
qua non for a better world.70 
The revolutionary events of 1848 / 49 consequently forced the 
two revolutionaries to formulate a concise theory that incorporated 
the history of revolutions, one that Marx and Engels had witnessed 
themselves. The failure, therefore, must have had an impact on the 
understanding of revolutions and the future political course of the 
proletariat, whose representatives had again not been successful in 
involving the masses at a level that was perceived as essential for the 
66 MEW 7: 440. For a detailed analysis see Stadler, »Wirtschaftskrise und Revoluti-
on,« 113 – 144.
67 Neumann and von Hagen, »Engels and Marx on Revolution,« 268.
68 Ibid., 269.
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success of revolutionary change for the future. They intensified their 
study of revolutions to come up with a more sophisticated revolution 
theory, one that would pay tribute to history and the failures of the 
past.71 It was at this time that the terms »locomotives of history« and 
»dictatorship of the proletariat« first appeared in Marx’s and Engels’s 
works, although the two intellectuals never really accurately defined 
what the latter actually meant.72 Their works between 1849 and 1852 
predominantly deal with the question of why the revolution had 
failed, although capitalist structures were well developed at the time, 
and why it had been unable to have the impact of the Great French 
Revolution some decades before, especially in the sense that it did not 
provide a chance for the communists to drive the revolutionary pro-
cess any further.73 This would, with regard to the further theoretical 
considerations of Marx and Engels, be one of their main questions: 
How could the bourgeois-democratic revolution be driven forward to 
reach the proletarian revolution as some kind of second step in the 
overall process?74 The historical example of the French Revolution 
could therefore no longer be used as an ultimate example, although 
their experience of 1848 / 49 was often reflected and framed according 
to their historical knowledge about the events in France between 1789 
and 1799.75 
The events Marx and Engels witnessed during the Revolution of 
1848 would nevertheless function as a theoretical filter for a recon-
sideration of the French Revolution.76 This means that every revolu-
71 Hundt, »Zur Entwicklung,« 34.
72 Ibid. On the »dictatorship of the proletariat« see Mike Schmeitzner, »Lenin und 
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mus und Demokratie 14 (2017): 17 – 69.
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tionsauffassung,« Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 28, no. 2 (1980): 99 – 118.
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tionary theory needs to be updated according to the course of history, 
which is why the two intellectuals did not understand their own the-
oretical reflections as something that was written in stone, but rather 
as something that needed to be adjusted depending on the actual 
historical course of the future. This is one important aspect that we 
have to include in our understanding of revolutions as well. They are 
flexible processes that can hardly be predicted, and there will never 
be absolute knowledge about the next step within such a process, es-
pecially since revolutions are driven forward by human beings, who 
might not even act or understand themselves as conscious revolution-
aries. Revolutions, and this was understood by Marx and Engels, had 
to be seen within their specific space-time continuum,77 and although 
we can identify some generic developments and possible steps, a rev-
olutionary process can evolve; accordingly, every revolution must be 
studied in its specific space-time continuum to fully understand its 
nature, history, and very often its failure as well.
Nevertheless, for Marx and Engels, the working class, i. e. the pro-
letariat, would play the important role within a successful revolution of 
the future. Hundt identified three constant aspects of Marxist revolu-
tion theory that had their origin in the experiences of 1848 / 49, namely
1. the working class is already an essential part of the bourgeois-de-
mocratic revolution,
2. the determination, bravery, and energy of a revolutionary class, on 
the one hand, and reason and scientific consciousness on the other 
are decisive elements in times of a revolutionary crisis, and
3. the revolution has to be kept energetic or alive to guarantee suc-
cess in the end.78
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Marx and Engels had, according to these principles, identified four 
main aspects related to the Revolution of 1848. These are:
1. the proletariat needs to be self-organized and led by a revolutio-
nary fighting party,
2. the proletariat can only apply its power if it becomes the head and 
heart of a popular revolution, i. e. leading the masses during the 
revolutionary process to ultimately achieve a social change as well,
3. the proletariat has to break with and destroy the old political sys-
tem to establish a classless order, and
4. the revolutionary workers‹ movement is not only limited by his-
torical materialism and economically determined conditions, but 
has more than one option for its course of action.79
The course of history could consequently only be changed by a rev-
olution if the latter did not act according to non-existent precon-
ditions, which is why each revolutionary process had to deal with 
specific conditions that could not yet be taken into consideration. 
This also makes comparative studies of revolutions necessary to really 
understand the generic aspects that exist and determine revolutionary 
processes, while differences can highlight specific factors that need to 
be taken into consideration while reflecting upon a historical revolu-
tion.80 
Regardless of these theoretical reflections, »Marx and Engels per-
sistently repeated the same essential points, independently of cir-
cumstance, medium and audience. The conception of a two-stage 
but uninterrupted revolution belonged to their stable core beliefs, 
from which they did not back away.«81 They, however, reformulated 
their revolution theory and relevant political strategies between 1843 
and 1850 based on their actual experiences, which means that they 
attempted to use their own experiences to establish a scientific rev-
79 Ibid., 50 – 51.
80 Ibid., 52.
81 van Ree, »Marxism as Permanent Revolution,« 544.
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olution model that would also apply the idea of historical material-
ism while still being flexible enough to be useful for revolutionaries 
in different contexts. That implies that they did not have a static 
model in mind that should be applied for all revolutions. They rath-
er thought of a collection of thoughts that might be used to better 
understand revolutionary processes as such, including their diversity 
with regard to time and place. At the same time, as US scholar Dan 
Edelstein highlighted, »[h]istory itself thus allowed Marx to update 
the revolutionary theory he and Engels had laid out previously in 
the Communist Manifesto. In defeat, the proletarians had come out 
of the shadows of the bourgeoisie and assumed their own identity as 
a revolutionary class.«82 In their works of the 1840s and 1850s, Marx 
and Engels tried to find the answer to their revolutionary hopes and, 
during that process, were eager to establish a set of rules or almost 
natural laws that could be applied to revolutions and taken into con-
sideration by future revolutionaries.83 As representatives of »an inter-
national community of revolutionary exiles,«84 it seemed almost nat-
ural that they would pay attention to the events that had caused their 
exile and the future revolutionary events, which could end it again.
How Engels addressed these pressing questions with regard to 
revolution, its meaning, its history, and its future shall be taken 
into closer consideration in the following section, which will pro-
vide a close reading of the early writings of the famous German 
intellectual. 
82 Edelstein, »Revolution in Permanence,« 374.
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Engels on Revolution
From early on, it was clear for Engels that a »revolution by legal 
means — in itself a contradiction, a practical impossibility«85 was im-
possible, because the capitalist elites would not allow a new social 
order to come into existence in a politically legal way. The early com-
munists, who organized themselves not only in Paris but also in cities 
of northern Germany,86 consequently had to figure out how to reach 
a better future, which for Engels was not utopian at all87 but also 
not achievable without conflict between the classes, namely between 
the exploiting and the exploited ones. In a later preface to the 1887 
American edition of his famous work The Condition of the Working 
Class in England (1845), Engels again highlighted the necessity for a 
revolution when he remarked: »What the Socialists demand, implies 
a total revolution of the whole system of social production.«88 That 
this revolution would be the expression of a class struggle was also 
highlighted in the 1891 preface to the English edition of the work: 
»So long as the wealthy classes not only do not feel the want of any 
emancipation, but strenuously oppose the self-emancipation of the 
working-class, so long the social revolution will have to be prepared 
and fought out by the working-class alone.«89 In the famous work 
itself, Engels described not only the life and precarious situation of 
the English working class, but also how this modern proletariat had 
been created by the industrial revolution, which he considered to be 
85 Frederick Engels, »The Internal Crises,« Rheinische Zeitung, no. 343 and 344, 
December 9 and 10, 1842. Accessed July 29, 2020. https://marxists.catbull.com/
archive/marx/works/1842/12/09.htm. 
86 Frederick Engels, »Continental Socialism,« in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 
Collected Works, vol. 4 (London: Lawrence & Wishart 2010), 212 – 213.
87 Frederick Engels, »Description of Recently Founded Communist Colonies Still 
in Existence,« in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 4 (Lon-
don: Lawrence & Wishart 2010), 214 – 228. 
88 Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England, London 1891 
[Leipzig 1845]. Accessed July 29, 2020. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/
works/download/pdf/condition-working-class-england.pdf.
89 Ibid.
Friedrich Engels and Revolution Theory 69
»of the same importance for England as the political revolution for 
France, and the philosophical revolution for Germany.«90 
The sorrows and sufferings of the English workers, however, 
would, according to Engels, only cease to exist as the consequence of 
a revolution: »When such insanity prevails in the property-holding 
class, when it is so blinded by its momentary profit that it no longer 
has eyes for the most conspicuous signs of the times, surely all hope 
of a peaceful solution of the social question for England must be 
abandoned. The only possible solution is a violent revolution, which 
cannot fail to take place.«91 Considering Engels’s early work, it is re-
markable that he had already identified the relation between capitalist 
exploitation and the stimulation for a revolution that is created by 
the exploitative politics of the ruling class. For the young man, who 
had been involved in the business of the ruling class but also seen 
the misery it created in towns like Manchester, consequently argued 
that the continuation of the current exploitative means of capitalism 
would eventually allow no other choice for the masses but to rise 
through revolution to change the existent economic, political, and 
social system. Or, as Engels formulated it,
assuming that England retained the monopoly of manufactures, that 
its factories perpetually multiply, what must be the result? The com-
mercial crises would continue, and grow more violent, more terrible, 
with the extension of industry and the multiplication of the prole-
tariat. The proletariat would increase in geometrical proportion, in 
consequence of the progressive ruin of the lower middle-class and the 
giant strides with which capital is concentrating itself in the hands of 
the few; and the proletariat would soon embrace the whole nation, 
with the exception of a few millionaires. But in this development 
there comes a stage at which the proletariat perceives how easily the 





As the English bourgeoisie would not correct the course of history 
by itself, a revolution seemed inevitable. This also means that the 
prophecy of revolution was already expressed by Engels in his initial 
work, although in a specifically English national context. It was con-
sequently obvious that a conflict between the classes needed to find 
its climax in revolution, which needed to be prepared and led by the 
working class: »So long as the wealthy classes not only do not feel the 
want of any emancipation, but strenuously oppose the self-emancipa-
tion of the working class, so long the social revolution will have to be 
prepared and fought out by the working class alone.«93
In his »Principles of Communism« (»Grundsätze des Kommunis-
mus,« 1847), Engels would continue his reflections on communism 
and revolution. The former he considered to be the doctrine of the 
conditions for the liberation of the proletariat, the class that solely 
gains within the capitalist system by selling its labor: »The proletariat, 
or the class of proletarians, is, in a word, the working class of the 19th 
century.«94 In contrast to the slave, the proletarian has to sell his work 
at a daily or hourly rate and has no secured existence. The proletar-
ian, again in contrast to the slave, is consequently part of capitalist 
competition and is accepted as a member of society. Consequently, 
the proletarian has a better legal status than the slave, but is regularly 
exploited while his life is threatened by this form of capitalist ex-
ploitation. While the slave can be liberated when slavery is abolished, 
the proletarian, however, can only be free when private property as 
such ceases to exist.95
The communists at the same time know, as Engels describes in 
his answer to question 16, which asks how the abolition of private 
property can be achieved, that revolutions are not purposely and ar-
93 Ibid.
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bitrarily made, but that they are the result of existent preconditions.96 
Once the global proletariat is forced into such a revolution by its 
steady exploitation, it will lead to the end of private property and 
the capitalist exploitation of the masses. In his answer to question 
18, which asks for the course of such a revolution, Engels describes a 
12-point agenda for the measures that would have to be taken by the 
proletariat, once a democratic system had been established. Engels 
argues that without a proletarian lead and instrumentalization of the 
revolution, a change of the social order would not be possible. His 12 
measures shall therefore be quoted here in some more detail:
1. Limitation of private property through progressive taxation, heavy 
inheritance taxes, abolition of inheritance through collateral lines 
(brothers, nephews, etc.) forced loans, etc.
2. Gradual expropriation of landowners, industrialists, railroad mag-
nates and shipowners, partly through competition by state indus-
try, partly directly through compensation in the form of bonds.
3. Confiscation of the possessions of all emigrants and rebels against 
the majority of the people.
4. Organization of labor or employment of proletarians on publicly 
owned land, in factories and workshops, with competition among 
the workers being abolished and with the factory owners, in so 
far as they still exist, being obliged to pay the same high wages as 
those paid by the state.
5. An equal obligation on all members of society to work until such 
time as private property has been completely abolished. Formati-
on of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
6. Centralization of money and credit in the hands of the state th-
rough a national bank with state capital, and the suppression of all 
private banks and bankers.
7. Increase in the number of national factories, workshops, railroads, 
ships; bringing new lands into cultivation and improvement of 
96 Ibid.
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land already under cultivation — all in proportion to the growth 
of the capital and labor force at the disposal of the nation.
8. Education of all children, from the moment they can leave their 
mother’s care, in national establishments at national cost. Educa-
tion and production together.
9. Construction, on public lands, of great palaces as communal dwel-
lings for associated groups of citizens engaged in both industry 
and agriculture and combining in their way of life the advantages 
of urban and rural conditions while avoiding the one-sidedness 
and drawbacks of each.
10. Destruction of all unhealthy and jerry-built dwellings in urban 
districts.
11. Equal inheritance rights for children born in and out of wedlock.
12. Concentration of all means of transportation in the hands of the 
nation.97
Once the first strike against private property has been waged by the 
proletariat, Engels continues, the latter will be forced to drive the 
change of the existent economic and social order further and further 
and »[f ]inally, when all capital, all production, all exchange have 
been brought together in the hands of the nation, private property 
will disappear of its own accord, money will become superfluous, 
and production will so expand and man so change that society will 
be able to slough off whatever of its old economic habits may re-
main.«98
With regard to the character of the future revolution as a world 
revolution, Engels also highlights that the globalization of capital-
ism will eventually cause a universal and global revolution, one that 
will probably change the world in our century, as capitalism seems to 
have reached its maximum extent and is currently facing an extreme 
global crisis, caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Engels, however, 
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
Friedrich Engels and Revolution Theory 73
although writing in the 19th century, had already foreseen that the 
anti-capitalist revolution would ultimately be a world revolution:
By creating the world market, big industry has already brought all the 
peoples of the Earth, and especially the civilized peoples, into such 
close relation with one another that none is independent of what 
happens to the others. Further, it has co-ordinated the social develop-
ment of the civilized countries to such an extent that, in all of them, 
bourgeoisie and proletariat have become the decisive classes, and the 
struggle between them the great struggle of the day. It follows that 
the communist revolution will not merely be a national phenomenon 
but must take place simultaneously in all civilized countries … It is 
a universal revolution and will, accordingly, have a universal range.
Engels, in this text, already developed some of the basic considerations 
of communism that would later also be expressed in the Communist 
Manifesto (1848)99 that, although relatively unimportant during the 
Revolution of 1848, would turn into a key document of human his-
tory.100 Although the text lost some of its appeal after the end of the 
Cold War, the present crisis stimulated some interest again, especially 
since more and more young people are looking for alternatives to 
the capitalist world order. Marx and Engels consequently pointed the 
navigators of a revolutionary course to the future.101
In their key theoretical text, the two intellectuals argued that the 
history of all past societies must be understood as one of class strug-
gle.102 In this struggle, the whole of society is divided according to two 
main classes, namely the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.103 While the 
99 On the genesis of the Communist Manifesto see Erbentraut and Lütjen, »Eine 
Welt zu gewinnen,« 79 – 84. On the importance and impact of this text see Hun-
ley, Life and Thought of Friedrich Engels, 65 – 79.
100 Erbentraut and Lütjen, »Eine Welt zu gewinnen,« 73.
101 Ibid., 76.
102 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, »Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei (1848),« 
in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke, vol. 4 (Berlin: Dietz, 1959), 462.
103 Ibid., 463.
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revolutionary class, i. e. the proletariat, holds the power to eventually 
overcome the existent order and is therefore joined by some enlight-
ened parts of the ruling class, it is the former that is the only truly 
revolutionary class.104 The already existent yet hidden civil war be-
tween the classes will eventually turn into an open revolution, which 
will become the base for the violent end of the bourgeoisie and the 
establishment of proletarian rule.105 The communists are perceived as 
part of the international workers‹ parties, namely the one that drives 
the proletariat forward to take their revolutionary chance if the latter 
should appear in a time of crisis.106 The communist revolution will 
eventually break with the existent conditions of property and capital 
in the most radical way possible to end the exploitation of one part 
of society by another.107 The revolution would have to make that pos-
sible by first establishing a democratic republic that could then be 
turned into a classless society, and therefore Engels explained in 1892 
that »Marx and I, for forty years, repeated ad nauseam that for us the 
democratic republic is the only political form in which the struggle 
between the working class and the capitalist class can first be univer-
salized and then culminate in the decisive victory of the proletariat.«108 
Regardless of the claims and the attempt to provide a scientific ex-
planation of class struggle and the role of the revolution in overcom-
ing it, the manifesto had, in a way, predicted the revolutionary events 
of 1848, although the outcome was quite different to that which was 
expected by the two German revolutionaries.109 While Marx tried to 
forge the »›people’s alliance,‹ the worker-peasant-petit bourgeois coa-
lition to fight for the democratic revolution«110 through his work for 
the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, Engels himself was actually involved in 
104 Ibid., 471 – 472.
105 Ibid., 473.
106 Ibid., 474.
107 Ibid., 480 – 481.
108 August H. Nimtz, »Marx and Engels on the Revolutionary Party,« Socialist Reg-
ister 53 (2017), Rethinking Revolution: 249.
109 Ibid., 250.
110 Ibid., 251.
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military operations during the revolutionary war, but eventually both 
men had to accept the facts, namely the failure of the revolutionary 
movement to gain mass support and to overthrow the existent order. 
In the end, it seems to have been clear that their predictions were only 
partly true, which is why both intellectuals continued 1) to consider 
their revolution theory to be a work in progress and 2) to further 
study historical events in relation to revolutionary processes. Since 
both of them had to live in exile due to their own roles during the 
Revolution of 1848, the failure was particularly felt by both intellectu-
als and their intensified interest to find out about the reasons for the 
revolution’s failure was quite natural.
In 1850, Engels published The Peasant War in Germany,111 a work 
that, to quote US anthropologist Eric R. Wolf, »represents a mile-
stone in social history, and remains a major contribution to debates 
about the historic role of peasantry today as in the past,« because »it 
attempted to understand the forces of revolution and counterrevolu-
tion as consequences of a determinate relationship of classes.«112 With 
The Peasant War in Germany, Engels tried to provide more than just a 
reflection about a historical episode of the past. He went way beyond 
that, and presented a »class analysis of the German countryside« and 
discussed »the question of historical maturity of the peasantry, the 
special features of peasant movements, the role of the peasantry in 
history, and the relationship between revolutionary leaders and the 
masses.«113 He consequently tries to follow his own suggestions by 
considering »revolutionary« events of the past in their specific con-
texts to better understand why they happened or eventually failed. 
Engels therefore began to analyze different revolutionary case studies 
to gain further insight for his theoretical understanding of revolution-
ary processes. 
111 Friedrich Engels, »Der deutsche Bauernkrieg (1850),« in Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels, Werke, vol. 7 (Berlin: Dietz, 1960), 327 – 413.
112 Wolf, »The Peasant War in Germany,« 83 – 84.
113 Theodor Bergmann, »Engels on Agriculture,« Science & Society 62, no. 1 (1998), 
Friedrich Engels: A Critical Centenary Appreciation: 147.
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Engels also wanted to emphasize that there was a German revolu-
tionary tradition, although the German states had since 1815 instead 
been in support of the counter-revolutionary forces of Europe:
The German people are by no means lacking in revolutionary tra-
dition. There were times when Germany produced characters that 
could match the best men in the revolutions of other countries; when 
the German people manifested an endurance and energy which, in a 
centralized nation, would have brought the most magnificent results; 
when the German peasants and plebeians were pregnant with ideas 
and plans which often made their descendants shudder.114
Regardless of this emphasis, the revolutionary events since 1848 had 
shown that a post-revolutionary unified Germany was not yet a pos-
sibility. This problem would also be at the center of Engels’s con-
siderations in »Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany« 
(1851 / 52).115 
The articles that were published by the New York Daily Tribune un-
der Marx’s name between 25 October 1851 and 23 October 1852 were 
only identified to have originated in Engels’s thought and to have been 
written by him in 1913, and their first publication in book form had 
been made possible by Eleanor Marx (1855 – 1898) in 1896. It was written 
in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1848, after which, according to 
Engels, the »forces of the past« were again the »forces of the present,« 
because the revolutionary parties had suffered from the most severe 
defeat.116 Regardless of the failure to achieve its revolutionary aims, the 
movement had shown and proved that revolutions are not made by 
114 Engels, »Der deutsche Bauernkrieg (1850),« 329. English translation taken from 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1850/peasant-war-germany/ch01.
htm.
115 Friedrich Engels, »Revolution und Konterrevolution in Deutschland (1851 / 52),« in 
MEW 8: 5 – 108. Accessed June 13, 2020. https://www.marxists.org/deutsch/archiv/ 
marx-engels/1851/deutsch/index.htm.
116 Ibid. 
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a handful of evil agitators but are an expression of disagreement by 
the masses and that each revolutionary eruption must be considered 
the consequence of a social need, whose fulfillment or achievement is 
prevented by outdated institutions and their representatives. The at-
tempt to prohibit the revolutionary forces from achieving change will, 
as Engels continued in his analysis, eventually force the masses to break 
their chains to gain true freedom and liberation as well as a true chance 
to achieve what they deem necessary with regard to a new and better 
social order.117 The Revolution of 1848 was consequently not caused by 
individuals, but rather was an eruption of the wish of the masses to 
create a new, better future. Engels also argues that the role of the petit 
bourgeoisie, especially in Germany, had been decisive during the rev-
olution, as this class was willing to replace the bourgeoisie but, at the 
same time, feared falling down to become part of the proletariat as well. 
What Engels emphasizes here is the diversity of those who might par-
ticipate in a revolutionary process for different reasons and, for as long 
as no change has been achieved, build a homogenous mass that directs 
its anger against the existent establishment, yet will fall apart once the 
initial aims of the revolutionary process have been achieved.118 
The famous German intellectual therefore realized and foresaw 
many problems revolutions would face in the future as well. A suc-
cessful revolutionary change needed the unity of those who longed 
for it. For Engels, the Revolution of 1848 failed because the bourgeoi-
sie feared the proletariat more than the counter-revolutionary forces.119 
In 1895, when he wrote the introduction to a new edition of Marx’s 
The Class Struggles in France, 1848 – 1850, Engels, from a retrospective, 
again argued that a new revolution would only be possible as a con-
sequence of a crisis and that all revolutions of the past had been ex-
pressions of a continuing class struggle between those who ruled and 
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Friedrich Engels, »Die Rolle der Gewalt in der Geschichte (1887 / 8),« in MEW 21: 
408. A similar evaluation could be taken into consideration for the German Rev-
olution of 1918 / 19.
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those who were exploited.120 At the same time, he emphasized that 
all these revolutions of the past had been minority revolutions, i. e. 
changes that were led, instrumentalized, and exploited by a leading 
minority who claimed to lead and rule in the name of a majority.121 
The radicalization of revolutionary processes was also described as 
the consequence of the wishes of a majority, whose representatives 
claimed to follow the original revolutionary ideals, protecting them 
from, amongst others, the counter-revolutionary forces. The revo-
lutionary masses, on the other hand, lose their energy and will to 
drive the revolution any further — one could argue this is because 
the masses tend to be less radical than anticipated–, especially since 
utopian dreams often turned into bitter disappointment about the 
promised change.122 After 1851, according to Engels, the chance for a 
revolution from below had ended and what followed were revolutions 
from above. He also argued that the time in which small groups were 
able to launch a revolutionary development or process had ended and 
that a true revolution could only be reached if the masses got actively 
involved, claiming their only »true historical right,« i. e. »the right for 
revolution.«123
The Afterlife of Engel’s Thoughts on Revolution, or:  
What to Make of Engel’s Revolution Theory?
It was the incompleteness of Marx and Engels’s writings with re-
gard to revolution theory that allowed so many to reinterpret them 
according to current revolutionary processes. They claimed them-
selves to be acting on behalf of the two eminent revolutionaries and 
120 Friedrich Engels, »Einleitung zu Karl Marx‹ ›Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich 1848 
bis 1850‹ (1895),« in MEW 22: 511 and 513.
121 Ibid., 513. Reading this text passage one could also argue, that Engels predicted 
many corruptions of revolutionary processes, e. g. Russia in 1917.
122 Ibid., 514.
123 Ibid., 523 – 524.
Friedrich Engels and Revolution Theory 79
theoretical thinkers of the 19th century, although they were acting 
in the realities of the 20th century.124 Of course, Engels, like Marx as 
well, also considered the French Revolution as an example of when 
the masses actively sought change,125 but was disappointed when 
they failed to stay active in 1848. Yet by witnessing the latter events, 
Engels in particular understood that revolutions would never be 
fully explained solely by theory. They need the masses to be success-
ful, and the masses tend to react according to their necessities and 
current demands, not according to a plan, a script, or theoretical 
assumptions. Therefore, the human factor is probably the most de-
cisive one in every revolutionary process. A successful revolution, 
and this aspect is supposedly the most important one in Engels’s 
theoretical approach, needed to be a revolution by the majority of 
the people.126 Liana Longinotti highlights this in particular when 
she writes that
[t]he considerations that are articulated around the theme of the »ma-
jority revolution« not only arose in Engels from the lesson of caution 
derived from the bankruptcy experience of the previous revolutions, 
but at the same time represented the definitive landing point of a 
reflection, extended over time, around the ways and forms of the 
proletarian revolution, which, after starting from the delineation of 
its successive phases and having passed through the subsumption of 
the democratic stage within the socialist revolution, came to nuclear 
its specific and distinctive features with respect to the great bourgeois 
revolutions.127
124 A. James Gregor, Marxism and the Making of China: A Doctrinal History (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 25.
125 Friedrich Engels, »Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissen-
schaft (1880),« in MEW 19: 194.
126 Liana Longinotti, »Friedrich Engels e la ›Rivoluzione di maggioranza‹,« Studi 
Storici 15, no. 4 (1974): 822.
127 Ibid., 823.
Frank Jacob80
Engels, who in his later years played an important role in making 
Marx’s work available and advertising its value,128 at the same time 
remained a revolutionary and was almost sad about the neglect of a 
revolutionary necessity by the German Social Democrats. In a letter 
to Richard Fischer (1855 – 1926), he argued: »In the Vorwärts the rev-
olution is sometimes denied with the same effort as it was preached 
for — maybe sometimes again — in the past.«129 The Engels of the 
1890s, in contrast to his more youthful self of the 1840s, had witnessed 
two failed revolutionary attempts, and now wanted to wait until the 
Social Democratic influence on society was sufficiently strong130 and 
until the military had been sufficiently politicized, especially since he 
knew that a revolution without the latter’s support might be as sense-
less as it would be hopeless.131
In contrast to his later instrumentalization in internal party fights 
about the revolutionary character of the German Social Democratic 
Party (SPD), Engels had never given up his belief in and hopes for a 
successful revolution.132 Nevertheless, his edition of Marx’s The Class 
Struggles in France 1848 – 1850 and his introduction for many seemed 
to anticipate many of Eduard Bernstein’s (1850 – 1932) later claims 
about peaceful political tactics and the abandonment of the revolu-
tion.133 Hence, »Engels would have found a parliamentary system gen-
128 Michael C. Howard and John E. King, A History of Marxian Economics, vol. 1: 
1883 – 1929 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 3 – 20; J. Jemnitz, 
»Engels and the Problems of the International Labour Movement in the 1890s,« 
Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 17, no. 3 / 4 (1971): 225 – 255.
129 Friedrich Engels to Richard Fischer, March 8, 1895, cited in Hans-Josef Stein-
berg, »Revolution und Legalität: Ein unveröffentlichter Brief Friedrich Engels’s 
an Richard Fischer,« International Review of Social History 12, no. 2 (1967): 182.
130 Ibid., 184.
131 Ibid., 187.
132 Ibid., 187 – 188. Also see Neumann and von Hagen, »Engels and Marx on Revo-
lution,« 278; Hollander, »Marx and Engels on Constitutional Reform vs. Revo-
lution,« 53.
133 Ibid., 51 – 52. On Bernstein and his revisionist position see: Manfred B. Steger, 
The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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erating a working-class majority unwilling to carry out a communist 
program unacceptable«134 and was never in favor of abandoning the 
revolution as the ultima ratio of Social Democratic politics.135
Regardless of his wish for a revolutionary change, Engels would 
also not have been in favor of Lenin’s interpretation of his and Marx’s 
work.136 From the Russian revolutionary’s perspective, as Bertram D. 
Wolfe (1896 – 1977), the American communist, scholar, and later an-
ti-communist during the Cold War, remarked,
[i]t was embarrassing to note that Engels had lived on to 1895, and 
had been brilliantly prophetic in describing the line-up, the magni-
tude, the nations under arms, the upsurge of national feeling, the 
socialist desire to avert war (pacifism) and to defend the fatherland 
(defensism), the possibility that the socialist parties and the Inter-
national would be temporarily drowned and broken by a flood of 
chauvinism, the million-massed death toll, the spread of ruin, de-
moralization and barbarism throughout Europe, in the very war into 
which Europe had now entered.137
After their death, as Engels had complained in a letter to Paul La-
fargue (1842 – 1911) in 1882, his and Marx’s works had been turned 
»into the dogmatism of a scientific oracle«138 instead of an attempt to 
understand a revolution in its timely context, something that would 
become even worse with regard to Soviet Marxism.139 Although lat-
134 Hollander, »Marx and Engels on Constitutional Reform vs. Revolution,« 54.
135 Hans-Josef Steinberg, »Freiheit und Notwendigkeit: Aus einem verlorenen Brief 
von Friedrich Engels an Ernest Belfort Bax vom Jahre 1886,« International Review 
of Social History 18, no. 2 (1973): 276 – 280. 
136 Bertram D. Wolfe, »Lenin Has Trouble with Engels,« The Russian Review 15, 
no. 3 (1956): 197. Also see the more detailed discussion in A. James Gregor, Marx-
ism, Fascism, and Totalitarianism: Chapters in the Intellectual History of Radicalism 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 102 – 135.
137 Wolfe, »Lenin Has Trouble with Engels,« 209.
138 Cited in Schäfer, »Friedrich Engels,« 36.
139 Herbert Marcuse, »Dialectic and Logic Since the War,« in Marxism, Revolution 
and Utopia (Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol. 6), eds. Douglas Kellner 
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er revolutions would draw inspiration from past events and even at-
tempt to recreate them,140 Engels was never in favor of a dogmatic 
revolution theory, especially not in his own writings, where he instead 
attempted to describe things to take into consideration for future 
revolutionary processes. Like Marx, he was affected by the failed Eu-
ropean revolutions in 1848:
Like most of their intellectual contemporaries, they now repudiated 
utopianism and turned to »science« as the instrument of progress. 
Their revolutionary goals remained unchanged, as did their belief that 
labor would one day be transformed from a tool of subjugation to a 
»means of emancipation, by offering each individual the opportuni-
ty to develop all his faculties, physical and mental, in all directions 
and exercise them to the full,« making work a »pleasure instead of a 
burden.«141
Engels, however, also realized that the masses were often not the most 
reliable revolutionaries: »we men and women are unfortunately so 
stupid that we never pluck up courage for real progress unless urged 
to it by sufferings that seem almost out of proportion.«142 Yet the role 
of the individuals, like their impact on the revolutionary outcomes, 
and Clayton Pierce (London / New York: Routledhge 2014), 88.
140 Stephen Eric Bronner, »The Communist Manifesto: Between Past and Present,« 
in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, ed. Jeffrey C. 
Isaac (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 145.
141 Joan Campbell, Joy in Work, German Work: The National Debate, 1800 – 1945 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 23 – 34. According to Hal 
Draper and E. Haberkern, »Marx and Engels came to believe that the French 
had ceded the leadership of the revolutionary movement, at least temporarily, to 
the Germans.« Hal Draper and E. Haberkern, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution, 
vol. 5: War and Revolution (New York: NYU Press, 2005), 130.
142 Letter by Engels, February 24, 1893, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Corre-
spondence 1846 – 1895 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1934), 510, cited in William 
A. Pelz, »Class and Gender: Friedrich Engels’s Contribution to Revolutionary 
History,« Science & Society 62, no. 1 (1998), Friedrich Engels: A Critical Centenary 
Appreciation: 117.
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could only be understood in a concrete space-time continuum, and 
therefore Engels did realize that 1848 was not 1793, that 1871 was not 
1848, and so on.143 Due to this realization, the famous German intel-
lectual also always studied the role of common people: »His contribu-
tions to understanding the importance of class are many, but among 
the most significant are: discerning the importance of the popular 
masses in history; understanding how common people express them-
selves within the culture and language of their times; demonstrating 
how historical consciousness is necessary for radical change; and plac-
ing the main emphasis on class struggle, as the motor which moves 
historical development forward.«144 Considering the role of individ-
uals and the factors that determined their daily life, Engels, applying 
Marx’s theoretical ideas about historical materialism, also understood 
that »the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions 
are to be sought, not in men’s brains, not in men’s better insight into 
eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production 
and exchange. They are to be sought not in the philosophy, but in the 
economics of each particular epoch.«145 All in all, for Engels, 
Marxist revolution required circumstances that made available a soci-
ety in which the »vast majority« of the population had been rendered 
»proletarian,« in the process of which commodity production had 
fully matured, generating the material wherewithal to fully liberate 
143 Ibid., 118.
144 Ibid., 121.
145 E. N. Trubetskoi, »Toward Characterization of the Theory of Marx and Engels 
on the Significance of Ideas in History,« in Problems of Idealism, ed. Edward A. 
Purcell (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 127. Trubetskoi criticizes 
Engels’s view for being too narrowly focused on historical materialism here: »In 
this whole theory there is a large share of truth. It is impossible to deny that 
economic facts play a primary role in social revolutions, or that people are gener-
ally inclined to sympathize with precisely the legal and political princi-ples that 
most correspond to their interests. It is another question whether only economic 
interests should be treated as independent causes of social revolutions, whether 
they alone determine the legal and political ideals of people.« Ibid., 139. Also see 
ibid., 274.
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humanity from the curse of poverty and compulsory labor. Among 
some of the very last things he was to write, Engels reminded rev-
olutionaries once again that the only truly Marxist revolution was 
one undertaken by a population that was essentially urban and pro-
letarian, that would seize the »gigantic productive forces« provided 
by mature machine capitalism, so that they might be marshaled to 
»planned production.«146
So what are we supposed to make of Engels’s revolution theory, or 
is there anything we can make of it at all? While it does not make 
sense for revolutionaries to identify themselves with the past,147 it 
does make sense to take a minute to look back at Engels’s writings. 
They offer us a lot of thoughts about revolutions and provide hope for 
their success, while at the same time do not neglect the dangers of ev-
ery revolutionary process. Engels’s writings about revolutions were an 
incomplete theoretical framework, yet were enough to engage future 
generations to think about the possibilities, necessities, and problems 
revolutions can cause. Therefore, his writings about revolution are 
even more important today. Not because we should be too inspired 
by 1848 or any other revolution of the past, but rather to sharpen 
our mind for possible revolutions in the future. Crises are a necessary 
precondition, the role of the masses is essential, and what role will 
the military play? Such considerations, willingly or unwillingly, must 
lead back to the revolution theory of Friedrich Engels, and it could be 
argued that those who wish to see a successful revolution of a majority 
would be wise to read his works in advance. If they can avoid the fail-
ure of a future revolution, that is maybe only pure chance, but at least 
they would be prepared for the possible turns of any revolutionary 
process. Considering the importance of such a legacy, it is tragic that 
the revolutionary Engels never experienced a successful revolution. 
146 Gregor, Marxism and the Making of China, 26. Engels’s citations are taken from 
Engels, »Nachwort (1894) [zu ›Soziales aus Russland‹],« MEW 22: 426 – 428.
147 Eric Hobsbawm, »Revolution,« in Revolution in History, eds. Roy Porter and 
Mikuláš Teich (Cambridge / New York : Cambridge University Press, 1986), 9. 
Friedrich Engels and Revolution Theory 85
After 200 years, it is time to prove his ideas about revolutions and to 
use them effectively to provide true freedom for all.
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The Gens, Military Conquest, and the 
Formation of the Manchu State 
Understanding the Pre-State Manchu Society 
from an Engelsian Perspective (1550 – 1651)
Jia Feng
Introduction
In The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State (1884), Frie-
drich Engels portrays a progressive picture of how human society 
evolved from a simple gentile order to the state in correspondence 
with the development of social production and the changed forms 
of property distribution, more specifically from common to private 
ownerships. To illustrate this fundamental transformation, much ink 
has been spilled on the institutions of society organized in peacetimes 
based on and in wartimes mobilized by gens, which Engels defines as 
»the foundation of the social order of most, if not all, the barbarian 
peoples of the world.«1 In a gens, all members shared equal tribal and 
gentile rights, such as equal share of common property, equal voice in 
democratic assembly, and shared obligations to revenge and defense.2 
Several gentes constitute a phratry (brotherhood), and several phra-
tries constitute a tribe.3 Facing common enemies might bring differ-
ent gens into a temporary confederation, but most of them dissolved 
right upon the fading of threats.4 As Engels argues, the gentile system 
was simply a »natural grouping,« suited perfectly to sparse popula-
1 Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State (Chip-
pendale, Australia: Resistance Books, 2004), 53.
2 Ibid., 88 – 92.
3 Ibid., 92 – 93.
4 Ibid., 95.
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tions over a vast territory.5 Although war captives were indeed admit-
ted into the conqueror’s tribe, because of the extremely undeveloped 
level of social production, where human labor »yielded no noticeable 
surplus as yet over the cost of its maintenance,« war prisoners were 
killed. Even for the tribes that indeed adopted the defeated as equal 
members, »the tribe remained the boundary for man, in relation to 
himself as well as to outsiders.«6
As Engels argues, arising from the development of social produc-
tion, intertribal wars not only broke loose the gentile institutions 
based on personal ties of blood but also facilitated the rise of pub-
lic power, the institutionalization of which was the state. In other 
words, the state emerged inevitably at the price of the dissolution 
of the old gentile order. Engels suggests that the rise of patriarchal 
authority and the inheritance of property by children was at the root 
of incentives of the supreme tribal leaders to extend their territories 
by waging wars.7 The development of private property also rendered 
it necessary to create hereditary system by replacing elective offices 
and, due to the corresponding demand for surplus human labor, to 
expand the enslavement of war prisoners to fellow members of the 
tribe. Personal wealth is thus »respected as the highest treasure, and 
the old gentile institutions are perverted in order to justify forcible 
robbery of wealth.«8 
Incorporating more people set in motion the growth of institu-
tions serving public purposes, more specifically the increasing cen-
tralized royal power. The institutions that facilitated royal power 
included the rise of the retinue. The quickly expanding population 
could not be governed anymore »by means of the old gentile con-
stitution.« The king’s permanent retinue or royal hereditary offices 
took its place.9 Public power existed in various forms, including the 
5 Ibid., 148.
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police force, army, and administrative officers.10 New rules also arose 
that institutionalized the unequal distribution of booty and the con-
centration of wealth in the hands of the military commander and 
subcommanders or rising nobility.11 
Especially illuminating is Engels’s insight on the lasting influence 
of the old gentile mentality when gentile organizations dissolved in 
many places in the face of the growing state machine.12 When com-
menting on why, in the 5th century, the invading Germans could 
transform the declining Roman empire that had a far greater level of 
civilization than the invaders themselves, Engels writes, 
What was the mysterious charm with which the Germans infused 
new vitality into dying Europe? Was it the innate magic power of the 
German race, as our jingo historians would have it? By no means. Of 
course, the Germans were a highly gifted Aryan tribe, especially at 
that time, in full process of vigorous development. It was not their 
specific national qualities that rejuvenated Europe, however, but sim-
ply—their barbarism, their gentile constitution.13 
The »gentile mentality« also entailed »personal efficiency and bravery,« 
which was widely seen in nomadic groups, and the sense of cohesion 
settling in gentes.14 In other words, when »conquered and conquer-
ors were almost at the same stage of economic development and the 
economic basis of society remained the same as before … the gentile 
constitution could continue for many centuries in a changed, terri-
torial form.«15
The founders of the Qing dynasty (1644 – 1911), the last dynasty in 
Chinese imperial history, were ethnically Manchus, who originated in 
10 Ibid., 115, 136.
11 Ibid., 136, 143.
12 Ibid., 115.




Manchuria, part of the northeastern provinces of today’s China.16 The 
name »Manchus« was not officially adopted until 1636, before which 
later Manchu conquerors were called »Jurchens« by the Ming people 
due to their shared ethnic origins with the Jin dynasty (1115 – 1234) 
founders.17 At the turn of the 15th century, there were three major 
Jurchen sub-groups: the Jianzhou, the Haixi, and the Yeren, so-called 
because of their varying degrees of economic development.18 In the 
late 16th century, the Jianzhou branch rose to dominance by annexing 
the other Jurchen tribes, and within decades went on to conquer the 
Ming court (1368 – 1644). 
In this paper, I will demonstrate that The Origin of the Family, 
Private Property, and the State offers certain important insights to 
our understanding of the transition of late 16th- and early 17th-cen-
tury Manchu tribal society into a state. For example, Engels makes 
it clear that the gens is an institution »common to all barbarians 
up to their entry into civilization.«19 Pre-conquest Manchu society, 
as I will point out below, despite its regular economic exchanges 
with the then reigning Ming court (1368 – 1644), was tribal in nature, 
organized by different equivalents of gens, phratries, and tribes. 
Hunting organizations were also based on gentes, first as the niru 
(company), the basic hunting and later military unit under which 
Jurchen men were organized, and then the gusa, larger divisions 
consisting of several niru, or banners. These were the foundational 
organizations of the Eight Banners System, the Manchus’ trade-
mark system, which recent revisionist Qing historiography claims 
to be the institutional bulwark of Manchu senses of in-groupness 
16 Franz Michael, The Origin of Manchu Rule in China: Frontier and Bureaucracy as 
Interacting Forces in the Chinese Empire (New York: Octagon Books, 1965), 12.
17 Liu Xiaomeng, Manzu cong buluo dao guojia de fazhan (Beijing: Zhongguo she-
hui kexue chubanshe, 2007), 1. 
18 Pei Huang, Reorienting the Manchus: A Study of Sinicization, 1583 – 1795 (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 101.
19 Engels, Origin, 88.
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or Manchu ethnic identity and to play a crucial role in making and 
maintaining Qing rule.20
The fact that pre-conquest Manchu society was fundamentally 
tribal and no exception to what Engels says about pre-state social 
organizations carries important theoretical weight because this fact 
poses a question on the special nature of the »Manchu way,« a pack-
age of time-honored Manchu customs, especially warrior values and 
martial culture dating back to the Manchu tribal and hunting age, 
the upholding of which is designated by recent Qing historiography 
as crucial to the strengthening and maintaining of the dynasty’s rule. 
Moreover, in its narration of the earliest period of Qing history, this 
scholarship tends to see the tribal-era development of banners, hunt-
ing units by origin, not only as a uniquely Manchu innovation but 
also as offering incentives to enhanced Manchu ethnic solidary, a 
key element to the transformation of Manchu tribes into the state.21 
Drawing upon insights from Engels’s The Origin of the Family, Private 
Property, and the State, I will not only argue that the banners, essen-
tially military units organized according to Manchu gentes, were not 
exceptions to any other early society before their entry into or contact 
with civilization, but also that this ethnic-centered view falls short in 
explaining the socio-economic and correspondingly political process 
of Manchu state-building. 
20 Mark Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Im-
perial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). Recent revisionist Qing 
historiography argues that the Manchu ethnic identity persisted throughout the 
dynasty and that the Manchu ruling class‹ conscious efforts to institutionalize 
the differences between the conquerors and the conquered not only enhanced 
the cohesion among the conquest elites but also strengthened the ties with cul-
turally adjacent Inner Asian minority groups. See Pamela Crossley, A Translucent 
Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999); Evelyn S. Rawski, The Last Emperors: A Social History of 
Qing Imperial Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). For a 
review of the New Qing history scholarship, see Joanna Waley-Cohen, »The New 
Qing History,« Radical History Review 88 (2004): 193 – 206.
21 Elliott, The Manchu Way, 8 – 13.
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My argument in this paper consists of two distinct but interrelated 
parts. First, I will argue that the Manchus‹ persistent consciousness to 
maintain their identities as a distinct ethnic group, and in particular 
such virtues as the toughness and virility suited to hunting and tribal 
life, in fact evinces the lasting legacy of Manchu »gentile mentality« 
in Engels’s discussion of the role of barbarism in rejuvenating the con-
quered but more civilized societies. This mechanism by which gentile 
institutions continued to exist for a long time in changed forms, how-
ever, is not a unique quality of Manchus, but common to »the most 
diverse savage and barbarian peoples of the present day.«22 
The second part of my argument is related to the first, in the sense 
that to fully comprehend the Manchu state-building process in the 
late 16th and early 17th centuries, it is critical to recognize the tribal 
and gentile origins of the Eight Banners System and to analyze the 
making of the Qing state not as enhancing those tribal elements, but 
as an opposite process of undermining, in part at least, the Manchu 
gentile constitution. More specifically, I will argue that the Manchu 
state arose precisely at the price of dissolving the economic principle 
of the »eight privileges,« namely the equal distribution of booty, peo-
ple, and lands among eight great families, the latter of which derived 
from Manchu time-honored customs and economically buttressed 
the Eight Banners System. I will demonstrate that the rapidly expand-
ing territories and substantially increased number of people brought 
under the control of the regime created new institutional options for 
the throne’s incumbent to enhance his power through mobilizing 
new tax resources and establishing new administrative organizations 
and allowed him opportunities to maneuver the gentile principles of 
equality among tribal members in a despotic direction. The economic 
principle that conditioned the Eight Banners System became increas-
ingly contradictory with the development of political centralization; 
the consolidation of royal power precisely resulted from the defeating 
of the dominance of old gentile Manchu rules. In short, it was pre-
22 Engels, Origin, 126, 157.
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cisely in the place where the dominance of the gentile constitution 
of the Manchu conquest regime dissolved that the Qing state arose.
Despite taking Engels’s insights on gentile institutions of early 
human society seriously, however, I do not mean to say that all pre-
state societies were the same, nor do I deny the unique characteristics, 
trajectories, and dynamics of the Manchu state-building process. In 
fact, because Engels’s theoretical framework is based on empirical ev-
idence primarily from Europe and occasionally from America, much 
more work could be done from the perspective of non-Western his-
tories to form a more balanced account of the transition from tribal 
society to the state. More specifically, I will delineate in detail the 
changing land and population policies of the Manchu conquest re-
gime and, in particular, how the increased number of people brought 
under the conqueror’s control turned the Manchu state formation 
in a centralized direction. While this study will reveal the not too 
special socio-economic origin of the »Manchu Way,« it will also take 
on Engels’s insights on the almost universal transition of early human 
society from gens to state to argue that the Manchu state arose not 
from the maintaining of gentile principles, but at the cost of them. 
Thus, Engels’s analysis of the breakdowns of the gens as an inevitable 
part of the emergence of state sheds new light on the socio-economic 
elements of Manchu state-building in the early 17th century and the 
nature of the »Manchu Way.«
The Manchu Gentile Society Before Conquest
Before conquest, the Jurchen society was organized in tribes, with 
the hala (clan, family) as the basic tribal unit followed by the mukun 
(clan, extended family), a social organization that grew out of and 
increasingly replaced the hala as a more elemental unit to organize 
people due to population growth, migration, and intertribal wars. 
In early Jurchen history, the hala was the very earliest social form 
and thus the first social identity, which had a continued legacy across 
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generations. The word hala was among the oldest Manchu words.23 
Sharing the same hala usually indicated sharing the same geographi-
cal and ancestral origin.24 Jurchen society of the hala stage also shared 
marriage and other social organizing principles with other barbarians. 
For example, Manchu ethnogenesis records often show a marriage of 
a male to a female from a different hala, which indicates the prohibi-
tion of marriage within the same tribal group.25 Other early Manchu 
records also demonstrate the practices of adopting individual mem-
bers of a gens who had been either hit by a natural disaster or on the 
losing side of an intertribal war into another.26
As Jurchen society grew both in size and complexity, the new so-
cial organization of the mukun emerged to replace the hala as the 
most basic clan unit. A distinct feature of the mukun was that, unlike 
the hala, being members of the same mukun did not necessarily mean 
either the same ancestry or the same surname. Instead, while peo-
ple in the same mukun might have different ancestral origins, people 
sharing the same ancestry might have different surnames.27 By the 
mid-16th century, due to the high frequency of migration as a result 
of wars, trades, and some sort of tribal annexation, the mukun had 
replaced the hala in some more advanced societies such as Jianzhou 
and Haixi Jurchens.28 In short, while the difference between the hala 
and mukun was not always so clear, generally speaking, the hala was 
larger than the mukun. As Aisin Gioro, the surname of the Qing ruler, 
demonstrated, within the Gioro hala, there were many other mukun 
than Aisin itself, such as Yi’ergen, Hulun, Tongyan, etc.29
23 Liu, Manzu cong buluo dao guojia de fazhan, 18. 
24 Liu Xiaomeng, Manzu de shehui yu shenghuo (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chu-
banshe, 1998), 18.
25 Manzhou shilu, vol. 1 (Taibei: Huawen chubanshe, 1964), 4 – 5.
26 Liu, Manzu cong buluo dao guojia de fazhan, 21.
27 Liu, Manzu de shehui yu shenghuo, 14. 
28 Ortai et al., eds., Baqi manzhou shizu tongpu, vol. 12 (Shenyang: Liaohai chubanshe, 
2002 [1744]), 12. 
29 Mo Dongyin, Manzushi luncong (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1958), 23.
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As a nomadic group, hunting was the central aspect of Jurchen 
economic life. In early Jurchen society, the uksun was the basic hunt-
ing unit.30 The very activity of hunting required each band to main-
tain a moderate size for quicker mobility, making the uksun a more 
desirable form than the mukun. Hunting spoils were equally distrib-
uted between tribal members, a fact that complies perfectly with what 
Engels says about barbarians up to their entry into civilization who 
lived in gens governed by the principles of democracy and equality 
between individuals.31 In the Manchu language, each share was called 
a ubu. Originally denoting the equal distribution of hunting spoils, 
the ubu later became the unit of the equal distribution of booty, cap-
tives, lands, and power.32
Within each uksun, more direct blood ties were maintained in 
a boo, or a family. The Jurchen hunting and gathering economy set 
an upper limit on the size of a family; while the eldest sons moved 
out upon adulthood to establish their own independent families, the 
youngest stayed to inherit the family fortune.33 
Hunting activities were generally organized based on the fami-
ly-clan organization. Jurchen hunters made their hunting tours in 
companies based on the unit of the gasan. In each tour, every hunter 
was allowed to shoot one arrow. The basic hunting unit was decimally 
organized, and was composed of a headman (ejen) and nine hunters.34 
The ejen was chosen based on his recognized hunting experience.35
Social organizations that arose from hunting practices prompted 
the forging of early quasi-military institutions. In daily and small-
scale hunting activities, Jurchen hunters marched in groups, encircled 
a large swath of forest from all directions, gradually tightened the 
30 Liu, Manzu de shehui yu shenghuo, 29. 
31 Engels, Origin, 88, 90.
32 Chen Wenshi, »Qingtaizong shidai de zhongyao zhengzhi cuoshi,« in Chen 
Wenshi, Mingqing zhengzhi shehui shilun, vol. 2 (Taibei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 
1991), 423 – 525. 
33 Liu, Manzu cong buluo dao guojia de fazhan, 47.
34 Taizu shilu, vol. 3 (Taibei: Huawen chubanshe, 1964), 6. 
35 Zhao-lian, Xiaoting zalu (Beijing: Zhonghuashuju, 2017 [1814 – 1826]), 220.
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circle, and finally drove animals within into a clearing to be shot.36 
A larger-scale hunting activity, known in Manchu as aba, contained 
a couple of decimal units. Before marching into the targeted forest, 
hunters gathered in arrays, distinguished by the colors of their ban-
ners. In a broader view, the banners were spread like a tree diagram, 
with the yellow banner placed at the center bottom, two shoulder 
banners colored red and white down to the left and right, and two 
head banners of blue placed further below each of the shoulder ban-
ners.37 The Manchu word niru means a big arrow. In traditional 
Jurchen hunting practices, since each warrior was allowed one arrow 
and nine warriors went out together under the leadership of a banner 
headman, niru later developed into the most rudimentary military 
unit, and niru ejen connoted the leader of each niru who gave out 
commands through banner signals.38
Even before the launching of large-scale Manchu conquests, these 
basic gentile institutions of Jurchen society underwent changes due to 
intertribal marriages, migration, and war, the last of which in partic-
ular took people beyond boundaries of the gentes they were originally 
born into, giving rise to a new identity based on place rather than 
original gens. The Manchu word gasan is precisely meant to denote 
the villages surrounding castles used for military defense.39 In the mid-
15th century, Jurchen settlements along the Tumen River were found 
to have members of different lineages within the same village. That is 
to say, while some villages were composed only of members from the 
same hala, others were a blend of people with different lineage ties.40
Although they shared similar social organizations and econom-
ic forms of life, Jurchens across tribes were by no means the same. 
Residing in the eastern and southern portions of Manchuria geo-
graphically most adjacent to Korean and Ming influence with richer 
36 Elliott, The Manchu Way, 57.
37 Mo, Manzushi luncong, 65.
38 Zheng, Tanwei ji, 175.
39 Liu, Manzu cong buluo dao guojia de fazhan, 38.
40 Ibid., 52. 
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soils, milder winters, and more plains suited to farming, the Jianzhou 
branch of Jurchens developed more advanced sedentary ways of life 
with a higher ratio of agriculture in their economy than other tribes.41 
Their adjacency with the Ming, moreover, made possible their loot-
ing campaigns in Liaodong, from which Jurchens brought back both 
agricultural tools and people.42 By the mid-16th century, intertribal 
competitions for resources were so intense that large-scale intertribal 
wars had begun, culminating in the dominance of the Jianzhou, the 
origins of later Manchu rule. 
In sum, the hala and later the mukun, namely gentes for Man-
chus, were the basic institutions of Jurchen society by the mid-16th 
century, complying perfectly with Engels’s statement that »the gens 
is an institution common to all barbarians up to their entry into 
civilization.«43 Gentile institutions also played an important role in 
the social and economic lives of Jurchens. As the foregoing discus-
sions have shown, hunting activities were organized based on gentile 
divisions, and the way that prey was distributed demonstrated that 
equality between tribal members was the rule of the day.44 Moreover, 
the emergence of gasan, namely villages in which residents were not 
necessarily from the same gens, shows the increasing complexity of 
Jurchen society. By this time, the organization of Jurchen society was 
not yet that of a state, and in fact a state was far from an evitable 
option.45 Most tribes never turned into a state until the rise of the 
Jianzhou branch, the one that first turned »habitual cooperation« 
among tribes into a regular »permanent league« and then continued 
to challenge the Ming rule.46
41 Huang, Reorienting the Manchus, 101.
42 Mo, Manzushi luncong, 47.
43 Engels, Origin, 88.
44 Certain features of the Manchu gens before their conquest in the late 16th centu-
ry remarkably resembled what Engels says about the Iroquois gens. Ibid., 88 – 92.
45 Ibid., 95 – 97.
46 Ibid., 96.
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Early Conquests and Using »Banners«  
to Absorb New Population
In the 1570s, large-scale intertribal wars started. After Nurhaci 
(1559 – 1626) succeeded to the leadership of the Jianzhou branch in 
1583, Jianzhou soon rose to supreme power in Manchuria. Having 
taken over a number of tribal city-states near his residence at Hulan 
Hada, he won a decisive victory over the allied army of Hulun Ssu 
Kuo in 1593, bringing home 3,000 horses and thousands of suits of 
armor while causing 4,000 casualties. Early victories gave Nurhaci 
not only prestige among Jurchen tribes but also booty to cover the 
costs of future expansions.47 Weaker tribes chose to surrender without 
resistance. In 1588, following the pledge of the Suwan chief, more 
tribes joined, bringing their people to Nurhaci’s territory.48 Of the 66 
tribes Nurhaci incorporated, 17 surrendered without resistance.49 In 
the years 1599 – 1601, he conquered the Hada and added charters of 
the surrendered to the 500 charters he already possessed, becoming 
the wealthiest chieftain in Manchuria.50 In 1607 he conquered the 
Hoifa, and finally, in 1613, after he defeated Ula, the vast majority of 
Jianzhou and Haixi lands and people were brought under his control.51 
A commander of an army of only 500 soldiers in 1583, within two 
decades, Nurhaci had unified all Jurchen tribes.
One strategy Nurhaci adopted was to absorb the conquered popu-
lation without dismantling their social institutions. More specifically, 
what Nurhaci did was to organize newly subordinated groups into 
niru while keeping their old clan organizations intact.52 For example, 
47 Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period (1644 – 1912) (Washing-
ton DC: US Government Printing Office, 1943), 596.
48 Wang Xianqian, ed., Donghua lu, vol. 1 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 
2002 [1884]), 12.
49 Hideo Ishibashi, Shindai Chūgoku no shomondai (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 
1995), 25.
50 Huang, Reorienting the Manchus, 70.
51 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, 596.
52 Zhao Erxun, ed., Qingshi gao, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977 [1928]), 9232.
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in 1593, while defeating the Zhusheli, Nurhaci moved its people to his 
own territories. In 1599, while conquering the Hada tribe, Nurhaci 
incorporated them into his household registration system.53 Through 
the transformation of the hunting niru into the military niru, Nurha-
ci infused into those previously dispersed Jurchen tribes a new rela-
tionship with the Manchu regime. 
Meanwhile, Nurhaci allowed the headman of the conquered tribe 
to maintain his original status, namely to become the niru-ejen, the 
leader of the newly forged military company. For instance, in 1595 / 6, 
during his return tour from Jianzhou Jurchen, the Korean diplomat 
Shen Zhongyi wrote that under the leadership of the brothers Nur-
haci and Surhaci, there were two hundred military headmen. All of 
them were old tribal chieftains and governed their own former tribal 
members.54 The tribal leaders were incorporated into the Jianzhou 
conquest regime, while old tribal organizations such as gasan, mukun 
and uksun were left undisturbed. A new identity to the conqueror’s 
regime began to transcend the previous allegiance to the tribe. By 
bringing together people with diverse tribal affiliations and geograph-
ical origins, Nurhaci’s conquest set in motion a remarkable political 
integration of Jurchen society.55
As Nurhaci’s military conquests progressed successfully, the niru 
organizations, originally hunting organizations, extended to other ar-
eas of Jurchen lives and gradually became a principal institution that 
worked to reconfigure Jurchen society and to rationalize the man-
agement of the Jurchen population. In 1616, the functions of niru 
companies extended to civilian areas. For example, in July of 1616, 
Nurhaci asked each niru to dispatch three persons to help build 200 
53 Zheng, Tanwei ji, 10 – 11.
54 Shen Zhongyi, »Jianzhou jicheng tuji,« in Qingchu shiliao congkan dishi, ed. 
Liaoning daxue lishixi (Shenyang: Liaoning daxue lishixi, 1979), 23.
55 Zhou Yuanlian, Qingchao xingqi shi (Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 1986), 
118 – 119.
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boats.56 Other examples can be found in areas of agricultural produc-
tion, public services, festival celebrations, military logistics, etc. For 
instance, in 1613, Nurhaci asked each niru to send ten adult males and 
four cattle to cultivate wastelands.57 In 1622, he asked each niru to 
offer three cattle as sacrifices for the end-of-year celebration.58 Start-
ing as the basic hunting unit of ten warriors, the niru later extended 
its application not only to military occasions to have 300 warriors in 
each of them but also to the general population as a unit of the equal 
distribution of public duties.
When conquests remained confined to Manchuria before 1621, 
conquered populations were divided largely by ethnic differences. The 
conquered Jurchens, or jusen in Manchu, were incorporated into the 
conquerors‹ niru organizations, while Chinese, Koreans, and Mongo-
lians, or ethnically non-Jurchens, became booi aha or household slaves 
of the conquerors.59 In other words, while the conquered from other 
Manchu tribes became jusen, enjoying a similar status to the old jusen 
of Nurhaci’s original tribes, the non-Manchu conquered populations 
were subjugated as booi bondservants. The jusen population enjoyed a 
free status because a long-cherished tradition of pre-conquest Jurchen 
society was that Jurchens never enslaved their own men.60 For in-
stance, in 1603, after Nurhaci conquered the Hada tribe, he moved 
Hada people to regions adjacent to his residence and enrolled them in 
the already existing niru population registration system. Applying the 
same rule to the vanquished Huifa tribe, in 1607 Nurhaci »disarmed 
its troops but enlisted its people.« Having conquered the powerful 




59 For a detailed semantic analysis of the word Manju and its relationship with 
jusen, see Ishibashi, Shindai chūgoku no shomondai, 19 – 36.
60 Wang Zhonghan, ed., Chaoxian lichao shilu (Shenyang: Liaoning daxue lishixi, 
1979), 127. 
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Ula tribe, in 1613 Nurhaci granted niru memberships to its »tens of 
thousands of households.«61
Generally speaking, before the conquests extended to areas with 
a non-Manchu population as a majority, the conquered population 
from other Manchu tribes was usually organized into niru organi-
zations, while ethnically non-Manchu people, mostly Chinese and 
Koreans, were subjugated as booi aha. Incorporating the conquered 
population in such ways perfectly suited the Manchu regime during 
the early conquests when a regular tax system remained absent and 
public duties could be accomplished at the lowest possible cost.62 
In 1619, Nurhaci won a decisive battle at Sarhu, his first major 
confrontation with the Ming court, which marked the beginning of 
the expansion of his conquests to the Han Chinese territory. That 
year, Nurhaci took over 70 fortified towns, including Fushun, Kai-
yuan, and Tieling. Tens of thousands of Chinese as well as Koreans 
fighting for the Ming were captured. These captives were distribut-
ed as booi aha among the Manchu nobles and put to work on the 
private landed estates of Manchu nobles as agricultural slaves.63 This 
battle thus significantly expanded the booi aha population and fueled 
the growth of tokso while also creating a larger imbalance of wealth 
among the Manchus.
Upon taking over Mukden, Nurhaci laid claim to vacated and 
uncultivated lands, equalized land shares, and conducted a univer-
sal redistribution of lands. »Masterless« lands, left behind by the 
thousands of Liaodong people who had fled, were transformed into 
state-controlled lands.64 Similarly to what Engels says about the ways 
that Germans distributed land among themselves upon conquering 
Roman provinces, on July 14th of 1621, Nurhaci decreed a reclamation 
61 Li Yanguang and Guan Jie, Manzu tongshi (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 
1991), 143.
62 Manwen laodang, 19, 37; Zheng, Tanweiji, 195 – 199.
63 Wang, Qingshi zakao, 24.
64 Kenneth M. Swope, The Military Collapse of China’s Ming Dynasty, 1618 – 44 
(New York: Routledge, 2014), 37 – 38.
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of 300,000 xiang (a Chinese equivalent of 10,000 square meters) of 
wasteland in Haizhou and distributed it to Manchu soldiers in resi-
dence.65 He then extended the offer of land to Han Chinese from the 
previous five Liaodong garrisons, asking each recipient to pay a quota 
of grain in tax and corvee labor duties in return.66 In November, mil-
itary duties were added to the mandatory service required from each 
adult male land recipient.67 The land redistribution was carried out 
only on »masterless« lands, based on the spirit of bringing the least 
disruption to the existing social order.68
Entering regions with a Han Chinese population as the majori-
ty changed the fiscal system of the conquering regime dramatically. 
The conquered land and population in Liaodong brought invaluable 
revenue and the manpower needed to build the public sector of the 
conquering regime. The land distribution and the subsequent tax col-
lection were all patterned on the Ming model.69 In March of 1621, the 
land quota that each adult male received settled on five xiang of grain 
fields and one xiang of cotton fields. 70 In addition, Liaodong people 
were also asked to pay corvee labor and undertake military service as 
assigned by the regime.71
The availability of agricultural revenues fueled the early develop-
ment of bureaucracy. To establish tighter local controls, the Manchu 
regime followed the Ming practice of organizing commoners under 
hundred-man chiefs (baizhang), who represented the state in charge 
of local administration.72 In 1621, to better handle ethnic relations, 
the crown founded the Bureau of Supreme Judges (Dutang yamen). 
This court was charged with providing residences for the Chinese, 
handling escapees, transporting military logistic supplies, harvesting 
65 Engels, Origin, 142; Manwen laodang, 219.
66 Manwen laodang, 244.
67 Ibid., 256, 263.
68 Jin-liang, Manzhou midang (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1967), 60.
69 Zhou, Qingchao xingqi shi, 266.
70 Manwen laodang, 220.
71 Li and Guan, Manzu tongshi, 203.
72 Manwen laodang, 271.
The Gens, Military Conquest, and the Formation of the Manchu State 107
grain, and negotiating merchandise prices.73 In 1622, 24 legal judg-
es (duanshiguan) were appointed to supervise legal practices within 
banners.74 
The conquerors distributed lands among themselves, and their 
corvee labor duties were shifted to the conquered Chinese. Because 
of the taxes and corvee labor contributed by the Chinese, the Manchu 
jusen commoners enjoyed less tax and service burdens. Their duties 
could thus concentrate on those that were truly »Manchu« since the 
gentile age. Such labor included digging ginseng, hunting, raising 
horses, escorting trading tours, baking seawater, etc.75 
Although progress in state-building had been made as the con-
quests expanded, the regime still only had limited tax resources, in-
evitably hampering the development of bureaucracy and supporting 
the continued strengthening of the old Manchu gentile rule of »eight 
privileges« (bafen). The rule of »eight privileges,« also called jakun 
ubu in Manchu, which originated from the tribal hunting tradition, 
stipulated the equal distribution of spoils, lands, and people among 
the Manchu top leadership, a principle of property distribution com-
monly found in gentile societies.76 It functioned first as a principle of 
distribution of booty. Valuables from booty such as gold, silver, and 
silk were assembled, equally distributed to each hoiso beile (the com-
mander of a banner) and finally through each individual beile into 
the hands of those who participated in the campaign.77 The rule soon 
became a set of overarching principles for organizing the new Man-
chu state. More specifically, the Manchu princes, primarily Nurhaci’s 
sons and nephews, were granted one share of the eight equal portions 
of the political, economic, and legal power of the Manchu state. This 
73 Yao Nianci, Qingchu zhengzhishi tanwei (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 
2008), 101. 
74 Ibid., 82.
75 Wang, Qingshi zakao, 20.
76 Similar military democracy was also found among Romans and Greeks. See En-
gels, Origin, 122 – 123.
77 Manwen laodang, 95.
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system was officially confirmed in March of 1622 when the eight hosoi 
beile were declared to be the central committee of the Manchu state. 
Under this structure, decisions on the imperial succession, state affairs 
generally, and serious legal cases not handled by lower courts were 
made collectively.78 
While this principle offered a ruling solution for such a rudimen-
tal regime with only limited fiscal resources, it later ran counter to the 
strengthening of royal power, the latter of which became increasingly 
imminent for the consolidation of the regime’s ever-expanding con-
quests. Within his own banner, the beile prince’s power was unparal-
leled. He was both the owner of the largest estates and the master of 
the booi aha population within his own banner. To be sure, Manchu 
jusen commoners within a banner had to meet labor and other ser-
vices demanded by the crown. But it was the beile prince who repre-
sented his banner at the imperial conference, and all public orders of 
the state had to be passed down through him. Therefore, under the 
system of the »eight privileges,« although the emperor did enjoy more 
public authority and his own yellow banner was widely acknowledged 
as being superior, he could not make arbitrary decisions. All state 
matters had to be discussed with the seven beile princes first.79 The 
Manchu emperor’s power was so limited that a later Chinese advisor 
at the Manchu court quipped that the crown was no different from 
a beile prince of his own yellow banner.80 This consultative nature of 
the feudal confederacy of the early Manchu state, formalized with the 
establishment of the Eight Banners System, planted the seeds of the 
future political crisis. 
When first entering Liaodong in 1621, Nurhaci did attempt to 
continue the old practices of subjugating all captives as serfs into 
Manchu princely estates, or tokso in Manchu. Between 1621 and 1625, 
the regime suffered from an extreme grain shortage, and the insuffi-
78 Ibid., 345 – 348.
79 Meng Sen, Mingqingshi lunzhu jikan (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), 218.
80 Luo Zhenyu, ed., Tiancong chao chengong zouyi (Taibei: Tailian guofeng chubanshe, 
1968), 276.
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cient development of the tax-collecting bureaus worsened the prob-
lem. To meet the financial needs of the military emergency, the ruler 
had to reorient his fiscal plan back to the »eight privileges« principle 
by subjugating the Chinese to be agricultural slaves on private prince-
ly estates.81 According to this policy, all Chinese and their lands were 
reorganized into equal-sized landed estates, each equipped with 100 
xiang of lands, 13 adult males, and 7 oxen. These new estates were 
then distributed to all Manchu military nobles based on their rank.82 
When the taxes collected from the agricultural production of the 
Ming model could not meet the requirements of the state’s budget, 
the old mode of production, featured by a promotion of the growth 
of privately owned landed estates and the use of forced bondservant 
labor, returned.83
This policy immediately provoked Chinese resistance and signifi-
cantly reduced agricultural productivity, making the existing grain 
shortage even worse.84 Intimidated by the oppressive Manchu policy 
in 1625, more Chinese fled, the incentive to work dropped, and har-
vests hit a new low.85 This policy granted more economic autonomy 
to beile princes. The economic power of the Manchu nobility soared, 
but at the cost of undermining the public coffers of the regime. On 
the newly formed princely estates, tax-collecting power fell into the 
hands of beile princes, accelerating fiscal decentralization.86 In short, 
as conquests continued to expand, applying old gentile organizations 
to incorporate the conquered population was confronted with resis-
tance and chaos. Thus, the Manchu population policy in the years 
1621 – 1625 showed that the old practice of turning the non-Manchu 
population into household slaves was meeting its limits.
81 Jin-liang, Manzhou midang, 73.
82 Manwen laodang, 644.
83 Zhou, Qingchao xingqi shi, 347, 351.
84 Ibid., 345, 347; Wu Tingyu et al, eds., Qingdai manzhou tudi zhidu yanjiu 
(Changchun: Jilinwenshi chubanshe, 1993), 29.
85 Manwen laodang, 858.
86 Meng, Mingqingshi lunzhu jikan, 233.
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Continued Conquests, Dismantled Gentile Constitution, 
and the Rise of Royal Power
In The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, Engels 
suggests that among many other favorable factors for the rise of royal 
power that arose from military conquests, there was one institution 
that especially favored it: »the retinue.«87 In regards to the mecha-
nism of continued warfare and the rise of royal power, Engels writes: 
»The military commander who had acquired fame gathered around 
his person a host of booty-loving young warriors pledged to loyalty to 
him personally, as he was to them. He fed them, gave them gifts and 
organized them on hierarchical principles: a bodyguard and a troop 
ready for immediate action in short expeditions, a trained corps of 
officers for larger campaigns.«88 Never-ending conquests were neces-
sary, because, as Engels explains, »they could be held together only by 
continuous warfare and plundering expeditions.«89 
As early Manchu conquests remained confined to Manchuria, 
several factors conducive to the strengthening of the ruling pow-
er had already arisen. The first was the booi or bondservants of the 
Manchu ruler. Most Chinese booi came from captives taken between 
1618 and 1621 in Fushun and Shenyang, constituting the main staff-
ing for the later establishment of the Qing Imperial Household De-
partment (neiwufu).90 The booi were among the earliest followers of 
Nurhaci’s military career. In 1584, when an assassin posed a security 
threat to Nurhaci, it was his booi niyalma that protected him from 
being harmed.91 During the time when supplies of Jurchen soldiers 
fell short, it was the booi who either fought shoulder to shoulder with 
87 Engels, Origin, 136.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Preston M. Torbert, The Ch’ing Imperial Household Department: A Study of its 
Organization and Principal Functions, 1662 – 1796 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1970), 16 – 17.
91 Manzhou shilu, 9.
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their masters or provided logistical support. The booi also engaged in 
collecting war spoils for their masters.92 In the early days of Nurhaci’s 
career, when well-equipped and organized troops fell short, it was his 
booi warriors who played a crucial role in securing his early victories.93 
By serving as his private security guards, personal servants, and more 
generally as a category of the population that was only supposed to 
owe their service to the leader, booi played a role in the rise of Nur-
haci’s power. 
Personal agents of a similar kind also included the khan’s private 
guards, known as bayara. The word bayara means guard or troops on 
guard duty. In organizational terms, bayara were selected based on 
military merit from each niru to undertake public duties. The bayara 
warriors were recruited from each niru to meet a variety of military 
duties.94 In 1635, after the division between the Upper Three Banners 
and the Lower Five Banners was made, the institutional structure 
of the bayara troops was changed correspondingly.95 After the Man-
chu state became a national regime in 1644, the Upper Three bayara 
troops (Bordered Yellow, Plain Yellow, and Plain White) became privy 
security guards of the emperor.96 
In The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, Engels 
not only shows that the emergence of the state was the result of the 
development of private property, but the accumulation of wealth into 
the military commander’s hands facilitated it.97 The early rise of Man-
chu power evinces this aspect. More specifically, through the monop-
92 Du Jiaji, Baqi yu qingchao zhengzhi lungao (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2008), 
95.
93 Zheng, Tanwei ji, 111.
94 Korehiro Anami, Shinsho gunji shi ronkō (Tokyo: Kōyō shobō, 1980), 181.
95 For documental evidence of the division between Upper Three and Lower Five 
Banners and its influence on the founding of the Imperial Household Depart-
ment, see Meng, Mingqingshi lunzhu jikan, 243. Also see Jonathan Spence, Ts’ao 
Yin and the K’ang-hsi Emperor, Bondservant and Master (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1978), 10. 
96 Zheng, Tanwei ji, 187.
97 Engels, Origin, 106 – 107.
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olized control of Jurchen special products such as ginseng, pearl, and 
furs and other measures to expand his fiscal resources, Nurhaci gained 
crucial funding for his early military successes. A special Jurchen ar-
ticle that perhaps played the greatest role in Nurhaci’s rise was gin-
seng. In the 16th century, the Ming court’s high demand for ginseng 
supplies gave this product a great market value.98 Abundant evidence 
shows that the rise of Nurhaci’s power went hand in hand with his 
success in the ginseng business. »At the age of nineteen, Nurhaci is 
said to have left his father to trade in ginseng at the Fushun horse 
market.«99 By the 1590s, »Nurhaci had already amassed a great fortune 
by monopolizing the trade in pearls, ginseng, fur, etc.; by mining; by 
taking silver in return for his yearly tribute to the Ming court; and by 
pillaging weaker tribes.«100 In particular, by inventing a new method 
of preserving ginseng, Nurhaci was able to sell it more dearly, which 
brought him more profits.101 By the end of the 16th century, Ming 
officials had already noticed that it was Nurhaci’s monopolization of 
ginseng on frontier horse markets that gave him dangerous economic 
power. Witnessing the Jurchen threat looming large in the 1620s, the 
Ming official on the Liaodong Peninsula, Cheng Kaihu, wrote, »Nur-
haci (nuqiu) had long been wealthy and powerful by monopolizing 
profits of furs and ginseng.«102 
The emergence of retinues or private bodyguards and the »robbery 
of wealth« by the supreme military commander, as Engels has shown, 
were but by-products of continued conquests. It was the latter that, 
in the end, shattered the old gentile institutions, which for a long 
98 Van Jay Symons, »The Ch’ing Ginseng Monopoly« (PhD diss., Brown University, 
1974), 121.
99 Ibid., 122.
100 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, 596.
101 Zhou Yuanlian, Qingchao kaiguoshi yanjiu (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 
1981), 58.
102 Cheng Kaihu, »Dongyi nu’erhachi kao,« in Qing ruguan qian shiliao xuanji, 
vol. 1, ed. Pan Zhe, Li Hongbin and Sun Fangming (Beijing: People’s University 
Press, 1985), 106.
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time before the conquest had played an overarching role in shaping 
Manchu society.103
When Abahai (1592 – 1643), Nurhaci’s eighth son, succeeded to the 
throne in 1627, tribal military democracy remained the political ethos 
that dominated the regime. On his deathbed, Nurhaci issued a set of 
instructions that granted more economic and political power to the 
beile princes with the »eight privileges.« He believed that it was a col-
legial rule, in which all the banner princes were to have an equal voice 
in policy formation, rather than an imperial system that helped guar-
antee the political success of the Manchu state. He urged the various 
princes to share the wealth acquired equally as their state expanded 
and to remonstrate with each other if any wrongdoing occurred.104 
Such a principle of collegial rule made the beile princes the equal 
beneficiaries of the thrones and lands of all subjugated peoples; none-
theless, it also reflected the fiscal limits of the Manchu regime and its 
inability to afford a fully functional bureaucracy. In 1634, responding 
to a criticism that the Manchu state cared more about taking wealth 
for the ruler alone rather than for building stronger public coffers, 
Abahai’s Chinese advisor explained, »Because lands of our state have 
not expanded enough and people are still struggling for existence, the 
day that Ming taxation system being applied in our state has not yet 
come.«105 In the 1620 – 1630s, this immature fiscal system left the Man-
chu state no choice but to adopt a fiscal policy called »raising people 
by eight banners« (baqi fenyang guoren; Manchu: ujimbi), namely to 
let the eight beile princes share both the burdens of state administra-
tion and the power of the state.
After 1627, Manchu conquest entered a golden era, marked by a 
string of new military successes in regions with majority Chinese and 
Mongol populations. In 1630, Abahai went on to conquer the towns 
103 Engels, Origin, 107.
104 Taizong shilu, 4.
105 Taizong shilu, 301.
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of Luanzhou and Qian’an, among others.106 The year 1631 saw his 
splendid victory in the Siege of Dalinghe.107 These military successes 
brought about a significant change to the previous structure of the 
Eight Banners System, the institutional bulwark of the old principle 
of »eight privileges,« which remained untouched when Abahai suc-
ceeded the throne. 
The first change was the addition of the eight Mongol banners. 
In 1621, two Mongol niru companies were formed from 645 Mongol 
households of the Kalga tribe brought to the Manchu state.108 The 
years after 1622 saw a large-scale incorporation of the Mongol pop-
ulation into the Manchu regime. In 1631, two separate Mongol ban-
ners (menggu erqi), detached from the Manchu banners, were estab-
lished.109 In 1635, the Mongol banners expanded to eight, paralleled 
with the already existing eight Manchu banners.110
The second change, related to the first, was to create eight Chinese 
banners, which shaped the Manchu regime in a more profound way. 
For the first few decades in the history of the Manchu conquest, when 
it came to the issue of Chinese captives, the usual approach adopted 
by the Manchu regime was simple but brutal: either to kill them all 
or to subjugate them as bondservants.111 The first significant change 
occurred after the Siege of Liaodong in 1621. Then, after Abahai as-
sumed his rule in 1627, there developed a clear tendency for Chinese 
institutions to rise up in the Manchu state machinery. The year 1628 
saw the first civil service exam organized by the Manchu regime to 
select Chinese talents with a booi status to serve in Manchu bureaus.112 
As the conquest regime expanded to the Ming territories, the Manchu 
ruler gradually turned from the old co-habitancy policy of Manchus 
106 Chen Jiahua and Fu Kedong, »Baqi hanjun kaolve,« in Manzushi yanjiuji, ed. 
Wang Zhonghan (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1988), 290.
107 Manwen laodang, 1131 – 57.
108 Yao, Qingchu zhengzhishi tanwei, 158; Wang, Qingshi zakao, 119.
109 Yao, Qingchu zhengzhishi tanwei, 158 – 159.
110 Ibid., 159 – 160.
111 Manwen laodang, 62.
112 Yao, Qingchu zhengzhishi tanwei, 161.
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and Chinese to the idea of establishing separate Chinese banners. In 
1637, the number of Chinese banners increased to two, four in 1639, 
and finally eight in 1642.
The establishment of eight Mongol and Chinese banners not only 
signified a new way by the Manchu regime to incorporate a con-
quered population who were ethnically different, but also provided 
leeway for the throne to break the collegial rule with seven top Man-
chu nobles and centralize power in his own hands. One telling exam-
ple of how the incorporation of the conquered populations changed 
the nature of the regime was the establishment of three additional 
Mongol banners that did not fall under the jurisdiction of the »eight 
privileges« and were under the throne’s direct control. That is, while 
the total number of male adults of the eleven Mongol banners formed 
in 1635 was 16,953, the three Mongol banners falling outside the »eight 
privileges« had 9,123 male adults, making up more than half of the to-
tal.113 More evidence suggests that this practice as to the organization 
of Mongol banners later became the norm.114 In addition, in 1636, 
the three outside vassal Mongol banner leaders were granted imperial 
titles by the throne, forging a tangible sense of personal loyalty among 
the banner leaders to the throne.115 All of this helped to enlarge the 
crown’s personal authority and to gain an upper hand over the princes.
A similar arrangement was found in the establishment of the Chi-
nese banners. In 1633, after Kong Youde (1602 – 1652), Geng Zhong-
ming (?-1649), Shang Kexi (1604 – 1676) and Shen Zhixiang (?-1648), 
the four high-ranking frontier officials of the Ming, shifted loyalty 
to the Manchu, they were organized into special Chinese banners 
that fell outside of the jurisdiction of the »eight privileges.« In Man-
chu, the relationship between Chinese bannermen and their Manchu 
banner leader was called ujimbi, a paternal relationship in which the 
Manchu banner leader was the giver of a livelihood. However, the 
Chinese bannermen who were in the ranks of special Chinese banners 
113 Qi Yunshi, Huangchao fanbu yaolve (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1965), 21.
114 Tayama, Shindai ni okeru Mōko no shakai seido, 79 – 81.
115 Du, Baqi yu qingchao zhengzhi lungao, 112.
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were different, because the sole authority for them was the Manchu 
imperial court.116
Thanks to the large-scale incorporation of the Chinese and Mon-
gol population into the Manchu regime during this period, Abahai 
began to break up the dominance of the »eight privileges« in the po-
litical system and to exceed his own power over the princes by con-
trolling more people, lands, and revenues. In 1627, Abahai established 
eight senior ministers (ba dachen) and eight banner lieutenant-gen-
erals (gusan i ejen) to be dispatched to each banner under the guise 
of assisting beile princes on banner affairs. He further established the 
new offices of 16 senior officials (shiliu dachen), designed to work with 
banner leaders on military affairs and judicial inquisitions.117 Through 
these arrangements, the imperial power began to have a strong pres-
ence within the banners. The old political order in which princes had 
hereditary control over their bannermen and enjoyed absolute ad-
ministrative autonomy within their banners began to be challenged.118
As territories of the regime expanded, Abahai also acquired a great-
er fiscal base to carry his centralization agenda even further forward. 
In 1629, the Three Inner Courts (nei san yuan), a modified version 
of the previous Literary Office (wenguan), were established, charged 
with offering administrative advice and secretarial assistance to the 
crown.119 Thereafter, this literary bureau became increasingly attrac-
tive to Chinese talents who were familiar with Confucian statecraft 
and offered them an opportunity to play an advisory role in the de-
cision-making of the Manchu court. The year 1631 saw the establish-
ment of Six Boards (liubu; Manchu: ninggun jurgan) on the Ming 
116 Zhang Jinfan and Guo Chengkang, Qing ruguanqian guojia falv zhidushi (Shen-
yang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 1988), 398 – 404; Chen Jiexian, Huangtaiji 
xiezhen (Taibei: Yuanliu chubanshe, 2004), 161 – 162; Chen, Mingqing zhengzhi 
shehui shilun, vol. 2, 481.
117 Taizong shilu, 6.
118 For a discussion of the actual overlapping staffing during Nurhaci’s reign be-
tween banner officers and court officers, see Chen, Mingqing zhengzhi shehui 
shilun, 437.
119 Zhang and Guo, Qing ruguanqian guojia falv zhidushi, 83 – 86.
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model, a milestone in the development of the administrative machin-
ery of the Manchu state. Upon his Chinese advisor’s advice, Abahai 
went on to establish the Censorate (ducha yuan) in 1636, an inde-
pendent bureau that supervised and impeached the misconduct of 
Manchu nobles and state officials.120 Despite the Manchu dominance, 
the staffing of the Six Boards did enjoy a broad ethnic representation. 
More importantly, for the first time, Chinese advisors made their way 
to the top administrative bureaus of the Manchu court, and the later 
trajectory of the development of the Manchu state did prove that they 
were the best allies for Abahai’s scheme of centralization.121
As Abahai took those forceful steps to subdue the powerful hosoi 
beile princes and placed bureaucratic constraints on them, the prin-
ciple of the »eight privileges« itself began to change. In 1631, Aba-
hai made a major modification to this principle by granting imperial 
protection to any individual who stepped forward to be open about 
any misconduct of the beile princes.122 This revision of the »eight priv-
ileges« began to loosen the autonomy of the princes‹ patrimony and 
thereby placed the princes under the surveillance of the state’s laws. In 
1634, Abahai began to revise the time-honored Manchu practice that 
the eight princes should share power and wealth equally, and replaced 
it with one whereby any benefit acquired from conquests should go 
to the »deficient banners« (buzu zhi qi) first.123 This change gave the 
Manchu emperor the discretion to decide which banner should be 
considered as »deficient,« representing the start of the imperial in-
tervention of the economic jurisdiction of the »eight privileges.« In 
1635, the state’s law further deemed the act of hiding the population 
as bondservants in order to evade the state’s taxes, which was widely 
120 See Xu Mingyuan’s memorial dated February 22, 1634 in Luo, Tiancong chao 
chengong zouyi, 399 – 401.
121 For a chart of Manchu, Chinese, and Mongol officials who were appointed to 
the Six Boards in 1631, see Zhang and Guo, Qing ruguanqian guojia falv zhidushi, 
55.
122 Taizong shilu, 153.
123 Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan, ed., Qingchu neiguoshiyuan manwen dang’an 
yibian, vol. 1 (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1989), 111.
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prevalent in banners as a way to increase the princes‹ personal wealth, 
as illegal.124 By making those profound revisions to the »eight privi-
leges,« the imperial power strengthened its control over the clan rule. 
The feudal and decentralizing tendency of the clan rule, formed and 
buttressed by the Eight Banners System, was effectively constrained.
Despite Abahai’s gains, the fashioning of imperial power was not 
completed within his reign, because the crown’s advantage in terms 
of the sheer number of banners he possessed was not yet dominant.125 
The limits of the accomplishments achieved by Abahai toward a cen-
tralized throne were best reflected in the succession crisis following 
his death in 1643. Instead of being set by the deceased crown’s tes-
tamentary edict, his son’s succession was decided by a joint confer-
ence of powerful nobles.126 Abahai’s centralization efforts had met 
their limits, because the throne had not taken control of an economy 
strong enough to build an efficient bureaucracy. This inevitably led 
to the economic reliance of the crown on the financial support of the 
princes. When the Manchu regime first entered Beijing in 1644, a 
symbolic event of the establishment of the Qing rule, the regime still 
faced mounting fiscal challenges, which left Shunzhi (1638 – 1661) no 
option but to turn to the princes for help.127
It was the turning into a national regime that fundamentally 
changed the fiscal bases of Manchu rule. Upon taking over Beijing, 
Manchu rulers made systematic efforts to restore the tax collection 
on the Ming model.128 By 1661, the last year of the Shunzhi emperor’s 
124 Ibid., 148. For a decree concerning this problem in 1635, see Nobuo Kanda, Jun 
Matsumura, and Hidehiro Okada, eds., Kyū Manshūtō (Tokyo: Tōyō bunko, 
1972), 61. For a legal case in 1639 concerning the state’s intervention in the tax 
evasion problem, see First Historical Archive, ed., Shengjing xingbu yuandang 
(Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1985 [1639 – 1640]), 181.
125 Yao, Qingchu zhengzhishi tanwei, 252 – 53.
126 Robert Oxnam, Ruling from Horseback: Manchu Politics in the Oboi Regency, 
1661 – 1669 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 38 – 40.
127 Shin’yo jokei (Seoul: Keijo Teikoku Daigaku Hobun Gakubu, 1935), 425.
128 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Impe-
rial Order in Seventeenth-Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985), 416.
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reign, the total count of agricultural lands had reached 549,357,640 
mu (one mu is roughly equivalent to 66.7 square meters). The gap 
compared to the count of 701,397,628 mu in 1578 is largely due to 
the exclusion of lands still under the control of the Southern Ming 
court at the time.129 This data suggests that in the first two decades 
of the Qing dynasty’s rule, taking control of the national economy 
gave the Manchu throne the fiscal resources it needed to build a fully 
functioning bureaucracy.
The expansion of the fiscal base of the Qing state in the post-1644 
era fundamentally changed the power balance between the throne 
and the nobility in general, and the nature of the Eight Banners Sys-
tem in particular. The years 1643 – 1651 saw a remarkable reduction in 
the number of princely power contenders and continued tendencies 
to gravitate power toward the throne, laying the foundation for the 
Upper Three Banners after the young Shunzhi emperor assumed his 
personal rule.130 In the post-1644 period, while each bannerman was 
granted a piece of banner land as their salary farm, they also began 
to receive silver or rice salaries directly from the crown. Initially only 
granted to cavalry soldiers, offers of silver or rice stipends extended 
to craftsmen, infantrymen, guards, and armored soldiers, although 
the salary gap still existed, with a soldier’s monthly salary being two 
tales and a craftsman’s salary only one tale.131 A significant salary in-
crease occurred after the Qing defeated the Southern Ming court 
(1644 – 1662), because this victory, by expanding tax-collecting areas 
to South China, brought the Qing more revenues.132
129 Liang Fangzhong, Zhongguo lidai hukou tiandi Tianfu tongji (Shanghai: Shang-
hai renmin chubanshe, 1980), 341, 380.
130 The three banners were his own Plain White banner, with the new additions of 
Plain Blue (preceded by Manggultai) and Bordered White (preceded by Dodo). 
131 Fu Lehuan, Liaoshi congkao (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 419.
132 For scholarly literature on the Southern Ming, a loyalist movement that was 
active in South China following the collapse of the Ming Dynasty in 1644, see 
Lynn A. Struve, The Southern Ming, 1644 – 1662 (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1984); Wakeman, Jr., The Great Enterprise, 319 – 413.
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The changes to the military and political systems of the regime 
were also seen in the establishment of the Green Standard Army (lvy-
ing), a centralized army recruited exclusively from the Chinese pop-
ulation.133 The earliest recruits came from those who had surrendered 
from the Ming army, later joined by recruits who opted to do so as a 
way of making a living.134 Unlike Manchu bannermen, soldiers in the 
Green Standard Army received salaries paid in monetary cash and / or 
in rice directly from the state fiscal system.135 In 1654, the number of 
Green Standard Army soldiers became triple that of Manchu banner 
soldiers. To feed the new troops, the Qing government paid an annu-
al salary of 11,518,400 tales in silver. Although the Qing government 
occasionally sought new financial sources to supplement the salary 
payments by selling offices (juanna) and opening up wasteland, in 
general, the majority of Chinese soldiers‹ salaries were distributed by 
the Board of Revenue.136 Since the salaries of the soldiers came from 
the government, not the princes, they became the crown’s soldiers, 
not to be compromised by the rule of the »eight privileges« anymore.
This changed power balance between the crown and the princes 
was immediately seen in the creation of new government regulations, 
designed to further check the influence of the princes in state affairs. 
In 1651, the Shunzhi emperor decreed that bureaucrats working in 
a banner did not have to come from the same banner. For example, 
a plain yellow bannerman could have an appointment in the plain 
white banner, a bordered yellow bannerman could have the same in 
the plain yellow banner, etc. Since then, the princes began to lose 
personal control of personnel and appointments within their own 
133 Luo Ergang, Lvying bingzhi (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1937), 26. 
134 Ibid., 17.
135 The earliest record about the salaries of Green Standard Army soldiers was found 
in 1654, which was 11,518,400 tales of silver. For sources of Green Standard Army 
soldiers‹ salaries, see Lai Fushun, »Qingchu lvying bingzhi« (MA diss., Institute 
of Literary Studies of Private Chinese Culture College, Taibei, 1977), 167. For a 
representative view concerning the importance of the Manchus‹ privileged iden-
tities as the conquerors, see Elliott, The Manchu Way, 2 – 13, 175 – 209. 
136 Lai, »Qingchu lvying bingzhi,« 168.
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banners. By 1651, the princes had even lost their power in the imperi-
al decision-making process. Thereafter, they took part in discussions 
on state affairs only as high-ranking state officials, not in the same 
way as they used to in the Deliberative Council of Princes.137 In 1651, 
the incumbent of the Manchu throne both nominally and in reality 
established his imperial authority, not by strengthening the gentile 
military democracy that facilitated the conquest in its early stages, but 
by passing beyond it: »the gentile order was finished« and »the state 
took its place.«138
Conclusion
Engels’s The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State pro-
vides invaluable insights on the politico-economic aspects of the early 
Qing state-building process and, more generally, on the transition 
from the Manchu tribal society to the state. First, recognizing the 
fact that the pre-conquest Manchu society was fundamentally tribal 
and no exception to what Engels says about pre-state social organiza-
tions gets to the very root of the nature of the Eight Banners System, 
a trademark Manchu institution, which recent Qing historiography 
has regarded as the key to the maintaining of the Manchu ethnic 
identity throughout the dynasty and thus to the understanding of 
the nature of the Qing rule. The foregoing discussion has shown that, 
originating in the Manchu tribal era, the banners were, by origin, a 
constellation of gens-based hunting units. Using hunting units as ear-
ly regime-building bases was not uncommon to other minority con-
quest groups in world civilizations, nor, after the state was in place, 
was the lasting influence of the »Manchu Way,« namely certain vir-
tues such as toughness and virility in hunting and tribal life, unique. 
When discussing how the Athenian state arose to replace the gentes, 
137 Du, Baqi yu qingchao zhengzhi lungao, 257 – 259.
138 Engels, Origin, 137.
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Engels argues that although »the organs of the gentile constitution 
were eliminated from public affairs … their moral influence, the tra-
ditional conceptions and views of the old gentile period, survived 
for a long time and expired only gradually.«139 It was rather common 
among many other minority conquest groups for the »gentile mental-
ity« to linger in its influence on the new social condition, despite the 
fact that »organs of the gentile constitution« were being transformed 
into organs of the state, and, for the benefit of the conquerors, this 
had to be done »quickly.«140
My second point is that only by coming to the gentile root of the 
Eight Banners System can we fully understand the Qing state-build-
ing process in the first half of the 17th century. More specifically, I 
have argued that although tribal organizations such as banners played 
a crucial role in absorbing conquered populations when conquests 
remained confined to Manchuria, such organizations met their limits 
after the conquests extended to regions with a Han Chinese popu-
lation as a majority, because, to borrow Engels’s words, it was im-
possible to absorb the entire mass into »gentile bodies« or to »rule 
them with the aid of the latter.«141 As Engels suggests, »[a]s soon as 
society passed beyond the limits for which this constitution sufficed, 
the gentile order was finished. It burst asunder and the state took its 
place.«142 Our story above precisely shows that the Qing state arose 
not by sticking to or enhancing the gentile rule of »eight privileges,« 
but by undermining it. In sum, Engels’s insights on the economic 
bases of the transition of the tribal society into the state remain rel-
evant, not only to early civilizations but also to a minority conquest 
regime in early modern China. While certainly not intending to offer 
a universal theory to explain all the complex and diverse paths of 
tribes transitioning into states, Engels’s work at least can serve to en-
lighten the importance of getting to the politico-economic roots of 
139 Ibid., 115.
140 Ibid., 143, 146.
141 Ibid., 143.
142 Ibid., 137.
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certain ethnically colored institutions. In this case, it was those polit-
ico-economic forces that motivated the transition of Manchu society 
from tribe to state that determined the manner and degree to which 
a particular ethnic identity influenced the new order — not vice versa.
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The Contribution of Engels to the 
Critique of Political Economy1
Renildo Souza
Friedrich Engels, at the age of 24, launched an effort to criticize Clas-
sical Political Economy. In his indignation, the young Engels con-
demned the triumphant theory of Adam Smith as the hypocrisy of 
»beautiful speeches about a love of humanity and cosmopolitanism.«2 
Besides protesting, in his Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy,3 
he paused in his analysis of classical economic categories, providing 
important embryonic formulations for Marxism.
The interpretation of the structure and operation of the capital-
ist economy, according to the laws, tendencies and regularities from 
a socio-historical standpoint, is an integral and relevant part of the 
elaboration and evolution of Marxist thought. The first steps in the 
critique of economic thought were taken by Engels. Before his meet-
ing with Karl Marx, he wrote Outlines (1843 – 1844), and he published 
Franco-German Annals in February of 1844. Engels, although he was 
quite young, benefited from his experience in the family business in 
Manchester, the center of the English Industrial Revolution; he was 
1 This contribution is a translation of »A Contribuição de Engels para a Crítica da 
Economia Política,« in Friedrich Engels e a ciência contemporânea, eds. Muniz Fe-
rreira, Ricardo Moreno, and Mauro Castelo Branco (Salvador: EDUFBA, 2007), 
29 – 52. The editor of the present volume would like to thank the author and the 
publisher of the original work to include this translation.
2 Friedrich Engels, »Esobozo de crítica de la economia política,« in Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, Escritos econômicos vários (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1975), 4.
3 In this text, the works Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy, The Condition 
of the Working Class in England, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and 
the State, Fundamentals of Political Economy Criticism (Grundrisse), and A Con-
tribution to the Critique of Political Economy will be designated, respectively, as 
Outlines, Condition, The Origin of the Family, Grundrisse, and Contribution.
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also a witness of the Chartist movement. He was immersed in an 
environment in which the classical political economy of Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo flourished. 
In the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Econo-
my, Marx, when referring to Engels, speaks of »his brilliant outline of 
a critique of economic categories.«4 It should be noted that the title 
of Engels’s article was borrowed by Marx for the subtitle of his mas-
terwork, Capital. Outlines is quoted a few times by Marx in volume 
one of Capital.
Evidently, in his Outlines, Engels was in agreement with Smith in his 
criticism of the mercantilist system. He disputed the equating of bullion 
to wealth, the centrality of trade balance, and rivalry and war among 
nations. However, he pointed out that the first stage of trade had already 
been surpassed: »it was understood that our treasure, the capital that 
remained inactive, increased continually when in circulation.«5 Here we 
see the identification, in germinal form, of the idea of the circulation 
of money as capital, which results in the valorization of value. However, 
there is still the need, obviously, to locate the ›secret‹ place where value 
is created, the sphere of production, and the concept of surplus-value. 
Engels signaled the emergence of Political Economy as a »natural 
consequence of the spread of commerce.«6 He understood that »the 
eighteenth century, the century of revolution, also revolutionized the 
economics.«7 All in all, Engels surpassed the evaluation of the practi-
cal conceptions of mercantilism and criticized Political Economy itself. 
»Modern economics — the system of free trade based on Adam Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations — reveals itself to be that same hypocrisy, inconsisten-
cy and immorality which now confront free humanity in every sphere.«8 
Cyril Smith emphasized the contradiction between the previous defi-
4 Karl Marx, »Prefácio,« in Contribuição para a Crítica da Economia Política (São 
Paulo: Nova Cultural, 1999), 53.
5 Engels, »Esobozo,« 3 – 4.
6 Ibid., 3.
7 Engels, »Outlines,« 419
8 Ibid, 420.
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nition of Political Economy (according to the Outlines)9 and the other 
definition provided by Engels in Anti-Dühring: »Political Economy, in 
the broadest sense of the term, is the science of the laws that govern 
the production and exchange of the material means of life in human 
society.«10
Nonetheless, this contradiction, noted by Smith, cannot be sup-
ported. In the passage of Anti-Dühring used by Smith, Engels is using 
the term ›Political Economy‹ as an embryonic interpretation that re-
flects diverse economic forms depending on the concrete conditions 
of production and distribution in each place and in each historical pe-
riod. He mentioned the problem of rudimentary forms of economic 
understanding. He referred to economy in general. Therefore, Engels 
was speaking hypothetically. He makes clear that »this Political Econ-
omy, conceived in these terms, with such amplitude (i. e., covering 
diverse human societies), is yet to be created. Everything that we have 
until now in terms of economic science is reduced, almost exclusively, 
to a genesis and to the development of the capitalist regime of pro-
duction.«11 Thought was restricted to Classical Political Economy, the 
liberalism of the writings of Adam Smith, John Ramsay McCulloch, 
James Mill, T. R. Malthus, J. B. Say and David Ricardo. It seems that 
Cyril Smith made a lot of noise for nothing. 
Extreme Moral Argumentation
In the book Condition, Engels repeated the moral emphasis already 
present in the Outlines, asserting that the English bourgeoisie was 
an immoral and incurably selfish class.12 He protested that the bour-
 9 Cyril Smith, »Friedrich Engels and Marx’s Critique of Political Economy,« 
Capital & Class 62 (1997): 127.
10 Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1990), 123.
11 Ibid., 130.
12 Friedrich Engels, A situação da classe trabalhadora em Inglaterra (Lisboa: Pre-
sença), 364 – 365.
Renildo Souza130
geois individual was indifferent to the hunger of workers and was 
concerned only with profit. For the bourgeois, »whoever does not 
make money is an idiot.« It was a »system of life in which each person 
works and enriches himself without showing concern for others.«13
This overwhelming, humanist, and moral argument reveals the 
limits of Engels’s Outlines. The author repeatedly cited envy, avarice, 
covetousness, the right of the mightiest, cunning, and hypocrisy in 
contrast to honesty, sincerity, and reason. Mercantilism was a fraud, 
»the most repugnant selfishness,« while Political Economy was the 
»science of enrichment that springs out from the envy and avarice of 
the merchants.« On all these pages, we see the most outrageous indig-
nation and moral condemnation. Already maturing, in 1884, Engels, 
in his work The Origin of the Family, amplified the focus of tempo-
rality, proposing that »the most vulgar ambition has been the driving 
force of civilization from its early days to the present; its defining 
objective is wealth, and always wealth, but not the wealth of society 
but that of the petty individual.«14
Ethical protest is essential. However, in science, it is not enough 
to simply replace an economic explanation with moral disapproval. 
The first moral protests by people like the leaders of Utopian Social-
ism (Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen) or the explosive episodes of 
indignation of the working masses reflected an injustice, resulting in 
the inequality of real economic conditions (in relation to the different 
social classes). It should then be recognized that »this appeal to mo-
rality and to right (law) does not make us advance scientifically even 
an inch.«15
Moral protest, however, is inseparable both from the observation 
of the social and environmental ills caused as the result of the econom-
ic reproduction of capitalism and from the examination of the alter-
native to that state of affairs. The economic mechanism that preserves 
13 Ibid., 120.
14 Friedrich Engels, A origem da família, da propriedade privada e do Estado, 10th ed. 
(Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1985), 199 – 200.
15 Engels, Anti-Dühring, 129.
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the interests and privileges of the ruling classes destroys the values and 
the sociability necessary for the ethics and the relationships among 
men. Instead of romanticism, naiveté, mere utopia, pious vows, and 
attacks against windmills, there is, besides other deficiencies, in the 
writings of the young Engels (in the Outlines), a complex and rich 
relationship between the ethical elements and the socio-economic 
analysis. Engels argues about the characteristics of the system of com-
petition and private property, pointing towards classist domination 
while also discussing anarchy and economic crises, and the possibility 
of the affirmation of collective consciousness and social revolution.
We must take into account that the ›modern‹ restoration of slavery 
by capitalism, the horrors of colonialism, and the social consequences 
of the industrial revolution have accumulated a lot of material, pro-
viding many reasons for moral denunciation. Furthermore, for social-
ists, there can be no wall between economic development and ethics. 
The capitalist economic infrastructure is associated with the super-
structure of prejudices, conservatism, and selfishness in bourgeois 
society. Gramsci drew attention to the need for a struggle in a moral 
and cultural direction, configuring a counter-hegemony of the work-
ers and their allies with the aim of gaining power. In the new society, 
the socialist ethic consists of values like liberty, solidarity, and justice, 
rejecting the reductionism of the socialist transition to tasks for the 
development of productive forces. This ethic demands responsibility 
in the use of material resources; preserving the environment better, it 
demands democracy and the participation of the masses.
In 1882, Engels, in the preface to the German edition of Condi-
tion, clarified that the context in which he made his first theoretical 
incursions was marked by a »juvenile stage of capitalist exploitation« 
in England.16 Thus, he correlates this fury of limitless exploitation 
with the beginnings of big industry. For this reason, at this point, 
in 1892, he believed that that stage had been surpassed in England 
16 Friedrich Engels, »Introdução,« in A situação da classe trabalhadora em Inglaterra 
(Lisboa: Presença), 432.
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while capitalism advanced in France, Germany, and, especially, in the 
United States.
Engels explained that on the new English economic stage, cun-
ning and small thefts against the workers no longer made sense, con-
sidering the progress of big industry and the broader markets.17 Big 
companies found the need for a certain commercial morality and to 
concentrate their time and attention on more relevant aspects of their 
business. Only small manufacturers still went for the pennies, the 
petty tricks, in order to survive. Social reforms, like the end of the 
›truck system,‹ and the law of ten hours, were »measures that chal-
lenged the spirit of free trade and unrestrained competition, but, at 
the same time, they increased the superiority of the colossal capitalists 
even more.«18 The need for the presence of a large number of workers 
in the major companies led the bigger industrialists to prevent useless 
conflicts and to accept the operation of labor unions. All this was in 
conformity with the acceleration of the concentration of capital and 
the suppression of minor competitors.
For this reason, Engels modified his previous explanation of ex-
ploitation caused by immoral human behavior.
Thus,
 … we should not seek the cause of this misery of the working class 
in these secondary effects but rather in the entire capitalist system. 
The worker sells his labor to the capitalist for a daily sum. After a few 
hours of work, he has reproduced the value of that sum, but his work 
contract demands that he continue working for a certain number of 
hours to finish the working day. At this point, the value he produces 
during these extra hours constitutes surplus-value, which costs noth-
ing to the capitalist, but which he keeps in his pocket. This is the ba-
sis of the system, which increasingly divides civilized society: on the 
one hand, the likes of Rothschild and Vanderbilt — owners of all the 
17 Ibid., 428.
18 Ibid., 430.
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means of production and subsistence, and on the other, an enormous 
mass of salaried workers, who only have their labor.19
In juvenile capitalism, the worst abuses of the process of industrializa-
tion are found in peripheral countries like Brazil, as demonstrated in 
the tragic inequality of the distribution of income and the miserable 
living conditions of the huge working masses. In countries of this 
type, moreover, during this neoliberal era, new difficulties emerge, 
once again stressing the importance of extracting absolute surplus val-
ue. This resulted in making work more precarious, with partial hours 
and temporary contracts, outsourcing, hourly wages, the revocation 
of labor rights, pseudo-cooperatives of work, precarious systems of 
production engaging all the members of the family, etc. 
Highlighting Economic Contradictions
Engels proposed a critique of Political Economy, declaring that he 
had turned to the study of the fundamental categories of classical 
theory, showing its contradictions and consequences.20 He noted that 
Political Economy’s operation of interpreting the system with the 
isolation and individualization of interests, reducing »everything to 
a web of particular interests, only results in opening the way for a 
great transformation in which our century is going, which will lead 
humanity to reconcile with nature and with itself.«21
Why did Engels say that »the defenders of freedom of trade (that 
is, the classic economists) are worse monopolists than the old mer-
cantilists?«22 Why did liberalism hide the basic, sacrosanct monopoly 
represented by bourgeois private property? The existence of private 
property for a few and the misery of the English people excluded any 
19 Ibid., 430 – 431.




sense of coherence expressed in national wealth. However, focusing 
his attention on commerce, a consequence of private property, Engels 
erroneously saw the exchange of goods as »a direct source of prof-
it,« since it is about »selling a higher price and buying as cheaply as 
possible.«
In the controversy over value, Engels failed to understand the de-
termination of value by the cost of production, in the sense of the 
quantity of labor incorporated into it, as Ricardo proposed.23 Engels 
saw this as »absurd abstractions.« Correctly, he criticized Jean B. Say, 
who defined value only by the perception of the usefulness of the 
good, showing the subjectivity of this type of evaluation. Engels, then, 
proposed a kind of conciliation, asserting that »value is the relation-
ship between cost of production and usefulness.« However, this could 
only be an approximation for a conventional definition of the market 
price. 
It was only much later that Marx clarified the distinction between 
value, price of production, and market price. According to the distinc-
tion of the organic composition of capital, among companies, values 
would be transformed into prices of production, equalizing the rate of 
profit in different sectors within the field of competition. There would 
be a redistribution of surplus-value among companies through the 
difference between price and value, but the total value, the total sur-
plus value, and its conformity with labor time would be maintained. 
Thus, the theory of value-labor was innovated and maintained. On this 
theme, Engels, looking at arguments about value, presented a comple-
ment to the third volume of The Capital, in which he addressed the 
relationship between the law of value and the rate of profit, defending 
the solution given by Marx for the transformation of values into pro-
duction costs (in view of the criticism and confusion).24
In his Outlines, Engels perceives the contradiction present in the 
theory of distribution of goods. Income would be composed of the 
23 Ibid., 8 – 10.
24 Friedrich Engels, »La ley del valor e la quota de ganancia,« in Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, Escritos econômicos vários (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1975), 232 – 248.
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remunerations of the so-called land, capital and labor services. How-
ever, »capital and labor are the same thing since [classic] economists 
themselves have confessed that capital is ›accumulated labor‹«25. The 
separation of labor and capital, born from private property, is an ex-
pression of »the division of mankind into capitalists and workers — a 
division which daily becomes ever more acute, and which, as we shall 
see, is bound to deepen.«26
Outlines presents an approach to the relationship between science 
and value that would later be developed by Marx in Grundrisse. En-
gels identified the negligence of Classic Economics with regard to the 
specific contribution of science towards the increase of goods: »the 
progress of science does not enter into its calculations.«27 He shows 
the emergence of mechanical inventions in England to be a reaction, 
among other things, to the lack of workers.28 The effect of the intro-
duction of machines was the reduction, relatively speaking, of the 
demand for labor. A part of the workers became unemployed while 
the other part saw their salaries reduced. Under these circumstances, 
the bargaining power of the collective actions of the workers became 
less effective. 
Engels, in his Outlines, agrees with the Classic Economic argu-
ment that machines reduced the prices of goods, broadening the mar-
kets and resulting in new positions for the unemployed. However, 
he disputes the magnitude of these benefits. Let us remember the 
perennially large number of unemployed, the constant technological 
change, the division of labor that limited the worker to one specific 
activity in the function of the type of machine, and the difficulty for 
the worker to change to a new occupation. 
25 Engels, »Esobozo,« 11 – 14.
26 Engels, »Outlines,« 430.
27 Ibid., 11, 24.
28 Engels, at this point, did not yet understand the distinction between labor and 
a special merchandise workforce, later clarified by Marx. In 1891, Engels wrote 
the preface to Wage Labour and Capital, which was a work written by Marx and 
published in 1849. In this preface, Engels provides a detailed explanation on the 
difference between concepts of labor and the workforce.
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In volume three of The Capital, Engels presents an addendum ex-
plaining that the increase in productivity consists of the decrease of 
live work and the increase of dead work, resulting in the reduction of 
the total sum of work in the commodity. He notes that this tendency 
to seek an increase in the productivity of labor is of no interest to cap-
ital in any circumstance. It matters »only when one saves more on the 
paid part of live work, than it is augmented in past work.«29 However, 
he exaggerated the contradictions and the limits of the system, as is 
evidenced by technological progress in the contemporary capitalism. 
Engels concluded that the capitalist mode of production requires an 
increase in productivity, but in certain circumstances it contradicts 
itself, showing its senility, curbing that development of productivity. 
It is obvious that Marx emphasized the centrality of the contra-
diction between the relations of production and the development of 
productive forces. This contradiction was essential for overcoming the 
capitalist mode of production. However, in Grundrisse, Marx pres-
ents the contradiction in a manner in which, implicitly, technological 
progress is not restrained:
The purpose of this production is, and continues to be, the magni-
tude of immediate working time …. To the extent, however, that 
big industry develops, the creation of effective wealth becomes less 
dependent on working time … than on the power of agents [from 
science and technology] set in motion … power that in turn … has 
no relationship with the immediate working time that its production 
costs, depending more on the general state of science and the progress 
of technology …. Capital itself is a contradiction in progress [due to 
the fact] that it tends to reduce working time to a minimum, but on 
the other hand it puts working time as the only measure and source 
of wealth …. On the one hand, it awakens to life all the powers of 
science and nature, as well as social cooperation and exchange, in 
29 Karl Marx, O Capital: Crítica da Economia Política, book 3, vol. IV.1, 3rd ed. (São 
Paulo: Nova Cultural, 1988), 186 – 188.
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order to make the creation of wealth (relatively) independent of the 
working time employed in it. On the other hand, it proposes to mea-
sure these gigantic social forces created in this way in working time 
and reduce them to the required limits in order that the value already 
created is maintained as value.30
Engels implicitly placed competition as the main moment of eco-
nomic activity, instead of production, just as Marx would formulate 
later. Engels did not yet understand that production, distribution, 
circulation, and consumption were indispensable, interlinked, and 
reciprocal conditioning moments within the same process. If, how-
ever, the Classical Economist classified the system through the beau-
tification of free competition, contrary to the monopolies prevalent 
under mercantilism, then Engels’s attraction to the study of competi-
tion and the market was only natural. The defense of free competition 
and the market by Smith is now retaken by neoliberalism, exalting 
the advantages of the market as the only regulating principle of the 
economy.
In Outlines, it is made clear that the consumer does not have 
perfect information about the goods offered in the market, as the 
Neoclassical Economy still assumes today. In spite of the veil of the 
freedom of the market, hiding the defects of the system, Engels ge-
nially anticipates the tendency of free competition to transform itself 
into a monopoly. In spite of liberal preaching, competition, based 
on interests that aspire to domination, »always ends in monopoly.« 
Our author continues by clarifying that this does not mean the end 
of competition among companies since »a monopoly cannot contain 
the flow of competition.«31
The tendency to centralization and the concentration of capital 
was further developed by Marx in Capital. That law of movement 
30 Karl Marx, Elementos fundamentales para la crítica de la economia política (Grund-
risse) 1857 – 1858, vol. 2. 13th ed. (México: Siglo Veintiuno, 1997), 227 – 229. My 
emphasis.
31 Engels, »Esobozo,« 15, 23.
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originated from accumulation and competition, which are coercively 
inevitable. It stemmed from the possibilities opened by the credit sys-
tem, from the role of limited liability companies, exemplified by the 
masses of capital of the English railroads. It stemmed from the need 
to increase the organic composition of capital due to the indispens-
able technological progress. 
The capitalist dynamic, based on instability and imbalance, is 
marked by periodic crises, occurring »with the same regularity as that 
of comets,«32 remarks Engels. Instead of information, calculation and 
planning, the economy is afflicted by the »lack of conscience of the 
interested parties.« This is what the natural law of economic equilib-
rium comes down to, in spite of the illusions of Political Economy. 
Whereas Classical Economists emphasized the harmonious nature of 
the economy and individual interests, Engels argued for the necessity 
for a collective conscience and the actions of men, not of loose atoms. 
This argument about collective human will had nothing to do with 
the positivism that, with some simplifications, some tried to accuse 
Engels, as we can see:
What can we think of a law that can only be imposed through peri-
odic revolutions? That it is precisely a natural law, based on the lack 
of conscience of the interested parties. If producers as such knew how 
much the consumers needed, if they could organize production and 
distribution, it would be impossible for there to be fluctuations in the 
competition [market] and their tendency towards crises. It produces 
in a conscious manner, and it overrides all those artificial and unsus-
tainable contradictions. However, as long as it continues to produce, 
as it does now in an unconscious manner, there will continue to be 
commercial [economic] crises, and each one of them will be neces-
sarily more universal and, consequently, more devastating than the 
previous ones. It will ruin a greater number of small capitalists, and it 
will increase, in greater proportions each time, the class of those who 
32 Ibid., 16.
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live off their work. In other words, it will increase the mass of labor 
that requires occupation, which is the fundamental problem of our 
economists, until finally a social revolution that our economists are 
incapable of imagining is provoked.33
In spite of its limitations, Outlines has a general view in which pri-
vate property and competition are unmasked as the fundamentals of 
Classical Political Economy. In the work Condition, Engels reaffirms 
the appearance of periodic crises when the internal and external mar-
kets become filled with English products.34 This is a description of a 
certain regularity of the cycles of overproduction. It is an open chal-
lenge to Smith’s self-regulation of the market and Say’s law of markets, 
supported by Ricardo, in which production creates its own demand, 
without the possibility of a crisis.
According to Engels, the concept of anarchy in the system covers 
both the productive effort and the distribution of consumer goods.35 
This anarchy is linked to the object of profit instead of the satisfac-
tion of social needs. He concluded that this anarchic operation of 
the economy is what imposed the disturbances and crises. Malthus‹ 
theory of population,36 justifying the »contradiction between simul-
taneous wealth and misery,« demanded a response. On the one hand, 
Engels, with a certain »productivist« charge,37 responded that, in the 
case of agriculture, »in a conscious manner and in the interest of ev-
33 Ibid., 16.
34 Engels, Classe trabalhadora, 120.
35 Ibid.
36 »Population, when not controlled, increases in a geometric progression. The 
means of subsistence only grow in an arithmetic proportion […]. Without doubt 
it is disheartening to think that the great obstacle on the road to any perfecting of 
society is of such a nature that we cannot hope to ever overcome it. The perma-
nent tendency of the human species is to grow beyond the means of subsistence, 
and one of the general laws of nature is that we do not have any reason to think 
that it will change.« Thomas Robert Malthus, Ensaio sobre a população (São Pau-
lo: Nova Cultural, 1996), 246, 360 – 361.
37 This productivism, contrasting with ecological concerns, is immediately relativ-
ized when Engels explains that this unlimited capacity, consciously conducted, 
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eryone,« »the investment of capital, labor and science could poten-
tialize the capacity of production of the soil infinitely.«38 On the oth-
er hand, referring to the general conditions of the market, he stated 
that »population is only excessive where the capacity of production 
is excessive.« The unemployed workforce is only an excessive capacity 
under certain economic circumstances. Engels, despite the emphasis 
on competition, does not shy away from reasoning about production 
fluctuations. He reasons that there is a type of equilibrium in which 
the productive impulse is weak, in which unemployment and hun-
ger are inevitable. If production accelerates, then we are open to the 
possibility of creating a future situation of super-production or even 
stagnation.
English industry needed a »reserve of unemployed workers.«39 That 
reserve was permanent except during »short periods of greater pros-
perity.« The magnitude of this reserve varies according to the behavior 
of the market, with greater or lesser occupation. A company’s search 
for an increase in the productivity of each worker is associated with 
the problem of unemployment. Thus, »the productivity of each work-
er raised to its maximum by competition, the division of labor, the 
introduction of machinery, and the utilization of natural forces are 
factors that lead to the unemployment of a multiplicity of workers.«40 
This formulation about the reserve of unemployed workers would later 
be developed by Marx as the concept of the »industrial reserve army.«
In contrast to the use of overpopulation to explain misery (and 
unemployment), in Malthus‹ proposition, Neoclassical Economics 
has enthroned, since the last decades of the nineteenth century, the 
balance of the labor market, with the economy naturally function-
ing at full employment and without crises. Only later, during the 
Great Depression, did John M. Keynes present a formulation of the 
would reduce »the burden of work that weighs upon humanity,« i. e. upon the 
workers.
38 Engels, »Esobozo,« 18.
39 Engels, Classe trabalhadora, 123.
40 Ibid., 119.
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possibility that the economy would fall back and prostrate itself in a 
form of equilibrium with unemployment. Thus, Keynes broke with 
Neoclassicism and recognized the existence of involuntary unemploy-
ment. This conclusion could, in a certain way, be associated with En-
gels’s intuition linking unemployment with the effects of the rate of 
growth of production.41 
Popularization of Economic Theory
Engels denounced the emergence of an abstract materialism, distant 
from concrete contradictions, in the explanation of the contempt and 
humiliation of men, that is, the »suffering of Christians.«42 God was 
exchanged for nature as something absolute, inevitable, for the ef-
fects of the economy upon the fate of men. Thus, Political Economy, 
instead of bringing forth a revolutionary examination of economic 
contradictions, preferred to adapt itself to the coming bourgeois era. 
For this reason, Classical Economists only represent intermediate 
progress with regard to the mercantilists. 
Throughout the history of capitalism, there is a conventional the-
ory, with various versions, that attempts to naturalize the economy. 
It sounds like an interdiction against any political intervention that 
is contrary to bourgeois interests. Engels exposes classical theory as 
an effort to beautify the economy through the exaltation of gains 
for the consumers (which today is called the »principle of consumer 
sovereignty«) and the celebration of the market as a bond of harmony 
between nations and individuals. 
41 In Keynes‹ thought, there is a reference to the analysis of Malthus (see Principles 
of Political Economy, Chapter VII), one of the representatives of Political Econ-
omy, who was alone in his argument about the possibility of the general satura-
tion of merchandise and the insufficiency of demand, which contrasted with the 
statement of Say’s law that prevails in Classical Economics.
42 Engels, »Esobozo,« 4.
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On the distinction between scientific Political Economy and vul-
gar Economics, Marx stated:
And to clarify once and for all, I understand as Classical Political 
Economics all economics since William Petty, which investigates the 
internal nexus of the bourgeois conditions of production as the an-
tithesis of vulgar economics (which only moves within the apparent 
nexus), ruminating again on the material already provided by sci-
entific economics, offering a plausible understanding of phenomena 
that are coarser and for the domestic use of the bourgeoisie, and is 
limited, moreover, to systematizing, pedantizing, and proclaiming as 
eternal truths the banal and presumptuous ideas that the agents of 
bourgeois production create around the world, which for them are 
the best possible.43
Political Economy only had a scientific character until David Ricardo, 
according to the judgment of Marx.44 Thus, the economy started to 
have a vulgar character from 1830, when the class struggle began to 
manifest itself with more clarity. Economic categories started to be 
presented directly, wrapped in the veil of ideological contraband of 
the class interests of the bourgeoisie.
The author of Outlines presents similar reasoning to Marx’s clas-
sification of vulgar Economics, but attacking, in some ways, even 
Ricardo himself: »While Smith and Malthus only met with loose 
fragments, later economists already had the whole system finished 
before them; all the consequences were in plain view, the contradic-
tions were evident.«45 There was a course of vulgarization, that is, a 
growing bourgeois ideologization of Political Economy. Ricardo was 
blamed for the scientific regression more than Smith, while Stuart 
43 Karl Marx, O Capital: Crítica da Economia Política, book 1, vol. I.1 (São Paulo: 
Abril Cultural, 1988), 76, n. 32.
44 Karl Marx, »Posfácio da segunda edição,« in O Capital: Crítica da Economia 
Política, book 1, vol. I.1 (São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1988), 22 – 23.
45 Engels, »Esobozo,« 5.
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Mill had contributed more to the misrepresentation of economics 
than Ricardo.
In epistemological terms, Engels’s intuition has great importance. 
It shows an escalation of superficiality or incessant reductionism, 
which accompany the unfolding of the dominant economic thought. 
And this is confirmed more and more, over time. In Political Econ-
omy, the attempt to naturalize economic facts, detaching them from 
the social and historical context, was repelled by Marx and Engels. 
Based on materialist conception of history, it was not possible to un-
derstand the capitalist system itself as something natural, eternal, the 
end of the evolution of humanity.
From the time of the founders of Marxism until today, things 
have only worsened in the field of the dominant economic theory. 
As we know, the accumulation of capital in our times has come to 
be understood as a gift of nature according to the automatism of the 
market, so long as each individual is not cut off from his activity, his 
entrepreneurship, and his self-interest by government intervention-
ism, and »syndicalist monopolies«. Therefore, let us look, briefly, at 
this growing abstraction of economic theory in the face of the prevail-
ing socio-economic reality in the capitalist system. The Neoclassical 
school, which emerged in the 1870s (particularly with Leon Walras, 
William Stanley Jevons, and Carl Menger), abandoned the focus of 
Political Economy on the determination of value based on labor. It 
covered up the investigation of problems regarding the distribution of 
goods among the social classes, putting aside Ricardo’s concerns. They 
simplified the difficulties of effective demand, in spite of Malthus‹ 
early warnings. Even the general equilibrium of Walras and the quan-
titative theory of money sanctioned reductionist visions of the general 
problems of production and circulation in the economy. 
From Classical theory, the Neoclassical authors broadened and 
radicalized the concepts of the naturalization, harmony, and equi-
librium of the economy. In the Neoclassical context, the marginalist 
analysis appears as an expression of the premises of rationality and 
the maximizing behavior of homo economicus. Thus, the preferences of 
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the consumer enthrone the deciding role, resulting from the individ-
ual’s choice in driving the economy. As a microeconomics of pricing, 
the theory was actually reduced to quantitativist formalism in order 
to simply describe the operation of the markets. The self-regulation of 
markets would promote economic stability. 
The history of the vulgarization of economic thinking according 
to dominant ideas has been a long one. Keynesian thought, partial-
ly divergent from this decadence, identified involuntary unemploy-
ment and economic malfunctions, but this generated the illusion 
that government action would be capable of preventing the crises of 
capitalism. From the 1970s onwards, there has been an upsurge in the 
vulgarization of economics with the monetarism of Milton Friedman 
and, later, the so-called school of rational expectations of Robert Lu-
cas. The latter would represent the so-called ›new classics,‹ as if it was 
a radicalized and worsened return to Classical Economics. There is a 
return to the aversion to any governmental intervention, assuming 
unlimited rationality on the part of individuals and sanctifying the 
self-regulation of the markets. 
History and Economics
In the preface to Origin, Engels attests that the materialist analysis 
of history is Marx’s and, he adds, »to a certain extent, our.« In the 
epistemology of classical Marxism, an association predominates be-
tween the economic explanation and the theory of historical mate-
rialism.46 The economy is a decisive, though not exclusive, factor in 
the evolution of society. For this reason, Engels considered that an 
increase in productivity was the key to understanding the evolution 
of private property, exchange, and the use of others‹ labor, resulting 
in contradictions among the recently constituted social classes.47 Over 
46 Jacob Gorender, »Introdução,« in Karl Marx, Para a crítica da economia política: 
Salário, preço e lucro (São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1982), vii.
47 Engels, A origem da família, 3.
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time, moving from adaptation to incompatibility between the new 
conditions and the old structure, there emerged, after a long time, 
the superseding of a society based on ties of kinship by a society or-
ganized around the power of the State and relationships of property. 
In civilization, slavery took deep roots, and society was divided 
between an exploiting class and a class of the exploited.48 Over the 
course of time, the development of civilization always manifests the 
contradiction between the progress of production and the conditions 
of the oppressed class.49 In civilization, there is a march towards the ex-
acerbation of the division between labor and mercantile production.50
In the evolution of capitalism, there was a period of so-called 
›primitive accumulation‹ between the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies. From the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries on, in England, 
there has been capitalism with its own technology, with big industry 
and the actual subsuming of labor to capital. Maurice Dobb records 
that Engels was one of the first to use the term Industrial Revolution 
to describe the transformations in the English economy and society.51 
Engels compared the importance of the Industrial Revolution, which 
had the creation of the proletariat as its main result, to the magni-
tude of the French Revolution. In the introduction to Condition, En-
gels asserted that the Industrial Revolution in England »transformed 
bourgeois society in its totality.«52
In order to study the proletariat, Engels did fieldwork, as he ex-
plains in the preface to Condition: »I lived for a long time among 
you [the workers], and for this reason I am well informed about your 
living conditions.«53 This accelerated industrialization demanded the 




51 Maurice Dobb, A evolução do capitalismo, 6th ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1977), 
316, n. 3.
52 Friedrich Engels, »Prefácio: Aos trabalhadores ingleses,« in A situação da classe 
trabalhadora em Inglaterra (Lisboa: Presença), 15.
53 Ibid., 7.
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provoked a rapid demographic growth.54 Artisans were ruined, and 
workers lost »the last vestiges of independent activity,« resulting in 
the blocking of mobility for the middle social strata.55 This situation 
forces us to think, to become aware, and opens up, for the first time, 
the possibility for the proletariat to begin an independent movement, 
concludes our author.
Concerning the State in general, Engels presents two fundamental 
traits: first, the State is a cohesive force of civilized society; and second, 
the State, always, in all typical periods, is an exclusive institution of 
the dominant class and consists, essentially, of an instrument of re-
pression against the oppressed and exploited class.56 Therefore, in the 
State, there is, simultaneously, a duplicity of cohesion and repression. 
Despite the classist character of the State, in the case of capitalism, the 
bourgeoisie has some reservations about the role of the State in cer-
tain matters that may contradict their economic interests. The bour-
geoisie uses the State against the proletariat, but it keeps the State, 
according to their ability and convenience, distant from certain issues 
related to economic activity.57
After the crisis of 1847, Engels identified the emergence of a new 
industrial era.58 The liberalization of foreign trade emerged with the 
repeal of the grain law, the expansion of colonial markets, the opening 
of China, the conclusion of the ruin of millions of weavers in India as 
a result of the competition from mechanical weaving in England, and 
the accelerated economic transformation of the United States.
In Condition, Engels predicted, in 1844, the overcoming, within 
twenty years, of English industry by competition and the subsequent 
spread of unemployment to the majority of the proletariat,59 who 
54 Engels, »Introdução,« 33.
55 Ibid., 18, 34.
56 Engels, A origem da família, 196.
57 Engels, Classe trabalhadora, 366.
58 Friedrich Engels, »Prefácio à edição inglesa em 1892,« in A situação da classe tra-
balhadora em Inglaterra (Lisboa: Presença), 428 – 429.
59 Engels, Classe trabalhadora, 387 – 388.
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would be left with no alternative but »to die of hunger or start a rev-
olution.«60 In 1892, Engels recorded, as a confirmation of this forecast, 
the rupture of the English industrial monopoly, setting a watershed 
that would lead the English proletariat to the loss of its privileges 
and free itself from the influence of its workers‹ aristocracy and turn 
towards the cause of socialism.61
Towards the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, new circumstances emerged through fi-
nancial capital, monopolies, and the end of the partition of overseas 
colonies by the great powers. Capitalism had entered its imperial 
stage, as evidenced by the development of Marxist theory through 
Rudolf Hilferding, Rosa Luxemburg, Nikolai Bukharin, and Vladi-
mir Lenin.
This new era of financial domination did not escape the notice of 
Engels.62 Thus, in the last year of his life, 1885, he wrote a note, later 
incorporated in Capital, analyzing the role of the stock market in the 
capitalist system. Engels noted the great changes in the significance of 
the stock exchange since Marx had written the third volume of Capi-
tal. The stock market had become »the most important representative 
of capitalist production.« Along with the acceleration of accumula-
tion, the group of rentiers was growing and new forms of associations 
were emerging in order to facilitate the investment of great amounts 
of capital. These new circumstances favored the emergence of trusts 
of production in commerce, banks, and lending institutions. Agri-
culture, foreign investments, and colonization companies would also 
become linked to the stock market.
60 »It is not right to suppress in the text numerous prophecies, in particular the 
one about an imminent social revolution in England, which were inspired by 
my juvenile ardor. What is surprising is not that many of those predictions did 
not come about but that many others were just and that in the critical period of 
English industry — consequence of the continental competition, mainly Ameri-
can — have effectively arrived.« Ibid., 434.
61 Engels, »Prefácio à edição inglesa,« 432. Also see Dobb, Capitalismo, 366.
62 Friedrich Engels, »La bolsa,« in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Escritos econô-
micos vários (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1975), 248 – 249.
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Engels’s Place in his Collaboration with Marx  
on Economics
There is some controversy around the legacy of Engels, including in 
his critique of Political Economy. Some find that Engels promoted a 
revision of Marx’s theory, turning towards a sort of reductionism or 
determinism. It is not the purpose of this article to deal exhaustively 
with this problem, but it is important to address his synthesis. J. D. 
Hunley points out that, since the 1960s, there has been an increase in 
questions about the compatibility between Marx and Engels.63 Hun-
ley adds that the prevailing view today is that there are important dif-
ferences between the two German revolutionaries. Eduard Bernstein 
(in the 1890s), Rodolfo Mondolfo (1912), George Lichtheim (1961), 
Norman Levine (1975), Terrell Carver (1883), and others are some of 
the so-called dichotomists since they have refuted, in different mea-
sures, the intellectual affinity between Marx and Engels.
Levine claims that there are important discrepancies between the 
first section of Engels’s edition of Volume 2 of Capital and the man-
uscripts kept in the International Institute of Social History. Among 
other things, this would result in the substitution of the Hegelian 
understanding of the totality of the economic process with Marx’s 
on the empiricist emphasis on particularity on the part of Engels.64 
However, among the various materials left by Marx, we can see both 
possibilities (totality and particularity), thus revealing some ambi-
guity, according to Hunley. Jerrold Seigel recognizes that there are 
discrepancies between the manuscript and the edited text of Volume 
3, but, in contrast to Levine, he sees the modifications introduced by 
Engels as necessary and justified. In his view, Engels rearranged some 
sections of chapters 13 and 14 of Volume 3 and attributed a more im-
portant role to neutralizing forces of the law of the decreasing tenden-
63 J. D. Hunley, »The Intellectual Compatibility of Marx and Engels,« Social Theory & 
Practice 17, no. 1 (1991): 1.
64 Ibid., 8.
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cy of the rate of profit. That solution by Engels reduced the positivism 
of the text, according to the law mentioned above.65
Hunley concluded that the two friends were in agreement on 
the fundamental issues. The great proof of unity was the harmoni-
ous work that they did together for almost 40 years, which included 
books and numerous journal articles.66 It was Engels who suggested 
the title and the opening sentences of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Lou-
is Napoleon. Engels also provided valuable insights into the mode of 
Asian production that were taken up by Marx.
In view of the strong accusation of vulgar economic determinism 
imputed on Marx and, above all, Engels, it is crucial to mention the 
letter that the latter sent to Bloch on September 21, 1890:
According to the materialist conception of history, the factor that 
ultimately determines history is the production and reproduction 
of real life. Neither Marx nor I stated anything more than this. If 
someone modifies the thesis saying that economic facts are the only 
determinant facts, then he would be making the thesis empty, ab-
stract, and absurd. The economic situation is the basis, but the differ-
ent factors of the superstructure that is built upon it — the political 
forms of the class struggle, the constitutions that, once a battle is 
won, the triumphant class writes, etc., the judicial forms, and even 
the reflections of all these real struggles in the brains of those who 
participate in them, the political, juridical and philosophical theories, 
the religious ideas and the further development that leads them to 
become a system of dogmas — also exert influence upon the course of 
historical struggles and, in many cases, determine their shape, as the 
predominant factor. It is a reciprocal game of actions and reactions 
among these factors, in which, through an infinite number of cases 
(that is, things and events whose internal connection is so remote or 
so difficult to demonstrate that we can consider it non-existent), the 
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 17 – 18.
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economic movement always imposes itself as a necessity. If that was 
not the case, applying the theory to any historical epoch would be 
easier than solving a first-degree equation.67
Cyril Smith claims that Engels did not understand Marx’s attitude 
with regard to Political Economy.68 For this critic, Engels would have 
gradually distanced himself from his valuable discoveries recorded in 
Outlines, abandoning the ethical and human vision, neglecting the 
monopolistic meaning of bourgeois private property. One of the im-
portant findings of Outlines, the verification that the old mercantile 
system had »a certain open, catholic frankness,« did not indulge in 
theoretical economic competitions in order to cover up all its com-
mercial immoralities.69 It changed reality and economic discourse. 
In Outlines, it was identified that in the new global conditions, now 
more humanized and attaching greater importance to value and mo-
rality, there was a place for Classical Economic theory in the form 
of Adam Smith. In Outlines, the pioneering perception of the links 
between economics and religion, within the framework of Protestant-
ism, made Engels admire Adam Smith as an economic Lutheran, ac-
cording to Cyril Smith.
Adam Smith showed the human aspect of commerce (that is, eco-
nomic liberalism): without wars among nations, without deliberate 
economic privileges by the State, without repression of the freedom 
to decide by each economic agent, without the prohibition of the will 
of the consumer in the act of exchange. This humanism, however, was 
very partial. All of this, in essence, was a »way to abuse morality for 
immoral goals.«70 In fact, private property prevailed as a monopoly, 
free competition to defraud consumers, civilization as exploitation 
67 Friedrich Engels, »Carta de Engels a Bloch, em 21 de setembro de 1890,« in 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Obras Escolhidas, vol. 3 (São Paulo: Alfa-ômega), 
284 – 285.
68 Smith, »Engels and Marx,« 123 – 142.
69 Engels, »Esobozo,« 7.
70 Ibid.
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of the people in the colonies, free-for-all competition, antagonism 
between collective and individual interests. 
Cyril Smith believes that Engels would have departed from the 
criticism of the categories of Political Economy, namely: use value 
and exchange value, value and price, labor, profit, and income. Engels 
would have underestimated the dual character of labour, the forms 
of value and fetishism.71 In contrast, Engels would have focused, over 
time, unilaterally on the concept of surplus-value, would have turned 
to the appreciation of value, emphasizing merely quantitative aspects. 
He would have become entangled in the question of materialist di-
alectics. He did not value his own critique of the population theory 
of Malthus in the terms that had already been established in Outlines. 
He did not go back to the universal human base employed to criticize 
both mercantilism and Political Economy.72
According to Cyril Smith, Marx’s critique of Political Economy 
did not turn to an empirical, factual description of the operation of 
capitalism nor to the proposition of the economic elements of social-
ism.73 The word ›capitalism‹ does not appear in Capital. The Marxist 
critique would have turned to the ideas and interpretations of the 
classics concerning the social relationships engendered by capital and 
its consequent contradictions. Cyril Smith thinks that criticism, for 
Marx, had the priority of challenging, in theory, in categories, in the 
most advanced and coherent system of economic thought, that is to 
say, Political Economy (since it explains the nature of modern soci-
ety).74 The inhumanity of bourgeois relationships was theorized as 
something natural and eternal by Political Economy. 
For Marx, the point of departure of the critique of Political Econ-
omy had to be human society, social humanism, in the view of Cyril 
Smith.75 Instead of capitalism, Marx spoke of capital as a social rela-
71 Smith, »Engels and Marx,« 136.
72 Ibid., 126 – 128.
73 Ibid., 124 – 125.
74 Ibid., 124 – 126.
75 Ibid., 125.
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tionship, hidden by the fetishism of merchandise. Value, for Marx, 
surpassed quantification and expressed human relationships as if they 
were relationships among things (20 yards of linen = one coat).
In the face of these criticisms by Cyril Smith, it is worth asking: is 
it true that, for Engels, the understanding of economics and classical 
thought was different? Let us see what he says: »The economy is not 
about things but rather relationships among people, and, ultimate-
ly, between classes, although these relationships are always linked to 
things and they look like things.«76
The facts made it difficult for Engels to accept the accusation of 
falsifying Marx’s thought. In the end, there were almost 40 years of 
intellectual collaboration between the two of them, with many texts 
written with the input of both. Furthermore, it is important to take 
into consideration all the revolutionary activity, in political affinity, 
that defined the lives of these friends. It is significant that after the 
death of Marx, the great political authority of the socialist movement 
was Engels, and even after his own death, his influence extended for 
many years among the ranks of the Second (Social-Democratic) In-
ternational. There are many reasons for calling Marx and Engels the 
Dioscuri, the twin heroes of Greek mythology. For Paul Lafargue and 
Wilhelm Liebknecht, Engels was Marx’s alter ego. Marx’s daughter, 
Eleanor, referring to their life and work, said that it was impossible 
to separate them.77 
It is counterproductive, in theory and method, to promote a clear 
separation between the work of Marx and the work of Engels.78 With 
76 Friedrich Engels, »A contribuição para a crítica da economia política, de Karl 
Marx,« in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Obras Escolhidas, vol. 1 (São Paulo: 
Alfa-ômega), 311.
77 Hunley, »Intellectual Compatibility,« 1.
78 In 1844 Engels published the Outlines and wrote Condition. Referring to his ideas 
during this period, Engels recognized, in 1892, with regard to Condition that »a 
book in which what is good is as much as what is bad shows the youth of the 
author« (427), I was twenty years-old, today I am three times older, and when 
I reread that book, I do not think that I need to be ashamed of it, and »it is not 
worth noting that the general theoretical point of view of this book — on the 
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regard to economics, in the division of work between the two friends, 
Marx took care of the deepening and systematizing of economic the-
ory, but Engels was the precursor for some relevant ideas. He brought 
forth embryonic elements that stimulated Marx’s study of economics. 
It is also inevitable to recognize that Engels assumed responsibility for 
editing the last two volumes of Capital, which included the technical 
work of redacting and, in the case of Volume 3, he made the effort to 
render intelligible some materials that had been left in rough shape 
by Marx. In that effort, beside his explanatory notes, Engels wrote the 
chapter on the effect of rotation on the rate of profit. Furthermore, 
we cannot ignore Engels’s effort to popularize Capital, breaking the 
so-called ›Conspiracy of Silence‹ through the publication of reviews 
and summaries in multiple forms of print.
The possibility of differences in focus and understanding between 
both thinkers is natural. Without a doubt, Engels always made the 
main role of Marx clear in the context of their collaboration. This 
is especially noted with regard to their economic studies. In spite 
of this, Engels was sought by Marx before the writing of Capital to 
collaborate on certain investigations, in addition to their correspon-
dence and the debates they held on economics and literature. In this 
sense, we can consider the following examples: Engels’s criticisms of 
concepts that underestimated the progress of agriculture; Engels’s re-
ception of Marx’s ideas that were contrary to what is called the quan-
titative school of currency (currency in circulation determining prices, 
foreign trade and crises79); the information Engels provided to Marx 
philosophical, economic and political plain — does not exactly coincide with my 
current position. In 1844 there was no modern international socialism that the 
works of Marx almost exclusively made into a science. My book represents one 
of the phases of that embryonic movement. (433). (Preface to the English 1892 
edition of The Condition of the Working Class in England).
79 The monetarism of Milton Friedman, starting in the 1970’s, had its origins in 
ideas already refuted by Marx 150 years earlier. The dynamic of the economy and 
the movement of prices make the circulation of currency and the credit system 
into derivative phenomena, although a serious mistake of a Central Bank in 
monetary policy can create economic problems.
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on the share of consumption by capitalists in the revenues of their 
companies; and the report Engels wrote, at Marx’s request, about the 
cotton crisis of 1965.80
The accusations that are made are either exaggerated or totally 
false. Thus, for example, there is no room to say that Engels influ-
enced Marx negatively, supposedly simplifying, for the sake of pop-
ularization, the explanations in chapter 1 of Volume 1 of Capital. In 
fact, it was in response to Marx’s letter, dated 3 June 1867, that Engels, 
without prejudice of logical or conceptual argument, suggested the 
use of historical illustrations on the process of the formation of mon-
ey in addition to the organization of the presentation of the text. 
Engels himself explained his methodology in his preface to Con-
tributions.81 For him, it was possible to employ two methods, histor-
ical and logical, in the critique of Political Economy. With regard to 
the historical method, he says: »This form presents, apparently, the 
advantage of greater clarity since in it we find the real development 
of things, but in practice the only thing that would result, in the best 
of cases, would be its popularization. … Therefore, the only method 
recommended is the logical one. However, this is, in reality, nothing 
but the historical method, stripped only of its historical form and its 
disturbing contingencies.«82 
Even in works that do not have economics as their main theme, 
Marx and Engels always make references to economic problems. For 
example, in The German Ideology, there is a strong presence of eco-
nomic elements. And so, as in their collaborative works, is it possible 
to locate and separate the economic contributions of Marx and En-
gels, and then place those contributions in opposition, one in relation 
to the other? This would not make sense. It is obvious that there is a 
80 Instituto de Marxismo-Leninismo, PCUS. Biografia de Friedrich Engels (Lisboa: 
Avante, 1986), 411 – 413.
81 Preface in 1859, that is, 15 years after Outlines, which negates the accusation that 
Engels, with the passing of time, had lost his understanding of Political Economy 
and had distanced himself from Marxist thought in this field
82 Engels, »Contribuição,« 310.
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sense of unity throughout their work, even though it was written by 
two people. 
Translated by Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo
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The Psychology of Friedrich Engels
From the Materialist Theory 
of Manual Labor to the Critique  
of Empiricism and Ideology1
David Pavón-Cuéllar
Introduction: Engels as a Marxist Psychologist
Friedrich Engels (1820 – 1895) was a Marxist, but only to the extent 
that Marx was also an Engelsian. The two men followed each other, 
they learned together and forged their ideas together, including those 
of a psychological nature. Substantive parts of the psychology that we 
attribute to Marx, presented and explained recently,2 are also attribut-
able to Engels. Hence, some authors prefer to speak of the psychology 
of Marx and Engels.3 However, there are also original Engelsian con-
tributions that must be considered separately, not because they con-
tradict Marxian theory but because they preceded Marx’s theory and 
advanced it through new avenues that paved the way for a Marxian 
psychology, stabilizing concepts that were still volatile in Marx. 
As we shall see, it is to the young Engels that we owe some of the 
first psychological formulations of Marx’s psychologies of material and 
historical determination, economic personifications, bourgeois individ-
uality, and resistance and rebellion. We also know the original mature 
Engelsian theories about psychic life: about its origin in manual work, 
1 The present chapter is a translation of »La psicología de Friedrich Engels: de las 
teorías materialistas del trabajo manual y del reflejo a la crítica del empirismo y 
de la ideología«, Dialectus 2(6) (2015): 150 – 162. The editor would like to thank 
the author and the publisher of the original work for the possibility to include it 
in the present volume.
2 »Las dieciocho psicologías de Karl Marx,« Teoría y Crítica de la Psicología 5 (2015): 
105 – 132.
3 See Samuel P. Coe, Contemporary Psychology in Marx and Engels (New York: 
American Institute for Marxist Studies, 1978).
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its constitution as a reflection of the real, its mediating function be-
tween subject and mundane-corporeal reality, and its immaterial figu-
ration as a primitive form of understanding dream phenomena. Engels 
offers us an interesting theoretical-methodological critique of empiri-
cist materialism in his elucidation of the psyche, as well as a denuncia-
tion of the psychological operation in the essence of ideology and the 
expansion of the horizon of the psychological-materialist explanation, 
beyond the productive, social basis and towards the foundations of sex-
ual reproduction. 
Considering the importance of the articulations of Marxism and 
psychoanalysis in the various intellectual movements of the last 150 years, 
we will pay close attention to co-incidences between the Engelsian and 
Freudian perspectives. We will see Engels agree with Freud in his em-
phasis on sexuality and family, as well as in the valorization of symptoms, 
the problematization of individuality, the consideration of corporeal 
materiality (and not only the mundane form), and the redirection of 
the abstract dualism of soul-body to the concrete monism of the body, 
and even the demonstration of psychic determination through hypnotic 
suggestion. With regard to the commonalities with Marx, we will also 
see how they are permanent and tend to systematize into a unitary theo-
ry, which will justify our assertion that Engels’s is the first of the Marxist 
psychologies. However, this does not exclude the existence of a critical 
tension between the psychological discipline and Engels’s perspective.
The Soul of the English Workers:  
The First Materialist Psychology
In his early work The Condition of the Working Class in England,4 En-
gels presents some psychological reflections that Marx later develops. 
The psychology of material determination was already delineated in 
4 Friedrich Engels, La situación de la clase obrera en Inglaterra (Moscow: Progreso, 
1980 [1845]).
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his dialectical characterization of the workers, who were both harmed 
by as well as beneficiaries of economic exploitation: deprived of »in-
tellectual activity« and »degraded« to »the condition of beasts,« they 
were nonetheless favored with »completely developed feelings« and 
»strong passions« thanks, precisely, to their lack of bourgeois »intellec-
tual culture« that »makes selfishness the main passion« and »concen-
trates all strength on money.«5 In terms of economic personification, 
the bourgeois man is a »money-man« who only seeks »accumulation,« 
whereas the worker is »more social« and his eyes are open more widely 
since he does not relate to the world with selfishness and prejudices, 
from which he is protected by his »imperfect culture.«6
In the Engelsian psychology of the English workers, as well as in 
the later perspectives of Marx and Freud,7 the cultural disadvantage 
implies, dialectically, a vital advantage. The workers’ lack of culture 
allows them to develop their sociability, knowledge, passions and feel-
ings. Their fortune lies in their misery. Analogously, the misery of the 
bourgeois individual is rooted in his wealth, which isolates him in his 
prejudiced and selfish individuality. 
Anticipating the theory of mass society, Engels transforms the psy-
che of bourgeois individuality into the hegemonic model of modern 
cities that promotes »sordid egotism,« the »isolation of each individ-
ual in his private interests,« and the fragmentation of society into 
»atoms« or »monads.«8 The »great cities« would discover the »disease 
of the social body,« and this was positive for Engels and his revalori-
zation of the symptom because this enabled him to learn the »appro-
priate means to heal it.«9 This same Engelsian dialectic, a precursor of 
the Freudian principle of abstinence and of the Marxian psychology 
5 Ibid., 89.
6 Ibid., 53.
7 Karl Marx, Manuscritos: economía y filosofía (Madrid: Alianza, 1997 [1844]); 
S. Freud, »El porvenir de una ilusión,« in Obras completas, vol. XXI (Buenos 
Aires: Amorrortu, 1998 [1927]), 1 – 56.
8 Engels, La situación de la clase obrera en Inglaterra, 11 – 12.
9 Ibid., 52.
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of resistance and rebellion, also operates in the conviction that the 
workers, »treated like beasts,« are able to »save the consciousness and 
feelings of their humanity« in their »continuous internal rebellion.«10
The young Engels preceded Marx and Freud in the revalorization 
of the symptom, in the discovery of vital misery in cultural wealth, 
in problematizing individuality, in envisioning economic personifica-
tion, and in underscoring material determination. The same young 
Engels was also a pioneer when he delineated a psychology of the 
historical determination of the English workers, in whose psyche 
he found the vestiges of past migrations, cultural fusions, econom-
ic changes, etc. Engels criticized those who »only recognize psycho-
logical development, the development of the abstract man, outside 
any connection to the past, when, in fact, the world depends on the 
past.«11 Such dependency, contradicting the amnesic tendencies of 
psychology, shows the presence of the past in everything that is pres-
ent in the world, since everything depends on the past.
Materialism of the Hands:  
The Origins of Corporeal Psyche
Considerations of the present and the past are constant in the thought 
of Engels, and this makes him delve into the most remote, pre-his-
toric and even pre-human times. These explorations always have a 
materialistic character. He is searching for the historical material de-
termination, which, once discovered, serves to critique the idealistic 
and amnesic affectations of our knowledge.
If man now tends to explain »his acts through his thoughts« psy-
chologically, it is because previously there were those who made the 
work »planned by their heads« be »executed by the hands of others.«12 
10 Ibid., 49.
11 Ibid., 99.
12 Friedrich Engels, »El papel del trabajo en el proceso de transformación del mono 
en hombre,« in Obras filosóficas (Mexico: FCE, 1876), 418.
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It was in this way that the mental-intellectual, the future subject of 
psychology, was abstracted from the corporeal-manual, distancing it-
self from it in order to devalue it, exploit it, marginalize it, dominate 
it, and repress it. Such an exercise of power, as a dominant-repressive 
material determination, allowed the powerful to acquire his appar-
ently elevated and independent existence as spirit, ideal, refined soul, 
and the psychic, distinct from the somatic and susceptible to being 
studied by psychology. Like Marx and Freud, Engels redirects the 
soul-body duality towards the concrete material totality in which it 
originates through a process of abstraction. Such abstraction is ideal-
ization and psychologization, and it is also social dissociation and a 
cultural-economic division between two parts of the body: the heads 
that do the planning, the powerful, and the obedient hands that do 
the work, the exploited. In the Engelsian explanation of the origin 
of humanity, it is the body that adopts an »erect posture« and thus 
frees the hands, which, thanks to their lack of occupation, can then 
turn towards work that becomes progressively more complicated and 
collectivized, which in turn incentivizes the development of language, 
the transformation of the senses, and the conversion of the »monkey 
brain« into a »human brain,« which ends up thinking of itself as an 
incorporeal, spiritual, ethereal soul.13 It is true, then, that the psyche 
of Engels, as well as that of Marx and Freud, comes from the body 
and owes everything it is to the body. Humanity stands out, in the 
end, because of its erect body with its manual work and because of 
its rational soul with its intellectual work. If the intellect became free 
from the hands, it is because the hands freed themselves from the 
erect body. It was »with the hands« that »the head developed« and 
»consciousness emerged.«14
Engels’s explanation, just like Marx’s and Freud’s, is perfectly ma-
terialistic. Matter is the first, most decisive and most fundamental 
element. The development of the human psyche is founded on the 
13 Ibid., 412 – 418.
14 Friedrich Engels, »Dialéctica de la naturaleza,« in Obras filosóficas (Mexico: FCE, 
1883), 299.
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development of language, the brain and the senses. This development 
is grounded in complex and collective work rooted in turn in the cor-
poreal materiality of the hands, which become independent as they 
detach themselves from the ground.
Materialism of Reflection:  
The Unreal Object of Psychology
In Engels’s materialistic approaches to psychology, the theory of 
corporeal-manual humanization (the material origin of human psy-
chism) is complemented with conceptions of the socio-economic 
material bases of the historical psychic configurations. The »moral 
ideas« of each epoch, for example, are ultimately explained by the 
»economic relationships« from which they come, »consciously or 
unconsciously.«15 The existence of private property imposes the mor-
al precept of »thou shall not steal,« as well as other contents of our 
consciousness, thoughts and feelings, invariably »determined by our 
current realities.«16 
The Engelsian notion of the historical material determination 
tends to be schematized in a theory of reflection that ends up estab-
lishing itself as the guiding principle of the Leninist perspective17 and 
some of the main currents of Soviet Marxist psychology,18 but which 
originates in Marx’s ideas such as the one that defines »the ideal« as 
»the material translated and transposed into the head of a man.«19 In 
15 Friedrich Engels, »La subversión de la ciencia por el señor Eugen Dühring (»An-
ti-Dühring«),« in Obras filosóficas (Mexico: FCE, 1878), 81.
16 Ibid., 158.
17 Vladimir I. Lenin, Materialismo y empiriocriticismo (Beijing: Ediciones en Lenguas 
Extranjeras, 1975 [1908]).
18 See Sergei L. Rubinstein, Principios de psicología general (Mexico: Grijalbo, 1982 
[1940]); Alexis N. Leontiev, Actividad, conciencia y personalidad (Mexico: Carta-
go, 1984 [1977]).
19 Karl Marx, »Postfacio a la segunda edición,« in El Capital (Mexico: FCE, 2008 
[1873]), xxiii.
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the Engelsian development of reflex theory, we begin with the met-
aphor of the idealist consciousness critically conceived as a »concave 
mirror« that inverts things into a »deformed image« of »historical re-
ality,«20 but, very rapidly, through »religious reflections« of the »real 
foundation,«21 we arrive at the representation of ideas and other men-
tal contents as »more or less abstract images of real things and phe-
nomena,«22 as »reflections in our thought« of the »real conflicts,«23 and 
as »refracted images of the real things.«24 
The reflected images, identified with the psyche, constitute 
well-defined and limited objects that apparently allow us to preserve 
psychology, preventing its object from becoming dissolved in the 
world and in the body, as happens with the young Marx25 and the old 
Freud.26 Unlike Marxist and Freudian theories (which end up assim-
ilating psychism into its economic-industrial and somatic-impulsive 
material determination), Engels maintains the object of psychology 
on the superficial field of the mirror that reminds us of the surface to 
which Freud reduced the ego and its psychology.27 The mirror creates 
a psychic world, deformed and sometimes inverted, that distinguish-
es itself from the world but does not stop being purely superficial, 
apparent, and imaginary. If we dig deeper into this world, we will go 
through it and we’ll leave it behind.
It is true that reflection theory preserves psychology, not exactly 
as a positive science, but rather as a negative study of an unreal 
20 Engels, »Anti-Dühring,« 83 – 84.
21 Ibid., 276.
22 Friedrich Engels, »Del socialismo utópico al socialismo científico,« in Obras filo-
sóficas (Mexico: FCE, 1880), 593.
23 Ibid., 597.
24 Friedrich Engels, »Ludwig Feuerbach y el fin de la filosofía clásica alemana,« in 
Obras filosóficas (Mexico: FCE, 1888), p. 562.
25 Marx, Manuscritos.
26 Sigmund Freud, »Esquema del psicoanálisis,« in Obras completas, vol. XXIII 
(Buenos Aires: Amorrortu, 1998 [1938]), 133 – 210.
27 Sigmund Freud, »El yo y el ello,« in Obras completas, vol. XIX (Buenos Aires: 
Amorrortu, 1998 [1923]), 1 – 66; Sigmund Freud, »El malestar en la cultura,« in 
Obras completas, vol. XXI (Buenos Aires: Amorrortu, 1998 [1929]), 57 – 140.
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object. And if it seems that we are falling into a certain dualism, 
this no longer divides the world into two realities, physical and psy-
chic, but into the physical reality and the psychic unreality, into 
the imaginary and the real, into what is reflected and its deformed 
reflection. Psychology must adhere to the unreal reflection, which is 
the only psychic thing, which can only be explained by what is real, 
by what is reflected, by the non-psychic, which, besides being what 
is reflected, is also the socio-economic thing by which its reflection 
is deformed on the ideological plane through »inversions« and other 
»complications.«28
The deformation of the psychic reflection (the difference that 
resists its assimilation into the physical-material reality) is deter-
mined and constituted by this same reality, by the economic system, 
by social classes and interests. What is reflected is what deforms 
itself ideologically, internally, in its own conscious exterior reflec-
tion. If men make history unconsciously and not only consciously, 
it is because their »ideal motives« exist interiorly and do not just 
reflect exteriorly the real »historical causes« that »determine them« 
and that »in the minds of the acting men are transformed into those 
motives.«29
The Engelsian psychic motive, like the Freudian one, is not just 
a figuration of its immanent cause but transformation. In other 
words, what psychology is concerned with is not only the reflection 
of reality, its conscious deformed representation, but also its un-
conscious deforming presence, that is, the presence of what reflects 
itself in knowledge, deforms itself in ideology, and transforms itself 
in history. The whole deformed psychic reflection, the object of psy-
chology, continues assimilating itself, monistically, to the deform-
ing, reflecting and reflected non-psychic. 
28 Engels, »Ludwig Feuerbach,« 562 – 574.
29 Ibid., 566.
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From Empiricism to Mysticism:  
A Critique of Observational and Experimental Psychology
We have already seen that Engels’s materialism does not lead, through 
reflection theory, either to the old body-soul duality or to a positive 
psychological science. We will now be able to observe that the Engel-
sian materialist psychology is not compatible with either an exclusive-
ly cerebral, cranial, neuronal materialism or with a purely observa-
tional or experimental empiricism. Engels makes this very clear in his 
critique of the phrenological projections of psychism on the shapes 
and parts of the cranium. 
In order to arrive at his critique of the empiricist materialism of 
phrenology, Engels chose a path similar to the one that Freud would 
choose when distancing himself from the empiricist materialism of 
the scientificist medicine of the nineteenth century. Both used hyp-
nosis, which, in both cases, demonstrated the mental determination 
of the physical and the necessity to theorize observation, allowing 
them to go beyond a series of empiricist excesses and materialist illu-
sions. In the case of Engels, the hypnosis of an adolescent from Man-
chester, in the winter of 1843 – 44, allowed him to refute the supposed 
phrenological location of certain psychic functions in certain parts of 
the cranium when he demonstrated that the location could be modi-
fied when the subject, in a hypnotic state, was induced to respond to 
the stimulation of other parts of the body and head. It was in this way 
that Engels, in his own words, discovered »a series of phenomena as 
the basis of the phrenological charlatanry, the majority of which were 
only different in a certain degree to the ones manifested in a waking 
state.«30 
Many years before Freud admitted the influence of a sort of hyp-
nosis in social life, specifically in mass phenomena, Engels recognized 
that the same type of suggestion exists in the waking state and studied 
it in order to explore the psychic causality of body responses. This cau-
30 Engels, »Dialéctica de la naturaleza,« 315.
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sality would not be perceived in the empirical investigations that lim-
ited themselves to observation and experimentation, thus condemning 
themselves to »the chimera, credulity and superstition,« that science of-
ten incurs when it »emphasizes simple experience« and »treats thought 
with contempt.«31 Do we not have here a sort of premonition of what 
would be a significant part of the modern psychological discipline? 
Our psychology, in fact, falls into the »most trivial empiricism« that 
»despises everything that is theory« and thus leads us to »mysticism.«32 
The mystical delusion would serve to establish those relationships that 
we have not established through »theoretical thought,« which, accord-
ing to Engels, exists precisely to »relate [the facts] to each other« or to 
»penetrate the relationship that exists between them.«33
The Origin of the Family and Sexual Love:  
Beyond Psychology
When readdressing Marx’s ethnological notes, Engels34 elaborated 
an intricate structure of theoretical relationships between scarce and 
doubtful empirical facts related to the pre-historic origins of the family 
and sexual love. The result was an enormous construct that not only 
reminds us of the fascinating interpretative excesses of Freud35 regarding 
the primordial horde but also contains valuable ideas that can serve as a 
bridge between Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis. Many of these 
ideas come from Marx and, in particular, from his reading of Morgan,36 




34 Friedrich Engels, El origen de la familia, de la propiedad privada y del Estado 
(Mexico: Colofón, 2011 [1884]).
35 Sigmund Freud, »Tótem y Tabú,« in Obras completas, vol. XIII (Buenos Aires: 
Amorrortu, 1998 [1913]), 1 – 164.
36 Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient Society, or: Researches in the lLnes of Human Progress 
from Savagery, through Barbarism to Civilization (New York: Holt, 1877).
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comparably superior vitality« over advanced societies37 and the (almost 
Freudian) conception of the monogamous family as a »microcosm of 
all the antagonisms that would later develop in society and the State.«38
In the work of Engels, based on that of Marx,39 we see an expan-
sion of the Marxist field of research from the »means of production« 
to the »means of reproduction«40 and from the »class struggle« to the 
»struggle between man and woman.«41 In this way, the socio-econom-
ic sphere, emphasized by Marxism, gives way to the familial-sexual 
sphere, emphasized by Freudian psychoanalysis. Like Freud,42 Engels 
did not separate both spheres but instead perceived a close relation-
ship between the two: the familial-sexual transition from matriarchate 
to patriarchate represents the socio-economic victory of »individual 
property over spontaneous primitive communism,«43 the first »class 
oppression« was the oppression of »the feminine sex by the masculine 
sex,«44 and in modern society, »the family man is the bourgeoisie with-
in the family« while »the woman represents the proletariat.«45
If the bourgeoisie is condemned to the monogamous family as a 
space for the exploitation of women, then the »oppressed classes« can 
aspire to equality between the sexes and to »marriage for love« and not 
»for convenience.«46 The authentic sexual-loving feeling, the core of 
psychism in Freudian theory, turns into a privilege of the oppressed in 
the Engelsian representation of the society of classes. Besides being a 
social and classist phenomenon, this feeling is historically fixed in the 
barbarian invasions at the end of the Roman Empire. Engels searched 
37 Karl Marx, »Proyecto de respuesta a la carta de V. I. Zasulich,« in Obras escogidas 
de Marx y Engels, vol. III (Moscow: Progreso, 1980 [1881]), 86.
38 Karl Marx, Los apuntes etnológicos de Karl Marx (Madrid: Siglo XXI y Pablo 
Iglesias, 1988 [1882]), 94 – 95.
39 Marx, »Proyecto de respuesta«; Marx, Los apuntes etnológicos.
40 Marx, Manuscritos, 35.
41 Ibid., 74 – 75.
42 Freud, »Tótem y Tabú.«
43 Engels, El origen de la familia, 62 – 74.
44 Ibid., 74.
45 Ibid., 84.
46 Ibid., 81 – 93.
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for the pre-historic origin of a gens that emerged from »group mar-
riage« in which »whole groups of men and whole groups of women 
possess each other reciprocally,« thereby »shutting out jealousy« and 
ensuring the »union of forces« necessary for the »evolution from an-
imality to humanity.«47 This group-social origin of being human, of 
the family and of sexuality contrasts with the familial-sexual origin of 
humans and social groups in Freud.48 However, outside of this con-
trast, Freud and Engels agree on the historical problematization-rela-
tivization of feelings of love, monogamous sexuality and the nuclear 
family in its modern Western versions. Neither of them accepts uni-
versal and eternal categories. Both insist on going beyond psychology, 
refraining from psychologizing social and cultural institutions. 
The Soul Apart: Psychology as the Essence of Ideology
Engels went all the way back to pre-history in order to explain not 
only the origins of humanity, the family and sexual love, but also the 
human psyche as an entity separate from the human body. We have 
already seen that such an irruption of the object of psychology was 
explained through the development of the hand, language and brain, 
with the resulting division between the manual work of the slave and 
the intellectual work of the master. This Engelsian idea, compatible 
with the Marxian view, would later give way to the hypothesis that 
the pre-historic man, »excited by dreams, started to believe that his 
thought and his sensations were not activities of his body but of a 
separate soul that lived inside him.« And »since that day, man has not 
been able to stop thinking about the relationship between the soul 
and the external world.«49
47 Ibid., 40.
48 Freud, »Tótem y Tabú«; Sigmund Freud, »Psicología de las masas y análisis 
del yo,« in Obras completas, vol. XVIII (Buenos Aires: Amorrortu, 1998 [1921]), 
63 – 136.
49 Engels, »Ludwig Feuerbach,« 546.
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The idealistic abstraction of the soul existing apart is reconnect-
ed with the concrete, mundane-corporeal totality in the Engelsian 
approach to psychology. This reconnection compares psychism to a 
mediating function between the human subject and everything that 
acts upon him and »moves his life« and must »manifest« itself psychi-
cally in his »head«: on the one hand, there is the body that manifests 
itself in sensations like »hunger and thirst«; on the other hand, there 
is the »external world« that »reflects« itself in the »shape of sensations, 
thoughts, impulses and willful determinations.«50 It is in this way that 
the psychological, individualist dualism of body-and-soul is trans-
formed in a sort of monism in which we can only distinguish two 
expressions of the same mundane-corporeal totality: its presence in 
the »propelling or determinant causes« and its representation through 
psychic reflections in the »ideological forms« of the »ideal or con-
scious motives.«51
In Engelsian theory, the object of psychology is reduced to an 
ideological reflection, ideal and conscious, of the world and the body. 
The psychological abstraction for which this reflection sees itself as 
a soul apart is the essential mechanism of ideology understood as 
»an activity that is in charge of thoughts, considered as entities with 
their own existence and developed in an independent manner, subject 
only to their own specific laws.«52 This Engelsian definition of ideol-
ogy is in itself a definition of psychology. However, more than being 
a precedent for a future critical Marxist conception of psychology as 
ideology,53 it is also an original representation that is also critical of 
ideology as psychology.
50 Ibid., 553.
51 Ibid., 566 – 567.
52 Ibid., 571.
53 Carlos L. Sastre, La psicología, red ideológica (Buenos Aires: Tiempo contemporá-
neo, 1974); Néstor A. Braunstein et al. Psicología: Ideología y ciencia (Mexico: Si-
glo XXI, 1975); Ian Parker, La psicología como ideología (Madrid: Catarata, 2010).
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Conclusion: Engels as a Marxist Critic of Psychology
The Engelsian critique of ideology is also a critique of the psycholog-
ical mechanism through which a psychic, ideal or intellectual object 
abstracts itself from the concrete reality, conceived as relatively inde-
pendent and ruled by its own laws. This mechanism is psychology 
itself and, consequently, when he criticized it, Engels also criticized 
psychology. In contrast with what is criticized, Engelsian research 
incorporates the psychic object in its concrete social, economic and 
historical reality on which it depends and by whose laws it is ruled. 
We can say, in this sense, that Engels was not so much a psychologist 
as a critic of psychology. 
The Engelsian critique of psychology began early on in his inves-
tigations of English workers, in which the psyche spreads out of its 
own domain and dissipates through society, the economy and history. 
Then, this object of psychology is presented as a product of the classist 
division between head and hands, a division upon which psychology 
would be founded and which would be fought by the communist in 
his struggle against classism. In his fight against class society and its 
psychological product, Engels would reduce the psychic to an unreal, 
apparent and superficial condition, a reflection in which there is only 
the reflected non-psychic and its distortion, which, ultimately, will be 
explained by the real reflected and not by the unreal reflection. 
As we have seen, Engels’s Marxist critique does not stop at a strict-
ly empirical psychology in which he alerts us to the dangers of a mys-
ticism that would compensate for the lack of theory. Theoretical re-
flection, in the direction that Engels sets, can only take us beyond the 
boundaries of psychology, even when dealing with the more intimate 
and personal elements (such as sexual love), which are redirected to 
their historical, group-social origins. How can we not go past the psy-
chology that we investigate when Engels conceives it as a simple sur-
face, the appearance and representation of that which hides from us?
Translated by Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo
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Engels and Evolutionist Ethnology1
Maria Rosário de Carvalho
Strictly speaking, for the anthropologist, the title of this article brings 
up the issue related to the so-called ›primitive society,‹ which gave rise 
to many ideological positions. These ideological positions shared the 
belief that societies were based on blood or in soil, and that the conse-
quent principles of descendance and territoriality could be equated to 
race and citizenship. The evolutionary or evolutionist structure offered 
the hope that although institutions may vary from society to society, 
they formed a hierarchy through which all would eventually progress.2 
The Antecedents to Lewis Morgan
The first ideas developed on the theme had India as locus empiricus, 
apparently the central political issue of the 1850s, and the dispute 
over the prevalence of law with regard to traditional customs and 
principles related to individual land rights derived from the British 
government and considerable parts of the utilitarian current. Henry S. 
Maine (1822 – 1888) intervened in the dispute, advocating for retaining 
the traditional system in India and, therefore, opposing a civil law 
based on a simplified English law. In fact, he and Bentham were on 
1 The present article is an extended translation of »Engels e a etnologia evolucion-
ista,« in Friedrich Engels e a ciência contemporânea, eds. Muniz Ferreira, Ricardo 
Moreno, and Mauro Castelo Branco (Salvador: EDUFBA, 2007), 65 – 84. The 
editor would like to thank the author and the publisher for the possibility to 
include the translation in the present volume.
2 Adam Kuper, The Invention of Primitive Society (London, Routledge, 1988).
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opposite sides: whereas Bentham believed that government was based 
on a social contract established by individuals for the protection of 
property, Maine proposed that original societies were based on fam-
ilies related by status and shared property. The so-called ›primitive 
societies‹ were subjected to a patrimonial despot.3
In his book Ancient Law, Maine sought to offer a solution to the 
conflict between the legal ideas of India and those of the British Em-
pire through a legal history of the family under the mantel of Indo-Eu-
ropean nations along a spectrum that connected India with ancient 
Germany and the British Crown through Rome. Nothing, in the light 
of that argument, prevented India from developing under British 
guidance, as had previously happened with Germany thanks to Rome.
The assumption, generalized at the time, that ›primitive peoples‹ 
carried out female infanticide indiscriminately was one of the means 
used by McLennan to attack Maine’s patriarchal theory. His argu-
ment imputed the practice of the large-scale search for women in 
external areas, which gave rise to the term ›exogamy.‹ On the other 
hand, since there was supposed to be a permanent struggle between 
communities, exogamy could not have resulted from a peaceful mo-
dality of approach but from acts of violence on the part of men in 
the position of beings forced to capture wives. These women, cap-
tured in small numbers relative to the demand, would be shared in a 
group under an arrangement called ›rough polyandry.‹ The more or 
less obvious conclusion was that, under such circumstances, it was 
difficult to establish paternity, as a result of which the first system of 
kinship would have to be based on bloodlines defined only by the 
female lineage.4 As Radcliffe-Brown noted many years later (1951), 
McLennan historically interpreted the custom of presenting the tak-
ing of a woman by one group from another as an act of hostility as a 
vestigial manifestation of the primitive conditions of human society. 
He presented the kidnapping or capture of women by another group 
3 Ibid., 7.
4 Ibid., 37.
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as the only way to obtain wives and generalized its diffusion.5 In this 
way, the excesses of evolutionist formulations were highlighted and 
delegitimized. 
The roughest forms of women sharing would have increasingly 
given way to a more refined and restrictive arrangement, in which 
uterine brothers with a recognized degree of solidarity would share 
a woman, a modality called ›Tibetan polyandry,‹ considered by Mc-
Lennan to be a stage in the development of marriage whose most 
important implication would be the sharing of descendance by the 
sons of a woman. In practice, Tibetan polyandry constituted another 
step towards the recognition of paternity. The idea of paternity, in 
turn, became firmly established, and its development was stimulated 
by the parallel growth of the welfare economy, which resulted from 
the necessity of having rules to govern the transmission of property 
between generations. 
As the reader may realize, these ideas are built upon precarious 
correlations and false assumptions. This is due to their character as 
preliminary outlines in attempts to establish a nexus between past 
and present according to an ascending linear march. Regarding liter-
ature that deals particularly with kinship, Radcliffe-Brown incisively 
pointed out that the theories that produced it »can only be called 
pseudo-historical,« imputing upon them unhappy results through the 
»legacy of erroneous ideas.« This legacy would be gradually discarded 
in favor of the development of field studies that did not refer to the 
origin of social systems, except when the actual history was known, 
in a clear allusion to the conjectures of McLennan, Maine and their 
contemporaries that ventured into this area.6 
5 Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown, »O Método Comparativo em Antropologia,« 
in Antropologia, edited by J. C. Melatti (São Paulo: Ática, 1978), 53.
6 Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown, »Introducción,« in Sistemas Africanos de 
Parentesco y Casamento, eds. Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown and Daryll Forde 
(Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama, 1982), 60.
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Lewis H. Morgan and the Order of Social Development
In 1871, a more elaborate version of McLennan’s thesis — that the first 
systems based on kinship would have been matrilineal, and the order 
of social development had the sequence tribe / gens / family — was pub-
lished by an American attorney, Lewis Henry Morgan. The Primitive 
Society provided a long and ambitious record of political and social 
evolution that, similarly to McLennan’s formulations, started with a 
matrilineal group and ended with the triumph of the state and the 
family. However, unlike his predecessors, Morgan had established, for 
the purposes of his research, a relationship with the Iroquois of New 
York, from whom he collected copious kinship terminology, and with 
the Crow from Missouri, from whom he recorded information on 
rituals and religious behaviors.7
Morgan was particularly interested in issues concerning American 
ethnology and, before writing The Primitive Society, he published Let-
ters on the Iroquois by Skenandoah (American Review, 1847), League of 
the Iroquois (1851), and Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Hu-
man Family (1871). In this last work, hereafter referred to as SCAHF, 
he distinguished descriptive systems — in which there were different 
terms for linear and collateral relatives, i. e. for father and mother, 
husband and wife, brother and sister, and son and daughter, none of 
which was applied outside the family nucleus — and he claimed that 
such systems would mirror the reality of biological kinship, clearly 
demarcating degrees of blood relationships.8 The systems of classifica-
tion, on the contrary, would not reflect the natural degrees of kinship 
but would bring relationships of different types together under one 
term, which could refer to father, brother of the father, or son of the 
7 Lewis Henry Morgan, A Sociedade Primitiva, Vol. I (Lisbon: Presença; São Paulo: 
Martins Fontes, 1976), 191.
8 The descriptive systems would be characteristic of all North American indige-
nous peoples (with the exception of the Inuit), southern Indian, Chinese, South-
east Asian and Pacific peoples, which for Morgan showed the unity of North 
American indigenous peoples and its relationship with Asian peoples.
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brother of the father, confusing different forms and degrees of biolog-
ical parentage, as recorded among the Iroquois.9
The question, as Levi-Strauss pointed out, is that kinship should be 
interpreted as a phenomenon of structure and not as the result of the 
simple juxtaposition of terms and customs.10 Furthermore, the systems 
of kinship cover two very different types of reality, that is, the termino-
logical system (system of vocabulary) and the system of attitudes, of a 
psychological and social nature. It is additionally always necessary to dis-
tinguish between two types of attitudes, i. e. those that are diffused and 
deprived of an institutional character, and obligatory attitudes, sanc-
tioned by taboos or privileges and expressed through fixed rituals. »In 
addition to automatically reflecting a nomenclature, these attitudes of-
ten appear as secondary elaborations destined to resolve contradictions 
and overcome insufficiencies inherent to the terminological system.«11
Morgan, on the contrary, gave excessive relevance to terminologies 
to the detriment of the system of attitudes. When opposing McLen-
nan’s refusal to admit that the systems that he had classified in terms of 
consanguinity and affinity (purely conventional and only established as 
a means to address one other when greeting), Morgan observed that a 
system of forms of greeting is ephemeral and postulated that a system 
of consanguinity is something very different, to the extent that the rela-
tionships of kinship that characterize it derive from the family and the 
matrimonial regime, being more permanent than the family itself since 
the latter evolves while the system remains immutable. This conception 
led to: a) the reification of kinship relationships, apprehended as mere 
expressions of the real conditions in which society lived in the period 
that the system was constituted, exerting an important influence on the 
daily life of human beings; and b) the conclusion that the uniformity 
9 Lewis Henry Morgan, Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Contributions of Knowledge, 1871).
10 Claude Lévi-Strauss, As Estruturas Elementares do Parentesco (Petrópolis: Paz e 
Terra; São Paulo: EDUSP, 1976), 164.
11 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Antropologia Estrutural (Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro, 
1970), 55 – 56.
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of immense regions of the globe and its preservation through very long 
periods of time should be the link to bring about marriage rules.12 
Thus, he tried to explain the origin of two systems of consanguinity 
and affinity from the forms of marriage and family from which they 
derived, admitting via hypothesis the existence of those forms. Having 
obtained a satisfactory explanation for each system, the previous exis-
tence of each modality of marriage and family could be deduced from 
the system that they explained. He also admitted that the sequence 
postulated was based, in part, on hypotheses, but it was sufficiently 
corroborated by the evidence to be taken into consideration. Future 
ethnologists were left to »establish a full picture of this sequence.«13
Let us see how he proceeded in the case of a consanguineous family. 
Considered the first and oldest form of the family institution, it would 
have stopped existing »even among the most backward savage tribes,« 
hence, it would not be possible to provide direct evidence of its existence.14 
The proof, then, that it had existed at a given moment in human history 
would have to be conclusive — »otherwise it would not demonstrate our 
thesis« — that is, strengthened by a system of consanguinity and affinity 
that for many centuries survived the marriage customs that had presided 
over its birth and whose presence demonstrated that this family existed 
at the moment the Malay system took shape.15 We are, then, confronted 
with something that resembles the petition of principle in Aristotelian 
terms: »Revealing relationships of kinship that ruled the consanguine-
ous family and its existence implies the existence of this type of family. 
Furthermore, it strengthens the theoretical certainty of the existence of 
the consanguineous family at the time it was established.«16
Another criticism directed at Morgan (who did not doubt the value of 
the terminologies of kinship to reveal the method of organizing relation-
12 Lewis Henry Morgan, A Sociedade Primitiva, Vol. II (Lisbon: Presença; São Paulo: 
Martins Fontes, 1978), 271.
13 Ibid., 138.
14 Ibid., 139.
15 Ibid., 139 – 140.
16 Ibid., 140.
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ships) was his attempt to classify all terminological systems using the two 
types referred to above when it was perfectly possible to use both classifi-
catory and descriptive principles, as Daryll Forde, among others, proved 
for the Yakö, a people established in the Ogoha province of southern 
Nigeria. According to Forde, their system constitutes an example of the 
total and simultaneous development of both groups of matrilineal and 
patrilineal relatives that, at the time of his fieldwork, were suffering from 
the impact of Western institutions but continued to give both lines of 
affiliation the same relevance. Forde identified the Abayong, Agwa’aguna 
and the Enna as other groups holding a similar dual system to the Yakö.17 
The restriction ascribed to SCAHF did not diminish its relevance, 
so much so that Claude Levi-Strauss did not hesitate in saying that 
Morgan founded, simultaneously, social anthropology and kinship 
studies18 and that he and Frank Hamilton Cushing were the great 
precursors of structural research.19
The Primitive Society
In The Primitive Society, Morgan postulated that »the history of hu-
manity is one in its origin, its experience, and its progress.«20 Endowed 
with essentially identical intelligence and a similar physical organism 
by virtue of their common origin, in the same ethnic period, humans 
have always arrived at the same results, in all times and all places.21 
It was this trait that led man to the invention of the arrow, which 
expresses the thought of a wild man, the fusion of iron ore, which 
represents the more developed intelligence of the barbarian, and, last-
17 Daryll Forde, »Doble Filiación entre los Yakö,« in Sistemas Africanos de Parentesco 
y Matrimonio, eds. Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown and Daryll Forde (Barcelo-
na: Editorial Anagrama, 1982 [1950]), 317.
18 Lévi-Strauss, Antropologia Estrutural, 325.
19 Ibid., 314.
20 Morgan, Sociedade Primitiva I, 8.
21 Morgan, Sociedade Primitiva II, 308.
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ly, steel, the materialized triumph of civilization. Finally, the labors, 
difficulties, and successes of the barbarians and savages would have 
been part of the »plan of the Supreme Intelligence,« who envisioned 
to make from the savage a barbarian, and from this a civilized man.22
His purpose was to prove that human progress continued its march 
through successive ethnic periods, internally demarcated by certain sub-
sistence arts, as evidenced by inventions, discoveries, and the develop-
ment of ideas of government, family, and property. In a peremptory way, 
he stated that these inventions and discoveries were directly related to 
the progress of humanity, and as social and civil institutions developed 
from original seeds of thought, they would represent the same scale of 
development. Taken together and compared, these institutions, inven-
tions and discoveries tended to demonstrate the origin of humanity in 
parallel to the needs of humans at the same stage of development and the 
identity of the activity of the human spirit in similar social conditions.23 
Organization into gens, fraternities, and tribes would have prevailed 
throughout the longest part of the most recent savage stage and through-
out the period of barbarism. The family, in a similar manner, would 
have assumed successively different forms, giving rise to systems of con-
sanguinity and affinity that would attest to the experiences of humanity 
during the transition from the consanguineous family to the monogamic 
family. Finally, forms of government, under the two general systems, had 
very different bases. The first system depended on people and personal 
relationships, and it constituted a society whose organizing unity was the 
gens, from which the fraternity, the tribe, and the confederation of tribes 
would emerge (through successive integration); the second system was 
based on territory and property and was characterized by constructing a 
state (civitas). The city or agglomerate, circumscribed by limits in whose 
interior property was established, constituted the foundation of the state 
and would lead to political society. The notion of private property pre-
sented the same evolution and the same development.24
22 Ibid., 308 – 310.
23 Morgan, Sociedade Primitiva I, 8.
24 Ibid., 8 – 9, 16 – 17, 19.
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The principle that apparently operated throughout human histo-
ry was a tendency towards moral progress in the form of the organic 
movement of society to distance itself from unfavorable conditions. 
The decline of classificatory systems of kinship and their replace-
ment by descriptive ones would have been impelled by the influence 
of relationships of property, a sign of so-called ›civilization.‹ The 
distribution of goods would be observed, and there was thus a se-
quence in the direction of concentration: if, in the so-called savage 
state, goods were distributed by members of the gens, in the early 
phase of barbarism they were restricted to the agnatic relatives, and 
finally, in the latter phase, goods were transmitted to sons as sole 
heirs.25 
Ethnic Periods and Arts of Subsistence
I. FIES Natural means of subsistence
II. FMES Consumption of fish and use of fire  
(Australia and Polynesia)
III. FSES Invention of the bow and arrow  
(Coastal Tribes of the Americas)
IV. FIB Invention of pottery  
(Amerindians east of the Mississippi)
V. FMB Animal domestication in the Oriental Hemi-
sphere and irrigation, brick buildings in the 
Western hemisphere (Indians of New Mexico, 
Mexico, Central America and Peru)
VI. FSB Smelting of iron ore (Homeric Greek tribes, Ita-
lic tribes, Germanic tribes during Roman times)
VII. Civilization Use of the phonetic alphabet and the production 
of literature
25 Morgan, Sociedade Primitiva II, 62.
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Source: A Sociedade Primitiva I, 20 – 24
According to Morgan, the systematic progress of ethnology demand-
ed that the development of the normal living conditions of savage 
and barbarian tribes be studied in regions where the institutions were 
homogeneous. Thus, Polynesia and Australia would be the best places 
for the study of societies in a savage state, whereas for the early and 
later phases of barbarism, the best field of study would be the Ameri-
cas during the time of their discovery.26
Development of Types of Family
 – Promiscuous intercourse
 – Intermarriage or the cohabitation of brothers and sisters
 – Communal family (first stage of the family)
 – Hawaiian custom
 – Malay form of the classificatory system
 – Tribal organization
 – Turanian and Ganowanian systems of relationships
 – Marriage between couples
 – Barbarian family (second stage of the family)
 – Polygamy 
 – Patriarchal family (third stage of the family)
 – Polyandry 
 – Emergence of private property and establishment of linear suc-
cession
 – Civilized family (fourth stage of the family)
 – Decline of classificatory systems of kinship, replaced by descrip-
tive systems
Morgan dedicated close to half of his book to the development of the 
system of the gens, based on the fact that it had survived the greater 
part of human history. The stages of progress were illustrated by five 
26 Ibid., 206.
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crucial case studies, each one of which was given its special relevance: 
Australian, Iroquois, Aztec, Greek, and Roman.
The Australian case represented the most primitive system, be-
ing only a short distance from the initial condition in which brother 
supposedly married sister in a form of incestuous group marriage; 
the Iroquois material was used to illustrate the subsequent stage of 
evolution in which the democratic gens was associated with larger 
federations; and the Aztecs, who would follow, were at the middle 
stage of barbarism. Later, Morgan classified the Aztec stage as a more 
advanced version of the Iroquois federation. His particular interest in 
the Aztecs was related to his attempt to refute the sources represented 
by Spanish chroniclers in which the Aztec monarchy was presented as 
analogous to European monarchies.27 He gave credence to the chron-
icles insofar as they described the actions of the conquistadors and 
the personal characteristics of the Indians, as well as their technology, 
diet, and dress; however, Morgan did not give any value to what the 
chroniclers wrote about the natives‹ society and government. In this 
respect, the value of the Spanish chroniclers‹ narratives was »practical-
ly null, since they did not know or learn anything with regard to the 
issue,« leading to his rejection of their formulations and to his study 
of the issue from the beginning, »using, however, that which is in 
concordance with what we know about Indian society.«28 
As far as the Greeks are concerned, their primitive government 
was essentially democratic, as gens, fraternities, and tribes were orga-
nized as self-governed bodies based upon the principles of freedom, 
equality, and fraternity, whereas the Roman empire was artificial and 
illogical, albeit capable of great achievements.29 
When the data produced by Morgan or collected from the avail-
able bibliography proved insufficient to support his ambitious project, 
he complemented them with other means, such as established En-
glish informants or bureaucratic or religious injunctions in different 
27 Morgan, Sociedade Primitiva I, 69.
28 Ibid., 225.
29 Morgan, Sociedade Primitiva II, 70.
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parts of the world. For Australia, for example, he used the help of En-
glish missionaries, and for other ethnographic contexts, he used the 
most diverse sources, such as Edward Tylor (Early History of Mankind 
and Primitive Culture), Homer (The Iliad and The Odyssey), Herrera 
(History of America), Lucretius (De Rerum Natura), Prescott (Conquest 
of America), Fernando de Alvarado Tezozomoc (Mexican Chronicle), 
Titus (Germania), Cicero (Topica), and many others.
The Reception of Morgan by Engels
Several authors, in the field of anthropology, disagree on the point 
that Morgan actually developed a materialist theory of history, taking 
into consideration that he also saw socio-political progress to be a 
signal of God, part of the master plan of the Supreme Intelligence, in 
which the barbarian was preceded by the savage and followed by civ-
ilization.30 What would have motivated Engels and Marx to embrace 
his ideas with such enthusiasm? In order to answer this question, 
it may be necessary to remember that Marx published little about 
non-European societies in that field, his most important contribution 
was his model of Asian production, a type of society with state orga-
nization whose village communities held communal land and would 
distribute the surplus internally, except for a certain amount reserved 
for the state. This model presented theoretical problems for Marxism, 
in part because Marx did not consider development to be geographi-
cally specific, and in part because it did not clearly signal the direction 
that societies of that type could take in terms of development.31
Towards the end of his life, Marx became attracted to new an-
thropology, having written extensive notes on the works of Morgan 
and his predecessors, notes that he never got to use. Engels then used 
these notes as the starting point for The Origin of the Family, Private 
30 Ibid.
31 Kuper, Invention of Primitive Society, 74.
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Property, and the State (1884), hereafter referred to as OFPPS. There is 
no way to know if Engels expressed Marx’s enthusiasm in an exagger-
ated form or in what way Marx related Morgan’s sequence of develop-
ment to the Asiatic model.32 However, the consensus is that Morgan 
became especially relevant within the Marxist tradition. The aspect 
of Morgan’s theory that interested Engels the most was his rediscov-
ery of the primitive matriarchal gens as the first stage of the gens in 
primitive peoples, which would be as important to anthropology as 
Darwin’s theory was to biology and the Marxist theory of value was to 
political economy. The evolutionary importance of this discovery was 
in showing a history of the development of the family as the product 
of historical processes and not as a natural institution. 
It is worth noting, preliminarily, the various convergences among 
the formulations of Morgan, Marx, and Engels, starting with the im-
portance given to kinship relations within the context of so-called 
pre-capitalist societies. Claude Levi-Strauss, in responding to criti-
cisms leveled by Georges Gurvitch regarding his distinction between 
stationary, fluctuating, and cumulative history, observed, quite appro-
priately, that the idea that societies considered primitive were ruled by 
links of consanguinity (kinship structures) and not by relationships of 
production is frequently expressed in Marx and Engels, who argued 
that, if those societies were not destroyed from the outside, they could 
perpetuate themselves indefinitely.33 
These themes, the French anthropologist reminds us, are constant-
ly taken up in Capital in relation to Indian and Germanic societies, 
which were, at that time, more ›primitive‹ than Marx thought. These 
themes were generalized by Engels in Anti-Dühring and OFPPS.34 In 
order to clarify the parallel between the »Germans of Tacitus« and the 
»American Redskins,« Engels said:
32 Lawrence Krader, The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx (Assen: Van Gorcum, 
1974).
33 Kuper, Invention of Primitive Society, 72 – 73.
34 Lévi-Strauss, Antropologia Estrutural, 361 – 362.
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The similarity is in fact more striking in that the mode of production 
is so fundamentally different — here hunters and fishermen, without 
husbandry or agriculture, there the nomadic breeding that passes to 
the culture of the fields. This proves precisely how much, at this stage, 
the mode of production is less decisive than the degree of composition 
of the old ties of consanguinity and the ancient reciprocal community 
of the sexes in the tribe. Without that, the Tlingit of the formerly 
Russian America35 could be copies of the old Germanic tribesmen.36
In response to Kautsky’s attempt to interpret primitive societies accord-
ing to historical materialism and through the exclusive use of economic 
notions, such as that of barbarism, Engels replied: »It is not barbarism 
that proves the primitive character but the degree of integrity of the old 
links of consanguinity in the tribe. It is those that must be established 
in a particular case before one is able to draw conclusions for particular 
tribes from those phenomena.«37 For all these reasons, we can conclude 
that Morgan’s attempt to elaborate a new typology of systems of kinship, 
in light of the knowledge acquired and the emphasis given to the orga-
nization of the gens, attracted the genuine interest of Marx and Engels.
Was the Materialist Conception of History  
Rediscovered by Morgan?
In the preface to OFPPS, Engels states, dramatically, that:
 …the following pages will be, in a way, the execution of my will. 
Marx was willing to present the results of Morgan’s research in rela-
35 Russian colonial possessions in America between 1733 and 1867, currently the 
U.S State of Alaska and the most distants settlements to Southern California and 
Hawaii. 
36 Ibid., 362.
37 Letter from Engels to Marx, December 8, 1882, cited in Lévi-Strauss, Antropolo-
gia Estrutural, 364 – 365.
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tion to the conclusions of his (to a certain extent, our) materialistic 
analysis of history, to clarify in that way, and only in that way, his 
entire scope. In America, Morgan rediscovered, in his own way, the 
materialistic conception of history, formulated by Marx forty years 
earlier — and, based on it — arrived, contrasting barbarism and civili-
zation, at the same essential results as Marx. I have, however, not only 
the detailed excerpts that Marx obtained from Morgan’s work but 
also the criticisms that he annotated that I will reproduce whenever 
they seem relevant.38
Engels points out that the social order in which men live at a given 
time or in a given country is conditioned by two types of produc-
tion, that is, by the degree of development of labor, on the one 
hand, and of the family, on the other; the less developed labor is, 
the more restricted the quantity of its products and, consequently, 
the wealth of society are; »with all the greater strength is the domi-
nant influence of the bonds of kinship over social regime manifest-
ed.«39 Thus, Morgan’s great merit was the discovery and the rees-
tablishment, in its essential traits, of this pre-historic foundation of 
our written history, as well as in finding, in the free unions of gens 
among North American Indians, the key to deciphering important 
enigmas, until then unresolved, about the history of Greece, Rome, 
and Germany.40
As is widely known, for the materialist conception, political econ-
omy constitutes the fundamental and determinant factor in man’s 
historical and social life. In this sense, Marxist materialism is, in fact, 
»economic materialism,« which identifies the trace of the union be-
tween the evolution of nature41 and the evolution of human society 
38 Letter from Engels to Kautsky, February 10, 1883, cited in Maximilien Rubel, 
Karl Marx: Essai de biographie intellectuelle (Paris, 1957), 301 – 302.
39 Friedrich Engels, A Origem da Família, da Propriedade e do Estado (Lisbon: Pre-
sença), 7 – 8.
40 Ibid., 8.
41 Ibid., 9.
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in the economic process conceived as »material production« through 
which men reproduce and continuously develop their means of ex-
istence and, therefore, their existence and everything contained in 
it. Every other event of historical, social, and practical existence, in-
cluding spiritual existence, has less influence over the development of 
everything.42
Engels’s embracement of the way in which Morgan rediscovered 
the materialistic conception of history was not without restrictions. 
In the history chapters devoted to Greece and Rome, Engels did not 
limit himself to reproducing the documentation of Morgan but also 
increased the data at his disposal; the section concerning the Celts 
and the Germans was ›essentially‹ his, since Morgan’s documents on 
the matter were second-hand; and, finally, he was forced to recreate 
the whole economic argument, which underscored that although it 
was sufficient for Morgan’s objective, it was not for his.43 
In this manner, the initially enthusiastic reception became more 
rhetorical, and Engels would later tone down his wording when he 
recognized that Morgan was the first who knowingly introduced a 
precise order to the pre-history of humanity and did so in light of the 
assumption that all of the great eras of human progress coincide, more 
or less directly, with the times when sources of subsistence broaden. 
The parallel development of the family, however, did not offer criteria 
that were as conclusive for delimiting the different periods as those 
offered by the arts of subsistence.44 
42 Karl Korsch emphasizes the value that Marx attributed to the complement and 
reasoning of his socio-historical materialism for the »natural sciences.« To prove 
it, he cites the observation that he made about Darwin’s theory of natural selec-
tion in a letter dated December 19, 1869: »Although roughly elaborated, as is the 
English custom, this is a work that contains the natural history foundations that 
serve our ideas.« Karl Korsch, Marxismo e Filosofia (Porto: Edições Afrontamen-
to, 1966), 160.
43 Ibid., 158.
44 Engels, Origem, 10.
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Translator … Traitor?
The assumption that the Asiatic mode of production was no more in 
1884, in OFPPS, became a problem for specialists in the evolution of 
Marxist theory. As the reader may remember, for Marx, the Asiatic 
mode of production is, necessarily, the one that remains for the lon-
gest, which is implicit in its assumptions; the individual does not be-
come independent from the community, and there is a self-sustaining 
circle of production, a unity of agriculture and manufacture. If the 
individual changes his relationship with the community, he changes 
the community and acts in a destructive manner upon it, and thus 
upon its economic assumptions. »In the Oriental model, the loss of 
property is almost never possible, except through completely exter-
nal influences, since the individual member of the community never 
enters into a free relationship to lose his economic objective with the 
community.«45
The exchange of letters of June 1853 between Marx and Engels is 
evidence of the conviction of both that the absence of private prop-
erty is the »key to the whole Orient.« That is the conclusion of Jean 
Chesneaux, who problematized the influence that the publication of 
The Primitive Society, which Engels read in 1883, had on him, and he 
recalled that Plekhanov had proposed to attribute this influence to the 
apparent change in Engels’s attitude. However, instead of supporting 
the accusation that Engels had been disloyal to Marx’s opinion on the 
Asiatic mode of production, Chesneaux thought that it was more ap-
propriate to determine the reach — decisive, but limited — of OFPPS, 
which did not seek to analyze the evolution of all human societies.46
In the prologue to the republished version of the article »A no-
tion of the ›Asiatic mode of production‹ and the Marxist schemes 
of the evolution of society,« published originally in 1964, Maurice 
Godelier admits having been wrong in concluding that Engels, after 
45 Ibid., 31.
46 Karl Marx, Elementos Fundamentales para la Critica de la Economía Política 
(Grundisse) (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1857 – 1858), 446 – 455.
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reading Morgan, had abandoned the concept of the Asiatic mode 
of production. A more detailed analysis and the chronology of the 
correspondence between Marx and Engels left no doubt in his mind 
that neither of them rejected the ideas elaborated from 1853 to 1877 
on the existence of ›despotic‹ forms of state, as edified in Asia, Russia, 
and other regions.47
He notes that Marx, in 1881, after reading Morgan, affirmed, once 
again, the existence of a despotic state in Russia and tried to discover 
its foundations, not in the necessity for great works but in the disper-
sion and isolation of agricultural communities in an immense terri-
tory, and in the Mongol domination. On the other hand, in OFPPS, 
he left behind the histories of Asia and America because, contrary 
to the history of the Greco-Roman West, the former would not de-
velop, according to Engels, more direct forms of transition from old 
clannish communities to the typical forms of states and class societ-
ies. In this way, OFPPS deepens, in light of Morgan’s formulations, 
one of the ways of transitioning to the state that Engels suggested in 
Anti-Dühring, that is, the Western way that leads to a generalization 
of productive slavery and mercantile production. Godelier claims, 
therefore, that there is continuity between Grundisses, Anti-Dühring, 
and OFPPS, the theses on the Asiatic mode of production having 
remained valid for Engels and continuing to designate a form of tran-
sition from societies without classes to societies with classes, »a transi-
tion that is incomplete and motivates slowness or stagnation in social 
development.«48
The position defended by Godelier seems to me to be the correct 
one, which it may be possible to demonstrate by referring directly 
to OFPPS. At the end of this book, Engels investigates the general 
47 Jean Chesneaux, »O Modo de Produção Asiático: Algumas Perspectivas de 
Pesquisa,« in O Modo de Produção Asiático, ed. Centro de Estudos e de Pesquisas 
Marxistas (C. E. R. M.) (Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1974), 22 – 23.
48 Maurice Godelier, »A noção de modo de produção asiático e os esquemas marx-
istas de evolução das sociedades,« in O Modo de Produção Asiático, ed. Centro de 
Estudos e de Pesquisas Marxistas (C. E. R. M.) (Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1974), 53.
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economic conditions that undermined, in the so-called later phase 
of the barbarian stage, the organization of the gens-based society and 
made it disappear. Up until this stage, production had been essen-
tially collective, and consumption also took place under a regime of 
direct distribution of goods in the midst of small or large commu-
nal collectivities. Production, then, did not overlap with producers. I 
suppose that Engels was describing the Asiatic model, in whose mode 
of production the division of labor was gradually introduced. It was 
in this way that production and common appropriation were un-
dermined, with individual appropriation emerging as the dominant 
rule, which opened the path to mercantile production, in short, the 
dominant model.49 
Final Considerations
For Franz Boas the question related to the origin of universal ideas 
was the most difficult problem in anthropology. He rebelled against 
the point of view that the same ethnological phenomena always have 
the same causes, as well as against the generalization that the similari-
ty of ethnological phenomena found in different regions of the world 
is proof that the human mind obeys the same laws in all places. He 
urged anthropologists to demand that the causes from which a phe-
nomenon developed be investigated and that comparisons be restrict-
ed to those phenomena that could be proven to be effects of those 
same causes.50 Boas became a firm opponent of what he designated 
as the excesses of evolutionism and emphasized that the evolution-
ist hypothesis implied the idea that modern civilization represented 
the highest cultural development, with the implication that all other 
cultural types were considered more primitive. He concluded: »We 
retrospectively build an orthogenetic development in the direction 
49 Ibid., 53 – 55.
50 Engels, Origem, 209.
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of our own modern civilization.« We contrapose, then, against the 
general evolutionary scheme, the admission of the existence of diverse 
»definitive and coexisting« types of civilization.51
Claude Levi-Strauss understood Boasian anti-evolutionism as a 
reaction derived from the fact that he used mainly mechanical mod-
els (whose constitutive elements are scaled according to the phenom-
ena studied), for which a notion of evolution does not have a heu-
ristic value.52 In doing so, he identified the weakness of evolutionist 
studies, that is, the utilization of mechanical models when statisti-
cal models should have been employed. The correct interpretation 
of Levi-Strauss eliminated, however, the strong critical position of 
Boas in relation to the evolutionary schemes developed throughout 
the nineteenth century, in which he identified a strong tendency to 
combine the historical aspect with the subjective evaluation of the 
various phases of development, the present serving as the standard 
of comparison.
The frequently observed change from supposed simple forms to 
more complex forms, from uniformity to diversity, was interpreted as 
a change from something of less value to something of greater value. 
Thus, he accurately concluded that the historical view assumed, in 
many cases, a poorly concealed teleological matrix.53 Furthermore, he 
observed that the generalizing method of the science of the period, 
according to which a real event did not possess scientific value in it-
self but only to the extent that it led to the discovery of a general law, 
collided with a purely historical vision, causing the subordination of 
historical facts to the concept of natural law. All the sciences that ad-
opted the historical point of view would soon evolve into attempts to 
discover the laws that determined evolution, and anthropology was 
not, in that sense, an exception.54 Boas did not shy away, however, 
51 Franz Boas, Antropologia Cultural (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2004 [1896]), 29, 31 – 32.
52 Ibid., 42.
53 Lévi-Strauss, Antropologia Estrutural, 310.
54 Franz Boas, A formação da antropologia americana, 1883 – 1911: Antologia (Rio de 
Janeiro: Contraponto / Editora UFRJ, 2004), 44.
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from admitting that anthropology owes its existence to the stimulus 
provided by those scholars and the conclusions they reached, but, at 
the same time, he exhorted us to not overestimate the influence of 
their bold generalizations.55
Afterword
Kevin B. Anderson readdressed,56 albeit much later than Lawrence 
Krader,57 the notebooks of Karl Marx, also called »annotations of 
Marx,« »ethnological notebooks,« and »notebooks of citations,« in 
which Marx summarized passages of books that he was studying, 
among which was Ancient Society by Lewis Morgan. These notebooks 
(to which Engels would not do justice) show him as a subtle and dia-
lectical reader at a moment in which he seemed to be turning towards 
»new directions,« towards non-Western societies, which would give 
rise to new theoretical dislocations.58
Certain aspects emphasized by Anderson clarify the motivations 
behind Marx’s interest in Morgan and, above all, in the relevance of 
non-Western, pre-capitalist societies in order to enhance their per-
ception through a comparison of social forms in order to reorient his 
thoughts on fundamental themes — such as history and the relation-
ship between complementarity and Western and non-Western social 
55 Ibid., 45.
56 Kevin B. Anderson, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity and 
Non-Western Societies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Kevin B. An-
derson, Marx nas Margens: Nacionalismo, Etnia e Sociedades Não Ocidentais (São 
Paulo: Boitempo, 2019).
57 Lawrence Krader, The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx (Amsterdam: Interna-
tionaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, 1974).
58 Societies that had been the object of colonization (India, Indonesia, Algeria, 
etc.); societies located outside the developing global capitalist system (Poland, 
Russia, China, etc.); and societies that were included in that system (the United 
States and Ireland).
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formations — for the unleashing of revolutionary developments. This 
is the direction of this brief afterword.
Marx’s position in favor of differentiated examinations of Eu-
ropean and Asian history, and contrary to the mere transference of 
concepts of social structure originating in the European model to 
non-Western societies, already suggested that he was in the process of 
an inflection that would move him away from the unilinear perspec-
tive expressed in the Communist Manifesto (and which would make 
him adopt a multilinear perspective).59
For this inflection, the notes of Maxim Kovalevski (a Russian 
sociologist and jurist), Lewis Morgan (on the American Indians) 
and Robert Sewell (a colonial official in India) may be determinant. 
Thanks to the former two, Marx came to admit that Indian society 
had a history, and the lines of castes that he saw in 1853 as »unsur-
mountable barriers that prevented social cohesion in the face of for-
eign invasion« became, by 1879, something that amazed him due to 
their porosity. The supposition of an »invincible march of great his-
torical forces« gave way to the contingent character of conquests, like 
those of the Muslim and British conquests in India.60 
Marx’s anti-colonialist position also emerges in his late writings 
and notes,61 either when taking the side of the colonized by suppress-
ing the excerpts of Sewell portraying the British conquest as a heroic 
struggle against Asiatic barbarism, or when reporting the death by 
suffocation of 100 British soldiers int the »Black Hole of Calcutta«, or 
when he highlighted the transformation of ancient forms of proper-
ty into unrestricted private property through the voracious forms of 
59 Anderson, Marx nas Margens, 312.
60 Ibid., 315 – 316.
61 For Anderson, Marx’s anti-colonialist side became more pronounced in the years 
1856 – 1857 through his articles in the New York Tribune. He supported the Chi-
nese resistance against the British during the Second Opium War and the revolt 
of the Sepoys in northern India during 1857 – 1859. It was during this period 
that some of his new thoughts on India were incorporated into the Grundrisse 
(1857 – 1858), as well as his multilinear theory of history. Anderson, Marx nas 
Margens, 348.
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British capitalism.62 He supported the Polish uprising of 1863, judged 
as fundamental for the labor and socialist movements, and he alerted 
the First International to the possibility that the denial of political 
and social rights to emancipated slaves in the United States would 
precipitate a bloodbath in the country.63 He also wrote notes about 
the colonial system of repartimiento in Spanish America, where Am-
erindians were hunted down if the supply of agricultural labor de-
clined.64 He also commented on the system of encomiendas, which 
imposed heavy communal taxes that led to the flight and suicide of 
many Amerindians.65 
Kovalevski’s notes about Algeria were concerned with communal 
forms of property in the pre-colonial and colonial periods, whose 
strength was prevalent in the Maghreb region. The French National 
Assembly of 1873 tried to disassemble the foundations of communal 
property, convinced that the breakdown of the connection between 
the Arabs and the land would be the only way to prevent an anti-co-
lonial revolt.66
The persistence of these communal structures would lead Marx 
to interpret them, preliminarily, as a potential source of resistance to 
capital, and, later, as a source of revolution when impelled by an »ex-
ternal subjective factor,« i. e. in association with a self-conscious and 
organized working-class movement.67
In his last writing on Russia, Marx would move away from the 
»model of implicitly unilinear development« when he admitted the 
possibility that non-capitalist societies may transition directly to so-
cialism from autonomous communal structures. However, the con-
dition for this to happen, as Marx and Engels state in the preface to 





66 Ibid., 323 – 324.
67 Ibid., 341.
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publication), would be through the association of communal struc-
tures with social sectors of the developed West.68 Similarly, any new 
system could emerge in the context of a wider social transformation 
involving the Western working class.69 It would be possible, then, for 
non-Westerners to share »the fruits of Western modernity.«
Translated by Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo
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Friedrich Engels’s Philosophy of Nature
An Interpretation of the Concept  
of the Dialectics of Nature1
Gottfried Schweiger
»Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious 
dialectics from German idealist philosophy and apply it in the mate-
rialist conception of nature and history.«2
It was due to (unfortunate) external circumstances, including in 
particular the death of Karl Marx and the need to finish and edit 
his work on political economy, that Friedrich Engels never found 
the time to flesh out his philosophy of nature and that he was not 
able to explicate the mentioned ›rescue‹ of dialectics and its applica-
tion with regard to the natural world. Engels’s Dialectics of Nature 
was only left as a fragment, which complicates its interpretation 
and leaves many questions open.3 His other work that deals with 
1 This is a revised version of a German text that was published almost ten years ago. 
I did not have time to incorporate recent literature on Engels, in particular Kaan 
Kangal’s recent and thoughtful study Friedrich Engels and the Dialectics of Nature 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).
2 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, »Anti-Dühring,« in Collected Works, vol. 25 
(1987), 11. I will cite Marx and Engels and thereafter provide the volume / page 
number. I will also always provide the original German text. »Marx und ich wa-
ren wohl ziemlich die einzigen, die aus der deutschen idealistischen Philosophie 
die bewußte Dialektik in die materialistische Auffassung der Natur und Ge-
schichte hinübergerettet hatten.« Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke, edited 
by the Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der SED (Berlin 
1956-) [= MEW], 20: 10.
3 The origins and the history of Engels’s Dialectics of Nature are explored in An-
neliese Griese, »Engels’s ›Dialektik der Natur‹. Theoretische Konzeption und 
philosophiehistorische Auseinandersetzung,« Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philoso-
phie 29, no. 6 (1981): 613 – 628; Anneliese Griese and Gerd Pawlzig, »Friedrich 
Engels und Charles Darwin,« in Dialektik 5: Darwin und die Evolutionstheorie, 
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questions of the natural sciences and nature is Anti-Dühring, a po-
lemic against Eugen Dühring and his »revolution in science.« As 
a polemic, this work should not be misread as systematic treatise 
and is no substitute for what the Dialectics of Nature should have 
been, other than that remarks about a dialectics of nature and the 
natural sciences are scattered throughout the work. In this chapter 
I will, nonetheless, try to explicate Engels’s concept of a philosophy 
of nature, but not without also acknowledging the shortcomings 
and missteps in the existing fragments and texts. I will focus on two 
questions. First, what is Engels’s concept of a philosophy of nature, 
and what should its relation with the natural sciences be? Second, 
what is the relation of Engels’s concept of a philosophy of nature to 
the one of Hegel, where is Engels different from Hegel, and where 
are there certain similarities?
Engels develops his philosophy of nature as a necessary addition 
to Marx’s political economy, without which the project of historical 
and dialectical materialism would be incomplete. There are no indi-
cations that Marx did not think highly of this enterprise or that En-
gels would be misguided to view the dialectics of nature as comple-
menting the dialectics of history and society. Engels was convinced 
that a dialectics of nature could not be done without an engagement 
with Hegel’s philosophy, in particular his philosophy of nature. With 
Hegel, classical philosophy had come to its end, Marx and Engels 
believed, and so had the philosophy of nature. Engels was convinced 
that with the advent of the modern natural sciences, the whole proj-
ect of a philosophy of nature had become obsolete. He wrote: »To-
ed. Hans Heinz Holz and Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 
1982), 127 – 153; Anneliese Griese and Gerd Pawlzig, »Naturwissenschaft und Di-
alektik in der 2. Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts,« in Naturdialektik — Naturwissen-
schaft: Das Erbe der Engelsschen ›Dialektik der Natur‹ und seine aktuelle Bedeutung 
für die Wissenschaftsentwicklung, ed. Manfred Buhr and Herbert Hörz (Berlin: 
Akademie-Verlag, 1986), 32 – 48; Kurt Bayertz and Wolfgang Krohn, »Engels im 
Kontext. Natur- und Wissenschaftsphilosophie im Zeitalter des Szientismus,« 
in Dia lektik 12: Die Dialektik und die Wissenschaften, ed. Hans Heinz Holz and 
Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1986), 66 – 98.
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day, when one needs to comprehend the results of natural scientific 
investigation only dialetically, that is, in the sense of their own inter-
connection, in order to arrive at a ›system of nature‹ sufficient for our 
time; when the dialectical character of this interconnection is forcing 
itself against their will even into the metaphysically-trained minds 
of the natural scientists, today natural philosophy is finally disposed 
of. Every attempt at resurrecting it would be not only superfluous 
but a step backwards.«4 Despite this programmatic retirement of a 
philosophy of nature, the Dialectics of Nature, which Engels himself 
planned and laid out in fragments, is a work of a philosophy of na-
ture, but a philosophy of nature of a new type. I will try to explain 
this type here.
The Natural Sciences  
as the Heirs of the Philosophy of Nature
Engels shares the view that a philosophy of nature should be under-
stood as an enterprise that tries to understand and analyze nature, its 
essence and laws, but from a philosophical perspective. While the nat-
ural sciences are concerned with questions relating to particular nat-
ural objects, the relations between them or particular laws of nature, 
a philosophy of nature has a wider aim and aims to uncover deeper 
truths (and also truths that are more steadfast than those of the nat-
ural sciences). Engels believes, as we can see in the quote above, that 
such a philosophy of nature has become obsolete because the natural 
4 Marx and Engels, »Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Phi-
losophy,« Collected Works, vol. 26 (1987), 386. »Heute, wo man die Resultate 
der Naturforschung nur dialektisch, d. h. im Sinn ihres eignen Zusammenhangs 
aufzufassen braucht, um zu einem für unsere Zeit genügendem ›System der Na-
tur‹ zu kommen, wo der dialektische Charakter dieses Gesamtzusammenhangs 
sich sogar den meta-physisch geschulten Köpfen der Naturforscher gegen ihren 
Willen aufzwingt, heute ist die Naturphilosophie endgültig beseitigt. Jeder Ver-
such ihrer Widerbelebung wäre nicht nur überflüssig, er wäre ein Rückschritt.« 
MEW 21: 296.
Gottfried Schweiger202
sciences can take its place. But Engels includes one condition for that 
to happen, namely that the natural sciences become »dialectic.« In one 
fragment, he writes the following in this respect: »Only when natural 
and historical science has become imbued with dialectics will all the 
philosophical rubbish—other than the pure theory of thought—be 
superfluous, disappearing in positive science.«5 Engels also believes 
that this incorporation of dialectics into the natural sciences is some-
thing scientists have to do themselves and which they are forced to do 
if they want to continue to make progress. For him, empirical research 
alone is not sufficient to understand nature, but they need sufficient 
and better theories to explain the empirical knowledge they gather. 
Nature itself is dialectical for Engels, and if the natural sciences want 
to better understand nature, they will have to become dialectical. He 
writes in the Anti-Dühring: »Empirical natural science has accumu-
lated such a tremendous mass of positive material for knowledge that 
the necessity of classifying it in each separate field of investigation 
systematically and in accordance with its inner inter-connection has 
become absolutely imperative. It is becoming equally imperative to 
bring the individual spheres of knowledge into the correct connec-
tion with one another. In doing so, however, natural science enters 
the field of theory and here the methods of empiricism will not work, 
here only theoretical thinking can be of assistance.«6 And for Engels, 
this »theoretical thinking« is dialectical, because only dialectics can 
explain nature and natural processes and developments. He writes: 
5 Marx and Engels, »Dialectics of Nature,« Collected Works, vol. 25 (1987), 491. 
»Erst wenn die Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften die Dialektik in sich aufge-
nommen, wird all der philosophische Kram — außer der Lehre vom reinen Den-
ken — überflüssig, verschwindet in der positiven Wissenschaft.« MEW 21: 296.
6 Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. 25, 338. »Die empirische Naturforschung 
hat eine so ungeheure Masse von positiven Erkenntnisstoff angehäuft, daß die 
Notwendigkeit, ihn auf jedem einzelnen Untersuchungsgebiet systematisch und 
nach seinem inneren Zusammenhang zu ordnen, schlechthin unabweisbar ge-
worden ist. Ebenso unabweisbar wird es, die einzelnen Erkenntnisgebiete unter 
sich in den richtigen Zusammenhang zu bringen. Damit aber begibt sich die 
Naturwissenschaft auf das theoretische Gebiet, und hier versagen die Methoden 
der Empirie, hier kann nur das theoretische Denken helfen.« MEW 20: 330.
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»But it is precisely dialectics that constitutes the most important form 
of thinking for present-day natural science, for it alone offers the an-
alogue for, and thereby the method of explaining, the evolutionary 
processes occurring in nature, inter-connections in general, and tran-
sitions from one field of investigation to another.«7 Engels acknowl-
edges in this passage, and throughout his writings, a »reflection theo-
ry« (»Widerspiegelungstheorie«) of knowledge and truth, which has its 
roots in Aristotle and was further explored and canonized in classical 
and orthodox Marxism, for example by Lenin. Knowledge, according 
to this theory, is constituted by thinking and reflecting on the outside 
world. Because nature and thinking are both dialectical, knowledge 
is only possible. Thinking represents »subjective dialectics,« and na-
ture, as well as everything else existing outside the mind, represents 
»objective dialectics.«8 Based on these epistemological and ontologi-
cal premises, Engels believes that the natural sciences will themselves 
incorporate dialectical thinking as soon as they want to make further 
progress. Herbert Hörz called this the »objective force« of dialectics, 
which compels the natural sciences to become dialectical.9 Philoso-
7 Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. 25, 362. »Grade die Dialektik ist aber für 
die Naturwissenschaft die wichtigste Denkform, weil sie allein das Analogon 
und damit die Erklärungsmethode bietet für die in der Natur vorkommenden 
Entwicklungsprozesse, für die Zusammenhänge im ganzen und großen, für die 
Übergänge von einem Untersuchungsgebiet zum anderen.« MEW 20: 330 – 331.
8 »Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-
called subjective dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the mo-
tion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by 
the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, 
or into higher forms, determines the life of nature.« Marx and Engels, Collected 
Works, vol. 25, 492. »Die Dialektik, die sog. objektive, herrscht in der ganzen 
Natur, und die sog. subjektive Dialektik, das dialektische Denken, ist nur Reflex 
der in der Natur sich überall geltend machenden Bewegung in Gegensätzen, die 
durch ihren fortwährenden Widerstreit und ihr schließliches Aufgehen ineinan-
der, resp. in höhere Formen, eben das Leben der Natur bedingen.« MEW 20: 481.
9 Herbert Hörz, »Naturdialektik und moderne Naturwissenschaft,« in Naturdia-
lektik — Naturwissenschaft: Das Erbe der Engelsschen ›Dialektik der Natur‹ und 
seine aktuelle Bedeutung für die Wissenschaftsentwicklung, ed. Manfred Buhr and 
Herbert Hörz (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1986), 11 – 31. See also his magnum 
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phy could ›help‹ them and support that development, but in the end, 
they are no longer necessary in the field of knowledge about nature, 
its history and developments. Thus no separate enterprise of a phi-
losophy of nature is longer needed. Engels believed that the natural 
sciences are already implicitly dialectal, but without being aware of 
that or openly acknowledging this, and throughout his writings on 
nature, he referred to recent discoveries and theories in the natural 
sciences that he believed would support his thesis. Still, Engels also 
put forward the thesis that the natural sciences were still dominated 
by non-dialectical thinking, which he called »metaphysical thinking,« 
and which hindered its further progress.
Dialectics would help the natural sciences to overcome this. He 
writes in a longer passage: »One can scarcely pick up a theoretical 
book on natural science without getting the impression that natu-
ral scientists themselves feel how much they are dominated by this 
incoherence and confusion, and that the so-called philosophy now 
current offers them absolutely no way out. And here there really is no 
other way out, no possibility of achieving clarity, than by a return, in 
one form or another, from metaphysical to dialectical thinking. This 
return can take place in various ways. It can come about spontaneous-
ly, by the sheer force of the natural-scientific discoveries themselves, 
which refuse any longer to allow themselves to be forced into the old 
Procrustean bed of metaphysics. But that is a protracted, laborious 
process during which a tremendous amount of unnecessary friction 
has to be overcome. To a large extent that process is already going on, 
particularly in biology. It could be greatly shortened if the theoreti-
cians in the field of natural science were to acquaint themselves more 
closely with dialectical philosophy in its historically existing forms.«10 
opus: Herbert Hörz, Marxistische Philosophie und Naturwissenschaften (Cologne: 
Pahl-Rugenstein, 1974).
10 Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. 25, 340 – 341. »Man kann kaum ein theo-
retisches naturwissenschaftliches Buch in die Hand nehmen, ohne den Eindruck 
zu bekommen, daß die Naturforscher es selbst fühlen, wie sehr sie von dieser 
Zerfahrenheit und Verworrenheit beherrscht werden und wie ihnen die jetzt 
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Engels mentions biology here because he, as well as Marx, believed 
that the discovery of the evolution of species and Darwin’s theoretical 
work were the most recent and most impressive examples of dialec-
tics in nature. The evolution of new species and its underlying »laws 
of nature« are dialectical, in their view. Based on these premises, a 
distinct philosophy of nature is no longer needed or desirable. For 
Engels, the scope and aim of a philosophy of nature was always to 
study and research nature, its laws and essence. This was no longer 
needed, now that the natural sciences were themselves able to do this. 
For him, philosophical and scientific knowledge of nature were no 
longer separate but one and the same if they incorporated dialectical 
thinking. What remains for philosophy, with respect to nature and 
the natural sciences, is epistemology, logics and methodology.
To sum up, Engels’s thesis that the whole project of a philosophy 
of nature has become superfluous rests upon two distinct premises. 
The first premise is ontological and states that nature is dialectical, and 
the second is epistemological and methodological, stating that the 
natural sciences can and will become dialectical. Engels aims to show 
both throughout his writings, and the Dialectics of Nature would 
have been a ›long argument‹ for both theses. That is the reason why 
the Dialectics of Nature is a work incorporating discussions about the 
essence of nature, the relation between philosophy and the natural 
sciences, and long treatments of recent discoveries and knowledge of 
the natural sciences, which Engels interprets in such a way that they 
landläufige sog. Philosophie absolut keinen Ausweg bietet. Und hier gibt es nun 
einmal keinen andern Ausweg, keine Möglichkeit, zur Klahrheit zu gelangen, als 
die Umkehr, in einer oder anderen Form, vom metaphysischen zum dialekti-
schen Denken. Diese Rückkehr kann auf verschiednen Weg vor sich gehen. Sie 
kann sich naturwüchsig durchsetzen, durch die bloße Gewalt der naturwissen-
schaftlichen Entdeckungen selbst, die sich nicht länger in das alte metaphysische 
Prokrustesbett wollen zwängen lassen. Das ist aber ein langwieriger, schwerfälli-
ger Prozeß, bei dem eine Unmasse überflüssiger Reibung zu überwinden ist. Er 
ist großenteils schon im Gang, namentlich in der Biologie. Er kann sehr abge-
kürzt werden, wenn die theoretischen Naturforscher sich mit der dialektischen 
Philosophie in ihren geschichtlich vorliegenden Gestalten näher beschäftigen 
wollen.« MEW 20: 332.
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support his ontological thesis of the dialectical nature of nature. From 
the perspective of a present-day reader, Engels’s insistence that the 
natural sciences should become dialectical and his ontological view 
that nature itself is dialectical seem quite odd and in contradiction 
with modern natural sciences and philosophy. Dialectics is discred-
ited in many ways, and today the standard position towards the nat-
ural sciences is that they are not dialectical and that it is not up to 
philosophy to criticize them for being non-dialectical. Engels’s view 
was different; he saw himself as an eager supporter of modern natural 
sciences and tried to free them from philosophy and »metaphysical 
thinking,« which he saw at its best in Hegel’s philosophy and his 
philosophy of nature. But Engels was not a positivist either. He was 
convinced that the natural sciences needed dialectics and that they 
could also learn something from classical philosophy, in particular 
from Hegel, otherwise they would be unfree and bound to ›bad‹ phil-
osophical assumptions and methods.
Engels’s and Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature
We can now discuss the relation between Engels’s idea of a dialectics 
of nature and Hegel’s philosophy of nature in more detail. However, 
before we do so, a few words need to be said about Hegel’s philoso-
phy of nature.11 Unfortunately, basically everything we know about 
this work is what is said in the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences, since Hegel did not write a separate book on the philosophy 
of nature. There is not much text available in the Encyclopaedia and 
what is there is written in a particular style because the Encyclopaedia 
was intended by Hegel to be a ›textbook‹ for his lectures; as such, 
11 Much has been written about Hegel’s philosophy of nature and views have 
changed over time. While even many Hegelians rejected Hegel’s philosophy of 
nature as pure speculation and absurd for a long time, recent work is more fa-
vorable. I provide an overiew of the debate in my book: Gottfried Schweiger, 
Dialektische Naturphilosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011).
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the text leaves many details open and room for interpretation. We 
know that Hegel provided much more information and detailed ar-
guments in his lectures, and he lectured on the philosophy of nature 
several times during his time in Berlin in the 1820s. Some lectures are 
now available through the transcripts of students, which makes them 
unreliable to some extent.12 Furthermore, a lot of text is also available 
through the so-called »Zusätze,« which were compiled by Karl Lud-
wig Michelet and added to some editions of the Encyclopaedia.13 The 
Zusätze are also not entirely reliable and are based on the transcripts 
of lectures as well, but Michelet did not provide the sources. Still, ev-
ery interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of nature will have to draw 
on these sources, simply because the original text in the Encyclopae-
dia is insufficient and only provides the core of Hegel’s thought. He-
gel himself would not have argued that his text in the Encyclopaedia 
should count as a fully fleshed out philosophy of nature.
For Hegel, it is evident that the natural sciences cannot substitute 
the philosophy of nature precisely because they are not dialectical in 
his view. In the Zusatz to §246 of the Encyclopaedia, he writes about 
physics, which stand for him for all natural sciences: »Now the inad-
equacy of the thought-determinations used in physics can be traced 
to two points which are closely bound up with each other. (α) The 
universal of physics is abstract or only formal; its determination is not 
immanent in it and it does not pass over into particularity. (β) The 
determinate content falls for that very reason outside the universal; 
and so is split into fragments, into parts which are isolated and de-
tached from each other, devoid of any necessary connection, and it is 
12 For example, Georg W. F. Hegel, Naturphilosophie, Bd. I: Die Vorlesung von 
1819 / 20, ed. Manfred Gies with Karl-Heinz Ilting (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1982); 
Georg W. F. Hegel, Vorlesung über Naturphilosophie, Berlin 1823 / 24, ed. Gilles 
Marmasse, postscript by K. G. J. von Griesheim (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 
2000). 
13 Georg W. F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Part Two (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1970).
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just this which stamps it as only finite.«14 Only philosophy can ›think‹ 
nature as it is, that is to say, dialectical. That is what Hegel tried in his 
philosophy of nature, and that is why most of the text is invested in 
doing something quite similar to Engels: Hegel interpreted findings 
and theories of the natural sciences with the aim to show that nature 
is indeed dialectical. But Hegel was not a dialectical materialist but 
an idealist, and thus his relation with the natural sciences is compli-
cated. At several points in his philosophy of nature, he assumes that 
his philosophical enterprise needs the natural sciences to access the 
dialectics in nature15, while at some other points he seems to suggest 
that a philosophy of nature could be done entirely without reference 
to the natural sciences and that one could ›deduce‹ most if not all 
that is philosophically important about nature from thinking alone, 
without the need for any empirical research.16 It is unclear how far 
14 Hegel, Encyclopaedia, §246, Zusatz. »Das Ungenügende nun der physikalischen 
Denkweise läßt sich auf zwei Punkte zurückführen, die aufs engste zusammen-
hängen. a) Das Allgemeine der Physik ist abstrakt oder nur formell; es hat seine 
Bestimmungen nicht an ihm selbst oder geht nicht zur Besonderheit über. b) Der 
bestimmte Inhalt ist eben deswegen außer dem Allgemeinen, damit zersplittert, 
zerstückelt, vereinzelt, abgesondert, ohne den notwendigen Zusammenhang in 
ihm selbst.« Hegel, Werke (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970).
15 For example: »The Philosophy of Nature takes up the material which physics 
has prepared for it empirically, at the point to which physics has brought it, and 
reconstitutes it, so that experience is not its final warrant and base. Physics must 
therefore work into the hands of philosophy, in order that the latter may trans-
late into the Notion the abstract universal transmitted to it, by showing how this 
universal, as an intrinsically necessary whole, proceeds from the Notion.« Hegel, 
Encyclopaedia, §246, Zusatz. »Die Naturphilosophie nimmt den Stoff, den die 
Physik ihr aus der Erfahrung bereitet, an dem Punkte auf, bis wohin ihn die 
Physik gebracht hat, und bildet ihn wieder um, ohne die Erfahrung als letzte 
Bewährung zugrunde zu legen; die Physik muss so der Philosophie in die Hände 
arbeiten, damit diese das ihr überlieferte verständige Allgemeine in den Begriff 
übersetze, indem sie zeigt, wie es als ein in sich selbst notwendiges Ganzes aus 
dem Begriff hervorgeht.«
16 »The relation of philosophy to the empirical sciences was discussed in the gen-
eral introduction [to the Encyclopaedia]. Not only must philosophy be in agree-
ment with our empirical knowledge of Nature, but the origin and formation of 
the Philosophy of Nature presupposes and is conditioned by empirical physics. 
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›thinking‹ alone can provide knowledge about nature, its laws and ob-
jects, but Hegel believes that at its core nature is dialectical, which for 
him means that nature is developmental but not historical. Maybe it 
is because Hegel lived before Darwin, but history for him is reserved 
for human history and development in nature only happens within 
a particular organism; there is no evolution. So while Engels strong-
ly believed that evolution is proof of the dialectics of nature, Hegel 
confines the dialectics of nature to a dialectics of the Notion or Idea. 
Hegel writes: »A thinking consideration must reject such nebulous, at 
bottom, sensuous ideas, as in particular the so-called origination, for 
example, of plants and animals from water, and then the origination 
of the more highly developed animal organisms from the lower, and 
so on.«17 Hegel can make this separation between Notion and Idea 
However, the course of a science’s origin and the preliminaries of its construction 
are one thing, while the science itself is another. In the latter, the former can no 
longer appear as the foundation of the science; here, the foundation must be 
the necessity of the Notion. It has already been mentioned that, in the progress 
of philosophical knowledge, we must not only give an account of the object as 
determined by its Notion, but we must also name the empirical appearance corre-
sponding to it, and we must show that the appearance does, in fact, correspond 
to its Notion. However, this is not an appeal to experience in regard to the ne-
cessity of the content.« Hegel, Encyclopaedia, §246, Zusatz. »Nicht nur muß die 
Philosophie mit der Naturerfahrung übereinstimmend sein, sondern Entstehung 
und Bildung der philosophischen Wissenschaft hat die empirische Physik zu ih-
rer Voraussetzung und Bedingung. Ein anderes aber ist der Gang des Entstehens 
und die Vorarbeiten einer Wissenschaft, ein anderes die Wissenschaft selbst; in 
dieser können jene nicht mehr als Grundlage erscheinen, welche hier vielmehr 
die Notwendigkeit des Begriffs sein soll. — Es ist schon erinnert worden, daß, 
außerdem daß der Gegenstand nach seiner Begriffsbestimmung in dem philoso-
phischen Gange anzugeben ist, noch weiter die empirische Erscheinung, welche 
derselben entspricht, namhaft zu machen und von ihr aufzuzeigen ist, daß sie 
jener in der Tat entspricht. Es ist dies jedoch in Beziehung auf die Notwendigkeit 
des Inhaltes kein Berufen auf die Erfahrung.«
17 Hegel, Encyclopaedia, §249, Zusatz. »Solcher nebuloser, im Grunde sinnlicher 
Vorstellungen, wie insbesondere das sogenannte Hervorgehen z. B. der Pflanzen 
und Tiere aus dem Wasser und dann das Hervorgehen der entwickelteren Tier-
organisationen aus den niedrigeren usw. ist, muß sich die denkende Betrachtung 
entschlagen.« He further explains: »It is a completely empty thought to represent 
species as developing successively, one after the other, in time. Chronological 
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and the appearance (Erscheinung) of nature because for him, nature 
is the other of the idea but is still bound to it and interwoven with it. 
He writes in paragraph §246 of the Encyclopaedia: »Nature has pre-
sented itself as the Idea in the form of otherness. Since therefore the 
Idea is the negative of itself, or is external to itself, Nature is not merely 
external in relation to this Idea (and to its subjective existence Spirit); 
the truth is rather that externality constitutes the specific character in 
which Nature, as Nature, exists.«18 What Hegel really means by this 
characterization of nature and how he understands the relation of 
the Notion and the Idea to nature is far from easy to grasp, which is 
also because several seemingly conflicting remarks are available in the 
Zusätze and in transcripts of his lectures, and I will leave that question 
open here. What is important is to understand that, for Hegel, philos-
ophy can understand the Notion or Idea that is present in nature (in 
the form of its Otherness), and that is what it should do. Philosophy 
is able to ›deduce‹ what is in nature a priori.19 Hegel writes: »None the 
difference has no interest whatever for thought.« Hegel, Encyclopaedia, §249, 
Zusatz. »Es ist völlig leer, die Gattungen vorzustellen als sich nach und nach in 
der Zeit evolvierend; der Zeitunterschied hat ganz und gar kein Interesse den 
Gedanken.«
18 Hegel, Encyclopaedia, §246. »Die Natur hat sich als die Idee in der Form des An-
dersseins ergeben. Da die Idee so als das Negative ihrer selbst oder sich äußerlich 
ist, so ist die Natur nicht äußerlich nur relativ gegen diese Idee (und gegen die 
subjektive Existenz derselben, den Geist), sondern die Äußerlichkeit macht die 
Bestimmung aus, in welcher sie Natur ist.«
19 That is one prominent interpretation of Hegel’s method, defended, for example, 
by Wolfgang Neuser and Vittorio Hösle. Neuser writes: »According to Hegel, 
natural philosophy then proves to be philosophy in that it can specify Notions 
a priori. […] The content of the specification of Notions can only be proved in 
the philosophical a priori deduction.« (»Nach Hegel erweist sich Naturphiloso-
phie dann darin als Philosophie, daß sie Begriffsbestimmungen apriori angeben 
kann. […] Der Inhalt der Begriffsbestimmungen kann nur in der philosophi-
schen a priori-Deduktion erwiesen werden.«) Wolfgang Neuser, »Die Natur-
philosophie,« in Hegels »Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften« (1830): 
Ein Kommentar zum Grundriß, ed. Hermann Drüe et al. (Frankfurt am Main: 
Surhkamp, 2000), 141 – 142. Hösle even argues that such an a priori deduction 
of natural objects, relations and laws can produce knowledge that has not yet 
been discovered or proved by the natural sciences. In such a case, philosophy of 
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less, Reason must have confidence in itself, confidence that in Nature 
the Notion speaks to the Notion and that the veritable form of the 
Notion which lies concealed beneath Nature’s scattered and infinitely 
many shapes, will reveal itself to Reason.«20 Engels, on the other hand, 
rejects such idealist metaphysics; for him, a philosophy of nature does 
not reflect on any kind of Notion or Idea that exists in nature (and 
forms it) because there is no such thing — for Engels, nature stands 
alone and for itself.
Despite the ontological differences between Hegel and Engels, 
and also despite the fact that Engels views Hegel’s philosophy of 
nature as obsolete and wrong in its intentions, both works show a 
lot of similarities in that both philosophers invest much work into 
interpreting the findings and theories of the natural sciences and 
both claim that, through this work of interpretation, they can show 
that nature is dialectical. They do that with different goals in mind, 
no less. As I showed earlier, Hegel is convinced that the natural 
nature can show that such objects, relations or laws must necessarily exist, even 
though the natural sciences are not yet aware of them. Hösle writes: »[S]o there 
may be the case that the a priori working philosopher, in fact, correctly works out 
conceptual structures, but that these do not correspond to any empirical concep-
tion of his time, because simply the sciences have not yet discovered the reality 
corresponding to the conceptual structure at the time.« (»[S]o kann es den Fall 
geben, daß der apriorisch verfahrende Realphilosoph zwar korrekt begriffliche 
Strukturen herausarbeitet, daß diese aber keiner empirischen Vorstellung seiner 
Zeit entsprechen, weil einfach die Wissenschaften zu seiner Zeit noch nicht die 
der begrifflichen Struktur korrespondierende Wirklichkeit entdeckt haben.«)
20 Hegel, Encyclopaedia, §376, Zusatz. »Aber dessen ungeachtet muß die Vernunft 
das Zutrauen zu sich selbst haben, daß in der Natur der Begriff zum Begriffe 
spricht, und die wahrhafte Gestalt des Begriffes, die unter dem Außeinander 
der unendlich vielen Gestalten verborgen liegt, sich ihr zeigen wird.« Right at 
the beginning of the philosophy of nature, Hegel makes it clear what he aims to 
achieve: »As the Philosophy of Nature is a comprehending [begreifende] treatment, 
it has as its object the same universal, but explicitly, and it considers this universal 
in its own immanent necessity in accordance with the self-determination of the 
Notion.« Hegel, Encyclopaedia, §246. »Indem die Naturphilosophie begreifende 
Betrachtung ist, hat sie dasselbe Allgemeine, aber für sich zum Gegenstand und 
betrachtet es in seiner eigenen, immanenten Notwendigkeit nach der Selbstbe-
stimmung des Begriffs.«
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sciences will always be deficient and not be able to fully grasp the 
Nation or Idea in nature, while Engels is convinced that the natural 
sciences will make any philosophy of nature and thus also his own 
work superfluous as soon as they become themselves dialectical en-
terprises. But although Engels rejects Hegel’s idea of a philosophy 
of nature as some kind of better natural science, the dialectics that 
he aims to prove is present in nature and can be acquired by the 
natural sciences is something he takes from Hegel. Engels writes 
in this respect: »It is, therefore, from the history of nature and hu-
man society that the laws of dialectics are abstracted. For they are 
nothing but the most general laws of these two stages of histori-
cal development, as well as of thought itself. And indeed they can 
be reduced in the main to three: The law of the transformation of 
quantity into quality and vice versa; The law of the interpenetration 
of opposites; The law of the negation of the negation. All three are 
developed by Hegel in his idealist fashion as mere laws of thought: 
the first, in the first part of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being; the 
second fills the whole of the second and by far the most important 
part of his Logic, the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures as 
the fundamental law for the construction of the whole system. The 
mistake lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and 
history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them. This is 
the source of the whole forced and often outrageous treatment; the 
universe, willy-nilly, has to conform to a system of thought which 
itself is only the product of a definite stage of development of hu-
man thought. If we turn the thing round, then everything becomes 
simple, and the dialectical laws that look so extremely mysterious in 
idealist philosophy at once become simple and clear as noonday.«21 
21 Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. 25, 356. »Es ist also die Geschichte der 
Natur wie der menschlichen Gesellschaft, aus der die Gesetze der Dialektik abs-
trahiert werden. Sie sind eben nichts andres als die allgemeinsten Gesetze dieser 
beiden Phasen der geschichtlichen Entwicklung sowie des Denkens selbst. Und 
zwar reduzieren sie sich der Hauptsache nach auf drei:
•  das Gesetz des Umschlagens von Quantität in Qualität und umgekehrt;
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In this passage, Engels makes several important claims that help us 
to better understand his dialectics of nature. The first claim is that 
the laws of dialectics can be found in nature itself and that Hegel 
was wrong to assume that they are only laws of thought. The second 
claim is that the relation of nature and thought or nature and No-
tion is turned around, and that Engels claims that nature is foun-
dational. Thirdly, he rejects Hegel’s methodology in his philosophy 
of nature, which claims that it can ›think‹ nature without reference 
to the natural sciences. It is the other way around for Engels. The 
natural sciences provide proof for the truth of dialectics and that it 
really exists in nature, while Hegel thought of the natural sciences 
as unable to provide any such definitive proof. Fourthly, despite his 
critique of Hegel and his dismissal of his methodology and idealist 
philosophy, Engels was convinced that Hegel said a lot of truths 
about nature and the dialectics within it. He even defended He-
gel against objections that assumed that his dialectics was nothing 
more than speculation or even plain wrong.22
•  das Gesetz von der Durchdringung der Gegensätze;
•  das Gesetz von der Negation der Negation.
 Alle drei sind von Hegel in seiner idealistischen Weise als bloße Denkgesetze ent-
wickelt: das erste im ersten Teil der »Logik,« in der Lehre vom Sein; das zweite 
füllt den ganzen zweiten und weitaus bedeutendsten Teil seiner »Logik« aus, die 
Lehre vom Wesen; das dritte endlich figuriert als Grundgesetz für den Aufbau 
des ganzen Systems. Der Fehler liegt darin, daß diese Gesetze als Denkgesetze der 
Natur und Geschichte aufoktroyiert, nicht aus ihnen abgeleitet werden. Daraus 
entsteht dann die ganze gezwungene und oft haarsträubende Konstruktion: Die 
Welt, sie mag wollen oder nicht, soll sich nach einem Gedankensystem einrich-
ten, das selbst wieder nur das Produkt einer bestimmten Entwicklungsstufe des 
menschlichen Denkens ist. Kehren wir die Sache um, so wird alles einfach und 
die in der idealistischen Philosophie äußerst geheimnisvoll aussehenden dialek-
tischen Gesetze werden sofort einfach und sonnenklar.« MEW 20: 348.
22 »It must however be recalled that the natural scientists‹ polemic against Hegel, 
in so far as they at all correctly understood him, was directed solely against these 
two points: viz., the idealist point of departure and the arbitrary, fact-defying 
construction of the system.« Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. 25, 343. »Es 
ist aber daran zu erinnern, daß die naturwissenschaftliche Polemik gegen Hegel, 
soweit sie ihn überhaupt richtig verstanden, sich nur gegen diese beiden Punkte 
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Hans Heinz Holz: From Engels to Hegel  
and the Plan of the Dialectics of Nature
Hans Heinz Holz provides us with one of the most sophisticated in-
terpretations of both Hegel’s and Engels’s work. I want to discuss a 
few of his insights in his work and also where, in my view, he errs in 
his interpretation of the programmatic of the Dialectics of Nature. In 
this discussion, I also want to explore a few more of the basic tenets 
of Engels’s concept. Holz aims to show that the Dialectics of Nature is 
a necessarily ontological project. He distinguishes between a philoso-
phy of nature as the project of an interpretation of the findings of the 
natural sciences and a philosophy of nature that takes the place of an 
ontology. Ontology, for Holz, is a necessary part of the Marxist phil-
osophical program and the dialectics of nature takes its place.23 Holz 
specifies these two levels or domains of a dialectics of nature: »This 
means that a dialectics of nature unfolds on two levels: On the one 
hand, in that general and fundamental domain of an ontology of na-
ture and of the regions and layers of natural being, i. e. an ontology of 
the forms of movement of matter and of natural history; on the other 
hand, in those areas of the specification of nature that are opened up 
by the individual natural sciences and in which statements about the 
particular form of dialectical processes and structures result depend-
ing directly on the respective state of the development of science and 
are consequently also quite clearly provisional and outdatable.«24 In 
gerichtet hat: den idealistischen Ausgangspunkt und die den Tatsachen gegen-
über willkürliche Konstruktion des Systems.« MEW 20: 334.
23 »In this sense, the dialectics of nature is a theory of the world’s constitution of 
being [Seinsverfassung der Welt] and thus takes the place of metaphysics in the 
system of forms of knowledge and its ideological function.« Hans Heinz Holz, 
Weltentwurf und Reflexion Versuch einer Grundlegung der Dialektik (Stuttgart: J. B. 
Metzler, 2005), 540. »In diesem Sinne ist die Naturdialektik eine Theorie von der 
Seinsverfassung der Welt und übernimmt damit die Stelle der Metaphysik im 
System der Wissensformen und deren weltanschauliche Funktion.«
24 Holz, Weltentwurf und Reflexion, 556 – 557. »Das bedeutet, daß eine Dialektik der 
Natur sich auf zwei Ebenen entfaltet: Einmal in jenem allgemeinen und funda-
mentalen Bereich einer Ontologie der Natur und der Regionen und Schichten 
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his view, Engels’s Dialectics of Nature aimed to combine these two dis-
tinct tasks, but most of the text that he was able to finish falls under 
the second category and is, therefore, largely outdated today. A similar 
objection could be raised towards Hegel’s philosophy of nature but 
with the difference that Engels was well aware of this, while Hegel’s 
program of an idealistic philosophy of nature aimed to uncover un-
disputable and everlasting truths also in the second area, which Holz 
calls »the specification of nature,« which are, for Holz, only available 
through the natural sciences and which are fallible.
Holz believes, in contrast to Engels, as I think, that the first task 
of a dialectics of nature, the development of a dialectical ontolo-
gy, is not bound to the natural sciences and thus not dependent on 
the current state of their development or particular findings. Rather, 
as he aims to show, the basic ontological premises of dialectics and 
that the natural world is dialectical can be proven independently of 
the natural sciences. That brings Holz’s concept of a philosophy of 
nature closer to Hegel’s. Holz bases his interpretation that Engels 
makes such a sharp distinction with regard to the ontological side of 
the Dialectics of Nature on a few remarks of Engels. For example, En-
gels writes that, according to his »Outline of the General Plan« of the 
Dialectics of Nature, it contains »dialectics as the science of universal 
interconnection« (»Dialektik als Wissenschaft vom Gesamzusammen-
hang«).25 For Holz, this »science of universal interconnection« can 
only be the product of philosophical »speculation,« hence ontology, 
not the product of an interpretation of the findings of the natural 
sciences. The »universal interconnection,« which in other places is 
translated as »totality« and which somehow better grasps its meaning, 
des natürlichen Seins, also eine Ontologie der Bewegungsformen der Materie 
und der Naturgeschichte; zum anderen in jenen Bereichen der Spezifikation der 
Natur, die durch die einzelnen Naturwissenschaften erschlossen werden und in 
denen Aussagen über die bestimmte Form dialektischer Prozesse und Struktu-
ren unmittelbar abhängig vom jeweiligen Stand der Wissenschaftsentwicklung 
auftreten und folglich auch ganz unmittelbar vorläufig und überholbar sind.«
25 Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. 25, 313; MEW 20: 307.
Gottfried Schweiger216
is for Holz not an empirical object26 in contrast to everything else 
that exists in nature, which are objects, and the relations between 
them. Thus the method of this variation of a dialectics of nature 
as ontology is not an interpretation of the findings of the natural 
sciences but a philosophical reflection on the very grounds of reali-
ty. Holz writes in this regard: »Rather, the dialectic of nature — as a 
philosophical theory of nature […] is to be derived from the theory 
of the reflection of the objective reality through consciousness.«27 
And he continues: »[T]he dialectic of nature [is] to be derived from 
the dialectic of thought, without having to fall into a subjective-ide-
alistic constitutional theory.«28 This is, obviously, a reference to the 
Kantian approach, which states that ontology and epistemology are 
inseparable. Holz believes that a materialist dialectics of nature can 
be constructed starting from the epistemological premises of a theory 
of reflection, and he assumes that Engels’s work can be interpreted in 
such a way to support this approach.
This interpretation of Engels is misguided for two reasons in par-
ticular. And it is a step back to Hegel, and his idea of a philosophy of 
nature, that Engels would not support. Firstly, Engels is quite clear 
that his method is not one of speculation and he does not deduce 
or construct the dialectics of nature starting from an ontological 
or epistemological idea. He uses very different notions to describe 
26 Holz is very close to Hegel in this interpretation when he writes: »That the to-
tality [Gesamtzusammenhang] is always only thought, that is, given as an idea or 
in the form of a metaphysical model, does not mean that it exists only as an idea 
(idealiter); the idea is rather the reflection of the reality of the world as totum.« 
Holz, Weltentwurf und Reflexion, 541, n. 3. »Daß der Gesamtzusammenhang im-
mer nur gedacht, das heißt als Idee oder in der Form eines metaphysischen Mo-
dells gegeben ist, besagt nicht, daß er nur als Idee (idealiter) existiere; die Idee ist 
vielmehr die Widerspiegelung der Realität der Welt als totum.«
27 Holz, Weltentwurf und Reflexion, 560. »Vielmehr ist die Naturdialektik — als phi-
losophische Theorie der Natur […] herzuleiten aus der Theorie von der Wider-
spiegelung des objektiven Seins durch das Bewußtsein.«
28 Holz, Weltentwurf und Reflexion, 561. »[D]ie Dialektik der Natur [ist] im Rück-
schluß aus der Dialektik des Denkens zu gewinnen, ohne dabei in eine subjek-
tiv-idealistische Konstitutionstheorie verfallen zu müssen.«
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his methods. He claims that the dialectics of nature, the dialectical 
laws, etc., are to be »found« (»auffinden«) in the natural sciences and 
their findings, that they can be »derived« (»ableiten«) or »abstract-
ed« (»abstrahieren«) from them. He is very clear that this is not a 
very philosophical enterprise at all, far from the speculative methods 
of Holz or Hegel, for that matter. I believe that Kurt Bayertz and 
Wolfgang Krohn, among others, interpret this correctly when they 
write: »This is the goal of the dialectics of nature, which according 
to Engels’s self-understanding, however, must not be a restitution of 
a philosophy of nature separated from the specialized sciences, but 
must reconstruct the envisaged comprehensive conception of nature 
[Gesamtbild der Natur] from the results of the specialized sciences 
themselves.«29 In the German Democratic Republic, and throughout 
orthodox Marxism, this was the mainstream interpretation of Engels 
and his Dialectics of Nature. Herbert Hörz, who was the main figure 
in the canonization of this interpretation, established the notion or 
concept of »generalization« (»Verallgemeinerung«) to describe Engels’s 
method. And because the Dialectics of Nature is the result of such a 
generalization of the findings and theories of the natural sciences, a 
distinct philosophy of nature, at least in the sense of Hegel or Holz, is 
obsolete and bourgeois.30
Secondly, Engels not only rejects the method Holz proposes but 
also his idea that we need something like such an ontology or »science 
of totality.« Rather, Engels assumes that what the natural sciences can 
29 Bayertz and Krohn, »Engels im Kontext,« 82. »Dies ist das Ziel der Dialektik der 
Natur, die dem Engelsschen Selbstverständnis nach jedoch keine Restitution ei-
ner von den Fachwissenschaften getrennten Naturphilosophie sein darf, sondern 
das angestrebte Gesamtbild der Natur aus den Resultaten der Fachwissenschaft 
selbst zu rekonstruieren hat.«
30 »Marxist philosophy does not need to be supplemented by a philosophy of na-
ture inasmuch as it is itself also the generalization of the results of the natural 
sciences.« Herbert Hörz and Karl-Friedrich Wessel, eds., Philosophie und Natur-
wissenschaften (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1986), 17. »Die 
marxistische Philosophie bedarf insofern keiner Ergänzung durch eine Natur-
philosophie, als sie selbst die Verallgemeinerung auch der Ergebnisse der Natur-
wissenschaften ist.«
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tell us about nature and the dialectics within it are sufficient: »As soon 
as each special science is bound to make clear its position in the great 
totality of things and of our knowledge of things, a special science 
dealing with this totality [Wissenschaft vom Gesamtzusammenhang] 
is superfluous. That which still survives independently of all earlier 
philosophy is the science of thought and its laws—formal logic and 
dialectics. Everything else is subsumed in the positive science of na-
ture and history.«31
Conclusions
What Engels wanted to do in the Dialectics of Nature was three-
fold. He wanted to show that there actually is a dialectics of nature, 
which means that he wanted to show that the laws of dialectics are 
actually operating in nature. That dialectics is not just an idea and 
that it is not just present in human history but in everything that 
exists. One major insight for him in this respect was that nature is 
historical, that nature is ever-changing and developing. While He-
gel only knows a dialectics of Notion and denies the historicity of 
nature, Engels was a staunch supporter of the idea of evolution. For 
him, evolution was a dialectical process, and the natural sciences 
themselves would become aware of that sooner rather than later. For 
Engels, there was no longer a sharp break between natural and hu-
man history; instead, they are interwoven and the latter evolved out 
of the former. He writes: »The whole of nature also is now merged 
in history, and history is only differentiated from natural history 
31 Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. 25, 26. »Sobald an jede einzelne Wissen-
schaft die Forderung herantritt, über ihre Stellung im Gesamtzusammenhang 
der Dinge und der Kenntnis von den Dingen sich klarzuwerden, ist jede besond-
re Wissenschaft vom Gesamtzusammenhang überflüssig. Was von der ganzen 
bisherigen Philosophie dann noch selbständig bestehen bleibt, ist die Lehre vom 
Denken und seinen Gesetzen — die formelle Logik und die Dialektik. Alles and-
re geht auf in die positive Wissenschaft von Natur und Geschichte.« MEW 19: 
207.
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as the evolutionary process of self-conscious organisms.«32 Secondly, 
Engels aimed to show that a separate philosophy of nature, which 
aims to uncover universal truths about nature and which is some-
how superior to the natural sciences, had become obsolete. Rather, 
what is necessary is to study and interpret the findings of the natu-
ral sciences, and the dialectics of nature thus becomes evident and 
stands for itself. For sure, Engels does not say much about how such 
an interpretation should be made, and his own work is not of much 
help either in this respect. Engels does not clearly say, for example, 
what should be done if some findings or theories of the natural 
sciences point in a different direction or outright deny dialectics. 
Should philosophy then criticize the natural sciences or try to prove 
them wrong? Engels himself does not shy away from such criticism 
and accuses the natural sciences from time to time in his work of 
being infiltrated by »bad« metaphysics and that they are themselves 
not able to understand that they are dialectical, even if they do not 
see or want that. He does that, though, with the intention to sup-
port them to become better natural sciences and to set them free 
from such bad metaphysics. Thirdly, and closely related to the previ-
ous point, Engels proposes a new relation between philosophy and 
the natural sciences, which can, at least in some points, be described 
as positivistic. He not only acknowledges that the natural sciences 
are the best available sources for knowledge about nature, but he 
also believes that philosophy depends entirely on them if it wants 
to say something meaningful about nature and natural processes. 
And because the natural sciences are themselves developing and the 
process of knowledge generation is never finished, so is the project 
of a dialectics of nature open-ended.
32 Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. 25, 516. »Jetzt auch die ganze Natur in 
Geschichte aufgelöst, und die Geschichte nur als Entwicklungsprozeß selbstbe-
wußter Organismen von der Geschichte der Natur unterschieden.« MEW 20: 
504.
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Engels’s project of a dialectics is unfinished. It was largely ignored 
outside of orthodox Marxism and sharply criticized,33 even by most 
Marxists in what were the Western countries during the Cold War. 
Natural scientists also largely ignored Engels’s writings, and they 
showed basically no interest in doing what Engels hoped they would 
do: prove that nature is dialectical.34 That is unfortunate, because the 
basic premises of Engels’s concept are worth re-reading and studying. 
Even if he is wrong, he provides the modern reader with an interest-
ing discussion of the aims and scope of a philosophy of nature, its 
methods, and its relation with the natural sciences.35 The latter point 
is crucial for all of the modern philosophy of nature, which still is 
positioned somewhere between Hegel or Holz and Engels, in that it 
is either envisaged as an enterprise separate from the natural sciences 
or an enterprise closely bound to and dependent on them. Even if 
there is nothing like a dialectics of nature and nature does not follow 
the laws of dialectics, the question remains as to whether there is any-
thing particularly philosophical to say about nature or to discover in 
the findings and theories of the natural sciences.
33 Helena Sheehan, Marxism and the Philosophy of Science: A Critical History (Atlan-
tic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993).
34 Two exceptions in the Western countries were John B. S. Haldane, The Marxist 
Philosophy and the Sciences (New York: Random House, 1939) and Richard Levins 
and Richard C. Lewontin, The Dialectical Biologist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1985).
35 Bonifaz Kedrow interpreted the Dialectics of Nature as a dialectics of the natural 
sciences. He argues that Engels was concerned with showing that the natural 
sciences are dialectical in themselves and that they stand in dialectical relations 
with each other. The dialectics of the natural sciences reflects the dialectics of 
nature, for example, like the transition from dead matter to living organisms is 
dialectical, as is the relation between chemistry and biology. Bonifaz M. Kedrow, 
Friedrich Engels über die Dialektik der Naturwissenschaft (Colognne: Pahl Rugen-
stein, 1979); Bonifaz M. Kedrow, Klassifizierung der Wissenschaften, vol. 1 (Co-
logne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1975).
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The Relationship  
between Art and Politics
On the Letter of Friedrich Engels  
to Margaret Harkness1
Henrique Wellen
An Allegory on Art and Politics
There is a famous fable about the relationship between art and poli-
tics. In the story (presented here with some alterations), a king, vain 
and materialistic in equal measure, vindictive and with revolutionary 
pretensions, made a call upon all artists to paint a portrait of him 
with the intention of selecting the one that portrayed him in the 
most realistic manner. The winner, as was the practice in that imagi-
nary era, would also obtain a noble title. However, a specific corporal 
trait of the subject of the painting introduced an unusual element to 
the contest and made it a difficult and dangerous proposition. The 
king had a physical malformation on his entire left side that was 
impossible to leave out of the portrait. This existential question that 
could determine the fate of the artists led to artistic alternatives and 
subterfuges that produced paintings of astounding complexity. How 
could it be possible to portray the king faithfully without offending 
him, given his vain sensibilities? If, on the one hand, the painting 
should reflect the closest representation of reality, the painter should 
also be careful not to present his subject in a light where he might 
suffer social humiliation as a result of his physical shortcomings be-
ing exposed.
1 This contribution is the translation of »Relação entre arte e política: sobre a carta 
de Friedrich Engels a Margaret Harkness,« Revista Espaço Acadêmico 17, no. 199 
(2017): 11 – 21 and the editor would like to thank the author and the publisher of 
the original work for granting permission to publish it in the present volume.
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The first contestant, after much reflection on the nuances and im-
plications of this paradox, resolved to depart from the second premise, 
since that one, being less explicit than the first, could save him from 
greater aggravations and would reduce the severity of his punishment. 
He thus opted to avoid a faithful portrait of the monarch, especially 
the representation of his physical defect, so by avoiding the physical 
problems of the king, he ended up creating a work of art that, in his 
view, would be superior to reality itself. When he finished his work, 
one could observe that the portrait looked superior to the real-life 
subject. In order to achieve that artistic effect, the painter used a risky 
subterfuge: the subject seemed to be in great physical shape, without 
a single defect. 
The king appeared painted from the front with very bright colors 
and with accented shadings, portrayed with a strength that would 
make Hercules envious and a sagacity that would fool Ulysses himself. 
As expected, the first impression that the painting created in the king 
was one of satisfaction and plain happiness. When he saw himself 
represented in that way, without any defects and showing corporal 
strength, his face showed a mixture of pride and sadness, and, ac-
cording to some witnesses, a few tears could be seen rolling down his 
face. There was a long pause in which the king, immersed in thoughts 
about the past, the present and the future, imagined himself in the 
physical condition depicted by the painting. How many humiliations 
could have been avoided! How many compliments he would have 
received! The painting evoked a myriad of sensations and feelings in 
the consciousness of the monarch, but, at the same time, it suggested 
the possibility of an alternative life that he was able to erase from his 
mind only with great effort.
Even though immersing himself in his thoughts gave him an in-
tense sensation of joy, the return to reality, the return from that ca-
thartic subjectivity, had a drastic impact in the most intimate corners 
of his being. When confronted with hard reality, he realized that it 
had had an even greater effect than his imagination. In reality, that 
painting was like a Siren’s song, analogous to the temptations experi-
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enced by Ulysses,2 barely useful to outwit the people with regard to 
the reality that he needed to confront. And so, exhibiting an amalgam 
of rancor and materialistic axioms, the king made a pronouncement 
on the painting and the fate of its creator.
That painting — said the king — is clearly surrounded by idealistic 
elements and, for that reason, it represents a counter-revolutionary 
person. And since the painting cannot express a concrete reality, it 
serves as an instrument for human and social alienation. It therefore 
represents an attempt to counter revolutionary forces, an opiate of 
the people, because it induces them to fall asleep in the face of reality. 
And so there is no alternative but to punish the artist with the death 
penalty. And this is how the king dealt with the first painter and the 
first painting. 
The second candidate felt a lot of paradoxical sensations; he felt 
relief because it was not his life that had been condemned to end but, 
on the other hand, the possibility of death was still very real for him. 
And here there is an important lesson about the rejection of art with 
idealist and subjectivist content, art intended as an escape from reality. 
He would not make the same mistake, and he would make an effort 
to portray the object with as much fidelity as possible. No arbitrary 
additions would be made. The work would simply reflect what is 
explicit and natural.
Based on these premises, the second candidate made a great effort 
to take away the processes and contradictions that could affect the 
corporal or mental expression of the king. In his painting, the king 
would be portrayed as a simple object, as a simple thing. If this had 
happened in a different period, one could say that the second artist 
2 In The Odyssey, through the use of a synthesis of oral history and myths, Homer 
narrated the adventures of Ulysses in his attempt to return home after the Trojan 
War. In his journey, one of the main challenges that the hero faced was his en-
counter with the Sirens who tried to seduce the sailors with their song. Ulysses 
ordered that all members of his crew cover their ears with wax, but he would be 
tied to the mast of the ship so that he could listen to the Sirens and survive. See 
Homer, A Odisseia (São Paulo: Editora 34, 2011).
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would, in a Positivist manner, »consider everything as simple things.«3 
In order not to repeat the mistake of his predecessor, he would pro-
duce an elemental copy of that which would express immediacy and 
the physical appearance of the king. In that way, with the king having 
an explicit physical deficiency, there would be no way to hide his 
shortcomings through idealist subterfuges. The second artist gathered 
his artistic abilities to produce a purely scientific reflection that would 
adhere to the rules of nature, just like the laws of gravity.
And so he presented the king frontally, showing not only his hu-
man nature but also representing his immutable human condition. 
The naturalist content was rooted in the desire to immortalize that 
situation as the only possible one for the king, and for that reason, he 
should be worshiped like a statue not only in the present but forever. 
The details of the second painting were so surgical that one could ob-
serve so many defects of reality itself on the body of the king and on 
his clothes, as well as in the surroundings of the portrait, that at first 
glance they were hard to identify. The painting showed several defects, 
but, as stated by the author of the work, they were not creations of the 
mind of the artist but only exact copies from that which served as the 
model for the painting.
When faced with this new and unexpected painting, the impact 
felt by the king was the opposite of the one caused by the first work. 
If the first idealist painter brought him feelings of happiness and satis-
faction, the second painting inspired feelings of sadness and rejection. 
The king was stunned; at that moment, he was simultaneously subject 
and object, looking at the most minute corporal defects. Seeing him-
self portrayed in such a manner, he not only felt diminished but also 
experienced an unfamiliar sense of impotence. If in the first painting 
he could be compared to great heroes who had been able to alter the 
fate that the gods had imposed upon humanity, in the second paint-
3 According to Durkheim, at the beginning of the second chapter of The Rules of 
the Sociological Method, »The first and most fundamental rule is to consider social 
facts as things.« Émile Durkheim, As Regras do Método Sociológico (São Paulo: 
Martins Fontes, 2007), 15.
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ing he seemed like a man who could hardly cope with the most insig-
nificant challenges of life. At that moment, the king, master over the 
destinies of countless people, felt powerless against the world. And so 
the feeling that invaded him at that moment was one of resignation, 
of the knowledge that nothing could be done to change the human 
condition. This was accompanied by a sense of paralysis, just as with 
the first painting, but for opposite reasons. When the king saw him-
self idealized in the first painting, he felt as if he had escaped reality 
(seduced by the song of the Sirens); faced with the second image, he 
felt that his body was devoid of force, like a statue made of stone, as 
if he was experiencing the effects of having seen Medusa.4 Hoping to 
chase away the naturalism presented in the painting, the king spoke 
loudly and with even more vigor than previously. This painting, he 
said, is even more alienating than the first one since it lacks a sense 
of history and a sense of social dynamic; one needed to be extremely 
strong not to succumb to the sense of resignation irradiated by this 
work. And so, with a proud defense of his alleged historical heroic 
traits, the king condemned the artist to the same fate as the first one. 
Given the fates of the two artists, there was great fear when a new 
candidate emerged. If the two artists had been executed after being 
accused of the opposite of what they had wanted to portray, the main 
concern with regard to the contest was not the benefit that one could 
obtain but their own survival. At this moment, after everything that 
had occurred, the new candidate stepped forward.
If the first painter (contrary to his intention of glorifying the 
king) was executed on charges of idealism, and the second candidate 
(who intended to portray the king in a more descriptive manner) 
4 In Greek mythology, Medusa was a monster of the underworld (a Gorgon) that 
had the body of a woman and serpents on her head instead of hair. As related 
in the adventures of Perseus, Medusa had the power of turning anyone who saw 
her into stone. References to Gorgons precede the feats of the demi-god Perseus. 
They were present in Aeschylus‹ Prometheus Chained as monsters who inhabit-
ed the plains of Quistene. See Aeschylus, »Prometeu accorentado,« in Prometeu 
acorrentado — Édipo Rei — Medéia by Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides (São 
Paulo: Abril cultural, 1980), 39.
Henrique Wellen228
received the capital penalty under charges of naturalism, why would 
anyone want to enter this contest? The new candidate had proba-
bly lost his senses, and that is why he drove towards his death so 
willingly. And even though this situation scared all those present, 
the king’s pronouncement was an even greater surprise. After an-
nouncing that he was already devoid of the hope of finding a paint-
ing that would reflect his wishes and, therefore, was close to ending 
the whole process, he remarked upon how surprised he was to find 
a work that could bring him such artistic and political satisfaction. 
Not satisfied with this compliment, the king continued to extol the 
third artist’s virtues and his ability to depict the king in such a pre-
cise aesthetic manner, without a hint of idealism or naturalism. The 
artist was thus deserving of all the titles and prizes promised to him. 
Furthermore, he would become a magistrate of the kingdom for life. 
For having demonstrated such competence in the aesthetic field, the 
painter should, according to a royal decree, assume the master chair 
in the field of arts and culture of the State. The general surprise from 
all those present (with the exception of the painter and his subject) 
was understandable. And everyone was curious as to the content of 
the portrait. What colors were used? What kinds of strokes were 
used? Was there a contrast of light and shadow? The use of curved 
lines or any other techniques typical of illusionist painting?5 There 
was only one way to find out, but the intimidation derived from all 
that had happened had drained all the courage necessary to placate 
the collective curiosity. There was such joy and such relief when the 
king, extremely pleased with his portrait, invited everyone present to 
contemplate the masterpiece. And thus, everyone was able to appre-
ciate the virtues presented in the painting and confirm that it was 
deserving of praise. 
5 One of the most common expressions of Brazilian reality in the so-called ›il-
lusionist paintings‹ is found in Baroque art. These paintings create figures that 
enhance the spiritual and religious elements to the detriment of rational and 
Renaissance traits. To that end, artists used several resources, such as the juxtapo-
sition of colors, light and shadow, drapes, and curved lines. 
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Friedrich Engels and the Triumph of Realism in Literature 
In the spring of 1888, Friedrich Engels, the famous German commu-
nist, sent a letter to Margaret Harkness in which he communicated 
some of his thoughts about one of the writer’s works entitled City 
Girl. Harkness (who used the pseudonym John Law) was an English 
writer who, as a result of contacts with socialist thinkers like Elea-
nor Marx (Karl Marx’s daughter), had made incursions into political 
thought and was resolved to use her literary talents in the advance-
ment of the socialist cause. 
The content of the letter did not demonstrate any analytical pre-
tensions about aesthetics but, nevertheless, it stands as a landmark of 
great importance for the Marxist analysis of the relationship between 
art and politics.6 The letter centers on the relationship between art 
and politics and, especially, on the specificity of each of their qualities 
and the elements that the writer utilizes to avoid equalizing art and 
politics. The letter addresses in an essentialist and introductory man-
ner the parameters that must be used to carry out a realistic analysis 
of literature and the relationship between those determinations and 
the political consciousness of the author.
With this argument in mind, and after congratulating Harkness 
for her artistic talent and courage to write such a work, Engels pro-
ceeded to analyze the quality of the book,7 defining what should be 
at the center of a work of art, namely its realistic character. Realism 
in art »implies, beside truth of detail, the truthful reproduction of 
typical characters under typical circumstances.«8 In this manner, next 
6 Several authors within the Marxist tradition point to the premise of the triumph 
of realism as the foundation of aesthetic analysis and cite Engels’s letter as the 
fundamental reference. Among the analyses that deal with this topic are the 
works of György Lukács. For a didactic synthesis of the relationship between 
Lukács‹ analysis and Engels’s position, see Ranieri Carli, A estética de György 
Lukács e o triunfo do realismo na literature (Rio de Janeiro: EDUFRJ, 2012). 
7 Engels uses the term »ein kleines Kunstwerk« to describe Harkness‹ novel.
8 Friedrich Engels, »Engels to Margaret Harkness,« in Marx & Engels Collected 
Works, Vol. 48: Letters 1887 – 90 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2010), 167.
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to narrative faithfulness and the delineation of characters and events, 
there must be a »typicality« to the work. 
For Engels, that is the central problem of the analyzed work, since 
the imbalance of that relationship marks an insufficiency on the part 
of the writer. On the one hand, the characters are »typical enough,« 
but on the other, »the circumstances which surround them and make 
them act are not perhaps equally so.«9 Engels cites the way in which 
the working-class characters in City Girl are lacking with regard to his-
torical development. The tuning fork between art and the portrayed 
reality was out of tune since Harkness‹ narrative presents a working 
class that played a passive role and needed external help (something 
that was valid for conditions in England at the beginning of the 19th 
century). Such conditions were very different from what English 
workers were experiencing during the last quarter of the 19th century 
when they had become organized into labor unions and political par-
ties. At that point, they had become an active political force.10 
One of the elements of the character of typicality noted by Engels 
can be found in the precise figurative expression of the reflected mo-
ment of reality. Art cannot do without that realistic relationship with 
a specific reality. Such a condition would not necessarily be derived 
from the submission of art to history, as if the former had to portray 
the most perfunctory details of the latter.11 What Engels pointed out 
9 Ibid.
10 An important framework in this development was the so-called »Spring of the 
Peoples,« a series of insurrections that spread throughout Europe in 1848. This 
represented the gradual strengthening of the working class in the political strug-
gle against capitalist exploitation. Providing historical, political, and documenta-
ry evidence of this movement, we have the Communist Manifesto, composed and 
published by Marx and Engels during this historical moment. See Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, Manifesto do Partido Comunista (São Paulo: Cortez, 1998).
11 There is no consensus for this premise either among the many art critics or 
among the Marxist aesthetes, as we can see in the critiques of Perry Anderson 
on the events and character of the war between France and Russia narrated in 
Tolstoy’s War and Peace. See Perry Anderson, »Trajetos de uma forma literária,« 
Revista Novos Estudos 77 (March 2007): 205 – 220; Leo Tolstoy, Guerra e Paz (São 
Paulo: Cosac Naify, 2011).
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was the indispensable relationship between those two forms of repre-
sentation (art and history) in order to prevent art from becoming a 
form of escape from reality, as well as an arbitrary crystallization of its 
appearance. However, one could question whether the German com-
munist wanted to present this admonition as an attempt to defend or 
to aggrandize the political struggle of the workers for the construc-
tion of socialism. The answer to this conflict appears in the following 
comments, in which instead of pleading for the artistic writing of 
socialist content, he praises a very different condition: »I am far from 
finding fault with your not having written a socialist novel,« or, as the 
Germans called it, a Tendenz-roman (an engaged novel), in order to 
»glorify the social and political ideas of the author.«12 That is to say, 
instead of criticizing Harkness for not writing a novel engaged in pro-
letarian causes, the impenitent defender of the working class praises 
the English writer precisely for the fact that she did not introduce 
her own political and ideological preferences into the narrative of the 
novel. And just to make things even clearer, Engels adds: »The more 
the opinions of the author remain hidden, the better for the work of 
art.«13 
As a way of exemplifying what he defends as realism in art (and, in 
this case, the possibility and necessity of creating a great work of art 
independent of the political proclivities of the author), Engels weaves 
comparisons among literary works produced by artists with very dif-
ferent ideologies. Whereas Émile Zola was a writer known not only 
for his literary work but also for his socialist political engagement, 
Honoré de Balzac was an author whose political perspective could 
be qualified as not only conservative but also sympathetic towards 
reactionary (and aristocratic) positions. Faced with both authors, one 
would expect that Engels, the defender of the working class, would be 
more sympathetic towards Zola’s work.14 However, as he admonished, 
12 Engels, »Engels to Margaret Harkness,« 167.
13 Ibid.
14 It is important to note that Émile Zola is the author of one of the artistic pieces 
of great importance in denouncing the exploitation of the workers by the capital-
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such a relationship should not be transposed to artistic specificity. In 
other words, what would serve in the effort to develop political mil-
itancy would not necessarily be useful in terms of aesthetic apprecia-
tion. It is precisely in this spirit that Engels issues his judgment on the 
author who is the real French master of world literature:
Balzac was politically a Legitimist; his great work is a constant elegy 
on the irretrievable decay of good society; his sympathies are all with 
the class doomed to extinction. But for all that his satire is never 
keener, his irony never bitterer, than when he sets in motion the very 
men and women with whom he sympathises most deeply—the no-
bles. And the only men of whom he always speaks with undisguised 
admiration, are his bitterest political antagonists, the republican he-
roes of the Cloîtred Saint-Méry, the men, who at that time (1830 – 36) 
were indeed the representatives of the popular masses. That Balzac 
thus was compelled to go against his own class sympathies and politi-
cal prejudices, that he saw the necessity of the downfall of his favour-
ite nobles, and described them as people deserving no better fate; and 
that he saw the real men of the future where, for the time being, they 
alone were to be found—that I consider one of the greatest triumphs 
of Realism, and one of the grandest features in old Balzac.15
In the case of that illustrious French author, the triumph of realism 
was expressed in the fact that his political and social beliefs did not 
impose limits on the typical representation of characters and events. 
The issue, made explicit in the quote above, is to defend the autonomy 
of art before politics in the sense that the specific quality of the former 
cannot be substantiated by the latter. That is to say, art has its own 
specificity and, even if political determinations are not absent, those 
elements only have expressive validity as part of the whole context. 
ists. In Germinal, Zola exposes the ordeals experienced by coal miners oppressed 
under the thumb of capitalism. See Émile Zola, Germinal (São Paulo: Estação 
Liberdade, 2012).
15 Engels, »Engels to Margaret Harkness,« 168.
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When dealing with aesthetic objects, it is the specificity of art that 
must absorb political elements in its particularity and not the other 
way around.
Engels did not claim that realist artist is endowed with ideological 
neutrality or that he is devoid of political values or ideas, but rather 
that the measure of art cannot be subsumed by its political interests. 
Realist art does have, however, a lot of values that can, depending on 
the audience, produce reflective effects with political content. How-
ever, it is not these effects that measure the greatness of the work of art 
that produced them. Due to the need to represent reality departing 
from its essence, realism endorsed by defenders of communism pre-
supposes a necessary reflection of the historical dynamic, its processes, 
and its immanent contradictions. 
This why the search for the artistic representation of typicality in 
both characters and events is prohibited by the escape from reality as 
well as by the naturalization of reality. This is because neither artistic 
idealism (very present in avant-garde and subjectivist conceptions) 
nor artistic naturalism (which in the case analyzed by Engels is exem-
plified by Zola) can express the complexity of the historical dynamic 
in its essential movements of continuity and rupture.
In both of the analyzed cases of aesthetic figurations, history ap-
pears, to a greater or lesser degree, fractured in its processes, either by 
the fantastic propelling of the character towards his social possibilities 
or by the imagery taken from the character’s immanent capacity for 
historical intervention. The relationships between individual and so-
ciety, between subjectivity and objectivity, and between teleology and 
causality are such that, when one pole is hypertrophied at the expense 
of the other, the artistic reflection will not capture the typical essence 
of the characters and events in the mediation between the singular 
and the universal.
In both cases, a painting about reality will represent a curtailment 
imposed on the character, either by his awareness of the concrete pos-
sibilities that surround him or by his interventionist practice against 
greater obstacles. Fundamentally, what will happen in these cases are 
Henrique Wellen234
watertight paintings about history that do not represent the complex-
ity of reality portrayed artistically but rather express, in a direct or 
indirect manner, the values, thoughts, and wishes of the artist himself.
Translated by Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo
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Friedrich Engels
 
From the ›Woman Question‹  
to Social Reproduction Theory
Vincent Streichhahn
The so-called ›woman question‹ appeared in the context of the bour-
geois revolution of 1848 as a political field of conflict in Germany. It 
is a broad bundle of topics that were negotiated in the 19th century in 
the political, social and literary fields. »It represented a space of polit-
ical argument in which the nature, implications and origins of sexual 
difference might be debated, and was regarded as intensely significant 
for both its symbolic and its practical import.«1 The situation of sin-
gle and married women, women’s work, sexuality, as well as political 
rights for the female sex were among the issues discussed. On the one 
hand, this discourse opened up a space in which women could think 
about themselves differently, while on the other hand, actors of all 
political persuasions were forced to react to the ›woman question‹ in 
order to become or remain hegemonic in this political field.2
The ›woman question,‹ in this case the right to women’s gainful 
employment or suffrage, was more than controversial in the organi-
zations of the young German labor movement. The General German 
Workers‹ Association (Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein) under 
the leadership of Ferdinand Lassalle (1825 – 1864) openly advocated 
a ban on women’s work, because female workers were considered 
competition in the job market. The Social Democratic Workers‹ 
1 Lucy Delap, »The ›Woman Question‹ and the Origins of Feminism,« in The 
Cambridge History of Nineteenth Century Political Thought, ed. Gareth Stedman 
Jones and Gregory Claeys (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 319. 
2 On the defensive reaction against female emancipation efforts in the German 
Empire see Ute Planert, Antifeminismus im Kaiserreich: Diskurs, soziale Formation 
und politische Mentalität (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998).
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Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei), founded by August Bebel 
(1840 – 1913) and Wilhelm Liebknecht (1826 – 1900) in 1869, also pre-
sented an extremely antagonistic picture. Although the first voices 
raised in their ranks called for the political and economic equality of 
the sexes, they did not prevail. The unification party conference of 
the Socialist Workers‹ Party of Germany (Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei 
Deutschlands) in Gotha in 1875 did not change much about this.3 
It took the commitment of Bebel, who in 1879 wrote what is prob-
ably the most popular book of the German labor movement,4 namely 
Woman and Socialism (Die Frau und der Sozialismus),5 to reverse the 
trend. Five years later followed the famous publication by Friedrich 
Engels (1820 – 1895) entitled The Origin of the Family, Private Proper-
ty and the State (Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und 
des Staats).6 After the repeal of the Socialist Laws (1878 – 1890), the 
›woman question‹ was at least programmatically taken into account 
by the German Social Democratic Party, allowing the activities of the 
proletarian women’s movement to develop increasingly within their 
structures in the following years.7
3 Manfred Scharinger, Proletarische Frauenbewegung. Kritische Bilanz und politische 
Lehren (Vienna: Arbeitsgruppe Marxismus, 2009), 28 – 51.
4 In 1898, the Berliner Illustrierte asked its readers about the most influential book 
of the last century. Bebel’s Woman and Socialism hardly after the Conversational 
Encyclopaedia, the Bible and On the Origin of Species by Darwin already ranked 
fourth (Willy Brandt, »Hundert Jahre nach August Bebel. Ein Bestseller dient 
der Gleichberechtigung,« in Frauen heute. Eine Bestandsaufnahme, ed. Willy 
Brandt (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1981), 14. 
5 August Bebel, »Die Frau und der Sozialismus,« in Ausgewählte Reden und 
Schriften, vol. 10, ed. Internationales Institut für Sozialgeschichte Amsterdam 
(Munich: K. G. Sauer, 1996 [1879]).
6 Friedrich Engels, »Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des 
Staats,« in Marx-Engels-Werke (henceforth MEW), vol. 21 (Berlin: Dietz, 1962), 
25 – 173.
7 Richard Evans, Sozialdemokratie und Frauenemanzipation im deutschen Kaisser-
reich (Bonn: Dietz Verlag 1979); Elisabeth Haarmann, Schwestern zur Sonne zur 
Gleichheit: Die Anfänge der proletarischen Frauenbewegung (Hamburg: Ergebnisse- 
Verlag 1985); Florence Hervé, ed., Geschichte der deutschen Frauenbewegung (Co-
logne: Pahl-Rugenstein 1982); Heinz Niggemann, Emanzipation zwischen Sozi-
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The present chapter pays special attention to a contextualizing 
appreciation of Engels’s theoretical contribution to the ›woman 
question.‹ In addition, The Origin of the Family will be confronted 
with some selected feminist critiques. Finally, the social reproduc-
tion theory (SRT) will be discussed, which in a certain sense is in 
a line of tradition with Engels, but also overcomes his theoretical 
gaps and deficits in important points. The article focuses on two 
theses: 1) on the one hand, Engels’s work, alongside Bebel’s book, 
was of great practical importance for overcoming »proletarian an-
ti-feminism«8 as a multidimensional obstacle to organization in the 
German working class; and 2) on the other hand, Engels left behind 
with The Origin of the Family and the dualism postulated therein a 
momentous revision of Marx’s theory that brings fatal theoretical 
problems. 
Engels and The Origin of the Family  
as a Tacit Course Correction
Three possible readings of Engels’s book9 should be mentioned: The 
Origin of the Family 1) as the central writing of the Marxist theory of 
women’s emancipation, which is probably the most common reading; 
2) as a construction process that should give historical materialism a 
alismus und Feminismus: Die sozialdemokratische Frauenbewegung im Kaiserreich 
(Wuppertal: Hammer, 1981); Sabine Richebächer, Uns fehlt nur eine Kleinigkeit: 
Deutsche proletarische Frauenbewegung (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschen-
buch-Verlag 1982).
8 Werner Thönnessen, Frauenemanzipation: Politik und Literatur der Deutschen 
Sozialdemokratie zur Frauenbewegung (1863 – 1933) (Frankfurt am Main: Europäi-
sche Verlangsanstalt, 1969).
9 On the history of the immediate development of the book see Editha Nagel, 
»Zur Geschichte der unmittelbaren Entstehung von Friedrich Engels’s Schrift 
›Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staates‹ und ihre He-
rausgabe in Deutschland (1884 – 1894),« Beiträge zur Marx-Engels-Forschung 3 
(1978): 125 – 141.
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unified form10; and 3) as a tacit course correction against Bebel’s pub-
lication, which in its first editions was still predominantly marked by 
political liberalism. 
In general, The Origin of the Family is presented in the research 
literature as one of the early central writings of the Marxist theory of 
women’s emancipation. This is factually correct, but it masks the actu-
al intention of the author. That does not mean, of course, that Engels 
has nothing to say about the oppression of women, but because his 
intention was different, he deals only with certain aspects of this op-
pression. Overall, he says very little about the situation of women un-
der capitalism.11 Only in the last pages of his book does he reach the 
phase of civilization, in which capitalism, in turn, has only a short life. 
The comments on this issue are therefore rather scattered throughout 
the book. This is no coincidence, but rather the expression of a focus 
of interest. In other words, it was its reception by female socialists that 
began a few years after publication that made it a classic on this issue. 
Because of the proletarian anti-feminism in the labor movement, they 
literally absorbed the remarks of Engels and Bebel. 
Right at the beginning, it must be mentioned that the controversy 
surrounding Engels’s book often gives the impression that the main 
subject is the family and everything else is an accessory. This is an un-
acceptable reduction. The title alone indicates that the family is mere-
ly part of a triad that still includes the state and private property. In 
10 »No (male) commentator on Marxism has taken The Origin of the Family as 
methodologically central to Marxism and to understanding Marx« (Terrell Carv-
er, »Marxism and Feminism: Living with Your ›Ex‹,« in Karl Marx and Contem-
porary Philosophy, ed. Andrew Chitty and Martin McIvor (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), 258).
11 Working in his father’s company in the textile industry, in which women played 
an important role, Engels was well aware of the situation of women under cap-
italism. In one of his early writings, Engels described the extremely precarious 
situation of female workers under capitalism very vividly (Friedrich Engels, »Die 
Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England,« in MEW, vol. 2 (Berlin: Dietz 1972 
[1845]), 225 – 506). The widespread absence of such descriptions in The Origin of 
the Family shows once again that it was not Engels’s task to systematically explain 
the oppression of women under capitalism in this book.
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contrast, Engels accomplishes with his work, as he modestly informs 
the reader in the preface, the completion of a »legacy.« We can charac-
terize this claim as a kind of ›metapolitics‹ that no longer depends on 
climbing into the arduous valley of critique in the melee,12 but rather 
aims to cast historical materialism into a coherent form that will shape 
posterity. What Engels wanted to show was the concrete application 
of historical materialism throughout human history. The family un-
doubtedly plays an important role in this, but the state and private 
property certainly do to no less a degree as well. It was by no means 
Engels’s intention to develop a systematic explanation of women’s op-
pression. With his approach, Engels (perhaps involuntarily) made a 
disastrous revision of Marx’s theory, which will be discussed below. 
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that it was an important merit of 
Engels to point out the historicity of the family (the state and private 
property) and thus deprive it of its supposed immutability.13
The reasons for Engels’s decision to write the book are unfortu-
nately in some ways still mysterious today. The creation process can 
only be partially reconstructed through the correspondence of Engels 
and some contemporaries. On February 16, 1884, in a letter to Karl 
Kautsky (1854 – 1938), Engels reported Marx’s enthusiasm for Lewis 
Henry Morgan’s (1818 – 1881) book14: »If I had the time, I would edit 
the material with Marx’s notes […], but that is not to be thought of.«15 
12 Matthias Bohlender, »Marx, Engels und der ›wahre Sozialismus‹ oder: Die Ge-
burt des ›historischen Materialismus‹ aus dem Handgemenge‹,« in ›Kritik im 
Handgemenge‹. Die Marx’sche Gesellschaftskritik als politischer Einsatz, ed. Matthi-
as Bohlender et al. (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2018), 15 – 49.
13 »However, an adequate political challenge to the status quo requires more than 
an awareness that existing social relations are not natural; it is also essential to 
point to the tendencies immanent to the system which point beyond it. This as-
pect of Engels’s analysis in Origin is less successful.« Paul Blackledge, »Frederick 
Engels, Social Reproduction, and the Problem of a Unitary Theory of Women’s 
Oppression,« Social Theory and Practice 44, no. 3 (2018): 311.
14 Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient Society (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995 
[1877]).
15 Friedrich Engels, »Engels an Karl Kautsky, 16. Februar 1884,« in MEW, vol. 36 
(Berlin: Dietz, 1979), 110.
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From late February to early March, Eduard Bernstein (1850 – 1932) vis-
ited Engels in London and reported: »Now, when I came over, he read 
to me from these manuscripts and the draft of a book based on Marx’s 
excerpts from the American Lewis Morgan’s Ancient Society, evening 
after evening until deep into the night.«16 At the same time, the unfin-
ished Capital volumes were waiting for completion. We must assume 
that the book project became increasingly important for Engels, and 
he almost fell into a kind of frenzy. In a letter to Friedrich Adolph 
Sorge (1828 – 1906) dated March 7, he says that Morgan »naturally 
rediscovered« Marx’s theory of history and concluded with »commu-
nist conclusions for today.«17 And on May 10, he tells Paul Lafargue 
(1842 – 1911) that he hopes to finish the manuscript, »a very important 
work,«18 by the end of next week. 
An additional reading, that of the tacit course correction, should 
be suggested here. This means that Engels recognized the significance 
of the ›woman question‹ as a political field of conflict, but neither 
Bebel’s nor Kautsky’s comments satisfied him. In other words, En-
gels’s The Origin of the Family is a political intervention written in 
order to maintain its own theoretical supremacy in the labor move-
ment. Bebel’s book in particular lacked a well-founded historical-ma-
terialistic foundation and Engels wanted to demonstrate his authority 
in interpretation. Admittedly, this reading is, in some respects, the 
flip side of the construction process, but sets a different accent. In 
the following, this reading will be checked for plausibility with some 
arguments.
Although Bebel and Engels corresponded with each other, the two 
›woman experts‹ of the labor movement did not seem interested in a 
joint substantive debate on the ›woman question.‹ This non-relation-
16 Quoted after Lawrence Krader, »Einleitung,« in Die ethnologischen Exzerpthefte, 
ed. Lawrence Krader (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976), 117.
17 Friedrich Engels, »Engels an Friedrich Adolph Sorge, 7. März 1884,« in MEW, 
vol. 36 (Berlin: Dietz, 1979), 124.
18 Friedrich Engels, »Engels an Paul Lafargue, 10. Mai 1884,« in MEW, vol. 36 (Ber-
lin: Dietz, 1979), 145.
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ship is initially surprising, since Engels had a lively correspondence 
with Kautsky in the early 1880s on questions of the origins of the 
family and marriage,19 as well as on the distribution of his new book.20 
In a letter to Engels dated May 11, 1882, Kautsky informed him that 
his own publication functioned in a certain sense as a »counterpart« 
to Bebel’s work, since in it he focused on the early history of man-
kind.21 After its publication in the Stuttgarter Kosmos, a Darwinian 
monthly journal that was highly regarded at the time, Engels was not 
very convinced of its content and sharply criticized some of Kautsky’s 
assumptions.22 In contrast, the correspondence with the thorough-
bred parliamentarian Bebel was quite sober: only once did Engels 
mention to Bebel that he had read his remarks »with great interest« 
and had discovered »many good things« in them. He does not really 
specify this general remark: »What you say about the development 
of industry in Germany is particularly clear and beautiful.« In the 
following, Engels only refers to his own position on industrial de-
velopment in Germany23 and thus deliberately chooses a discursive 
avoidance strategy.
It seems obvious, due to the convergence in time, that Engels 
wanted to use his writing (not only) to intervene in a corrective man-
ner. He met Kautsky personally in London in 1881 and maintained 
a close relationship with him even before Kautsky’s London exile 
(1885 – 1890). Therefore, Engels did not hesitate to call his friend quite 
harshly to order. Although he appreciated Bebel for his importance 
19 The three articles written by Karl Kautsky in 1881 – 1882 (»Hetärismus,« »Die 
Raubehe und das Mutterrecht: Der Clan,« and »Die Kaufehe und die patriar-
chale Familie«) were published together: Karl Kautsky, »Die Entstehung der Ehe 
und der Familie,« Kosmos: Zeitschrift für einheitliche Weltanschauung auf Grund 
der Entwicklungslehre 12, no. 2 (1882): 190 – 207.
20 Kautsky wrote to Engels on July 16, 1884: »Paper like that from Bebel’s Woman« 
(Benedikt Kautsky, ed., Friedrich Engels Briefwechsel mit Karl Kautsky (Vienna: 
Danubia-Verlag, 1955), 133). 
21 Ibid., 57.
22 Ibid., 46 – 164.
23 Friedrich Engels, »Engels an August Bebel, 18. Januar 1884,« in MEW, vol. 36 
(Berlin: Dietz, 1979), 87.
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to the German movement, it is precisely this fact that might have 
prevented Engels from a direct confrontation with the ›Workers‹ Em-
peror‹ (Arbeiterkaiser) in terms of content, since he shied away from 
the open conflict because of the possible consequences for the orga-
nization in Germany.24 However, an open conflict was not necessary 
at all, since Bebel willingly allowed himself to be taught by Engels’s 
theoretical authority.25 
By shifting the focus to the historical development since the prim-
itive societies, which Engels classifies as egalitarian societies in refer-
ence to Morgan’s investigations and Marx’s excerpts, he abstains from 
an explicit criticism of Bebel. At the same time, he elevates his own 
occupation to another level by identifying it as the completion of a 
»legacy.«
It can be said that Engels’s book had a considerable influence not 
only on Bebel’s Woman and Socialism, which became more popular in 
Germany. However, the popularity of Bebel’s book, which introduced 
the masses to Marxism, was by no means only due to his remarks 
on the ›woman question.‹ As early as 1926, the bourgeois sociolo-
gist Hilde Lion (1893 – 1970) described in her study of the women’s 
movement that »[f ]or the intellectually vibrant proletarian, Bebel was 
almost always the mediator to Marx.«26 In addition, it should not 
be forgotten that the socially highly controversial and partly tabooed 
topic of sexuality certainly had a certain appeal to readers (like the 
authors). The importance of the utopian, i. e. the pointing out of 
concrete utopias, must not be overlooked either. For example, Bebel’s 
book »was almost the only work in the Marxist literature of the time 
24 Marie-Claire Hoock-Demarle, »Frauen und Frauenemanzipation in Engels Brie-
fen,« in MEGA-Studien Journal 2 (1996): 54 – 65.
25 Engels turns Bebel’s explanations in a historical-materialistic way. Bebel’s book 
continued to grow in the following editions. While the first edition had just 180 
pages, the final German version had 519 pages. This was due to the fact that he 
took over large parts of Engels’s prehistory and materalistic arguments, but above 
all to the fact that he constantly added empirical material. 
26 Hilde Lion, Zur Soziologie der Frauenbewegung: Die sozialistische und die katholi-
sche Frauenbewegung (Berlin: Herbig, 1926), 38.
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that openly met people’s needs for a detailed and specific account of 
the socialist future.«27
Bebel’s Influence, Engels and Political Liberalism
Marxist theory has long been accused of gender blindness. In the 
meantime, research has shown that this accusation is not tenable in 
its entirety. Heather A. Brown shows in her systematic study Marx on 
Gender and the Family: A Critical Study28 how the question of gender 
relations and the family runs through the work of Marx and Engels.29 
Although it is certainly not a dominant theme, it can nevertheless be 
found in the margins of many of their writings.30 Despite this fact, 
they did not provide a coherent theory of women’s oppression or gen-
der relations, although some claim that for The Origin of the Family. I 
will show below that this is not true. However, from the early writings 
to the late work of Marx and Engels, there are aspects that indicate a 
27 Lise Vogel, Marxismus und Frauenunterdrückung: Auf dem Weg zu einer umfassen-
den Theorie (Münster: Unrast Verlag, 2019 [1983]), 148.
28 Also noteworthy is her analysis of Marx’s ethnographical notebooks, which have 
not been examined to date with regard to their position on gender, but which 
at the same time form the basis for Engels’s The Origin of the Family. Heather A. 
Brown, Marx on Gender and the Family: A Critical Study (Chicago: Haymarket 
Books, 2013), 133 – 162, 176 – 209.
29 Brown claims to have presented the first systematic work on this question 
(Brown, Marx on Gender, 3). However, Manfred Scharinger published on this is-
sue a few years earlier. This fact does not detract from the significance of Brown’s 
work, as it sets different accents to the more historiographically oriented book 
from Austria. Unfortunately, the latter work, probably due to language barriers, 
usually gets lost in the reception. Manfred Scharinger, Geschlechterverhältnisse 
bei Marx und Engels: Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung (Vienna: Arbeitsgruppe 
Marxismus, 2007). 
30 As far as I know, only Sam Stark has mentioned that Marx also dealt with the 
situation of women in one of the so-called »London Notebooks« (1850 – 1853): 
»But in the common descriptions of this period in the life of Karl Marx as a 
time of systematic studies on a critique of political economy, which was only 
occasionally interrupted by journalism, this issue has no clear place.« Sam Stark, 
»Marx und die Frauenfrage,« Zeitschrift für Ideengeschichte 11, no. 3 (2017): 55. 
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preoccupation with gender issues and can be made fruitful in part for 
a gender-sensitive analysis. Moreover, and this is hardly mentioned, 
the two were early advocates of women’s political participation in 
workers‹ associations while the majority of their German comrades 
still vehemently opposed it.31 
But precisely because of Marx’s and Engels’s fragmentary preoc-
cupation with the ›woman question‹ — almost completely hidden in 
the excerpt notebooks32 — it was another book that focused Marxist 
attention on the ›woman question‹ for the first time: of course, it was 
August Bebel’s Woman and Socialism. Female Marxists in particular 
oriented themselves according to these works in the following period. 
Clara Zetkin (1857 – 1933) would take the writings of Bebel and Engels 
as the starting point for her speech at the founding congress of the Sec-
ond International in Paris in 1889, which she published quite quickly 
as a pamphlet. Marxist theoretical works on the ›woman question‹ in 
the 19th century were dominated by German authors, which is also 
evident from the reception of these works by foreign female socialists.33 
Political activism by women was not a matter of course in the 
labor movement at that time. It took two authorities of the Ger-
man labor movement, Bebel and Engels, to deal with the ›woman 
question‹ in order to partially push back ›proletarian anti-feminism‹ 
within Social Democracy. This was mainly supported by a misogyne 
journeyman culture that formed the basis of the young German labor 
movement.34 The industrial proletariat, as the ideal type of working 
31 Judy Cox, »How Marx and Engels fought for women’s liberation,« International 
Socialism, March 29, 2020, https://isj.org.uk/jcox-marx-engels-women-lib/.
32 It should be noted that it is often not clear what Marx intended to do with the 
thousands of pages of excerpts and that he did not use most of them directly for 
his work. 
33 Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward Aveling, »The Woman Question: From a 
Socialist Point of View,« Westminster Review 125 (1886): 207 – 222; Nadežda Kon-
stantinovna Krupskaja, Zhenschina-rabotnica [The Woman Worker] (Munich, 
1901). 
34 Thomas Welskopp, »›Der Geist ächt männlichen Strebens‹: Mikropolitik und 
Geschlechterbeziehungen im Vereinsmilieu der frühen deutschen Arbeiterbewe-
gung,« Kurswechsel 3 (1997): 67 – 81.
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class imagined by Marx, was still a minority in the workers‹ organi-
zations in Germany in the 1860s due to the catch-up development of 
German capitalism. However, there were at least two other relevant 
approaches to Marxism: one via Christianity and one via liberalism. 
The latter shaped figures such as Bebel,35 Zetkin, and also Engels and 
Marx at different times. 
In particular, the influence of liberalism on Marxist political po-
sitions and theory development is often misunderstood. In a recent 
essay, Cornelia Klinger refers to this fact in a semi-serious way as »a 
leftist melancholia about liberal democracy.«36 Klinger thus describes 
an affinity that shames the actors: a close relationship between liber-
alism and the labor and women’s movements. This close relationship 
results from »the thinking of the Enlightenment and the ideals of the 
bourgeois revolution.«37 This is decisive, since Bebel’s political social-
ization through liberalism, as well as his contacts with the bourgeois 
women’s movement,38 according to my thesis, from the perspective 
of the sociology of knowledge represent a constitutional condition of 
the Marxist theory of women’s emancipation that could not flourish 
in the anti-feminist milieu of the young German labor movement.39 
The situation is similar for Clara Zetkin, who came into contact 
with the bourgeois women’s movement through her mother at Au-
35 Although Bebel himself was a wood turner, he came into close contact with the 
liberal thinking of the time through his membership and chairmanship of the 
Workers‹ Educational Association (Gewerblicher Bildungsverein) in Leipzig. 
36 Cornelia Klinger, »Weder eine bürgerliche Ehe noch eine perverse Wahlver-
wandtschaft: Von Liberalismus und Frauenbewegung zu Neoliberalismus und 
Postfeminismus,« in Liberalismus: Traditionsbestände und Gegenwartskontroversen, 
ed. Karsten Fischer and Sebastian Huhnholz (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2019), 362.
37 Ibid. 
38 Margrit Twellmann, Die deutsche Frauenbewegung: Ihre Anfänge und erste Ent-
wicklung 1843 – 1889 (Kronberg: Athenäum-Verlag, 1976), 139 – 177. 
39 A similar argumentation is found in Evans, who describes not only Bebel’s ideas 
»as a reaction to the theoretical views that determined the position of bour-
geois-liberal individualism in the woman question.« Evans, Sozialdemokratie und 
Frauenemanziaption, 27. The specification made here emphasizes more strongly a 
sociological perspective of knowledge. 
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guste Schmidt’s (1833 – 1902) teacher training seminar in Leipzig from 
1874 to 1878.40 At the end of the 19th century, Zetkin’s theoretical 
views on the ›woman question‹ were by no means ›strictly‹ Marxist. 
These »developed only gradually. Her articles from the 1880s show 
little Marxist influence and generally use arguments borrowed from 
either Bebel or Saint-Simon or the bourgeois-liberal theory of wom-
en’s emancipation.«41 After the repeal of the Socialist Laws, Zetkin 
became one of the outstanding leaders of the proletarian women’s 
movement in Germany. In doing so, she earned merit less as a the-
oretician than as an organizer, agitator, and editor of Die Gleichheit 
(Equality).42 
Especially in the second women’s movement, Marx and Engels 
were accused of having largely ignored gender relations in their work. 
Engels and Bebel were even called »fairy-tale uncles of the woman 
question« by feminist activists in order to brand their supposed sex-
ism.43 This vehemence, despite certain prejudices of Bebel and En-
gels regarding the gender question, fails to recognize the significance 
of these two books for the constitution of the proletarian women’s 
movement in the ranks of the German Social Democrats. 
Of course, there were also socialist feminists for whom the works 
of Engels and Bebel were indispensable reference works.44 During this 
40 Clara Zetkin’s mother, Josephine Eißner, maintained good relations with the two 
pioneers of the bourgeois women’s movement, Auguste Schmidt and Louise Ot-
to-Peters, which made it possible for her daughter to be admitted to the Leipzig 
teacher training seminar. Gilbert Badia, Clara Zetkin: Eine neue Biographie (Ber-
lin: Dietz, 1994), 11 – 14.
41 Evans, Sozialdemokratie und Frauenemanziaption, 98.
42 Mirjam Sachse, Von ›weiblichen Vollmenschen‹ und Klassenkämpferinnen: Frauen-
geschichte und Frauenleitbilder in der proletarischen Frauenzeitschrift ›Die Gleich-
heit‹ (1891 – 1923) (Kassel: Universitätsbibliothek Kassel, 2011).
43 Roswitha Burgard and Gaby Karsten, Die Märchenonkel der Frauenfrage: Fried-
rich Engels und August Bebel (Berlin: Frauen-Selbstverlag, 1975).
44 Some activists at the time saw The Origin of the Family as the cornerstone of 
socialist feminism, primarily because of the fact that Engels historicized the in-
stitution of the family and, by demanding the socialization of reproductive tasks, 
provided important remarks for a post-capitalist organization of reproduction. 
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time, they made the first attempts to make the economic writings of 
Marx and Engels fruitful for an analysis of women’s oppression under 
capitalism. They rely primarily on a critical re-reading of Capital. The 
rich debate that developed between socialist feminists from the 1970s 
onwards is made clear by the so-called ›domestic-labor debate.‹45 
Building on Lise Vogel’s work, the SRT, which is predominantly rep-
resented by Anglo-Saxon authors, emerged from this historical con-
troversy.46 This will be discussed in more detail below. Beyond this, 
from the end of the 2000s onward, the first systematic attempts were 
made to appreciate the complete works of Marx and Engels from a 
gender-sensitive perspective.47
To put it all in a nutshell, Marx and Engels certainly reflected on 
gender relations in their writings, albeit not systematically. However, 
without the influence of political liberalism, the debate would proba-
bly not have been so intense. Female Marxists at the turn of the cen-
tury oriented themselves mainly to Bebel’s and Engels’s works. After 
all, it was the task of the second women’s movement to take on classic 
works, to subject them to fundamental criticism, and to develop them 
further. In the next section, selected feminist critiques of Engels will 
be presented in a concise manner to crystallize the crucial points.
Selected (Socialist-)Feminist Critiques 
In this section, the criticisms of Engels by three female authors 
are explained in more detail, namely those of Simone de Beauvoir 
(1908 – 1986), Lise Vogel and Heather A. Brown. In The Other Sex, de 
For example: Kate Millett, Sexus und Herrschaft. Die Tyrannei des Mannes in 
unserer Gesellschaft (Munich: Desch, 1971), 148 – 172.
45 For a compact presentation see Lise Vogel, »Hausarbeitsdebatte,« in Histo-
risch-kritisches Wörterbuch, vol. 1, ed. Frigga Haug (Hamburg: Argument Verlag, 
2003), 540 – 554.
46 Tithi Bhattacharya, ed., Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering 
Oppression (London: Pluto Books, 2017).
47 Brown, Marx on Gender; Scharinger, Geschlechterverhältnisse. 
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Beauvoir probably presented the first feminist critique of Engels.48 It 
comprises only a few pages but reveals fundamental logical inconsis-
tencies. Vogel,49 on the other hand, is exemplary for a line of criti-
cism that focuses on the dual-system topic. Brown, meanwhile, refers 
to Engels’s economic and technical determinism,50 which leads to a 
one-sided framework. The criticisms are partly complementary. 
As a reminder, Engels’s argumentation51 is presented here in rad-
ical brevity: Engels assumed that the primitive societies of mankind 
were egalitarian societies. With economic and technical develop-
ment, i. e. the development of productive forces, people succeeded 
in producing a considerable surplus over time. Private ownership of 
land and tools, which had previously been common property, was 
created. These things used to be inherited along the maternal line 
of inheritance (matrilineality) to the children, since only mothers 
knew beyond doubt who their biological children were. According 
to Engels, maternal rights had to make way for the paternal line of 
inheritance (patrilineality). Engels calls this »the world historical de-
feat of the female sex.«52 As an institution, the family had the primary 
purpose of preserving property and bequeathing it to its descendants. 
The circle of the family became narrower with time. The women 
were obliged to monogamy by the men to ensure that only their 
own children would inherit. A central thesis of Engels is therefore 
that women’s oppression is directly linked to the emergence of class 
societies. The struggle between the sexes, according to Engels, occurs 
48 Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht: Sitte und Sexus der Frau (Hamburg: 
Rowohlt, 1983 [1949]), 62 – 68.
49 Vogel, Marxismus und Frauenunterdrückung.
50 An argument that Vogel, de Beauvoir and also Michèle Barrett, as another classic 
feminist, have already cited in a similar way. Michèle Barrett, »Introduction,« in 
The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1986), 7 – 30.
51 For a more detailed presentation see Scharinger, Geschlechterverhältnisse, 264 – 413; 
Brown, Marx on Gender, 163 – 175; Vogel, Marxismus und Frauenunterdrückung, 
119 – 145.
52 Engels, »Der Ursprung der Familie,« 61.
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at the same time as class relations.53 Engels treats both developments 
as simultaneous.
De Beauvoir deals with Engels in her magnum opus, published in 
1949, in the context of a tribute to historical materialism. A woman 
cannot be considered simply as a sex-determined organism: »the con-
sciousness that woman has of herself is not determined by her sexuali-
ty alone: it reflects a situation that depends on the economic structure 
of society, a structure that expresses the degree of technological de-
velopment that humanity has reached.«54 After a concise summary of 
Engels’s argumentation, de Beauvoir points to two central cruxes in it. 
The main problem is the »transition from public to private ownership, 
but nobody tells us how it happened.«55 She notes that Engels himself 
admits »[w]e don’t know anything about that yet.«56 According to 
de Beauvoir, he neither provides historical evidence nor attempts an 
interpretation. 
De Beauvoir hits the real sore spot with her second criticism: »Nor 
is it convincing that private property necessarily entailed the enslave-
ment of women. Historical materialism [sic!] takes for granted facts 
that should be explained; it simply accepts the bond of the interior 
that links man with property.«57 Although it is Engels and not the 
premises of historical materialism that makes this argument, the crit-
icism is correct. It is logically impossible to deduce from the emer-
gence of private property the inevitable oppression of women.
Why does oppression take place precisely along the category of 
gender (and race)? Why does the gendered division of labor have such 
serious effects? This cannot be explained simply by the end of matri-
lineal society due to the introduction of private poverty and patrilin-
53 »The first class opposition that appears in history coincides with the develop-
ment of the antagonism between man and woman in monogamous marriage, 
and the first class oppression coincides with that of the female sex by the male.« 
Ibid., 68.
54 De Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht, 62.
55 Ibid., 64.
56 Engels, »Der Ursprung der Familie,« 157.
57 De Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht, 65.
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eality. Again, this only describes what needs to be explained. On the 
other hand, de Beauvoir also emphasizes the demands of mother-
hood, which lead to an asymmetrical relationship with men if society 
does not deal with them appropriately.
In Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary Theory, 
Vogel focuses on a different theme, which Engels raises with a formu-
lation in the foreword.58 Interestingly, the argument was not taken 
up by his contemporaries,59 but only activists of the second women’s 
movement did so. In the foreword to the 1884 edition, Engels talks 
about two forms of production that take place separately: the produc-
tion of food and that of people.60 Paradoxically, he thus laid the foun-
dation for a dualism with serious consequences. In doing so, he drew 
on the manuscript of The German Ideology,61 which was not published 
during his or Marx’s lifetimes. There, in 1846, the two write in a very 
similar way: »The production of life, both of one’s own in labor and of 
fresh life in procreation, now appears as a double relationship: on the 
one hand as a natural, on the other as a social relationship.«62
58 Vogel, Marxismus und Frauenunterdrückung, 141 – 143.
59 »At the end of the century, socialists found the assertion in the preface con-
cerning a duality of social reproduction ›extremely remarkable,‹ in fact ›almost 
incomprehensible.‹ Soviet commentators finally agreed that Engels was wrong, 
and that this statement could only refer to the earliest stages of human history, 
when humans were supposedly so much a part of nature that one could not even 
speak of the existence of social relations of production.« Vogel, Marxismus und 
Frauenunterdrückung, 142. 
60 »According to the materialistic conception, the determining factor in history is, 
in the final instance, the production and reproduction of the immediate essen-
tials of life. This, again, is of a twofold character. On the one side, the production 
of the means of existence, of articles of food and clothing, dwellings, and of the 
tools necessary for that production; on the other side, the production of human 
beings themselves, the propagation of the species. The social organization under 
which the people of a particular historical epoch and a particular country live is 
determined by both kinds of production: by the stage of development of labor 
on the one hand and of the family on the other.« Engels, »Der Ursprung der 
Familie,« 27 – 28.
61 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, »Die deutsche Ideologie,« in MEW, vol. 3 (Ber-
lin: Dietz, 1969 [1846]), 5 – 530.
62 Ibid., 29.
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We can extend this point with comments from Terrell Carver, who 
emphasizes the importance of this shift. Engels »attempted to build 
on this revision an apparatus of twin-track ›determination‹ in history, 
involving sex-oppression and class-oppression.«63 These »major revi-
sions to Marx’s theoretical work« had not been dealt with in detail 
by the interpretative tradition. Marx had already taken a different 
approach in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Politi-
cal Economy.64 »The Origin of the Family […] complicates what was 
otherwise a settled and (reasonably) simple story of historical ›de-
termination‹ by an identifiably singular factor (production, albeit of 
its ›means‹ and ›relations‹) — as opposed to the obviously dual-factor 
›production‹ and ›re-production‹.« It was certainly not that simple 
and complete in Marx’s writings, but Carver is correct when he re-
marks that »those problems have rarely, if ever, been addressed out-
side the feminist context, and given the airing they evidently merit.«65
Vogel argues that by using the manuscript of The German Ideology, 
which Engels rediscovered after Marx’s death, he acquired many the-
oretical weaknesses of their earlier work. By postulating two separate 
systems of production of material life, he makes a very rudimentary 
distinction between natural and social phenomena, which Marx had 
actually overcome. It implies that the family would be an indepen-
dent unit of social development. »And it is precisely this implication 
that has caught the imagination of contemporary socialist feminists, 
often tempting them into a quite cavalier reading of the Origin.«66 
According to Vogel, however, he should have based his account 
on Marx’s theory of social development. She criticizes Engels’s tech-
nological determinism, which he takes over from Morgan, the un-
critical adoption of the idea of the double production of The German 
Ideology and a utopian critique of property. »The Origin constituted a 
63 Carver, »Marxism and Feminism,« 258.
64 Karl Marx, »Einleitung: Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie,« in MEW, vol. 13 
(Berlin: Dietz, 1971 [1857]), 615 – 641.
65 Carver, »Marxism and Feminism,« 260.
66 Vogel, Marxismus und Frauenunterdrückung, 143. 
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defective text whose ambiguous theoretical and political formulations 
nevertheless became an integral part of socialist legacy.«67
Brown aims in a similar direction to Vogel: »While de Beauvoir, 
Barrett, and Vogel all provide important critiques of Engels’s Origin 
of the Family, all three tend to conflate the positions of Marx and 
Engels.«68 However, the above should make it clear that this does not 
apply to Vogel. Brown argues that Marx took a more nuanced ap-
proach to this issue »since he was operating within a more dialectical 
framework [and was therefore] able to avoid the sort of determinism 
that Engels’s study displays.«69 While Engels assumed, according to 
Brown, that the introduction of private property created the condi-
tions of women’s oppression, Marx did not believe that property was 
the only relevant factor. In contrast, Marx saw that the contradictions 
developed very early, even in communal societies. Brown quotes Raya 
Dunayevskaya (1910 – 1987) in more detail, which is reproduced here, 
since it is a key passage:
Nothing less than the vital question of transitions is at stake in the 
differences between Marx’s and Engels’s views. Marx was showing 
that it is during the transition period that you see the duality emerg-
ing to reveal the beginnings of antagonisms, whereas Engels always 
seems to have antagonisms only at the end, as if class society came in 
very nearly full blown after the communal form was destroyed and 
private property was established. Moreover, for Marx the dialectical 
development from one stage to another is related to new revolution-
ary upsurges, whereas Engels sees it as a unilateral progression.70
The development of class and gender antagonisms is embedded by 
Engels in a monocausal narrative. This leads him to the assumption 
67 Ibid. 
68 Brown, Marx on Gender, 165.
69 Ibid.
70 Raya Dunayevskaya, Rosa Luxemburg, Women’s Liberation, and Marx’s Philosophy 
of Revolution (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982), 180 – 181.
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that social conflicts would not have been possible at all before a rele-
vant generation of added value.71 Referring to Marx’s notes on Mor-
gan in the notebooks, Brown explains how Marx saw the potential in 
early primitive societies for the development of inequalities that did 
not arise from private property. There, Marx recognized »the estab-
lishment of ranks — relationship of chief to mass — and the economic 
interests that accompanied it.«72 
Accordingly, Marx saw a multitude of factors for social conflicts 
and for the development of antagonisms. But Marx also assumed a 
certain power of action on the part of women, even under the most 
difficult conditions, which does not seem to be the case with Engels’s 
description of the »world historical defeat of the female sex.« Brown 
therefore sees the greatest difference between Marx and Engels in the 
more deterministic arguments of the latter. »Engels primarily looks to 
economic and technological forces to explain possibilities for change. 
Thus, Engels remains within a relatively deterministic and unilinear 
framework, whereas Marx‹ formulation allows for greater variety in 
outcomes and for much greater degree of human agency, especially 
for women.«73
It became apparent that the criticisms of the three authors have 
different nuances, but complement each other in part. De Beauvoir 
emphasizes that Engels neglects the question of gender and treats its 
appearance as a cause. Vogel and Brown are united by their concern 
to separate Marx from Engels. While Vogel explains in abstract form 
that Engels’s dualism does not explain the social development of the 
family and changes because he does not see the family as a component 
of social totality, Brown demonstrates it concretely. She argues that 
Engels sees social development too deterministically and exclusively 
in the field of technology and production, while Marx also considers 
social factors. The two views are not mutually exclusive, but comple-
ment each other. 
71 Brown, Marx on Gender, 174. 
72 Dunayevskaya, Rosa Luxemburg, 181.
73 Brown, Marx on Gender, 175.
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Theoretical Confusion in the Marxist Tradition
In the following, I will concentrate on Lise Vogel’s criticism of Engels’s 
approach, which postulates two independent forms of production. 
Tithi Bhattacharya, currently one of the most impressive theorists in 
the field of SRT, succinctly sums up the void of »classical« Marxism 
concerning the oppression of women: »There is an unresolved tension 
at the heart of Marxist explanations for women’s oppression under 
capitalism. Although there is general agreement that the bourgeois 
family, as the dominant kinship unit, has something to do with gen-
erating and reproducing that oppression, the exact role of the family 
varies among Marxists.«74 In other words, Marxist theory has long 
failed to theorize the family / domestic labor, which has led to an inad-
equate explanation of women’s oppression under capitalism. Engels 
made a significant contribution to this with his approach.
What role does the family, as one of the core institutions for the 
production of life and equally importantly the production of the 
commodity labor, play in Engels’s thinking? »Reproductive labor 
had social forms that organized it, such as marriage and the family; 
but the labor itself was seen as biological. Women who performed 
this labor were also naturalized, as biological beings unable to effect 
changes in these social orders.«75 Engels reproduced a version of what 
Bhattacharya calls »the dependence through sexual division of labor 
explanation of women’s oppression.«76 Bebel, too, represents a variant 
of this thinking, but in contrast to Engels, he locates the reasons for 
women’s oppression on dynamics within the household and in the de-
pendence of women on men. This rather simplistic explanation leads 
74 Tithi Bhattacharya, »Liberating Women from ›Political Economy‹: Margaret 
Benston’s Marxism and a Social-Reproduction Approach to Gender Oppres-
sion,« Monthly Review, January 1, 2020, https://monthlyreview.org/2020/01/01/
liberating-women-from-political-economy/. 
75 Elisabeth Armstrong, Marxist and Socialist Feminism (Northampton, MA: Smith 
College, Faculty Publications). 
76 Bhattacharya, »Liberating Women from ›Political Economy‹.«
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to the fact that Bebel, especially in the first editions of his book, barely 
manages to go beyond bourgeois-liberal demands for equality.77 Due 
to his materialistic foundation, Engels is more theoretically grounded, 
but still deficient.
The programmatic conclusions refer to demands for equal ed-
ucation and the economic independence of women through 
wage labor. »Liberal reformers usually emphasized the emancipa-
tion-through-education route while the socialist stress was on eman-
cipation-through-waged work, albeit with many overlaps between the 
two paths.«78 We recognize in both Bebel and Engels the heritage of 
the liberal tradition, which is enriched by socio-material aspects. En-
gels calls complete legal equality a prerequisite for true social equality 
of the sexes. »Then it will be plain that the first condition for the 
liberation of the wife is to bring the whole female sex back into public 
industry, and that this in turn demands the abolition of the monoga-
mous family as the economic unit of society.«79
Engels and Bebel assumed that the liberation of women is not 
possible under capitalism. Both therefore linked the liberation of the 
female sex very closely to the fate of the working class. Thus Bebel 
wrote in the first edition of his book: »The woman and the worker 
both have in common that they have been the oppressed since time 
immemorial.«80 According to Bebel, only the common fight could 
help: »The woman is also called upon not to be left behind in this 
struggle.«81 For Bebel, there was indeed a connection between the 
›woman question‹ and the ›labor question,‹ but in his case they do 
not fall into one.82 And Engels wrote in a letter to Gertrude Guillau-
me-Schak on July 5, 1885: »In my opinion, true equality between man 
77 Evans, Sozialdemokratie und Frauenemanzipation, 40 – 52.
78 Bhattacharya, »Liberating Women from ›Political Economy‹.«
79 Engels, »Der Ursprung der Familie,« 76.
80 Bebel, »Die Frau und der Sozialismus,« 10.
81 Ibid., 198.
82 »A full and complete solution of the woman question — by which I mean that 
women are not only equal to men by law, but are also economically free and 
independent of them, and as far as possible equal to them in intellectual train-
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and woman can only become a truth when the exploitation of both 
by capital is eliminated and private domestic work is transformed 
into a public industry.«83 The demand to socialize private domestic 
work would become a central principle of the socialist strategy. In En-
gels’s case, however, women’s liberation seems to be the inevitable re-
sult of capitalist development and shows his economic determinism: 
We can already see from this that to emancipate woman and make 
her the equal of the man is and remains an impossibility so long as 
the woman is shut out from social productive labor and restricted 
to private domestic labor. The emancipation of woman will only be 
possible when woman can take part in production on a large, social 
scale, and domestic work no longer claims anything but an insignif-
icant amount of her time. And only now has that become possible 
through modern large-scale industry, which does not merely permit 
of the employment of female labor over a wide range, but positively 
demands it, while it also tends towards ending private domestic labor 
by changing it more and more into a public industry.84
The constant struggle against sexism — even within the working 
class — was not at the top of Engels’s priority list. Even a relatively 
simple measure to reduce the double burden on women unfortunate-
ly did not come to his mind: men can also do work in the house-
hold. The sexual division of labor approach has a profound theoretical 
weakness. The misleading statement of Engels in his foreword certain-
ly contributed to this confusion. In close reference to Bhattacharya, 
three points in particular can be criticized concerning the classical 
approach taken by Engels and Bebel.
ing — is just as impossible under the present social and political institutions as 
the solution of the labour question.« Ibid., 10.
83 Friedrich Engels, »Engels an Gertrude Guillaume-Schak, 5. Juli 1885,« in MEW, 
vol. 36 (Berlin: Dietz, 1979), 341.
84 Engels, »Der Ursprung der Familie,« 158.
Friedrich Engels: From the ›Woman Question‹ to Social Reproduction Theory   257
1. Perhaps the most important point concerns the fact that »the divi-
sion of labor explanation set up social production as being exter-
nally related to the family, as though the family merely bore the ef-
fects of social production rather than was a unit that alongside the 
production of commodities co-constituted those very relations 
making up the totality of social production under capitalism.«85
2. This approach underestimates the importance that women have 
always had in social production. Participation in social producti-
on as the key to women’s emancipation does not explain at all why 
women have so far failed in their liberation, even though they had 
a major role in work in earlier class societies. »The elevation of wa-
ged work as the path to equality, similarly, fails to explain why or 
how gender inequalities are consistently and reliably reproduced 
through the very functioning of that work.«86
3. Engels failed to sufficiently theorize the family under capitalism, 
since he causally links the division of labor, property relations and 
women’s oppression. The thesis of the dissolution of the family, 
already established in the Communist Manifesto, has, despite all 
the changes, not been confirmed in any way, however. Historically, 
on the other hand, it can be said that working families themselves 
held fast to the maintenance of the oppressive institution of the 
family, since it apparently promised them security. Even in the 
present day, at least in the Western hemisphere, family forms have 
pluralized, but by no means dissolved.
Despite all progress in the political practice of the movement evoked 
by the writings of Engels and Bebel, which of course still had to be 
fought for by women, the theoretical explanatory power of these 
approaches is severely limited by the points made. »If this was the 
totality of thinking about gender in the Marxist tradition, then we 
would be facing a serious problem.«87 Fortunately, various socialist 




feminists have pointed out in the past that this approach, formulated 
in The Origin of the Family, is by no means congruent with the the-
oretical considerations of Marx. Vogel and Brown have already been 
mentioned. Bhattacharya makes a similar point when she writes that 
the »Marxist method remains the key to understanding, and solving, 
the problem of gender oppression. […] [T]heir writings on general 
social production contain the seeds of a far more robust, creative, and 
historical materialist theory of gender under capitalism. This is the 
social reproduction approach.«88
While it was of immense importance for the common organiza-
tion of women and men in the workers‹ associations that two au-
thorities of the labor movement dealt with the ›woman question‹ in 
a progressive way, they left behind serious theoretical problems. The 
political consequence, therefore, is that Engels’s dualism has led to 
confusion about the meaning of the family in the socialist tradition 
following him.
Socialist Feminism 
In the context of the second women’s movement, a debate was held 
which is now known as the »domestic-labor debate.«89 Following his-
torical forerunners such as Mary Inman,90 Margaret Benston present-
ed a theoretically important contribution in 1969.91 Benston’s con-
siderations are important because it is probably the first time that 
domestic labor was understood as an economic activity and thus lo-
cated within the capitalist mode of production. What Benston did 
88 Ibid.
89 Vogel, »Hausarbeitsdebatte,« 540 – 554.
90 Mary Inman was an American communist, who argued that the reproductive 
labor of women should be recognized as productive work. Mary Inman, In 
Woman’s Defense (Los Angeles: The Committee to Organize the Advancement of 
Women, 1940).
91 Margaret Benston, »The Political Economy of Women’s Liberation,« Monthly 
Review 21, no. 4 (1969): 13 – 27.
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not yet find, however, was a consideration of what specific commod-
ity domestic work produces. This is the (re)production of commod-
ity labor. Finally, in the 1970s, the ›domestic labor debate‹ unfolded, 
which produced important contributions such as those of Mariarosa 
Dalla Costa and Selma James,92 Wally Seccombe93 and many others. 
»Largely unhappy with the economist focus of these earlier pieces and 
dual-system theory, Lise Vogel sought to expand beyond the focus 
on domestic labour without positing separate spheres.«94 The central 
concern of her approach was to overcome the dualism led by Engels 
and adopted by many feminists of the second women’s movement 
and to develop a uniform theoretical framework for the analysis of 
women’s broaden our understanding of the political economy of so-
cial reproduction.«95
Social Reproduction Approach
Vogel’s approach is characterized by the attempt to examine women’s 
oppression in the context of a feminist critique of political econo-
my. The value-theoretical specification of the concept of reproduction 
can theoretically grasp the structural interlocking of the reproduc-
tion of commodity labor and the production of added value far more 
systematically than previous approaches, and at the same time free 
them from normative assumptions. Furthermore, this value-theoret-
ical concept of reproduction can expand our understanding of class 
struggles, which by no means take place only in the factory but also in 
the public reproduction sector, such as the health and education sec-
92 Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, The Power of Women and the Subversion 
of the Community (Bristol: Falling Wall Press, 1972).
93 Wally Seccombe, »The Housewife and Her Labour under Capitalism,« New Left 
Review 83, n oppression under capitalism. »Thus, Vogel begins to o. 1 (1974): 
3 – 24.
94 Brown, Marx on Gender, 69.
95 Ibid., 70.
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tors.96 Vogel developed her concept of reproduction from a feminist 
re-reading of the theory of value in the first volume of Marx’s Capi-
tal. Ultimately, Vogel theorizes reproductive work as a component of 
Marx’s concept of necessary work.97 
In Capital, Marx refers, among other things, to the significance 
of gender in determining the value of labor, but explicitly excludes 
it from further investigation.98 Nevertheless, his economic writings 
contain some important remarks on the reproduction of labor. Marx, 
for example, emphasizes the central importance of the consumption 
of labor.99 This is characterized by two sides: productive and indi-
vidual consumption. In the production of goods, the workers them-
selves consume means of production and thus increase the value of 
the product. The worker thereby acts »as the moving force of capital 
and belongs to the capitalist.« In individual consumption, on the 
other hand, the the worker and her / his labor belongs to her / himself 
and »performs vital functions outside the production process.« This 
means the consumption of food, »the consumption of which serves to 
reproduce the muscles, nerves, bones, brains of existing workers and 
to create new workers.«100 
Vogel ties in at this point: it is true that individual consumption 
describes an area of the daily reproduction of individual workers. 
96 Ronda Kipka and Vincent Streichhahn, »Kapital gegen Leben: Plädoyer für 
einen politik-ökonomischen Reproduktionsbegriff,« Prokla 197, no. 4 (2019): 
585 – 590.
97 Vogel himself does not find the extension of the necessary work entirely convinc-
ing in an essay from 2000 and was criticized for this; see Susan Ferguson and 
David McNally, »Capital, Labour-Power, and Gender-Relations: Introduction to 
the Historical Materialism Edition of Marxism and the Oppression of Women,« 
in Lise Vogel, Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary Theory 
(Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2013), xvii-xl, here xxxiii.
98 Karl Marx, »Größenwechsel von Preis der Arbeitskraft und Mehrwert,« in MEW, 
vol. 23 (Berlin: Dietz, 1962 [1867]), 542.
99 Karl Marx, »Lohn, Preis und Profit,« in MEW, vol. 16 (Berlin: Dietz, 1962 [1865]), 
131.
100 Karl Marx, »Der Akkumulationsprozeß des Kapitals,« in MEW, vol. 23 (Berlin: 
Dietz, 1962 [1867]), 596 – 597. 
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However, there is no systematic explanation for how this relates to 
people outside of the wage employment relationship (e. g. children, 
the sick, the elderly). Marx ignores the fact that an entire class of 
workers and not only the individual worker must be reproduced. 
Moreover, the processes of social reproduction must be organized over 
generations in order to ensure the maintenance of the accumulation 
of capital in the long term.101 Against the background of these con-
siderations, Vogel develops a typology with which she distinguishes 
three areas of the reproduction of the labor force: 1) the production 
of the products directly consumed by the worker, 2) the maintenance, 
education and care of all those outside the work process, and 3) gen-
erative reproduction (primarily childbirth, but also migration, etc.).102 
Up to now, the value-theoretical definition of the concept of re-
production has not included gender relations. From a theoretical 
point of view, Vogel concludes, the reproduction of the labor force 
»is by no means bound to private kinship-based households […]. In 
particular, it does not necessarily include any or all of the following 
components: heterosexuality, biological reproduction, family forms 
or generational renewal.«103 Nevertheless, social reproduction cannot 
be thought of at present without the security of women. In order to 
understand how the dynamics of capital accumulation (re)produce a 
social-reproductive contradiction as well as modern gender (and race) 
relations, it is necessary, among other things, to functionally deter-
mine the social-reproductive significance of the household for capital.
What is certain is that women still do significantly more unpaid 
domestic labor than men and are increasingly exposed to (male) vi-
olence in their own families. »While the family is fundamental to 
women’s oppression in capitalist society, the pivot of this oppression 
is not women’s domestic labour for men or children, however op-
101 Vogel, Marxismus und Frauenunterdrückung, 145.
102 Ibid., 188.
103 Lise Vogel, »Nachtrag: Hausarbeit neu gedacht,« in Marxismus und Frauenun-
terdrückung: Auf dem Weg zu einer umfassenden Theorie (Münster: Unrast Verlag, 
2019 [2000]), 259.
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pressive or alienating this might be.«104 However, the household is 
undoubtedly one of the central institutions of women’s oppression 
because it functions as a venue for the structurally contradictory rela-
tionship between reproduction and the accumulation of capital. The 
domestic unit receives its oppressive function through its social-re-
productive function for capital. This does not mean, however, that 
the specific form of this oppression is deterministic and monocausal, 
but rather that it is permanently reproduced through processes of 
subjectivation.105 The family remains tenacious because it continues 
to be the most practicable model for ensuring the necessary repro-
duction of the commodity of labor at the lowest cost. However, and 
this is a central point of SRT, it is not necessarily responsible for the 
reproduction of labor.
But why do predominantly women take over reproductive tasks? 
Vogel assumes that the biologically limited period of pregnancy in 
class societies tends to lead to a gender-specific division of labor and 
its institutionalization. Under capitalism, this ›ideally‹ expresses itself 
in the form of the bourgeois nuclear family. This does not mean that 
women are more caring because of a supposed ›nature‹ and there-
fore take over predominantly unpaid reproductive work. The private 
and domestic tasks are, however, performed according to the biolog-
ical-physical facts that reproduction and breastfeeding require bodies 
of the ›female‹ sex.106 From the perspective of the ruling class, the 
bearing of children tends to be cost-intensive, since potentially val-
ue-added-producing labor is withdrawn from the market during this 
period. At the same time, childbearing is necessary to generatively 
reproduce the working class. In this respect, a socially-reproductive 
contradiction arises between the highest possible rate of exploitation 
104 Ferguson and McNally, »Capital,« xxv.
105 Julia Dück und Katharina Hajek, »›Intime Verhältnisse‹: Eine gesellschaftstheo-
retische Erweiterung der Debatte um soziale Reproduktion,« in Feminismus und 
Marxismus, ed. Alexandra Scheele und Stefanie Wöhl (Weinheim: Beltz Juventa 
2018), 220 – 233.
106 Ferguson and McNally, »Capital,« xxv.
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and the long-term preservation of the commodity of labor, which 
unfolds the fatal dynamic that produces the androcentric gender rela-
tions that are reproduced and naturalized every day through cultural 
and symbolic practices.107 
It is up to the state as »ideal total capitalist«108 to deal political-
ly with this contradiction in the tension between state, market and 
family. The relationship between these three classical poles of welfare 
state research109 was applied to social reproduction by Nancy Fraser. 
She distinguishes three different phases of reproduction from the 
19th century until today.110 The extent to which the processes of social 
reproduction are organized by the state, commodified or left within 
the family is the result of a variety of factors: labor requirements, 
economic conditions, class struggles and contingent developments. 
Class struggles can influence the value of the commodity labor, since 
it is not a fixed quantity. From a classical Marxist perspective, the 
workers, traditionally the industrial proletariat, can increase the val-
ue of their labor force through union wage struggles in production. 
However, on the one hand, this sociological determination of the 
working class does not go far enough but, on the other, the rate 
of exploitation can also be tweaked through struggles in the public 
reproductive sector.111 
Moreover, already in Marx’s work, a class is the variable result of a 
historical process in which one class constitutes itself in an antagonis-
tic struggle against another class. According to Cinzia Arruzza, one of 
the worst political mistakes, therefore, is to want to determine what 
107 Pierre Bourdieu, Die männliche Herrschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
2005).
108 Friedrich Engels: »Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissen-
schaft,« in MEW, vol. 19 (Berlin: Dietz, 1987 [1880]), 222.
109 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1990).
110 Nancy Fraser, »Contradictions of Capital and Care,« New Left Review 100 (2016): 
99 – 117.
111 Kipka and Streichhahn, »Kapital gegen Leben,« 585 – 590.
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is considered class struggle and what is not.112 The feminist struggles 
of recent years have initiated a process of class subjectivation that 
has made the organized working class more colorful and feminine. 
The reproductive strikes carry a huge potential for class struggles to 
unfold, since schools and hospitals are essential for the reproduction 
of the whole capitalist system and, at the same time, function as crys-
tallization points where different parts of classes meet. This potential 
must be used in the struggle for a society free of domination beyond 
exploitation and oppression.
For Vogel, as she writes in her essay from 2000, the attempt of 
a uniform materialistic theoretical framework is still an unfinished 
project. The representatives of SRT have taken up the thread of that 
time again. Finally, the SRT is intended to develop a »historical-ma-
terialist reading of social power relations that identifies the conditions 
under which race, gender, sexuality and class can be (co-)reproduced, 
transformed and potentially revolutionized.«113 So the challenges have 
not diminished and are by no means solved, but many activists are 
working on these important issues in a promising way.
Outlook
Engels’s The Origin of the Family, indissolubly linked to Bebel’s work, 
had an immensely important meaning for the political practice of the 
labor movement. Bebel and Engels made it possible to partially over-
come »proletarian anti-feminism« so that proletarian women — de-
spite continuing resistance — were able to organize themselves in the 
ranks of the German Social Democrats after the fall of the Socialist 
Laws. Engels had two main reasons for publishing his book. On the 
112 Cinzia Arruzza, »From Women’s Strikes to a New Class Movement: The Third 
Feminist Wave,« Viewpoint, December 3, 2018, https://www.viewpointmag.
com/2018/12/03/from-womens-strikes-to-a-new-class-movement-the-third-
femi nist-wave/. 
113 Ferguson and McNally, »Capital,« xxxvii.
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one hand, the publication was a tacit course correction that seemed 
necessary to him due to the publication of Bebel’s work. On the oth-
er hand, he apparently believed to have found proof of the Marxist 
world view in the works of Marx and Morgan. Engels was determined 
to present this proof to the public. It was, however, not him but the 
book’s reception by female socialists that began a few years after its 
publication that made it a classic on this issue. 
Nevertheless, with Engels’s book and the dualism postulated 
therein, he left behind a momentous revision of Marx, which main-
ly preoccupied socialist feminists of the second women’s movement. 
Fortunately, the approaches of Engels and Marx are not congruent 
on this issue. The Marxist method includes the possibility of solving 
the theoretical problems raised. It was Lise Vogel who made the first 
well-founded attempt to overcome Engels’s dualism within a unitary 
materialist theoretical framework. But as she herself has admitted, 
this project is still unfinished.
To bring this project to a conclusion is the concern of many Marx-
ist feminists who have been working on the SRT in the last decade. 
»Marxist feminist scholars did not simply expand the definition of 
›production‹ to include unpaid and racialized reproductive labor as 
its hidden center, but asked what it revealed about capitalism as a 
whole.«114 I am convinced that SRT is currently the most fruitful at-
tempt, but it is still an immense task that is becoming increasingly 
urgent in the face of worsening crises of civilization. There is, however, 
a tradition in Marxism that we should turn to more intensively again 
in order to deal with these theoretical and practical challenges. Engels 
(and Marx), though not his writing on The Origin of the Family, is an 
indispensable reference point for this. 
114 Armstrong, Marxism and Socialist Feminism.
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In the Shadow of Karl Marx
Perception and Reception of Friedrich Engels  
in the Digital Age
Riccardo Altieri
Reciprocity or Hierarchy?
The following article is dedicated to Friedrich Engels’s perception in 
academic literature. The aim is to determine why Engels was often 
overshadowed by Karl Marx, how he has been ›ignored‹ in the lit-
erature, and what influence this shift in perception has had on his 
own biography. The center of this study will be his presence on the 
Internet compared to that of Marx. Is there a reciprocity of both or 
a kind of hierarchy, where Marx is ranked (far) above Engels? But 
before talking about the two by name, a comparison of the concepts 
that subsume their theories under one term should take place first.
If one searches for the German term ›Engelsismus‹ on the Internet, 
one will get different results on different platforms: while Google (G) 
has 964 hits, there are 983 on Ecosia (E) and 71,800 on Bing (B) and 
Yahoo (Y).1 The English translation ›Engelsism‹ has 4,050 (B / E / Y) 
and 45,500 (G) hits. Comparing these terms with the corresponding 
terms ›Marxismus‹ and ›Marxism,‹ it can be quickly realized that Marx 
outperforms his contemporary Engels everywhere (Fig. 1).
1 Searches were conducted on Bing.com, Ecosia.org, Google.com, and Yahoo.com. 
Because of the often-identical algorithms behind B, E, and Y, the results are 
sometimes but not always the same. The used data are to be understood purely 
quantitatively; there is no qualitative differentiation regarding the plausibility of 
the search results.
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A look at the results on Google, for example, offers the following: 
while the term ›Marxismus‹ is approximately 1,575 times more com-
mon than ›Engelsismus,‹ we find comparable tendencies for the En-
glish translation: there, the term ›Marxism‹ scores nearly 300 times 
more hits than »Engelsism.« But do these numbers really reflect the 
performance ratio of the theoretical impact of those two authors? The 
Berlin Institute for Critical Theory would maybe contradict this as-
sumption. In his Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism, Sven-Eric 
Liedmann wrote: »In a way, what has been commonly referred to as 
›Marxism‹ since about 1890 is more a creation of Friedrich Engels 
than Karl Marx, so that Arnold Künzli could say that the expression 
›E[ngelsism]‹ was actually more appropriate.«2 A second tool provided 
by Google is one called Google Trends. Unfortunately, it is only pos-
sible to check the data from 2004 until the present, but in these years, 
another unambiguous fact emerges: Karl Marx (red) has an average 
impact of 27, while that of Friedrich Engels (blue) is only 3 (Fig. 2). 
The peak in 2018 refers to the 200th birthday of Karl Marx, which also 
had minor repercussions on the impact value of Engels.
2 Sven-Eric Liedmann, »Engelsismus,« in Historisch-Kritisches Wörterbuch des 
Marxismus, vol.  3: Ebene — Extremismus, ed. Wolfgang Fritz Haug (Hamburg: 
Argument-Verlag, 1997), 384. This refers to Arnold Künzli, Karl Marx. Eine Psy-
chographie (Wien: Europa, 1966), 18. See also Helmut Hirsch, Friedrich Engels in 




Engelsismus Marxismus Engelsism Marxism
Bing (B) 71,800 450,000 4,050 4,030,000
Ecosia (E) 983 450,000 4,050 4,030,000
Google (G) 964 1,520,000 45,500 13,600,000
Yahoo (Y) 71,800 450,000 4,050 4,030,000
Fig. 1: Search engine results for Marxism and Engelsism in German and 
English. Search date: April 4th, 2020.
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Although terms such as the former Marx-Engels Institute in 
Moscow, the Marx-Engels Works (Marx-Engels-Werke, MEW) or the 
Marx-Engels Complete Edition (Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe, MEGA2) 
have the names of both philosophers in their titles, Karl Marx was 
always in the spotlight while Friedrich Engels stepped back. But this 
imbalance was not always so. 
Engels vs. Marx?
At the beginning, Engels even stood before Marx. In the first years of 
the Second International, Engels was considered an »undisputed au-
thority,« even an »oracle,« by labor leaders and theorists.3 How, when 
and where did this shift of perspective occur, then? »The orthodox 
Marxist-Leninist myth looks at Marx and Engels as intellectual twins 
who took on different tasks for practical reasons.«4 Accordingly, the 
short-term dominance of Engels can be determined during the early 
phase of his work, which is replaced by a reciprocity for the duration 
of orthodox Marxism-Leninism before Karl Marx was clearly granted 
preference in contemporary history and the digital age. Any kind of 
partisanship and comparison of the two, however, requires critical 
consideration, since it mostly takes place superficially.5
Again and again, Engels was accused of making fundamental mis-
takes in his reading of Marx, which would have led to a complete 
distortion of content that can still be found in the perception and 
reception through adaptation.6 Even Engels himself had problems 
with adequately reviewing Marx’s works, did not feel empowered, and 
3 Liedmann, »Engelsismus,« 384.
4 Ibid.
5 Ingo Elbe, »Die Beharrlichkeit des ›Engelsismus‹. Bemerkungen zum ›Marx-En-
gels-Problem‹,« in Marx-Engels-Jahrbuch 2007, ed. Beatrix Bouvier et al. 
(München: Oldenbourg Akademie-Verlag, 2008), 105.
6 Ingo Elbe, Marx im Westen. Die neue Marxlektüre in der Bundesrepublik seit 1965 
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2008), 24; Jan Hoff, Marx global. Zur Entwicklung 
des internationalen Marx-Diskurses seit 1965 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2008), 199. 
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was almost forced by his friend to grant him such a favor.7 Engels 
wrote: »Marx was a genius, the rest of us at most were talents.«8 Jür-
gen Herres would contradict Engels here because, in his opinion, the 
latter was equal to his friend in terms of education, knowledge and 
language, and even superior in his linguistic skills.9 But later, he be-
came part of the ›Marx Party‹ and voluntarily submitted to his friend. 
Together they built a »unity of the different ones.«10 In the year of 
Engels’s 200th birthday, Hein Paler published a German book with 
the expressive title Friedrich Engels: The Creative Shadow, which is 
symbolic of his hidden-remaining character.11
It is common knowledge that Engels came from a well-known 
family of entrepreneurs, lived a bourgeois lifestyle throughout his 
life — recognizable by clothing style, living situation and habi-
tus — and even owned millions in shares. Many only saw him as a so-
cialist, comparable to a prophet who preaches water but then drinks 
wine himself, or in his case, champagne. He left not only £2 million 
on his death, but also 150 bottles of the expensive French beverage.12 
But was it not precisely his financial security that made Marx’s work 
even possible? Engels is not the only millionaire in history who was 
also a socialist or communist: Felix Weil, for example, was close to the 
Communist Party of Germany (KPD), and later the Communist Par-
ty of Germany (Opposition) (KPO) and also the Socialist Workers‹ 
Party (SAP);13 Diether Dehm is a member of Die Linke (The Left) in 
Previously contradicted by Hans-Holger Paul, Marx, Engels und die Imperialis-
mustheorie der II. Internationale (Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, 1978), 55.
7 Elbe, Marx, 105.
8 Quoted in Jürgen Herres, Marx und Engels. Porträt einer intellektuellen Freund-
schaft (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2018), 18.
9 Ibid., 19.
10 Ibid., 7.
11 See Hein Paler, Friedrich Engels — Der kreative Schatten (Norderstedt: Books on 
Demand, 2020).
12 Ibid., 16 – 17.
13 See Jeanette Erazo Heufelder, Der argentinische Krösus. Kleine Wirtschaftsgeschich-
te der Frankfurter Schule (Berlin: Berenberg-Verlag, 2017).
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the German Bundestag;14 and the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany 
(MLPD) receives financial support from millionaires and their heirs 
for each election campaign15 — to name just three arbitrary examples. 
What they all have in common is that they themselves were never in 
the front row of the political movement, but always acted as patrons 
in the background or played a somewhat different subordinate role.
If we speak today of Marxism and less often of Engelsism, their 
works were by no means closed theories. Rather, it can be seen as a 
fragmentary œuvre. While Marx still published the first volume of 
Das Kapital during his lifetime, volumes 2 and 3 were edited and pub-
lished by Engels after Marx’s death.16 Taking everything into account, 
their work should be understood primarily as a contribution to early 
globalization and its counter-movement.17 It was precisely because he 
was so close to Marx that Engels was perfect for publishing and con-
tinuing his work.18 But this is also the main reason for his position 
within the reception of Marxist history. Michael Krätke stated that 
for the duration of orthodox Marxism-Leninism, the perceptions of 
Engels in the West and in the East went through different stages of 
development. In the Soviet Union and its allied states, the image of 
Engels had an increasingly negative connotation. »As a result, Engels 
was forgotten as a historian, as a political theorist and as a military 
specialist, and as a whole his intellectual achievement was irrelevant, 
14 Peter Jochen Winters, »Ist die PDS am Ende?,« in Zehn Jahre Deutsche Einheit. 
Eine Bilanz, ed. Wolfgang Thierse (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 2000), 107.
15 Kevin Hagen, »Sieger im Klassenkampf. Jahr für Jahr kassiert die linksextreme 
Splitterpartei MLPD riesige Summen von privaten Einzelspendern. Warum ist das 
so? Geschichten über das revolutionäre Erbe,« Spiegel online, December 29, 2015, 
https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/mlpd-die-grossspender-der-kom 
munisten-a-1069871.html.
16 Herres, Marx und Engels, 11.
17 Ibid., 12 – 13.
18 Michael R. Krätke, »Das Marx-Engels-Problem: Warum Engels das Marxsche 
›Kapital‹ nicht verfälscht hat,« in Marx-Engels-Jahrbuch 2006, ed. Beatrix Beauvi-
er et al. (München: Oldenbourg Akademie-Verlag, 2007), 142.
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compared to the Marxian, his work was not congenially and rather 
negatively dismissed.«19
Reception
What did the reception of Engels look like in later decades? If one 
considers, for example, the 1st volume of the 2nd edition of Gus-
tav Mayer’s important Engels biography from 1934, Engels appears 
there over 1,200 times (Fig. 3). Marx, however, is only mentioned 496 
times.20 So Engels is mentioned about two and a half times as often as 
his friend. But how about in other works on both or written by them?
Of course, there is no publication that reaches the ideal value of 
1.0, since that would mean that Marx’s and Engels’s names were men-
tioned exactly the same number of times. But as these twenty exam-
ples clearly show, there are unambiguous trends: in the eight works 
that have Friedrich Engels as their central theme, the Engels-Marx 
factor always exceeds the value of 1.0. Conversely, this value always 
fell below 1.0 in the six books that have Marx as their main subject. 
It really becomes interesting when looking at the values  for the six 
examples that can be assigned to Marx and Engels equally. There, the 
value falls below 1.0 in each and every case. Although this tendency 
does not guarantee general statements, it allows forecasts that go in a 
clear direction: at least in the works that deal equally with Marx and 
Engels, Engels is apparently fundamentally surpassed by Marx — at 
least when it comes to the simple frequency of their names appearing. 
In the tabular example, Dethmann’s work from 1920 (-1.19) achieved 
the ›best‹ value, whereas the ›worst‹ result was achieved by Eubanks in 
1984 (-3.61). Of all twenty examples chosen, Dethmann also achieved 
the ›top‹ result in the overall comparison. This work is the second 
oldest of those reviewed, whereas the ›worst‹ result in total was in the
19 Ibid., 143.
20 Gustav Mayer, Friedrich Engels. Eine Biographie. Erster Band: Friedrich Engels in 
seiner Frühzeit (The Hague: Springer Science+Business Media, 1934).
Riccardo Altieri278
20 random works 
by release date
Engels Biographies Marx Biographies Books on/by both
Engels Marx factor Engels Marx factor Engels Marx factor




















































In the Shadow of Karl Marx 279
Sperber, Karl Marx 
(2013).
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Fig. 3: The Engels-Marx Ratio in (Biographical) Literature (1918 – 2020)21. 
© Riccardo Altieri, April 8th, 2020.
second most recent study, namely Heinrich’s Marx biography from 
2018 (-10.49). The best overall result was achieved by the Master’s the-
sis by Michael A. Boden, a Major in the US Army, from 2001 (+5.64).
Especially in Germany, as a non-academic, Engels always had a 
hard time surviving in front of the inflated Marx. He had no high 
school or university degree and no doctorate. Or, as Krätke sums it 
up, »[i]n Germany, where academic cretinism has always blossomed, 
one has to add: the man wasn’t even habilitated!«22 Until today, En-
gels’s own creativity is defined by his work in the service of Marx; for 
example, by the fact that he is considered to be the one whom Marx 
could always trust without reservation.23 In Western Marxism, there 
is also the exaggerated accusation that Engels did not understand his 
friend’s work; maybe he defined Marxism, but he also garbled it up. 
He was accused of not having published the Marxian work in its orig-
21 All data for this survey come from files of the works of Marx and Engels that 
can be obtained in some way on the Internet. The formula for the factor follows 
mathematical law: big number divided by small number equals the factor. If the 
numerical value is exactly 1.0, there is a reciprocity between Engels and Marx. If 
the factor is bigger than 1.0, there is a gradient between Engels and Marx, and if 
it is smaller than 1.0 there is an incline between Engels and Marx. Of course, it 
is possible that the data are slightly distorted, considering that the name ›Marx‹ 
also appears in terms such as ›Marxism‹ or can refer to relatives with the same 
surname who are mentioned in the books. This also applies to Engelsism and the 
Engels family. So, this approach in fact underlines the argument.
22 Krätke, »Marx-Engels-Problem,« 143, fn. 5.
23 Ibid., 143 – 144.
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inal wording. In doing so, he changed the text to such an extent that 
it seems possible to speak of a falsification.24 However, let us get back 
to the digital age.
Engels and Marx in the Digital Age
The results from various online search engines for the terms »En-
gelsismus / Engelsism« and »Marxismus / Marxism« have already been 
presented. But how about target words like »Friedrich Engels« and 
»Karl Marx«? In the following table (Fig. 4), the searchable platforms 
named before have been supplemented by specifically academic ones.
The number of scientific search engines is of course significantly 
higher than the chosen selection. However, in order not to exceed 
the confines of an essay, a maximum number of twenty was set again. 
In addition to the four search engines already used, sixteen explicitly 
academic tools were added. The decisive factor was not the level of 
the results obtained, but rather their general level of awareness. Al-
though B, E and Y again use the same search algorithms, their result 
factor (-5.72) is slightly better than that of G (-6.06), which, however, 
was able to achieve significantly more hits. What is essential to note 
is how much higher the number of hits was in all four cases for the 
search term »Karl Marx« compared to »Friedrich Engels.« And this 
one-sided trend unfortunately also runs through all the academic 
search engines. 
The highest hit results were achieved for »Friedrich Engels« on in-
fotopia (1,300,000) and for »Karl Marx« on VirtualLRC (19,700,000). 
But both search engines are among the four ›worst‹ when it comes to 
optimizing the Engels-Marx factor. The top result was achieved by ac-
ademic.microsoft.org (-1.55), which had the lowest hit rate, followed 
by Science.gov (-2.12). But however the numbers get interpreted, each 
24 Ibid., 147. See also Michael Heinrich, »Engels’s Edition of the Third Volume of 
Capital, and Marx’s Original Manuscript,« Science and Society 60, no. 4 (1995).








Bing.com (B) 1,030,000 5,890,000 -5.72
Ecosia.org (E) 1,030,000 5,890,000 -5.72
Google.com (G) 4,260,000 25,800,000 -6.06










academic.microsoft.org 293 455 -1.55
Baidu.com 15,800 75,100 -4.75
base-search.net 1,142 10,806 -9.46
core.ac.uk 12,669 71,445 -5.64
Google Scholar 126,000 1,040,000 -8.25
Infotopia 1,300,000 15,400,000 -11.85
jstor.org 10,636 60,666 -5.70
Libgen.is 421 999 -2.37
refseek.com 329,000 4,130,000 -12.55
ScienceDirect.com 529 7,857 -14.85
Science.gov 198 419 -2.12
semanticscholar.org 13,400 71,400 -5.33
VirtualLRC.com 1,060,000 19,700,000 -18.58
worldcat.org 22,295 120,001 -5.38
worldwidescience.org 702 1,482 -2.11
Fig. 4: Search results for Marx and Engels on academic platforms.  
© Riccardo Altieri, April 9th, 2020
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result reflects that Karl Marx can be found in the digital world many 
times more often than his friend and contemporary Friedrich Engels. 
This process, which has now lasted well over 100 years and has only 
recently emerged in the digital age, is unstoppable in its development 
and also irreversible.
Freed from the dogmata of the Cold War era, this observation is 
just an observation and nothing else. No course corrections or sen-
timentalities are required here. For historical science, data can be 
derived from this on the question of how an apparently historically 
equivalent personality can be marginalized over decades by setting an 
ideological focus. Internal Marxist debates showed long ago that, in 
the case of Engels vs. Marx, there is no ›right‹ or ›wrong.‹ But in ad-
dition to this special situation, methodical-analytical approaches are 
also appropriate for comparable ›twin pairs‹ in history: for example, 
Romulus and Remus, Goethe and Schiller, or Liebknecht and Luxem-
burg. Almost always, one benefited from the other and outshone his 
partner through his own growth — intentionally or unintentionally.
Final remarks
To take a step back, Marx position and ranking was, to a certain extent, 
a conscious decision by Friedrich Engels himself, too. To name just 
one example, Marx’s death in the year of 1883 should be mentioned 
here. When he died, friends like Johann Philipp Becker (1809 – 1886) 
wrote about him as »the mightiest head of our party.«25 But Engels 
also put him on an indisputable podium. Instead of talking about 
the loss of his friend, in his funeral speech, he regretted the loss of 
his fellow combatant and spoke of him as the »greatest living think-
er«: »Like Darwin with the law of the development of organic na-
25 Quoted in Hans Peter Bleuel, Friedrich Engels. Bürger und Revolutionär. Die zeit-
gerechte Biographie eines großen Deutschen (Bern / München: Scherz-Verlag, 1981), 
359.
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ture, Marx discovered the law of development of human history.«26 
German Social Democrats, specifically August Bebel, asked Engels to 
give up his British exile and come back to Germany. But he refused.27 
Perhaps that would have been the moment when Engels could have 
stepped out of the shadows to follow in the footsteps of his revered 
friend. Instead, he devoted himself to the publication of the estate, 
thereby increasing Marx’s later reputation. 
In the first foreword to the 1883 German edition of the Commu-
nist Manifesto, which he signed alone, Engels wrote: »Unfortunately, I 
have to sign the foreword to the current edition alone. Marx, the man 
to whom the entire working class of Europe and America owes more 
than anyone else — Marx lies in the Highgate cemetery, and the first 
grass is already growing over his grave.« Then he put forward the ba-
sic ideas of the manifesto, which he had written together with Marx, 
only to add: »This basic idea belongs only and exclusively to Marx. I 
have said this many times, but it is necessary now to do it also before 
the ›Manifesto‹ itself.«28 In the foreword to the English edition of 1888, 
he reduced his performance in the manifesto even further: »Although 
the ›Manifesto‹ was the work we both did, I feel obliged to state that 
the basic idea at its core belongs to Marx.«29
A question might now arise as to why Engelsism never really de-
veloped alongside Marxism, especially in a positive connotation. Ru-
dolf Walther knows the right answer when he writes about Engels 
that »[t]he one who lived, thought, and wrote so freely was and is too 
good for a church, a sect, or a party and all their Isms.«30 But apart 
26 Quoted in ibid., 360.
27 Ibid., 362 – 363.
28 Friedrich Engels, »Vorwort zur deutschen Ausgabe1883,« in Manifest der Kommu-
nistischen Partei, ed. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engel (Berlin: Karl-Dietz-Verlag, 
1959), xvii-xviii.
29 Friedrich Engels, »Vorrede zur englischen Ausgabe von 1888,« in Manifest der 
Kommunistischen Partei, ed. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engel (Berlin: Karl-Dietz-
Verlag, 1959), xxiii.
30 Rudolf Walther, Aufgreifen, begreifen, angreifen. Historische Essays, Porträts, politi-
sche Kommentare, Glossen, Verrisse (Münster: Oktober Verlag, 2011), 232.
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from that, the question about why Marx is clearly overrepresented on 
the Internet, as he previously was in the literature, remains justified, 
and we must also ask how Engels can be better served in the future. 
If there were no answers to this, science would have no choice but to 
agree with Engels in his humble judgment when he wrote to Eduard 
Bernstein (1850 – 1932) while Marx was still alive, which he expressed 
as follows: »I don’t understand how to be jealous of a genius; it is such 
a thing of its own kind that we, who do not have it, know in advance 
that it is unreachable for us.«31 The 200th birthday of Engels may at 
least increase interest in the man, who was an important intellectual 
not only following Marx, but next to him.
A judgment by Josef Stalin (1878 – 1953) that he expressed on Engels 
should convince the last doubters, however, that the philosopher de-
serves to be put in the spotlight as an independent personality — and, 
of course, in contrast to the dictator’s purge fantasies: »Even Engels 
was not right about everything. It wouldn’t be a bad thing if we could 
implicate Engels somewhere in Nikolai Bukharin’s (1888 – 1938) writ-
ing.«32 It is well-known what Stalin thought of Bukharin, although 
his murder was a completely different way of removing someone from 
the collective memory.
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»But the necessity of authority, and of imperious authority at that, 
will nowhere be found more evident than on board a ship on the 
high seas. There, in time of danger, the lives of all depend on the 
instantaneous and absolute obedience of all to the will of one.«
—Friedrich Engels1
»[T]here is no fixed and constant authority, but a continual exch-
ange of mutual, temporary, and, above all, voluntary authority and 
subordination.«
—Mikhail Bakunin2
»Today humanity faces an acute crisis not only due to the coronavi-
rus, but also due to the lack of trust between humans. To defeat an 
epidemic, people need to trust scientific experts, citizens need to trust 
public authorities, and countries need to trust each other. [ …] In 
this moment of crisis, the crucial struggle takes place within huma-
nity itself. If this epidemic results in greater disunity and mistrust 
among humans, it will be the virus’s greatest victory.«
—Yuval Noah Harari3
1 Friedrich Engels, »On Authority,« in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. 
Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 732.
2 Mikhail Bakunin, »What is Authority?« The Marxists Internet Archive, accessed 
April 1, 2020, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bakunin/works/various/ 
authrty.htm. 
3 Yuval Noah Harari, »In the Battle Against Coronavirus, Humanity Lacks Lead-
ership,« Time, March 15, 2020, https://time.com/5803225/yuval-noah-harari- 
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Introduction: Reading Engels in the Time  
of the Coronavirus Outbreak
This study seeks to elaborate on the thoughts of Friedrich Engels 
(1820 – 1895) about authority.4 This study is important because, tra-
ditionally, the name Engels tends to be considered »small« compared 
to his colleague Karl Marx (1818 – 1883).5 Many of Marx’s ideas were 
born together with Engels, such as the Communist Manifesto (1848), a 
monumental work that raised Marx to the status of one of the world’s 
leading thinkers that endures to this day.6 Another of Marx’s impres-
sive works that is known to the world today, Das Kapital, also could 
not have been born without the help of Engels.7 Marx is known as a 
person who read more than he wrote.8 The reason is predictably that 
Marx wanted his writing to be a work built on strong theoretical 
and data foundations.9 However, Engels had another consideration, 
coronavirus-humanity-leadership/.
4 In particular, the study considers his short writings entitled »On Authority« and 
»Versus the Anarchists.« Although short, a lot of inspiration can be drawn from 
the writings of Engels, primarily to help us understand contemporary phenom-
ena such as the coronavirus outbreak.
5 Terrell Carver, Engels: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), vii.
6 Tristram Hunt, Marx’s General: The Revolutionary Life of Friedrich Engels (New 
York: Holt Paperbacks, 2009), 1 – 2.
7 Even after the publication of Das Kapital, Engels was instrumental in introduc-
ing this book to a broad audience. For example, Engels wrote nine reviews about 
Das Kapital that had a positive tone. Engels also became a supervisor in the trans-
lation of the book into English so that Marx’s work could gain a wider audience. 
See Shlomo Avineri, Karl Marx: Philosophy and Revolution (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2019), 144; Michael Charles Howard and John Edward King, A 
History of Marxian Economics, vol. 1: 1883 – 1929 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1989), 8.
8 Michael Evans, Karl Marx (London: Routledge, 2004), 47.
9 For example, Marx did not want to rush to complete the second volume because 
he wanted to get accurate data about the latest developments that had occurred 
in the UK related to the potential crisis of capitalism. See Bertell Ollman, Alien-
ation: Marx’s Conception of Man in Capitalist Society (London: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1971), 62.
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wherein the publication of Das Kapital — of which Marx planned to 
publish six volumes — would not be finished if Marx read too much. 
Because Marx used more and more of his time to read, to explore 
particular topics, extra work was needed, and in the end, the writing 
of Das Kapital continued to be delayed.10 Finally, thanks to Engels’s 
insistence, Marx was able to complete the first volume of the original 
six-volume plan that Marx envisioned.11 Engels was also instrumental 
in editing Marx’s second and third volumes of Das Kapital, which 
were left unfinished until the end of his life, and later, Engels chose 
to publish them.12 In other words, Engels was a »big« intellectual, as 
was his colleague Marx.13
However, it is unfortunate even long after his death, Engels’s name 
is still positioned as a »complement« to the big-name Marx (even in the 
academic world, his ideas are known as Marxism and not Engelsism14) 
10 Even after the publication of the first volume, Marx felt that his work was still 
not perfect. He stressed that he would revise his work if he found new findings 
from the results of his research process and critical readings on various issues. 
See Paul Prew, Tomás Rotta, Tony Smith and Matt Vidal, »The Enduring Rel-
evance of Karl Marx,« in The Oxford Handbook of Karl Marx, ed. Tomás Rotta, 
Tony Smith, Matt Vidal and Paul Prew (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2019), 13.
11 William Otto Henderson, The Life of Friedrich Engels Volume II (London: Rout-
ledge, 1976), 399.
12 Lars Magnusson and Bo Stråt, A Brief History of Political Economy: Tales of Marx, 
Keynes and Hayek (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016), 10.
13 William Otto Henderson, The Life of Friedrich Engels Volume I (London: Frank 
Cass, 1976), xi; Peter Singer, Marx: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 59.
14 Regarding with the term Englelsism, it can be said that, there is a unique 
tendency among some academics who seek to »purify« Marxism from Engels’s 
influence. The attempt to »purify« Marxism was driven, for example, by their 
suspicion of Engels, who was the editor of some of Marx’s works such as the 
second and third volumes of Das Kapital. They feared that Engels’s subjective 
interpretation influenced the originality of Marx’s work. In other words, there 
was the potential for Marx’s ideas to be interfered with by Engels’s thought 
as a thinker who had different ideas to Marx. So for these academics, further 
studies must be conducted to clarify the influence of Engels on Marx’s work. 
This trend is rather excessive, because Engels can be said to be a figure who 
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so serious studies on him by academics are lacking.15 But now it is 
undeniable that a new trend has also emerged. Many academics are 
now interested in studying the figure and thought of Engels.16 This 
new trend in studying Engels seriously is something to be celebrated 
because, with the increasing number of academics involved, the in-
contributed to shaping Marx’s thinking, so it would be naive if they wanted to 
erase the role of Engels in the formulation of Marxism. However, if the direc-
tion of this trend is to uncover the vital role of Engels in formulating Marxism, 
then this tendency can be accepted. Marx and Engels must be appreciated as 
intellectuals who both contributed to the creation of an original idea called 
scientific socialism. See Carver, Engels, 12 – 13.
15 Terrell Carver is one of the academics who are aware of the lack of fascination 
in the academic world with positioning Engels as a brilliant thinker. Even the 
number of those who study him as a historical figure is relatively small. Carver 
has tried to fill this academic vacuum by writing an introduction to placing 
Engels as an independent thinker who deserves to be taken into account in the 
academic world. See Carver, Engels, vii; Terrell Carver, Friedrich Engels: His Life 
and Thought (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), xvi.
16 For example, two biographies of Engels written by two different authors ap-
peared at not too distant times. The first book by John Green is titled Engels: 
A Revolutionary Life and the second book written by Tristam Hunt is titled 
Marx’s General: The Revolutionary Life of Friedrich Engels. Although they focus 
more on the historical side of Engels and do not explicitly elaborate on his 
thinking, both books got a warm appreciation from both contemporary so-
cialists and non-Marxist academics. Interestingly, this appreciation was at the 
same time their affirmation that Engels was a thinker who could not merely be 
»reduced« to a subordination of Marx. Ian Angus, who wrote a review for the 
Socialist Review, appreciates the books as works that fill the void in the study of 
Engels. Angus even states that there have only been two biographical studies of 
Engels in the 100 years since the death of the great thinker, namely the works 
of Gustav Meyer (1936) and William Henderson (1976). The two works are 
now out of print, so it is difficult for public audiences to access them. Angus 
also encouraged a more serious study of Engels with an emphasis on the ideas 
he generated, rather than merely studying the life of Engels. Likewise, Martin 
Jacques — a non-Marxist academic — appreciated Hunt’s work as one that gave 
readers a new insight into the life of Engels. Despite the scarcity of studies of 
Engels, Hunt was able to show that he is a great thinker — equivalent to Marx. 
See Ian Angus, »Two Accounts of Engels’s Revolutionary life,« Socialist Voice, 
August 24, 2009: 28; Martin Jacques, »Marx’s Keeper,« The Guardian, May 2, 
2009, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2009/may/02/frock-coated-engels- 
hunt. 
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formation discovered on the history of the life and intellectuality of 
Engels that was previously unknown to the public will be priceless 
treasure.17 The exploration of the life history of Engels is undoubt-
edly not only crucial for the academic world but also for the gen-
eral public. This view is no exaggeration because, like Marx, Engels 
was a man who walked in a critical tradition in which he was com-
mitted to developing the project of the emancipation of the people 
from the various forms of oppression that enveloped them.18 This 
study is expected to be a complement to previous works on Engels. 
In other words, it is hoped that this work can become part of a new 
trend of Engels studies. This work highlights Engels’s ideas about 
authority, as he turned the debate about authority in an axiological 
direction. For Engels, authority can be emancipatory but also can 
be oppressive. Engels stated that if one negates the distinction be-
tween the two models of authority, then what happens is chaos be-
cause that authority is necessary, especially in emergencies. 19 This 
study argues that Engels’s thought is relevant for understanding 
contemporary phenomena, specifically those related to COVID-
19.20 This paper argues that the coronavirus outbreak is unique be-
17 J. S. McClelland, for example, underlines several of Engels’s intellectual works 
in the context of the development of Marxism that might not have been previ-
ously realized by many parties. For example, according to McClelland, Engels 
contributed to giving Marx knowledge about Feuerbach’s criticism of Hegel. 
So it is not surprising that Marx’s critique of Feuerbach is printed along with 
Engels’s work on Feuerbach (as an appendix). McClelland himself concluded 
that Engels’s position was not subordinate but equivalent to Marx. See J. S. 
McClelland, A History of Western Political Thought (London: Routledge, 1996), 
574.
18 José Manuel Sánchez Bermúdez, The Neoliberal Pattern of Domination: Capital’s 
Reign in Decline (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 87.
19 Engels, »On Authority,« 732; Friedrich Engels, »Versus the Anarchists,« in The 
Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 729.
20 The medical world gave this virus the name COVID-19 as an identity marker 
to distinguish it from other types of coronavirus. When the term coronavirus is 
used in this study, this refers to COVID-19, not to another type of coronavirus. 
See Jianxing Yu, »Confronting and Governing the Public Health Emergency,« 
Journal of Chinese Governance 5, no. 2 (2020): 137 – 139.
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cause it grew in the post-truth era,21 so it can be said that it is the 
first post-truth outbreak of the 21st century.22
Furthermore, this study is considered even more important be-
cause although other works on Engels have begun to emerge, attempts 
to contextualize the ideas of  Engels with contemporary events can be 
said to be very rare.23 Recall that in 2008 when the global economic 
21 The term post-truth has become popular since it was named as the 2016 Word of 
the Year by Oxford Dictionaries. Oxford Dictionaries defines post-truth as a condi-
tion in which objective factors influence public opinion less than emotions and 
personal beliefs. Oxford Dictionaries‹ definition emphasizes the binary opposi-
tion between facts and opinions where subjective opinions have more of an effect 
on people in the post-truth era. This study argues that post-truth is built on facts. 
But it also agrees with Keyes‹ notion that there is a blur between fact and fiction. 
That means that post-truth description is not merely an opinion, but the reality is 
wrapped up in a story that tends to be fiction (or difficult to verify). Post-truth is 
not only a matter of the decaying boundary between facts and opinions but also 
its effect on society. It can be said that post-truth is almost sure to cause unrest, 
fear, and panic for the public so they take actions that tend to be irrational. See 
Kai Horsthemke, »›#FactsMustFall‹? — Education in a Post-Truth, Post-Truthful 
World,« Ethics and Education 12, no. 3 (2017): 273 – 288; Scott Wilson, »Pre-Truth, 
Post-Truth and the Present: Jacques Lacan and the Real Horror of Contempo-
rary Knowledge,« in Post-Truth and the Mediation of Reality: New Conjunctures, 
ed. Rosemary Overell and Brett Nicholls (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2020), 
154; Lisa Portmess, »Post-Truth: Marcuse and New Form of Social Control,« in 
America’s Post-Truth Phenomenon: When Feelings and Opinions Trump Facts and 
Evidence, ed. C. G. Prado (Santa Barbara: Preager, 2018), 65.
22 Although not similar, there is a previous study conducted by Hakkı Taş in which 
he tried to understand one particular event as a post-truth event. In his research, 
Taş examines the failed coup that occurred on 15 July 2016 in Turkey as an exam-
ple of a post-truth coup. Taş explicitly used the term »Turkey post-truth coup« 
because the nature of the coup was filled with a variety of bombastic narratives 
(about the Gulenist conspiracy), very little of which was supported by robust data. 
The impact of the coup itself became a new marker for politics in Turkey, termed 
by Taş as »new Turkey,« where, according to the author, the failed coup became 
an excuse for Erdogan to strengthen his grip on the country by making himself 
a hero who had succeeded in defeating foreign conspiracies (such as the US and 
Germany were accused of being involved in) that had aimed at overthrowing him. 
See Hakkı Taş, »The 15 July Abortive Coup and Post-Truth Politics in Turkey,« 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 18, no. 1 (2018): 14 – 15.
23 An exception, for example, is the work of Michael Löwy, who tried to devel-
op the tradition of eco-socialism. Interestingly, Löwy underlines Engels’s work, 
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crisis occurred, there was a strong attraction from academics — and 
also from the public — to Marx’s ideas.24 The financial crisis that be-
gan in the US, where there was a problem of credit, eventually spread 
widely and impacted various countries in the world.25 Some academ-
ics, for example, issued arguments that the global economic crisis was 
following Marx’s thesis on the plight of capitalism26 where capitalism 
tries to defend itself from a crisis by introducing several strategies, one 
of which is through the credit system, to ensure the small bourgeoisie 
does not collapse. But the effort of capitalism to maintain its exis-
tence ultimately has limitations. These limitations were reflected in 
the occurrence of bad credit in the US, and finally, led to the crisis of 
global capitalism.27 This study cannot elaborate the argument further 
for reasons of space, but this does underline that Marx’s ideas have 
been discussed again. Even at the grassroots level, the thoughts of 
which sought to draw a link between the destruction of nature (forests in Cuba) 
and the Spanish colonial capitalist production system that operates in the region. 
Although, according to Löwy, Engels did not elaborate much on the linkage 
between capitalism and environmental damage more systematically, Engels’s idea 
could become a foundation for developing a Marxist analysis of current global 
ecological damage. See Michael Löwy, »Marx, Engels, and Ecology,« Capitalism 
Nature Socialism 28, no. 2 (2017): 16.
24 Slavoj Zizek, a well-known scholar who studies Lacanian philosophy, is one of 
the academics who affirmed a new trend of intellectual and public excitement 
about the ideas of political economy developed by Marx. Beyond academics 
like Zizek, popular media also became involved in the trend; Time, for example, 
released a special edition on February 2, 2009 with the provocative title »Global 
financial crisis: What would Marx think?« See Christian Fuchs, »Dallas Smythe 
Today — The Audience Commodity, the Digital Labour Debate, Marxist Polit-
ical Economy and Critical Theory. Prolegomena to a Digital Labour Theory of 
Value,« in Marx and the Political Economy of the Media, ed. Christian Fuchs and 
Vincent Mosco (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 523.
25 Paul ›t Hart and Karen Tindall, »From ›Market Correction‹ to ›Global Ca-
tastrophe‹: Framing the Economic Downturn,« in Framing the Global Economic 
Downturn: Crisis Rhetoric and the Politics of Recessions, ed. Paul ›t Hart and Karen 
Tindall (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009), 3.
26 Peter Hudis, Marx’s Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 
1 – 2.
27 Christian Fuchs, Digital Labour and Karl Marx (New York: Routledge, 2014), 13.
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Marx received much appreciation and became the basis of inspiration 
for the emergence of the 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement in the 
US.28 This took place in New York with people chanting the slogan, 
»we are the 99 %.« This development means that Marx’s ideas have 
been discussed again both in public and academic circles because his 
ideas are considered relevant in reading contemporary phenomena.
A strong interest in Marx can be found again with the outbreak 
of the coronavirus. For example, academics like David Harvey have 
tried to apply Marx’s ideas to understand the origin of the coronavi-
rus outbreak.29 Harvey’s analysis is in line with the big ideas devel-
oped by eco-Marxist exponents who are trying to develop a Marxist 
analysis to see the link between capitalism and natural exploitation, 
which leads to environmental damage.30 The difference is that Har-
vey specifically developed an argument about the connection between 
capitalism, the exploitation of nature, and the emergence of the coro-
navirus.31 Harvey argued that nature became a kind of »iron cage« that 
traps many dangerous viruses. However, the destruction of nature 
28 Singer, Marx, 105.
29 Harvey, a contemporary Marxist geographer, analyzed the coronavirus outbreak 
as an unintended consequence of a capitalist system that sought to turn nature 
into mere industrial raw material. Harvey’s idea was in line with non-Marxist aca-
demics such as David Quammen, who believes that the disruption of ecosystems 
by human activity causes viruses. According to Quammen, the viruses are then tar-
geting humans as new hosts due to their lost ecosystems. See David Harvey, »An-
ti-Capitalist Politics in the Time of COVID-19,« Jacobin, March 20, 2020, https://
jacobinmag.com/2020/03/david-harvey-coronavirus-political-economy-dis 
ruptions; David Quammen, »We Made the Coronavirus Epidemic,« The New 
York Times, January 28, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/opinion/ 
coronavirus-china.html.
30 Bradley J. Macdonald, Performing Marx: Contemporary Negotiations of a Living 
Tradition (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 47 – 49.
31 In comparison, another famous scholar, Vandana Shiva argued similarly to Har-
vey. Although she did not explicitly base her writings on Marx’s ideas, Shiva 
concluded that the coronavirus pandemic could not be separated from capital-
istic logic, which sees nature as the raw material of production. Shiva presented 
evidence that the Ebola outbreak also occurred due to deforestation. Shiva, as 
an ecofeminist thinker, has made an argument for de-industrialization, especial-
ly for changes in the food system. See Vandana Shiva, »Ecological Reflections 
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and subsequent human contact with this damaged nature allows the 
transfer of various viruses that were previously »isolated« from hu-
mans, one of which is the coronavirus.32
Another analysis was conducted by Martin Suryajaya,33 who tried 
to underline the potential crisis of capitalism caused by the coronavi-
rus.34 According to him, the coronavirus will encourage the creation 
of the lumpenproletariat. Its emergence would happen as a natural 
consequence of the policy that required the manufacturing industry 
to lay off hard work to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. The 
cessation of production for a long time will result in companies losing 
money and going out of business. In his analysis, Suryajaya believes 
this crisis will not only occur in the manufacturing industry but will 
widen to a variety of other industries that cannot be based on working 
from home, such as the entertainment industry. Along with the fall 
of various industries, the monetary system may also be destroyed if 
many people no longer invest their money but prefer to withdraw it 
to guard against uncertain situations for a long time. In short, the 
coronavirus outbreak has the potential to lead to a severe crisis of cap-
italism — although Suryajaya politely says that it is only a prediction 
and will not necessarily occur.35
Unfortunately, amid the popularity of the name Marx, it can be 
said there has been no serious effort from academics to elaborate En-
gels’s thought in context to understand the coronavirus outbreak — at 
least, not as far as the search conducted by the author has shown.36 
on the Coronavirus,« Medium, March 23, 2020, https://medium.com/post- 
growth-institute/ecological-reflections-on-the-coronavirus-93d50bbfe9db.
32 Harvey, »Anti-Capitalist Politics.«
33 Martin Suryajaya is a young Indonesian thinker who is well known for his works 
on Marxism.
34 Martin Suryajaya, »Membayangkan Ekonomi Dunia Setelah Korona Atau Cer-
ita tentang Dua Virus,« MartinSuryajaya.com, March 30, 2020, https://www.
martinsuryajaya.com/post/membayangkan-ekonomi-dunia-setelah-korona.
35 Ibid.
36 There are various other critical analyses of the coronavirus outbreak with different 
emphases. Take, for example, Yasraf Amir Pilliang, a famous Indonesian post-mod-
ern thinker, who took inspiration from Paul Virilio to put forward an argument 
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Amid the scarcity of Engels studies, this article tries to contextualize 
Engels’s ideas for a better understanding of the coronavirus outbreak. 
Engels’s thoughts on authority are essential to counter the post-truth 
tendencies that coincide with the global spread of epidemics.37 These 
post-truth tendencies have caused severe problems for humanity be-
cause the anti-authority biases inherent in the post-truth era make 
it difficult for humans to work together as a species to »wage war« 
against the coronavirus.38 At the same time, Engels also contributed to 
revealing another dangerous tendency where the anti-authority trend 
is faced with the logic of traditional authority based on the spirit of 
territorialism within the framework of the Westphalian state.39 The 
for the de-globalization trend that occurred due to the outbreak. Other famous 
academics such as Naomi Klein, also known as an anti-capitalist activist, tried to 
see the outbreak as based on the ideas of s hock doctrine and disaster capitalism. 
She tried to explain the symptom of the return of elite characters in this outbreak 
who manipulated people’s fears to pass unpopular policies (leading to widening 
injustice, benefiting the elite, and harming ordinary citizens). Interestingly, Klein 
concluded that we should be wary of elite discourse and that citizens would be 
being selfish by staying quiet at home. Klein said we would never be safe if we did 
not help our neighbors because without them (for example, those who carry out 
the production process) our needs are also potentially in danger. The demands on 
the elite to enforce a policy that will cover all parties then become an inevitability. 
But once again, it needs to be emphasized that in the middle of an abundance of 
weighty analyses, academics who refer to Engels to analyze the coronavirus out-
break critically have not yet been seen. See Yasraf Amir Pilliang, »Virus De-Global-
isasi,« Kompas, March 30, 2020, https://kompas.id/baca/opini/2020/03/30/virus- 
de-globalisasi/; Marie Solis, »Coronavirus Is the Perfect Disaster for ›Disaster Capi-
talism‹,« Vice, March 13, 2020, https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/5dmqyk/naomi- 
klein-interview-on-coronavirus-and-disaster-capitalism-shock-doctrine. 
37 Engels, »Versus the Anarchists,« 729.
38 The post-truth narrative cannot be separated from the spirit of anti-authority, 
especially authority in the mainstream sense (e. g. legal-formal authority). See 
Gabriele Cosentino, Social Media and the Post-Truth World Order (Cham, Swit-
zerland: Springer, 2020), 8 – 9; Steve Fuller, Post-Truth: Knowledge As A Power 
Game (London: Anthem Press, 2018), 10.
39 Michael E. Clarke, Xinjiang and China’s Rise in Central Asia — A History (Abing-
don: Routledge, 2011), 3; Kal Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? 
The Evolution of Territoriality in American Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 10.
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tendency of the return of authority in the Westphalian sense also 
has the potential to cause various new problems. The conclusion 
that Westphalian logic is problematic is not an exaggeration, giv-
en the nature of Westphalian authority, which emphasizes potential 
territorial isolation (disengagement), hampering the possibility for 
global cooperation.40 Furthermore, the application of a Westphalian 
style of authority raises the risk of the presence of an authoritarian 
state that considers that a single command lies in its hands and 
potentially eliminates other ideas that are deemed not to be under 
its command.41 
On the other hand, the efforts to bring back Westphalian logic in 
our era will also potentially strengthen anti-authority tendencies in 
society. This trend, for example, is reflected in the Indonesian context 
where local governments — even citizens at the local level — choose 
to take actions that are different from the national government com-
mand line.42 This phenomenon happened because they feel that the 
excessive domination of the central government is not followed by ef-
40 Interestingly, the WHO eventually revised the use of the term social distancing 
and turned it into physical distancing. The reason, as stated by Maria van Kerk-
hove, an epidemiologist working at the WHO, is that efforts to build a feeling of 
interconnection are essential for maintaining public mental health amid the epi-
demic. In other words, the WHO is aware that without robust global connectiv-
ity, efforts to fight the coronavirus will encounter major obstacles. See Harmeet 
Kaur, »Forget ›Social Distancing.‹ The WHO Prefers We Call It ›Physical Distanc-
ing‹ Because Social Connections Are More Important Than Ever,« CNN, April 
18, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/15/world/social-distancing-language- 
change-trnd/index.html.
41 Florian Bieber, »Authoritarianism in the Time of the Coronavirus,« Foreign 
Policy, March 30, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/30/authoritarianism- 
coronavirus-lockdown-pandemic-populism/.
42 Jamal A. Nashr, »Tegal Lockdown karena Corona, Wali Kota: Tak Ditegur Mend-
agri,« Tempo, April 3, 2020, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1327529/tegal-lock 
down-karena-corona-wali-kota-tak-ditegur-mendagri; Irwan Syambudi, »Lock-
down Mandiri ala Jogja: Ditolak Pemerintah, Diinginkan Warga,« Tirto, March 
27, 2020, https://tirto.id/lockdown-mandiri-ala-jogja-ditolak-pemerintah-diing 
inkan-warga-eH3o.
Nuruddin Al Akbar300
fective policymaking in the face of the increasingly widespread coro-
navirus epidemic across Indonesian territory.43
This study will use the case of the global response to the coronavi-
rus outbreak to elaborate on how the logic of anti-authority and au-
thority in the traditional sense (Westphalian state) have emerged at the 
same time. It seeks to reflect on the circumstances of China, the US, 
Europe, Indonesia, and other cases deemed relevant. This study places 
Engels’s thought as an analytical framework in which the coronavirus 
outbreak is interpreted as a post-truth outbreak. To deal with the post-
truth coronavirus outbreak, we must enter into the discussion of the 
crisis of authority that has occurred globally, followed by efforts to find 
a new form of authority that would have the function of liberating hu-
mans from the threat of a coronavirus outbreak. Without realizing the 
importance of the axiological aspects of the existence of authority, as 
stated by Engels, the world will have a hard time facing this pandem-
ic.44 Furthermore, what happens by choosing a non-liberating form of 
authority has the potential to give birth to new chaos amid humans‹ 
race to face the coronavirus, which can develop quickly and is also 
known to be able to mutate. Without the search for accurate solutions 
amid diminishing time, humans‹ existence as a species is at stake.
Contextualizing Engels’s Thought  
in the Coronavirus Crisis
Before entering into the discussion of Engels’s idea of authority when 
dealing with the coronavirus outbreak, we first need to understand 
his idea in more detail. This discussion is also important because En-
gels’s idea of authority has been criticized by some academics and 
43 The Jakarta Post, »COVID-19: Regions Start Locking Down as Govt Works on 
Regulation,« The Jakarta Post, March 28, 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2020/03/28/covid-19-regions-start-locking-down-as-govt-works-on-regu 
lation.html. 
44 Engels, »On Authority,« 732; Engels, »Versus the Anarchists,« 729.
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contemporary anarchist writers who feel that Engels’s criticism of 
anarchists is inappropriate.45 This study argues that Engels’s idea of 
authority, raised in the nuance of the debate between Marxists and 
anarchists, was not a misplaced criticism46 but rather a valid academic 
criticism. Engels tried to direct the debate over authority to the axio-
logical side, and it can be said that this axiological side did not receive 
adequate discussion from anarchists.47
Although this study believes that Engels’s criticism of anarchists‹ 
positions can be justified, it must be acknowledged that anarchists‹ 
positions remained useful in the debate about the idea of authority. 
Mikhail Bakunin’s (1814 – 1876) most important contribution to the 
debate over authority was bringing it into the ontological domain.48 
45 For example, academics such as Paul McLaughlin say that Marxist criticism of an-
archists on authority is only based on prejudice, which tends to be simplistic and 
inaccurate. Anarchists, who write on a number of websites using pen names like 
Yuki, also say figures like Engels failed to understand the concept of anarchism 
about authority. Another article called »An Anarchist FAQ« labelled Engels’s 
criticism of anarchists non-fundamental, accusing Engels of being ignorant and 
of not understanding what he criticized. See Paul McLaughlin, Anarchism and 
Authority: A Philosophical Introduction to Classical Anarchism (Aldershot: Ash-
gate, 2007), 12; Yuki, »The Semantical Issue Behind Engels’s »On Authority« and 
How It Relates to Modern Day Anarchism,« The Anarchist Library, July 12, 2019, 
https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/yuki-the-semantical-issue-behind-engels-
on-authority-and-how-it-relates-to-modern-day-anarchism#fn1; The Anarchist 
FAQ Editorial Collective, »An Anarchist FAQ (09/17),« accessed April 1, 2020, 
https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/the-anarchist-faq-editorial-collective- 
an-anarchist-faq-09-17.pdf.
46 Engels, »Versus the Anarchists,« 729.
47 Anarchists are more concerned with the ontological side of authority. See Saul 
Newman, From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-authoritarianism and the Dislocation of 
Power (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001), 25 – 26; David W. Lovell, From Marx 
to Lenin: An Evaluation of Marx’s Responsibility for Soviet Authoritarianism (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 74.
48 It should be stated here that the views of famous thinkers such as Bakunin do 
not necessarily »bind« anarchists in general. This tendency can be seen as a man-
ifestation of a strong anti-authority tendency among anarchists. So the ideas 
put forward by thinkers from Bakunin and Kropotkin to Proudhon cannot be 
considered as ideas that are fully accepted and shape the face of the anarchist 
movement as a whole. That is why it is also a question for academics and or anar-
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Bakunin’s argument is right when he mentions the destructive po-
tential of an authority that is considered positive by the Marxist (e. g. 
the concept of a proletarian state).49 Based on that concern, Bakunin 
tried to formulate an alternative to reduce the destructive potential 
of an authority. He then discusses a new form of authority based on 
the idea of »voluntary« to minimize the form of authority that has 
the potential to oppress individuals in the future.50 History proves 
that deviations of authority, previously believed by Marxists to be a 
liberating authority, occurred in the history of the Russian Revolu-
tion.51 The Russian Revolution experienced corruption, especially in 
the Stalin era, which changed the proletarian state into a totalitarian 
state by placing Stalin as the absolute ruler in that country.52
The synthesis of Engels’s and Bakunin’s thoughts is also relevant 
if it is related to the discussion about the coronavirus outbreak. Be-
fore looking at the synthesis of Engels’s and Bakunin’s thoughts, it is 
chist exponents who then blame Engels’s criticism of the anarchist movement by 
describing the views of one of the leading anarchist thinkers, because it could be 
that the ideas of the thinkers on which they base their arguments were not fully 
agreed on by the anarchist movement in the days of Engels. See Richard T. De 
George, »Anarchism and Authority,« Nomos 19 (1978): 92.
49 Feigan, »Marx’s »Dictatorship of the Proletariat,« Contemporary Chinese Thought 
46, no. 2 (2015): 28.
50 Bakunin, »What is Authority?«
51 Leon Trotsky (1879 – 1940), one of the architects of the Russian Revolution, also 
had concerns like Bakunin that the revolution could experience symptoms of 
corruption. Trotsky saw that there was a potential similarity between the Russian 
Revolution and the French Revolution, which, despite its noble goals, ultimately 
led to the growth of the dictator Napoleon Bonaparte (1769 – 1821). Trotsky’s con-
cern can be said to be reasonable. In the Stalin era, it seems that Russia turned 
into a kind of new empire that had control over its satellite states in Eastern Eu-
rope. See Jay Bergman, The French Revolutionary Tradition in Russian and Soviet 
Politics, Political Thought, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 
438 – 439.
52 An ironic historical fact is that Stalin (1878 – 1953), who had a major role in deviat-
ing the authority of the workers for his political interests, is an admirer of Engels’s 
idea of authority — It is not surprising, then, that Stalin used Engels’ thought as 
his main guide in arguing with anarchists. See Roland Boer, Stalin: From Theology 
to the Philosophy of Socialism in Power (Singapore: Springer, 2017), 120.
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necessary to understand the nature of this post-truth era, which is 
characterized by anti-authority.53 Why does a rejection of authority 
symbolize post-truth? To grasp this, we must understand the nature 
of post-truth and its effects on the global public. Post-truth, as em-
phasized by Oxford Dictionaries, is a marker of shifting public confi-
dence from facts to personal opinions.54 The facts referred to here are 
facts obtained from the empirical method.55 For example, statements 
that the Statue of Liberty exists in the US can be empirically verified 
by visiting the location of the statue. But there are also subjective in-
terpretations of facts. Take, for example, the statement that the Statue 
of Liberty is an icon of the US. A different approach must be taken 
to verify this statement, because it cannot be checked empirically. The 
way to validate this statement is to look at the collective imagination 
of the global community. If it is proven that the citizens of the US 
and the world have a relatively similar vision — that the building is an 
icon of the US — , we can say that this statement can be declared val-
id. The subjective side of interpreting this reality is natural, related to 
the symbolic side inherent in human beings.56 However, the personal 
side of reality becomes problematic in the post-truth era due to the 
construction of imagination related to one fact, which tends to spread 
fear and excessive distrust of the »external world.«57
Take the example of the coronavirus, which first appeared in the 
territory of China, as far as experts have been able to verify. However, 
the presence of the virus in Wuhan was then given the subjective 
53 Robert Farrow and Rolin Moe, »Rethinking the Role of the Academy: Cogni-
tive Authority in the Age of Post-Truth,« Teaching in Higher Education 24, no. 3 
(2019): 273.
54 Wilson, »Pre-truth, Post-truth and the Present,« 154.
55 Saulo de Freitas Araujo, »Truth, Half-Truth, and Post-Truth: Lessons from 
William James,« Journal of Constructivist Psychology [online] (February 2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10720537.2020.1727390.
56 Ibid.
57 Frank Fischer, »Knowledge politics and Post-Truth in Climate Denial: On the 
Social Construction of Alternative Facts,« Critical Policy Studies 13, no. 2 (2019): 
134 – 135
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interpretation that the virus was a biological weapon belonging to 
China that had leaked out.58 It is true that the  virus initially spread 
in the Wuhan region (which became the epicenter of the spread of 
the virus).59 It is also a fact that there is a virus research laboratory in 
Wuhan which has the official name of the Wuhan Institute of Virol-
ogy.60 But it is become problematic when the events are arranged in 
the framework of the narrative of
fear.61 The fear narrative is increasingly »convincing« by showing 
images of the laboratory, the logo of which resembles that of the fic-
titious company »Umbrella Corporation« in the Hollywood films 
and video games titled Resident Evil, which is responsible for releasing 
viruses that turn humans into zombies. However, if one examines 
the image critically, the image that appears »convincing« turns out to 
be built on wild fantasies that are difficult to verify and some irrele-
vant data.62 The emergence of post-truth narratives that are difficult 
to check, such as this case, quickly spread through social media and 
58 BBC, »China coronavirus: Misinformation spreads online about origin and 
scale,« BBC, January 30, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-51271 
037.
59 Huan Yang, Peng Bin and Alex Jingwei He, »Opinions from the Epicenter: An 
Online Survey of University Students in Wuhan Amidst the COVID-19 Out-
break,« Journal of Chinese Governance 5, no. 2 (2020): 234 – 248; Yu, »Confronting 
and Governing the Public Health Emergency,« 137 – 139
60 Emily Makowski, »Theory that Coronavirus Escaped from a Lab Lacks Evi-
dence,« The Scientist, March 5, 2020, https://www.the-scientist.com/news-opin-
ion/theory-that-coronavirus-escaped-from-a-lab-lacks-evidence-67229.
61 Molly Stellino, »Fact Check: Did the Coronavirus Originate in a Chinese Labo-
ratory?« USA Today, March 22, 2020, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/fact 
check/2020/03/21/fact-check-did-coronavirus-originate-chinese-laboratory/288 
1150001/.
62 The laboratory logo that is claimed to be similar to the Umbrella Corporation logo 
is actually a logo of a laboratory in Shanghai named Shanghai Rulian Bao Hu San 
Biotech. So it would be naive for the logo in Shanghai to be used as a justification 
for the development of biological weapons in Wuhan. Further studies conducted 
on the laboratory in Shanghai also found no indication of biological weapons 
being developed. See Rachael Krishna, »This Company Is Based in Shanghai, not 
Wuhan,« Full Fact, January 30, 2020, https://fullfact.org/online/wuhan-resident- 
evil-coronavirus/.
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affect the public at large, which then causes mass fear. In this con-
text, anxiety and, at the same time, hatred of China emerged.63 The 
implications can be very complicated, such as the growth of racism 
towards Chinese people, which led to efforts to blockade their terri-
tory to avoid the »threat« of China.64 From this explanation, we can 
conclude that, starting with a post-truth narrative, it turns out to be 
possible to influence global politics. We can also find that the panic 
response is not much help because the coronavirus cannot be prevent-
ed from spreading globally just by closing off one particular territo-
ry.65 So, instead of the post-truth narrative contributing to saving the 
world, it opens the way for the virus to develop more quickly because 
China is left to struggle alone in facing the threat of the coronavi-
rus.66 When China could no longer restrict the spread of the virus, it 
quickly spread to various other parts of the world, breaking through 
territorial boundaries that many imagined would be effective against 
the global spread of the virus.67
Based on the example above, we can see several anti-authority ten-
dencies arising from the post-truth narrative about China. If we look 
at the WHO release, it is said that the spread of the virus should 
63 Eoghan Macguire, »Anti-Asian Hate Continues to Spread Online Amid 
COVID-19 Pandemic,« Al Jazeera, April 5, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2020/04/anti-asian-hate-continues-spread-online-covid-19-pandemic-200 
405063015286.html.
64 Lauren Aratani, »Coughing while Asian‹: Living in Fear as Racism Feeds Off 
Coronavirus Panic,« The Guardian, March 24, 2020, https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2020/mar/24/coronavirus-us-asian-americans-racism.
65 Lucy Budd and Stephen Ison, »Air Travel Restrictions Won’t Protect Us from the 
Coronavirus,« The Jakarta Post, February 10, 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.
com/travel/2020/02/10/air-travel-restrictions-wont-protect-us-from-the-corona-
virus.html.
66 James T. Areddy, »Amid Coronavirus, the World Closes Its Doors to China: ›I 
Feel So Isolated‹,« The Wall Street Journal, February 18, 2020, https://www.wsj.
com/articles/amid-coronavirus-the-world-closes-its-doors-to-china-i-feel-so-iso 
lated-11582060811.
67 Jessie Yeung, »A Global Coronavirus: Travel Bans, Face Masks, and Fear,« CNN, 
February 27, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/02/27/world/gallery/coronavi 
rus-prevention/index.html.
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not be used as a basis for racist action.68 However, WHO’s authori-
ties have been ignored by a number of parties. For example, in some 
European countries, there has been an increase in anti-Chinese sen-
timent. The rise of anti-Chinese sentiments in Europe is related to 
the spread of the post-truth idea that ethnic Chinese, in general, are 
»carriers« of the coronavirus.69 Likewise, global mistrust in the Chi-
nese government authorities increased, which led to many countries 
taking action to isolate China.70 Yet it was precisely the isolation of 
China that essentially provided ample space for the coronavirus to 
multiply. The virus is able to multiply quickly, and thus relying on 
Chinese energy alone was not going to be enough to contain the 
spread of the deadly virus. So it is not surprising that Xi Jinping con-
tinued to push for global cooperation rather than shut down and the 
placing of suspicion on Chinese authorities.71 Antipathy toward Chi-
nese authority and citizens does not provide much benefit in dealing 
with the threat of the virus.72
This strong anti-authority tendency, inherent in the post-truth era, 
is one of the reasons why the world has become so desperate while 
68 Paula Larsson, »Anti-Asian Racism during Coronavirus: How the Language of 
Disease Produces Hate and Violence,« The Conversation, March 31, 2020, https://
theconversation.com/anti-asian-racism-during-coronavirus-how-the-language-
of-disease-produces-hate-and-violence-134496.
69 Kung Phoak, »Stop Prejudice, the Novel Coronavirus Has no Race,« The Jakarta 
Post, February 22, 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2020/02/22/
stop-prejudice-the-novel-coronavirus-has-no-race.html.
70 Leslie Josephs, »China Grows Isolated as Airlines Cancel More than 50,000 
Flights Amid Coronavirus Epidemic,« CNBC, February 6, 2020, https://www.
cnbc.com/2020/02/06/coronavirus-china-becomes-increasingly-isolated-as-air 
lines-pull-out.html.
71 Stuart Lau and Owen Churchill, »Xi Jinping Urges ›Stronger International 
Cooperation‹ and Quick Action to Fight Coronavirus Pandemic and Stave Off 
Global Recession,« South China Morning Post, March 26, 2020, https://www.
scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3077174/xi-jinping-urges-stronger-inter 
national-cooperation-and-quick.
72 Mara Pillinger, »Virus Travel Bans Are Inevitable But Ineffective,« FP, February 23, 
2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/23/virus-travel-bans-are-inevitable-but- 
ineffective/.
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facing the coronavirus outbreak. This statement does not mean that 
if this outbreak happened in the context of a »normal« era, the world 
could quickly solve this problem. However, this post-truth situation 
naturally complicates global cooperation.73 Global cooperation is the 
key to fighting a pandemic that does not recognize territorial logic, 
including gender and certain social classes. In other words, humans 
are weakening their position amid the threat of this deadly plague 
if they continue to maintain their anti-authority logic that impedes 
global cooperation.74
However, it is also interesting to realize that the emergence of the 
post-truth era also brought strong sentiments about restoring »tradi-
tional« authority.75 This desire for resurrecting »traditional« author-
ity can be traced back to long before this outbreak began. There is 
a growing trend in the academic world that seeks to resurrect »tra-
ditional« authority, such as the authority of scientists, as a solution 
to the post-truth era.76 So what is happening today where there is a 
desire to strictly re-enforce Westphalian territorial logic, is a manifes-
tation of a long-standing desire to restore the »traditional« authority 
that has been marginalized due to the rising tide of the post-truth era. 
The desire to turn back history by positioning traditional authority 
as an answer to overcoming the post-truth problem can be said to 
be problematic. To say that there are problems inherent within the 
desire to resurrect »traditional« authority is not an exaggeration be-
cause reality shows that the closing of borders between one country 
and another does not prevent the spread of the virus in countries that 
are trying to isolate themselves.77 In the context of finding solutions, 
the synthesis of Engels’s and Bakunin’s ideas could be an alternative 
73 Harari, »In the Battle Against Coronavirus.«
74 Ibid.
75 Fischer, »Knowledge Politics,« 135 – 136.
76 Ibid.
77 Noah Higgins-Dunn, »Travel Restrictions ›Irrelevant‹ if Coronavirus Becomes 




that transcends the »traditional« logic of territorialism and also offers 
a form of authority that encourages human cooperation at all levels.78 
Engels’s concept of authority cannot be separated from the prolonged 
debate between Marxists and anarchists.79 Marx, who at that time 
became an intellectual defender of Marxism, faced one of the giant 
intellectuals of the anarchists, Bakunin.80 Both Marx and Bakunin be-
lieved that capitalism was an oppressive system, and they agreed that 
revolution was the starting point for changing current harsh orders.81 
But despite these similarities, both had different philosophical foun-
dations that made them argue about some fundamental problems, 
one of which is authority.82
Bakunin was an intellectual who grew up in a tradition of em-
piricism that recognizes the supremacy of experience over abstract 
concepts.83 Bakunin was also an intellectual who was influenced by 
the philosophy that emphasizes the idea of  a »state of nature.«84 The 
idea of  a »state of nature« envisions a primitive human era that tends 
to be good but then experiences degradation due to the concept of 
78 This study agrees with Emma Woods that post-truth cannot be confronted by 
reviving »traditional« authority but instead by devising a new form of author-
ity that is more dynamic, open, and dialogic. Specifically, Woods believes that 
scientific authority must be transformed in such a way as to make it more open 
to public criticism. In line with Woods, this study believes that the authorities 
based on Westphalian logic are not adequate to fight the coronavirus outbreak. A 
new form of authority that is more nuanced in universal human interconnection 
is needed, and this would also open up a broad range of movements for indi-
viduals that are needed to deal with the pandemic. See Emma Woods, »Science 
Policy in a Post-Truth World,« in Risk and Uncertainty in a Post-Truth Society, ed. 
Sander van der Linden and Ragnar E. Löfstedt (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), 41.
79 Newman, From Bakunin to Lacan, 17.
80 Paul McLaughlin, Mikhail Bakunin: The Philosophical Basis of His Theory of An-
archism (New York: Algora Publishing, 2002), 96.
81 Eric Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1975), 201.
82 Newman, From Bakunin to Lacan, 17.
83 McLaughlin, Mikhail Bakunin, 113.
84 Barbara Goodwin, Using Political Ideas (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 
2007), 133.
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organized society, especially in the era of capitalism.85 Interestingly, 
Bakunin did not take the idea of »state of nature« wholeheartedly be-
cause he agreed with Marx that the fundamental phase of humanity 
was a primitive society era where humans lived in communality but 
still maintained their autonomy.86 Primitive society for Bakunin was 
a society that naturally existed because individuals needed each other, 
but in which there was no attempt by one party to dominate another.87 
He believed that there was no domination in primitive communist so-
ciety because there was no »external« authority capable of influencing 
individual movements.88 Individual autonomy remains a fundamental 
thing in Bakunin’s thought about freedom.89 For Bakunin, the ideal of 
revolution is the desire to return man to his primitive state.90 From this 
desire, it can be concluded that Bakunin considers that the concept of 
authority is naturally problematic.91 The spontaneity of life and coop-
eration is the key and not the »imposed authority / external authority,« 
which is the key to overcoming the problem of contemporary human 
oppression.92 His view about the spontaneity of life makes Bakunin 
and other anarchists uncomfortable with the concept of the proletari-
an dictatorship echoed by Marx.93
85 Samuel Rezneck, »The Political and Social Theory of Michael Bakunin,« The 
American Political Science Review 21, no. 2 (1927): 280 – 281.
86 John Morrow, History of Western Political Thought (London: Red Globe Press, 
2019), 91.
87 Rebecca A. Martusewicz, »›All this Boundless Multitude:‹ Rereading Mikhail 
Bakunin for EcoJustice Education,« Educational Studies 48, no. 1 (2012): 1 – 2.
88 William L. Remley, Jean-Paul Sartre’s Anarchist Philosophy (London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2018), 81 – 82.
89 McLaughlin, Anarchism and Authority, 19.
90 Leon P. Baradat, Political Ideologies: Their Origins and Impact (Abingdon: Rout-
ledge, 2016), 152.
91 Lawrence Wilde, Global Solidarity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2013), 29.
92 Martin Phillip Johnson, The Paradise of Association: Political Culture and Popular 
Organizations in Paris Commune of 1871 (Ann Arbor: The university of Michigan 
Press, 1996), 278.
93 Lyman Tower Sargent, »Mikhail Bakunin (1814 – 76),« in Encyclopedia of Nine-
teenth-century Thought, ed. Gregory Claeys (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 32.
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Unlike Bakunin, Marx grew up in a Hegelian tradition.94 Marx 
acknowledged that the primitive society era was a classless society.95 
Still, according to dialectical law, there was a process of community 
development that led to the idea of individual ownership.96 Histori-
cal movements continued until the era of capitalism, which for Marx 
was an era of humans‹ exploitation of other humans.97 But unlike 
Bakunin, Marx viewed capitalism as not entirely evil.98 Even Marx 
saw the bourgeoisie as revolutionaries of his time99 because, at that 
time, the worker was not in a state of being aware of his class con-
sciousness.100 Capitalism, in its turn, will open the consciousness of 
the working class because of the alienation effect produced by the 
system.101 In the end, the workers will carry out a revolution and 
then create a communist society, which is the end of the dialectics 
of history.102
Unlike Bakunin’s position, Marx felt that history was moving for-
ward and not backward.103 Marx also felt that because the foundation 
94 Norman Levine, »Hegelian Continuities in Marx,« Critique 37, no. 3 (2009): 
346 – 370.
95 Marian Sawer, Marxism and the Question of the Asiatic Mode of Production (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 211 – 212.
96 Simon Clarke, Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology: From Adam Smith to 
Max Weber (Aldershot: Macmillan Academic, 1991), 59.
97 William Clare Roberts, Marx’s Inferno: The Political Theory of Capital (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), 127.
98 Chilla Bulbeck, Re-orienting Western Feminisms: Women’s Diversity in a Postcolo-
nial World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 19.
99 R. J. Holton, The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1985), 189.
100 Elliott Johnson, David Walker and Daniel Gray, Historical Dictionary of Marx-
ism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 81.
101 I. Fetscher, »Karl Marx on Human Nature,« in Karl Marx’s Economics: Critical 
Assessments, ed. John Cunningham Wood (London: Routledge, 1998), 220.
102 Fred Moseley and Tony Smith, »Introduction,« in Marx’s Capital and Hegel’s 
Logic: A Reexamination, ed. Fred Moseley and Tony Smith (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 1.
103 Huaiyin Li, »Rewriting Modern Chinese History in the Reform Era: Changing 
Narratives and Perspectives in Chinese Historiography,« in Marxist Historiogra-
phies: A Global Perspective, eds. Q. Edward Wang and Georg G. Iggers (Abing-
don: Routledge, 2016), 95.
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was class consciousness, so the state could be used for the sake of class 
struggle as well.104 Marx suggests that the state (which in the modern 
framework is attached to formal legal authority) can be used for the 
benefit of workers, especially in the transition to socialism.105 So even 
though Marx does not explicitly elaborate on the concept of authori-
ty, he does not consider authority in the sense of »external authority« 
to be a problem.106 Marx also stated that class consciousness needs to 
be formed before the revolution.107 In other words, he considers the 
idea of  the »state of nature« that Bakunin believed was inaccurate be-
cause »naturally« they (the workers) did not have class consciousness, 
so they had to become »aware« by learning.108 Unlike Marx, Bakunin 
believed in spontaneity rather than the indoctrination of »abstract 
concepts« by an external actor as the key to revolution.109
Engels entered the debate between Marxism and anarchism by 
trying to strengthen the argument of Marxism.110 Engels also raised 
the discussion about authority as a new academic debate. He felt that 
if the issue of authority were not cleared up first, various discussions 
about the revolution, the state, and so on would become endless de-
104 Newman, From Bakunin to Lacan, 27 – 28.
105 David Pavon-Cuellar, Marxism and Psychoanalysis: In or Against Psychology? 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 71.
106 Paul Thomas, Karl Marx and the Anarchists (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 16.
107 Joseph M. Schwartz, The Permanence of the Political: A Democratic Critique of the 
Radical Impulse to Transcend Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1995), 150 – 152.
108 Timothy Messer-Kruse, The Haymarket Conspiracy: Transatlantic Anarchist Net-
works (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2012), 34.
109 Nathan Jun, »Anarchism and Just War Theory,« in Comparative Just War Theory: 
An Introduction to International Perspectives, eds. Luis Cordeiro-Rodrigues and 
Danny Singh (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), 23 – 24.
110 Engels’s analysis completes the position of Marx, who believes that it is not au-
thority but an oppressive form of authority that must be rejected. Marx imag-
ined that a new form of emancipatory authority would come along with the 
proletarian revolution. The difference is that Marx talks about the future, while 
Engels talks about the nature of authority by bringing it into the philosophi-
cal realm. See Peter Lamb, Marx and Engels’s Communist Manifesto (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2015), 97.
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bate.111 For Engels, when discussing authority, we must speak in terms 
of an axiological realm.112 Engels argued that authority could not be 
reduced to merely a form of evil. An authority that has a liberating 
vision is an authority worth supporting.113
Engels gave the simple example of a ship sinking in the middle of 
an ocean.114 Without apparent authority, all the passengers on the ship 
could drown.115 The authority, which has the function of liberating, 
becomes crucial to ensure the safety of the ship’s passengers.116 So for 
Engels, the discussion about authority must start from its function 
and then discuss its form. This form adjusts according to the liber-
ating function to be achieved. In the case of a ship that is threatened 
with sinking, passenger survival is a fundamental idea that forms the 
basis of the joint motion of the passengers. From the discovery of 
this specific function, Engels gives the example that there must be 
exceptional leadership that is obeyed by all passengers of the ship.117 
Engels talked about someone who had sufficient leadership capacity 
so that all passengers would not be in a panic and take various irra-
tional actions, such as throwing themselves into the sea, which would 
be an act of suicide. The existence of this one command is crucial to 
regulating passenger movements. No passenger may act to violate his 
111 Barry Hindess, »Socialism, Communism, Anarchism,« in Edinburgh Companion 
to the History of Democracy, eds. Benjamin Isakhan and Stephen Stockwell (Ed-
inburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 350 – 351.
112 According to Herbert Marcuse (1898 – 1979), Engels did not want the abolition 
of authority but to transform it into a democratic form. In other words, Engels 
talks about the axiological realm where the purpose of authority is what must 
be addressed rather than imagining authority as an evil concept, which then ne-
cessitates erasing the idea of authority. See Paul Blackledge, Friedrich Engels and 
Modern Social and Political Theory (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2019), 147 – 148.
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orders in order that all human resources on the ship can be utilized 
optimally for the safety of all of them.118
The example used by Engels is interesting because it is related to 
several dimensions, namely binding concepts together, leadership, 
and obedience.119 Without these three dimensions of authority, we 
can be sure the ship will sink. In other words, it is not spontaneity but 
a rationally planned work (concept-based) that becomes important.120 
Engels attempted to refute Bakunin’s position and those who agreed 
with him by asserting that authority was a necessity if he wanted free-
dom or safety from danger.121
For Engels, authority is a matter of axiology. If authority is based 
on the idea of liberating, then it becomes valid, but if it is not, then 
it is rejected.122 From Engels’s explanation, it can also be drawn that 
»shared concepts« are essential because these are the fundamental di-
mension of liberating authority.123 Based on these shared concepts, a 
contextual strategy can be designed depending on the mission it in-
tends to carry out.
Engels’s contribution to the debate over authority deserves ap-
preciation. But the position of anarchists, especially Bakunin, is not 
entirely wrong. Bakunin’s concept, which is based on spontaneity, 
if used in the context of saving a ship from the possibility of sink-
118 Ibid.
119 The three dimensions of liberating authority are not explicitly stated by Engels 
in his article, but are provided here to make it easier for the reader to understand 
Engels’s explanation of the concept.
120 Lenin agreed to Engels’s idea of authority and tried to add his argument that 
without centralized coordination and based on rational planning, it would be 
impossible for a factory to produce, or for ships to sail smoothly at sea. In other 
words, Lenin underlines the issue of rational planning and not spontaneity as the 
key to the success of the workings of an order. See George G. Brenkert, Political 
Freedom (London: Routledge, 1991), 166.
121 Daniel E. Saros, Information Technology and Socialist Construction: The End of 
Capital and the Transition to Socialism (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 29.
122 Stanislaw Ehrlich, Pluralism On and Off Course (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), 
148.
123 Engels, »On Authority,« 732 – 733.
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ing, may end in chaos because there are no big ideas that frame the 
movement of the passengers.124 However, the example given by Engels 
about a single form of leadership that tends to be personalistic is an 
unhealthy tendency.125 It could be said that Engels did not pay too 
much attention to how a liberating idea, if wrongly applied, could 
lead to disaster too.126 The ontological aspect of authority does not get 
much attention from Engels.
Interestingly, anarchist thinkers like Bakunin elaborate on the 
ontological side that was forgotten by Engels, so the ideas they put 
forward deserve serious attention as well. Bakunin’s idea of »volun-
tary authority« and also the idea of  the spontaneity of the masses 
can be used as inspiration to develop Engels’s ideas.127 Contemporary 
anarchist intellectuals have tried to further develop Bakunin’s ideas 
about »voluntary authority« and also made efforts to maintain the 
spontaneity of the masses within a broad framework of decentralized 
networks.128
The concept of liberating authority developed by Engels coupled 
with positive criticism from Bakunin about the »voluntary« side and 
spontaneity can be synthesized in the context of being an alterna-
tive offer in the global war against the coronavirus. This study offers 
the interpretation of a discursive form of authority so that the fun-
damental of authority is a shared idea that guides human motion.129 
124 Ibid, 732.
125 Ibid.
126 In Bakunin’s thought, it is not justified to assume that there is an infallible au-
thority on whom a person always relies. Bakunin proposed maintaining criticism 
of authority, for example, by asking questions of different health experts and 
thereby relate to the authority of health science as a whole so as not to rely on 
just one expert’s opinion, which could be wrong. See Peter Marshall, Demanding 
the Impossible: A History of Anarchism (Oakland: PM Press, 2010), 294.
127 Bakunin, »What is Authority?«
128 Jeff Shantz, Constructive Anarchy: Building Infrastructures of Resistance (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2010), 19.
129 The term discursive authority is inspired by Marcuse’s reading of Engels whereby 
authority does not have to mean bad. Marcuse himself formulated the idea of 
rational authority, which, according to him, was necessary to ensure the suffi-
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The shared idea that was implied is the idea of  human survival as a 
species.130 The idea of  humans as a species is crucial to be encouraged 
because, in the context of the coronavirus outbreak, it is necessary 
to realize that this virus is not targeting a particular country, gender, 
civilization, race, or social class.131 Global collaboration must be built 
on the idea of the unity of human beings as a species.132 The contextu-
alization of strategies relevant to this post-truth era must be designed 
from the idea that human beings must work together as a species. 
This study argues network-based cooperation is a promising alter-
native.133 This collaborative network must also provide space for spon-
ciency of a civilization. Interestingly, the concept of rational authority developed 
by Marcuse is one based on knowledge-based authority. This study considers that 
knowledge-based authority necessitates an emancipatory discourse that could be 
an ultimate reference to ensure the survival of the current human civilization 
from its potential extinction due to the threat of the coronavirus outbreak. See 
Christopher Holman, Politics as Radical Creation: Herbert Marcuse and Hannah 
Arendt on Political Performativity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 83
130 Anna Carthaus, »Yuval Noah Harari on COVID-19: ›The Biggest Danger Is Not 
the Virus Itself‹,« DW, April 22, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/virus-itself-is-not- 
the-biggest-danger-says-yuval-noah-harari/a-53195552. 
131 Zizek gives an interesting illustration that the ethics of global cooperation must 
be encouraged, like the ethics of treating a soldier injured badly during a war. 
Although he / she is unlikely to recover, maximum effort is made to help the 
wounded soldier. Soldiers can be compared to humanity as a species that is at war 
with the coronavirus. No matter the kind of soldier (or their background), they 
must be saved because the existence of one soldier is crucial in the success of the 
war against the coronavirus. See Slavoj Zizek, »Barbarism with a Human Face,« 
Welt, March 19, 2020, https://www.welt.de/kultur/literarischewelt/article2068292 
59/Slavoj-Zizek-on-Corona-Barbarism-with-a-Human-Face.html.
132 Yuval Noah Harari, »Yuval Noah Harari: The World After Coronavirus,« Finan-
cial Times, March 20, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/19d90308-6858-11ea-a3 
c9-1fe6fedcca75.
133 An interesting inspiration can be obtained from the work of Peter Kropotkin 
(1842 – 1921), one of the leading anarchist thinkers besides Bakunin, who also 
stressed the need to develop an organization with network characteristics. Kro-
potkin gave an example of a charity called the Royal National Lifeboat Institu-
tion, which is based on collective work but without the need for organizational 
centrality. See Andrew Whitworth, Information Obesity (Oxford: Chandos Pub-
lishing, 2009), 141.
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taneous movements. Spontaneity does not mean that a person moves 
at will without the guidance of one particular big idea (i. e. the sur-
vival of the human species).134 Spontaneity must be interpreted such 
that there is room for each individual to develop their own methods 
in the fight against the coronavirus.135 With the opening of the space 
of spontaneity, various ideas that were previously unthinkable can be 
raised.136 It is these creative ideas generated from various parties that 
have significantly contributed to human survival on a macro level.137
134 The spontaneous movement of the masses must be framed together with one 
big idea, namely the survival of humanity as a species. It is in this context that 
the idea of authority must inevitably exist, but in the form formulated by Engels 
and Marcuse, namely liberating discursive authority. See Engels, »On Authority,« 
732; Holman, Politics as Radical Creation, 83.
135 In the language of Emma Goldman (1869 – 1940), an American anarchist, free 
space must be provided so that individuals are allowed to »do it their own way.« 
See Colin Ward, Anarchism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2004), 68.
136 Herbert Read (1893 – 1968), a British literary critic and also an anarchist, argued 
that spontaneity is closely related to creativity. Using the framework of Fromm’s 
psychology, Read stated that the effort to discipline spontaneity is what makes a 
society »sick,« and to »make it healthy« again, spontaneity must be given a large 
space so that a variety of creativity can be fostered. In the context of the war 
against the coronavirus, if the authority that works tends to be monolithic, it has 
the potential to destroy the brilliant ideas that are potentially emerging from the 
community. See Carissa Honeywell, A British Anarchist Tradition: Herbert Read, 
Alex Comfort and Colin Ward (New York: Continuum, 2011), 65. 
137 According to Harari, global information sharing is vital to ensure the survival of 
humanity. Harari exemplifies how it is crucial for every individual to have proper 
scientific knowledge on how to prevent the transmission of the coronavirus so 
that he can act appropriately. The problem for Harari that is happening right 
now is the closure of information rather than information disclosure. If Harari 
accuses, for example, some politicians of trying to block valid information from 
spreading, it can also be added that the traditional authority model based on 
territorialism is not conducive to the free flow of information globally. Instead, 
the network model offered in this study can be an alternative to ensure that the 
free flow of information can occur smoothly. The information in question is not 
just related to technical information to prevent transmission of the coronavirus 
but also inspirational information that can inspire people in various parts of the 
world to be encouraged to carry out humanitarian actions. See the UNESCO 
Courier, »Yuval Noah Harari: ›Every Crisis Is Also an Opportunity‹,« The UNES-
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The logic of the collaborative network that gives room to spon-
taneity is also expected to reduce the post-truth effect because no 
dominant authority is allowed in the logic of the network.138 In the 
context of avoiding the dominance of one party, it is necessary to 
contextualize the idea of  Engels, especially on aspects of leadership 
and obedience.139 This study argues that leadership is not necessarily 
singular but can be plural.140 An essential component of leadership 
also lies not in its command abilities but in the ability to inspire other 
individuals.141 The redefinition of leadership as an entity that can be 
a source of inspiration also changes the meaning of obedience. Obe-
dience is not interpreted as blind submission but becomes the ability 
to capture inspiration and give birth to positive new inspiration.142 So 
in this leadership context, for example, the position of experts such 
as the WHO is positioned as an essential source of inspiration on 
how to fight viruses based on scientific methods.143 This inspiration 
inspired some community members who then took the initiative to 
produce masks and sell them cheaply to prevent a scarcity.144 Other 
communities, such as religious or social movements, took the initia-
tive to buy masks and distribute them to the poor so they could get 
CO Courier, accessed April 30, 2020, https://en.unesco.org/courier/news-views-
online/yuval-noah-harari-every-crisis-also-opportunity.
138 Bakunin, »What is Authority?«
139 Engels, »On Authority,« 732 – 733.
140 McLaughlin, Anarchism and Authority, 158; Joyce Rothschild and J. Allen Whitt, 
The Cooperative Workplace: Potentials and Dilemmas of Organisational Democracy 
and Participation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 16 – 17.
141 Nunzio Pernicone, Italian Anarchism, 1864 – 1892 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1993), 290.
142 Jeffrey Shantz and Dana M. Williams, Anarchy and Society: Reflections on Anar-
chist Sociology (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 45 – 56.
143 BBC, »Virus corona: Tips terlindung dari Covid-19 dan mencegah penyebaran 
sesuai petunjuk WHO,« BBC, April 2, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/
dunia-52127080.
144 Ahmad Sukirno, »Komunitas Difabel Boyolali Bikin Masker untuk Warga Mis-
kin,« rri.co.id, April 8, 2020, http://rri.co.id/post/berita/816848/daerah/komuni 
tas_difabel_boyolali_bikin_masker_untuk_warga_miskin.html.
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extra protection without spending money.145 Inspirational work based 
on network logic, for example, has occurred in many parts of Indo-
nesia. Similar work may also have occurred in many other countries. 
What should be encouraged is to increase such inspirational work in 
the future.
Conclusion: Engels’s Discursive Authority  
or the Extinction of Humans as a Species
One conclusion that can be drawn from this study is the importance 
to rethink the definition of authority to deal with the coronavirus 
outbreak. Engels explained that authority was inevitable in ensuring 
the survival of humanity. Without an acknowledgment of liberating 
authority, this global coronavirus outbreak will spread without signif-
icant obstacles. The virus has become unstoppable due to the fertile 
post-truth ground, which makes it difficult for humans to develop a 
joint strategy that is effective in dealing with the coronavirus threat. 
Post-truth narratives are built by manipulating the subjective side of 
human beings in interpreting reality. The subjective side of humanity 
is bombarded with narratives that are difficult to verify and often 
contain disinformation. The attacks result in public panic and, at the 
same time, reinforce a sense of distrust in all forms of authority. 
What followed was a revival of extreme individualism that affected 
not only individuals but also communities and even nation-states. It 
is this extreme individualism that then leads to, for example, embar-
rassing events such as when the US was accused by some French and 
German officials of stealing a shipment of masks bound for France 
145 Muhammadiyah, »MCCC Denpasar Bagikan 1000 Masker Kepada Warga Kota 
Denpasar,« Muhammadiyah, April 10, 2020, http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/
id/news-18793-detail-mccc-denpasar-bagikan-1000-masker-kepada-warga-kota-
denpasar.html; Makhfud Syawaludin, »NU Kabupaten Pasuruan Segera Bagikan 
50 Ribu Masker Kain,« NU Online, April 11, 2020, https://www.nu.or.id/post/
read/118950/nu-kabupaten-pasuruan-segera-bagikan-50-ribu-masker-kain.
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and Germany amid the rise of the »global war for masks.«146 All coun-
tries try to prioritize themselves with irrational actions. So Engels’s 
idea of  liberating authority becomes a promising alternative to pre-
vent the world from falling into chaos and global barbarism.
This concept of liberating authority offered by this study is an 
idea developed by Engels (and also enriched by Bakunin’s ideas) is 
authority in the discursive sense, not authority held by a particular 
institution. Authority in the discursive sense must be interpreted as a 
shared idea (big narrative) about the survival of humans as a species. 
In other words, humanism became the highest authority in the war 
against the coronavirus. Humanism here is not interpreted abstractly 
but very specifically, namely as our survival as a species. It is this ac-
ceptance of the grand narrative of humanism that forms the founda-
tion for building trust globally. The meaning of this kind of authority 
will also prevent the accumulation of power in an institution such as 
the ruling regime in a particular country, which tends to be corrupt.
The discursive authority will prevent the public from blind obe-
dience to any form of »small« authority within its sphere. The public 
will see the »small« authority, such as an expert organization like the 
WHO, as one entity that has an essential role in leadership against the 
coronavirus. But as necessary as the role of WHO leadership may be, 
for example, it cannot hold leadership alone and must be helped by 
other forms of leadership. In this new framework, everyone can and 
must take a leadership role because without their contribution (in any 
form), this global war will not be successful. Everyone can be likened 
to musicians in a musical performance in which each person plays a 
different role (producing different sounds through different musical 
146 Tim Lister, Sebastian Shukla and Fanny Bobille, »Coronavirus Sparks a ›War 
for Masks‹ as Accusations Fly,« CNN, April 3, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/ 
2020/04/03/europe/coronavirus-masks-war-intl/index.html; Kim Willsher, Ju-
lian Borger and Oliver Holmes, »US Accused of ›Modern Piracy‹ After Diver-




instruments). But it is precisely from the variations in sounds that 
cause a distinct beauty to arise and that makes music concerts mean-
ingful. The unity of sound gives birth to musical tunes and makes the 
audience feel comfortable.
Leadership here is not meant as a sign of dominance because lead-
ership is not inherent but an action that can be done by anyone. So 
we can say leaders like Duterte, who is threatening to shoot Filipinos 
who protest against his lockdown policy, are unacceptable in this kind 
of discursive authority scheme.147 Such an attitude does not give birth 
to a positive impulse to further strengthen cooperation among Fili-
pinos but rather weakens trust among them, especially toward their 
government.
Engels’s thought about discursive authority could be a reasonable 
solution and should be encouraged by academics as a new form of 
global cooperation. Without a change on the paradigmatic side, we 
are allowing the virus to win against humans. Take the lessons of Chi-
na, for example, where an effort to concentrate authority in the cen-
tral government in Beijing under Xi Jinping’s command ultimately 
slowed down the detection and handling of the virus. Although China 
has since halted the spread of the virus in the country, the distrust that 
emerges from Chinese citizens has not stopped. Citizens‹ anger over 
the death of doctor Li Wenliang, for example, is proof of the logic of 
»traditional« authority, which had become the dominant paradigm in 
China to stem the spread of the coronavirus, causing many problems.148 
147 Yuki Tsang, »›Shoot Them Dead‹: Philippine President Duterte Warns Coronavi-
rus Lockdown Violators,« South China Morning Post, April 2, 2020, https://www.
scmp.com/video/coronavirus/3078165/shoot-them-dead-philippine-president- 
duterte-warns-coronavirus-lockdown.
148 BBC, »Li Wenliang: Coronavirus Death of Wuhan Doctor Sparks Anger,« BBC, 
February 7, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-51409801; Jose-
phine Ma and Jun Mai, »Death of Coronavirus Doctor Li Wenliang Becomes 
Catalyst for ›Freedom of Speech‹ Demands in China,« South China Morning Post, 
February 7, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3049606/
coronavirus-doctors-death-becomes-catalyst-freedom-speech.
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President Xi was forced to go to Wuhan himself, which can be inter-
preted as an apology to its citizens.149
The application of the logic of »traditional« authority based on terri-
torial logic is still affecting China — to a greater or lesser degree — since 
the outbreak began to be controlled. Some residents — and also some 
police — affected by territorial logic rejected the government’s attempt 
to open the border between Wuhan (Hubei Province) and neighbor-
ing regions (e. g. Jiangxi Province).150 This event means that despite 
the ongoing formation of a new consciousness based on the discursive 
idea of human survival as a species (which gained momentum with 
the »Wuhan Jiayou« phenomenon151), the new awareness process is 
149 Simon Tisdall, »Covid-19 Is Exposing the Frailty in Autocrats and Democrats 
Alike,« The Guardian, March 15, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/commentis 
free/2020/mar/15/covid-19-exposing-frailties-autocrats-democrats-alike-trump-
xi-eu-un.
150 Lea Li, »Police, Public Clash as Border Reopens Between Coronavirus Epicentre 
Hubei and Jiangxi Province,« South China Morning Post, March 29, 2020, https://
www.scmp.com/video/china/3077466/police-public-clash-border-reopens-be 
tween-coronavirus-epicentre-hubei-and.
151 The phenomenon of »Wuhan Jiayou« is marked by Wuhan residents scream-
ing from their apartment or residence, to which other residents respond with 
replies containing a message of unity and cooperation. The term »Wuhan Ji-
ayou« means »Wuhan residents, get excited.« It is a message to fellow Wuhan 
residents to work together to get through the crisis. This moment of togeth-
erness later inspired some Wuhan residents to document the event and spread 
it via the Internet. Those who circulated it on the Internet can be said to have 
performed a leadership function because they were trying to inspire the world 
with the event they were experiencing in Wuhan. This message can be said to 
affect many parties. Many countries are also encouraged to take part in helping 
Wuhan and China overcome the coronavirus outbreak. The Chinese govern-
ment also realized that their »traditional« way was not sufficient, even though 
they continued to act according to the »old« logic. The Chinese government 
then gave more leeway for the spirit of »Wuhan Jiayou« to be spread wider and 
globally. It should be noted that several buildings in China turned on lights 
to read »Wuhan Jiayou,« which then inspired others in other countries to do 
the same. See Pythag Kurniati, »Bertemu Kapolri, Polisi Jambi yang Nyanyikan 
Lagu Jiayou Wuhan Ditawari Sekolah Perwira,« Kompas, March 8, 2020, https://
regional.kompas.com/read/2020/03/08/13111271/bertemu-kapolri-polisi-jambi- 
yang-nyanyikan-lagu-jiayou-wuhan-ditawari; Elsa Emiria Leba, »Semangat Be-
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not necessarily able to completely erase the logic of »traditional« au-
thority based on distrust with other parties.
In conclusion, it seems no exaggeration that the world today is 
faced with two choices, namely the discursive authority offered by 
Engels or the »traditional« authority model based on the Westphalian 
logic of territorialism that wants to place the state as the highest hold-
er of control. The choice of »traditional« authority — which is still 
the choice of many countries today — does not provide a meaningful 
solution for humanity. The number of coronavirus patients globally is 
not decreasing but continues to grow in an increasingly extraordinary 
number. Not to mention the application of this kind of »tradition-
al« authority, which has the potential to strengthen the proliferation 
of post-truth narratives globally, because to strengthen the positions, 
territorialism often requires justification from post-truth narratives. 
This, for example, can be witnessed in the US, which continues to de-
velop the idea of  a »Chinese virus« conspiracy under Donald Trump’s 
leadership.152 The development of post-truth narratives, in turn, com-
plicates the situation, in which the US has become the non-Asian 
region most severely affected by the coronavirus.153 This negative de-
velopment means that the logic of territorialism that is trying to be 
lum Padam, Wuhan Jiayou!« Kompas, February 1, 2020, https://kompas.id/baca/
internasional/2020/02/01/semangat-belum-padam-wuhan-jiayou/; Tresno Setia-
di, »Kisah Mahasiswa di Wuhan Saat Virus Corona Merebak, Teriak ›Jiayou‹ 
dari Balik Jendela,« Kompas, February 17, 2020, https://regional.kompas.com/
read/2020/02/17/17033981/kisah-mahasiswa-di-wuhan-saat-virus-corona-mere 
bak-teriak-jiayou-dari-balik?page=all.
152 Sabrina Tavernise and Richard A. Oppel, Jr., »Spit On, Yelled At, Attacked: Chi-
nese-Americans Fear for Their Safety,« The New York Times, March 23, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/chinese-coronavirus-racist-attacks.
html; BBC, »Coronavirus: Trump Attacks ›China-Centric‹ WHO Over Global 
Pandemic,« BBC, April 8, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-522 
13439.
153 Nicole Chavez, Jason Hanna and Christina Maxouris, »US Coronavirus Cas-
es Reach more than 101,000 as Reported Deaths Hit New Daily High,« CNN, 
March 28, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/27/health/us-coronavirus-fri 
day/index.html.
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maintained and even strengthened by post-truth narratives is leading 
to an increasingly devastating humanitarian crisis.
Global barbarism seems to be the right term to refer to the current 
global tendency in dealing with the coronavirus outbreak. Yet, at the 
same time, world leaders such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
have appealed for stronger global cooperation to face the coronavi-
rus.154 But it seems that such appeals are mere rhetoric without any 
real action as long as the logic of »traditional« authority is still en-
trenched in the minds of world leaders. Some netizens responded to 
Merkel’s speech by posting images of burning European Union flags 
(especially in Italy).155 The action illustrates the low public confidence 
in Merkel’s rhetoric, especially among Italian citizens, who have suf-
fered from one of the most severe outbreaks among EU countries.
Engels’s idea about authority is a reasonable choice to fill the 
gap between the rhetoric of cooperation that is being discussed by 
world leaders and the policies adopted by these leaders. At present, 
humanity does not need authority, which results in a dualism be-
tween rhetoric and action. Humanity needs an authority that does 
not discriminate between one country and another, between one 
class and another, or between one civilization and another. Humans 
need a form of authority that can unite them as one human species. 
Not bound by boundaries that are confirmed by the old conception 
of authority. This new conception of a discursive authority that can 
unite humanity in the big idea as an endangered species needs to be 
developed. The Engelsian concept (enriched by Bakunin’s ideas) is an 
alternative offer that needs to be developed primarily by the academic 
world in the hope that global efforts against the coronavirus outbreak 
154 Eszter Zalan, »Merkel: Virus Is Biggest Challenge in EU History,« Euobserver, April 
7, 2020, https://euobserver.com/coronavirus/148003; Ayhan Simsek, »Merkel: 
Coronavirus Biggest Challenge in EU’s History,« Anadolu Agency, April 6, 2020, 
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/merkel-coronavirus-biggest-challenge-in- 
eu-s-history/1794764.
155 Katya Adler, »Coronavirus Outbreak Eats into EU Unity,« BBC, April 3, 2020, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52135816.
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will not move increasingly towards barbarism or, even more severely, 
humans‹ extinction as a species on earth.
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Engels as Course Reading  
in the 21st Century History Classroom
Alexander Maxwell
This chapter examines Friedrich Engels’s Condition of the Working 
Class in England (1845)1 as a course reading for first-year university 
students. Its narrative is essentially autobiographical. I describe my 
personal motives to the text when I first thought to assign it in a 
»Modern Europe« survey course, student reactions, and how student 
reactions affected subsequent iterations of the first-year survey. As it 
happens, my students, mostly millennials, responded more favorably 
to the text than I had expected. Their enthusiasm ultimately inspired 
me to reevaluate Engels’s continued relevance in the 21st century.
An autobiographical narrative, perhaps, should begin with an au-
tobiographical sketch. I was born in Los Angeles, spent most of my 
high school years in Southern California, and did my undergradu-
ate degree at the University of California, Davis. For this degree, I 
spent two years as an exchange student in Germany. I found life 
in Central Europe congenial. While in Germany, I studied Czech 
and after graduating moved to Prague to teach English as a Sec-
ond Language (ESL). I have since lived, worked or studied in several 
Central European towns, including Bratislava, Budapest, Bucharest, 
and Erfurt. When I did my history Ph.D, I wrote my thesis on Slo-
vak history. After finishing my doctorate, I found short-term jobs 
in Wales and Nevada, and eventually landed a permanent position 
at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. I am happily 
1 Friedrich Engels, Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England (Leipzig: Otto 
Wigand, 1845); first English translation by Florence Kelley Wyschnewetzky, The 
Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844 (New York: John W. Lovell, 
1887).
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settled in New Zealand, but when I feel homesick, I feel homesick 
for Central Europe. 
Neither my adolescence in Southern California nor my under-
graduate education provided any particular emphasis on the works of 
Karl Marx or Friedrich Engels. I was assigned some Marx to read in 
an excellent undergraduate course called »European Intellectual His-
tory,« but my strongest memory of reading Marx as an undergraduate 
is a metaphor comparing economic progress to »that hideous, pagan 
idol who would not drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain.«2 
At 18, I found Marx’s prose pleasingly dramatic. As far as I remember, 
I did not read any Engels as an undergraduate.
Nor did my formative experiences in the ruins of the Soviet Em-
pire encourage a serious study of Marxism. On the contrary: con-
versations I had in the former Eastern bloc after the fall of the Ber-
lin Wall encouraged a contemptuous attitude. I treated the failure 
of the Soviet system as self-evident, and the collapse of the Soviet 
system as a boon to humanity. During the early 1990s, I was not 
alone treating the Soviet Union’s failure as a definitive repudiation 
of Marxism. My atheism repelled me from American conservatism 
and I usually took leftist positions on cultural issues like gay rights, 
but as a young man I accepted market economics, regularly read The 
Economist, and basically approved of how Tony Blair changed the 
British Labour party.
My graduate training, furthermore, did not lead me to the Marxist 
classics. I specialized in the origins of nationalism. The 19th century 
may be the century in which Engels lived, but most East-Central 
European historiographies also remember it as the era of so-called 
»national awakening.« I wrote my master’s thesis on national awaken-
ing in North Macedonia, my doctoral thesis on national awakening 
in Slovakia, my second book on clothing and national awakening, 
2 Karl Marx, »The Future Results of British Rule in India,« New-York Daily Tri-
bune, August 8, 1853, cited in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works 
(New York: International Publishers, 1979), 222.
Engels as Course Reading in the 21st Century History Classroom 337
and my third book on national awakening in Hungary.3 I have also 
published several works on nationalism theory.4 The nationalist ideol-
ogies and nationalist activism that interest me tend to come from the 
middle classes, they do not reflect the struggles of workers or prole-
tarians. Nationalism, as I study it, belongs to intellectual and cultural 
history: it is rather removed from the social or economic history that 
interested Marx and Engels.
Scholars influenced by the thought of Marx and Engels have ad-
mittedly made several outstanding contributions to nationalism the-
ory. Austrian Social Democratic politician and Marxist theorist Otto 
Bauer (1881 – 1938) wrote an excellent overview of how nationalist poli-
tics developed in Habsburg Austria.5 Bauer particularly influenced the 
3 Alexander Maxwell, Choosing Slovakia: Slavic Hungary, the Czech Language and 
Unintended Nationalism (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009); Alexander Maxwell, Pa-
triots Against Fashion: Clothing and Nationalism in Europe’s Age of Revolutions 
(London: Palgrave, 2014); Alexander Maxwell, Everyday Nationalism in Hungary 
(Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019).
4 Alexander Maxwell, »Primordialism for Scholars Who Ought to Know Better: 
Anthony D. Smith’s Critique of Modernization Theory,« Nationalities Papers 
(published online March 2020), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.93; Al-
exander Maxwell and Molly Turner, »Nationalists Rejecting Statehood: Three 
Case Studies from Wales, Catalonia, and Slovakia,« Nations and Nationalism, 
(published online December 2019), DOI: 10.1111/nana.12577; Alexander Max-
well, »›Supplicant Nationalism‹ in Slovakia and Wales: Polyethnic Rights During 
the Nineteenth Century,« Central Europe 16, no. 1 (2018): 29 – 50; Alexander 
Maxwell, »Nationalism as Classification: Suggestions for Reformulating Nation-
alism Research,« Nationalities Papers 46, no. 4 (2018): 539 – 555; Alexander Max-
well, »Nationalism and Sexuality,« in The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Gender 
and Sexuality Studies, ed. Nancy Naples (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), vol. 4, 
1741 – 1744; Alexander Maxwell, »Typologies and Phase Theories in National-
ism Studies: Hroch’s A-B-C Schema as a Basis for Comparative Terminology,« 
Nationalities Papers 38, no. 6 (2010): 865 – 880; Alexander Maxwell, »Multiple 
Nationalism: National Concepts in 19th Century Hungary and Benedict Ander-
son’s ›Imagined Communities‹,« Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 11, no. 3 (2005): 
385 – 414.
5 Otto Bauer, Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (Vienna: Ignaz 
Brand, 1907); available in English as The Question of Nationalities and Social 
Democracy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
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Czech scholar Miroslav Hroch,6 author of the influential Social Pre-
conditions of National Revival in Europe, the first work I read in grad-
uate school.7 I was ultimately more impressed by the British Marxist 
historian Benedict Anderson (1936 – 2015), whose Imagined Commu-
nities has become a classic in the field.8 The influential historian Eric 
Hobsbawm (1917 – 2012) also wrote from a Marxist perspective.9 These 
scholars persuaded me that nationalism arises from social transforma-
tions that are not really captured by the phrase »industrial revolution,« 
but can, for want of a better term, be summarized as »modernization.« 
Yet if Marxist nationalism scholars influenced my understanding of 
how nationalism arises, they neither inspired me to read Marx and 
Engels nor much influenced my political stances. I found their work 
interesting despite rather than because of their Marxism. 
When I started designing undergraduate course syllabi, in short, I 
had no special desire to assign Engels, or indeed any Marxist classics. 
American conservatives often express suspicion of »Marxist profes-
sors,« as John Wilson documented in his analysis of »the conservative 
attack on higher education.«10 While I would certainly have failed any 
conservative purity test, I doubt anybody actually claiming to be a 
Marxist would acknowledge me as espousing any flavor of Marxism.
My first chance to teach the modern Europe survey came in 2006. 
I won a one-year temporary teaching fellowship at the University of 
6 Miroslav Hroch, »Learning from Small Nations, Interview,« New Left Review 58 
(2009): 43.
7 Miroslav Hroch, Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern 
Europas: Eine vergleichende Analyse zur gesellschaftlichen Schichtung der patrio-
tischen Gruppen (Prague: Charles University, 1968); available in English as Social 
Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social 
Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985).
8 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism (London: Verson, 1983).
9 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
10 John Wilson, The Myth of Political Correctness: The Conservative Attack on Higher 
Education (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 10 – 11.
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Nevada, Reno. The main theme of the course, as I taught it, was 
the rise of nationalist politics. Skeptical of textbooks but encouraged 
to use one, I chose Mark Kishlansky’s Sources of the West: Readings 
in Western Civilization, an anthology of bite-sized excerpts from var-
ious primary sources. I felt some moral pressure to select readings 
from Kishlansky’s textbook wherever possible so that students would 
get value for their textbook purchase. The course contained fourteen 
weeks; I gave two lectures each week. In week 8, I discussed Marxism 
in a grab-bag lecture that also covered Darwin, secularization, and 
suffragism. For that week, I assigned as course reading Kishlansky’s 
excerpt from Condition of the Working Class in England.11
Several considerations led me to assign Engels, rather than any 
other sources found in Kishlansky. I started from the pedagogical 
assumption that students in Nevada might struggle to understand 
the appeal of socialism to historical actors. Given my own politics, I 
was hardly hoping that my course lectures and course readings would 
convert students to Marxist politics, but hoped to persuade students, 
some of whom I assumed would be strongly anti-Communist, that 
Marxism, socialism, and communism arose in response to pressing 
social problems. Kishlansky also offers an excerpt from the Com-
munist Manifesto,12 but Engels’s detail-oriented description of urban 
squalor seemed more likely to help conservative or unworldly mid-
dle-class American students appreciate the suffering caused by the 
industrial revolution.
I felt some trepidation about how the class would respond to En-
gels. Teaching in a state that had just helped re-elect George W. Bush, 
I worried that some conservative students might refuse on principle to 
11 Friedrich Engels, »The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845),« ex-
cerpt in Sources of the West: Readings in Western Civilization, vol. 2, eds. Mark 
Kishlansky, Patrick Geary and Patricia O’Brien (New York: Longman: 2006), 
reading 103.
12 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, »The Communist Manifesto,« excerpt in: Sourc-
es of the West: Readings in Western Civilization, vol. 2, eds. Mark Kishlansky, Pat-
rick Geary and Patricia O’Brien (New York: Longman: 2006), reading 112.
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read anything by a Communist icon. I also feared that Engels might 
strike them as dreary. So, for my 2006 course, I assigned two other 
course readings to accompany Engels: Kishlansky’s excerpt from Be-
atrice Webb’s Women and the Factory Acts (1896), and a short excerpt 
from Coventry Patemore’s poem »Angel of the House« (1854).13 The 
Webb text illustrates how socialist activists tried to improve the lives 
of working class women. Patemore’s ode to bourgeois domesticity, I 
hoped, would strikingly contrast with working-class concerns. View-
ing working class suffering through the lens of gender would also 
speak to the feminist themes of the lecture, and perhaps the poem, 
which I thought fascinating, would compensate for a course reading I 
personally had not found particularly interesting. 
My 2006 students in Nevada did not respond to these course read-
ings as I anticipated. Patemore’s poem left them wholly cold, and they 
did not want to discuss any gender issues. Instead, they wanted to 
discuss Engels! They immediately understood and appreciated pre-
carity as a social problem, they reacted with fascination to Engels’s 
description of working-class squalor. One student decided to change 
the topic of his research essay so as to study Engels more carefully. I 
had wholly misjudged student reactions. 
I remembered student enthusiasm for Engels when designing an-
other modern Europe survey after my arrival in New Zealand. In 
2008, shortly after joining the faculty of Victoria University of Wel-
lington, a senior colleague and I created lectures for a team-taught 
course, given over a twelve-week semester. There were two lectures 
a week, and after the first week, students also attended a weekly »tu-
torial« (discussion section). I still taught my half of the course as the 
rise of nationalism, but the different teaching circumstances required 
13 Beatrice Webb, »Women and the Factory Acts (1896)« excerpt in Sources of the 
West: Readings in Western Civilization, vol. 2, eds. Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary 
and Patricia O’Brien (New York: Longman: 2006), reading 120; »The Angel of 
the House,« excerpt from Bernie Heidkamp, Genders and Identities in the Poet-
ry of Walt Whitman (1997). Accessed March 25, 2020. https://whitmanarchive.
org/archive1/classroom/student_projects/bernie/patmore.html. 
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several innovations. In Wellington, for example, faculty routinely 
compile their own books of readings instead of using a textbook, I 
thus gained more freedom to choose whatever reading best served my 
pedagogical aims. 
My colleague and I chose to devote the eleven weekly tutorials 
to the in-depth discussion of primary sources, which encouraged us 
to find a single text. Kishlansky’s brief excerpts would no longer be 
appropriate: we needed something longer. When selecting readings, 
my colleague and I both prioritized exposing students to canonical 
texts, echoing the spirit of a so-called »great books« course. Marxism, 
socialism, and communism have been important forces in world his-
tory and educated people should have some idea what they are about. 
Engels’s The Condition of the Working Class in England surely qualifies 
as one of the »great books.« So, however, would several works by the 
even more famous Karl Marx. Browsing anthologies of Marxist clas-
sics for a suitable reading, I looked first for something written by 
Marx.
In the end, however, I again chose Engels’s Condition of the Work-
ing Class in England. Marx’s Capital proved much too long and com-
plex for a first-year modern Europe survey, and I found no suitably 
self-contained excerpts. I more seriously considered a chapter from 
the Communist Manifesto. The book as a whole seemed too long for 
one week’s course reading; students who have to read more than 40 
pages tend not to be prepared for class discussion, but the individu-
al chapters are about the right length. The opening chapter, »Bour-
geois and Proletarians,« nicely outlines the Marxist theory of history. 
The stirring bit about proletarians having nothing to lose but their 
chains, however, comes from the end of the final chapter, »Position of 
the Communists in relation to the various existing Opposition Par-
ties.« This last chapter, however, opens by expressing support for the 
Chartists in England, Agrarian reformers in America, Social Demo-
crats in France, the Radicals in Switzerland, and the 1846 uprising in 
Kraków. I feared first-year students in New Zealand would be over-
whelmed if the course reading began with a long list of unfamiliar 
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political parties. I remembered how positively students in Nevada had 
responded to Engels, so I stuck with that.
Since I needed a lengthier reading, I also properly read Engels for 
the first time. The book proved more engaging than Kishlansky’s ex-
cerpts had led me to believe. Engels describes hunger, streets, houses, 
furniture, clothing, and toilets: everything is immediate and concrete. 
Engels mentions several place names that students in New Zealand 
do not know, such as Benthal Green and »the famous rookery of 
St. Giles,«14 but the point comes through even if readers are not famil-
iar with English geography. My favourite passage from the whole work 
occurs in the chapter »the Great Towns,« in which Engels describes a 
traveler arriving in London by ship. The sight of the Thames packed 
with tall-masted ships, Engels tells his readers, »is so vast, so impres-
sive, that a man cannot collect himself but is lost in the marvel of En-
gland’s greatness before he sets foot upon English soil.«15 The passage 
illustrates an enthusiasm for progress I expected students would find 
surprising, and its eloquence also captured my imagination. 
In the end, therefore, my senior colleague and I assigned Engels for 
tutorial discussion. The accompanying lecture remained a grab-bag of 
19th-century social movements, covering socialism alongside secular-
ism, racial »science,« anti-Semitism, and suffragism. I extended the 
bit on socialism, transcribing key passages from the Communist Man-
ifesto onto PowerPoint slides. My colleague and I did not teach the 
tutorials ourselves, but indirect feedback from postgraduate student 
tutors was positive. In New Zealand, as in Nevada, students liked 
reading Engels. 
Ten years later, I am teaching still another first year Modern Eu-
rope survey. The course is still team taught, but my senior colleague 
has left the department and been replaced by a junior colleague. I am 
still a scholar of nationalism and I still dwell primarily on the rise of 
nationalism in the course narrative overall. Nevertheless, my lectures 
14 Friedrich Engels, Condition of the Working Class in England (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 41, 39.
15 Ibid., 36.
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now depict socialism as a serious if ultimately unsuccessful alternative 
to national movements. I still show excerpts from the Communist 
Manifesto on PowerPoint slides, but in the relevant lecture Marx no 
longer shares space with secularism or suffragism. I instead depict 
utopian socialism, Marxism, and anarchism as social consequences 
of the industrial revolution. The lecture also links more directly with 
subsequent lectures on 20th-century communism.
In the meantime, I have also acquired a deeper understanding of 
the history of socialism. Preparing lectures for a different course, I 
read biographies of Marx, Vladimir I. Lenin (1870 – 1924) and Leon 
Trotsky (1879 – 1940), which in turn inspired me to broader reading 
about the First and Second International, as well as the history of 
anarchism. My deeper understanding in turn informed my first-year 
lectures. To demonstrate the internationalist scope of the First In-
ternational, for example, I made a PowerPoint slide depicting on a 
map the location of active correspondents in the first half of 1866; 
to construct the map I went through the minutes from the First 
International.16 
In the most recent version of the syllabus, last taught in 2018, I 
have also further expanded the Engels content. As in my 2008 course, 
students are supposed to discuss the »The Great Towns« in the tuto-
rial meetings for week eight. As in the past, students find the reading 
engaging, and tutors describe it as one of the more successful tutorials. 
Students like reading Engels! The 2018 course, furthermore, requires 
students to buy a cheap paperback edition of Condition of the Work-
ing Class in England and write a short essay about it. Students have 
two options for their essay on Engels. Both options require students 
to analyze his text in light of another course reading, chosen so as to 
minimize the chance that an online essay mill will have an essay ready 
to download. 
16 The General Council of the First International, 1864 – 1866, The London Conference 
1865, Minutes (Moscow: Progress, 1964).
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The first essay option asks students whether the political system 
described in the 1789 »Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citi-
zen,« a founding constitutional document from the French Revolu-
tion, provides the necessary means to address the injustices Engels 
outlines. Students generally answer in the negative: they do not think 
that a »democratic« government is sufficient to curb the excesses of 
the industrial revolution. Our students mostly come from the com-
fortable middle classes; I am not sure whether they realize that their 
skepticism implies a radical rejection of parliamentary democracy. 
The second essay option asks students to compare the living con-
ditions Engels describes with those depicted in Slavenka Drakulić’s 
How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed, an extremely read-
able memoir of socialist Yugoslavia.17 Student opinion on this ques-
tion is more evenly divided: some emphasize differences, others stress 
similarities. Several students compare Drakulić’s description of shod-
dy Yugoslav housing to their own student accommodation in Wel-
lington. (Rental housing in New Zealand is shockingly poor overall).18
Over the course of my career, therefore, Engels has steadily grown 
in importance. Initially assigned as only in the form of a brief excerpt, 
Engels’s Condition of the Working Class in England has fifteen years 
later become a staple course reading in my »Modern Europe« survey. 
As a course reading, the text has proved much more successful than 
I had expected. Indeed, it may be the only course reading I assign in 
which students get more out of the reading than I do. Indeed, looking 
back, my own inability to predict the appeal of Engels may be the 
most interesting feature of the story. 
17 Slavenka Drakulić, »On Doing Laundry,« in How We Survived Communism and 
even Laughed (New York: Vintage, 1987), 43 – 54.
18 Philippa Howden-Chapman et al., »Tackling Cold Housing and Fuel Poverty in 
New Zealand: A Review of Policies, Research, and Health Impacts,« Energy Poli-
cy 49 (2012): 134 – 142; Elinor Chisholm and Kimberley O’Sullivan, »Using Twit-
ter to Explore (Un)Healthy Housing: Learning from the # Characterbuildings 
Campaign in New Zealand,« International Journal of Environmental Research and 
Public Health 14, no. 11 (2017): 1424.
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My inability to anticipate the appeal of Engels could have any 
number of causes, but a difference in social origins seems unlikely. 
I resemble most of my students in that I enjoy white privilege in a 
settler society. Polynesian students attend Victoria University of Wel-
lington, and students of color attended the University of Nevada at 
Reno, but such students have not been strongly represented in the 
first year »Modern Europe« survey. The students in my courses prob-
ably boast from more diverse class backgrounds, but my downwardly 
mobile middle-class upbringing has not created any noticeable cul-
tural differences between me and my students. 
My students, however, are much more concerned about their own 
economic prospects than I had been at their age. I grew up in the final 
years of the Keynesian consensus. As a child, I did not know what I 
wanted to be »when I grew up,« but I feared boring, meaningless work 
more than unemployment and poverty. Nor did I question whether 
I could afford university, I assumed a way would somehow be found. 
My confidence was not entirely misplaced. My father paid the loan I 
took out for my undergraduate degree, and I won fellowships for my 
graduate study. University history teaching jobs are hard to find and I 
did not have a proper job until I was thirty-eight years old, but I got 
one in the end, even if I had to move to a distant country that I had 
never previously visited. Thanks to some combination of persever-
ance and good fortune, things worked out for me in the end.
The students I teach, by contrast, are coming of age in an era of 
neoliberalism, and experience the precarity that neoliberalism implies. 
Since several authors have ably documented the overall trend toward 
economic insecurity in recent decades,19 I will here consider only the 
cost of university tuition. I began my undergraduate degree in the 
19 Loïc Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecu-
rity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009); Rob Lambert and Andrew 
Herod, eds. Neoliberal Capitalism and Precarious Work: Ethnographies of Accom-
modation and Resistance (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016); 
Sanford Schram, The Return of Ordinary Capitalism: Neoliberalism, Precarity, Oc-
cupy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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1987 / 8 school year, and taught my first Modern Europe survey in 
Nevada in 2005 / 6. During that time, the cost of American univer-
sity education at a four-year institution, adjusted for inflation, has 
more than doubled, rising from US$ 9,223 in 1987 / 8 to US$ 21,281 
in 2005 / 6 (in constant 2016 / 7 dollars).20 The situation aspiring stu-
dents face in New Zealand is not nearly so dire, but the trend is 
moving in the same direction. In 2000, the median total student debt 
upon graduation was NZ$ 2,360, but in 2016, the most recent year 
for which figures are available, the median total student debt was 
NZ$ 18,650.21 The erosion of the welfare state is a global process, af-
fecting both Nevada and New Zealand. 
Declining economic opportunity has led to a general divergence 
in political opinions. Economic precarity, Ruth Milkman argues, 
has contributed to »a new political generation« more open to social-
ist thinking.22 A 2019 Gallup survey found, for example, that 49 % 
of Millennials have a positive view of »Socialism,« as compared to 
39 % of my own generation, and 32 % of Baby Boomers. The same 
poll found millenials relatively disenchanted with »Capitalism.«23 
This generational shift has caused anxiety among existing elites: the 
Washington Post, for example, published an alarmist editorial under 
the headline »Millennials have a higher opinion of socialism than 
20 »Table 330.10: Average Undergraduate Tuition and Fees and Room and Board 
Rates … Selected Years, 1963 – 64 through 2016 – 17,« National Center for Educa-
tion Statistics (2017). Accessed January 24, 2020. https://nces.ed.gov/programs/
digest/d17/tables/dt17_330.10.asp. 
21 »Median Annual Amount Borrowed and Median Student Loan Leaving Balance,« 
data table available at »Affordability of Tertiary Education to Students,« Minis-
try of Education, New Zealand Government (2020). Accessed January 24, 2020. 
https://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/statistics/indicators/main/family-and- 
community-engagement/1999. 
22 Ruth Milkman, »A New Political Generation: Millennials and the Post-2008 
Wave of Protest,« American Sociological Review 82, no. 1 (2017): 1 – 31.
23 Lydia Saad, »Socialism as Popular as Capitalism Among Young Adults in U. S.,« 
Gallup, October 1 – 13, 2019. Accessed January 24, 2020. https://news.gallup.com/
poll/268766/socialism-popular-capitalism-among-young-adults.aspx. 
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of capitalism.«24 I suspect that New Zealand students sympathet-
ic to socialism, if confronted with the Washington Post’s anxieties, 
would respond much as New Zealand Green MP Chlöe Swarbrick 
responded to a parliamentary heckler: »OK Boomer.«25
Perhaps, then, my students like reading Engels because they find 
him relevant to their lives. Engels shines a spotlight on precarity, and 
that speaks to their anxieties about their own futures. He also pro-
vides a scathing and timeless critique of establishment hypocrisy, for 
example, in his memorable denunciation of those »charitable out of 
self-interest,«26 and I think students respond to that, as well. Most 
importantly, he frames inequality and poverty as injustices deserving 
remedy. 
One could, of course, over-state Engels’s relevance to millennial 
concerns. Millennials are supposedly the first generation of »digital 
natives,« and since Engels did not anticipate the internet, he has little 
to say about its dilemmas. Millennials are also concerned about the 
environmental crisis. I struggle to see Engels as a pioneering envi-
ronmentalist, even if, as Ted Benton rightly observed, »Engels makes 
links between the environmental conditions and health of the indus-
trial working population on the one hand, and their working con-
ditions and class relations on the other.«27 Even Engels’s analysis of 
industrial capitalism, furthermore, provides few answers to Lenin’s 
famous question »What is to be done?«28 Engels calls for dramatic 
changes to the structure of society without divisively spelling out 
24 Catherine Rampell, »Millennials Have a Higher Opinion of Socialism than of 
Capitalism,« Washington Post, February 6, 2016.
25 Dan Satherley, »›OK Boomer‹: World Reacts to NZ Politician Chloe Swarbrick’s 
Use of Meme in Parliament,« Newshub, November 7, 2019. Accessed January 
24, 2020. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2019/11/ok-boomer-world-
reacts-to-nz-politician-chloe-swarbrick-s-use-of-meme-in-parliament.html. 
26 Engels, Condition of the Working Class, 283 – 284.
27 Ted Benton, »Engels and the Politics of Nature,« in Engels Today, ed. Christopher 
Arthur (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 68.
28 Vladimir I. Lenin, Chto dělat’? Nabolěvshie voprosy nashego dvizhenije (Stuttgart: 
Dietz, 1902); see also »What is to be Done?« in Collected Works (Moscow: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1961), vol. 5, 347 – 530.
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what exactly those changes ought to be. Identifying problems is easier 
than finding solutions. Students presumably would not respond as 
well to the book if it confronted them with concrete policy proposals. 
Students nevertheless engage so deeply with Engels that I have in 
turn found myself drawn to more closely his ideas in my middle age. 
If a relatively privileged youth explains why I was unable to predict 
Engels’s appeal when I started teaching, reading Engels with multiple 
cohorts of undergraduate students has helped me see the power and 
relevance of his thought in the 21st century. My economic opinions 
have also shifted leftwards: I no longer read The Economist, even if I 
still do not make a very good Marxist. The work of Engels, mediated 
through the appreciative eyes of my undergraduate students, played a 
role in shaping my political views. 
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